Information systems failure, politics and the sociology of translation: the problematic introduction of an American computerised reservation system and yield management at French Railways by Mitev, NN
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE, POLITICS 
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF TRANSLATION: 
THE PROBLEMATIC INTRODUCTION OF AN 
AMERICAN COMPUTERISED RESERVATION 
SYSTEM AND YIELD MANAGEMENT AT 
FRENCH RAILWAYS 
f 
Nathalie Nadia MITEV 
Business and Informatics Research Institute 
Information Systems Research Centre 
University of Salford, UK 
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements of the 
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, December 2000 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents i 
List of Figures viii 
List of Tables ix 
List of Acronyms X. 
Acknowledgements x1i 
Abstract xiv 
CHAPTER I- SOCRA TE AS A FAILURE? I 
1.1 Introduction and background I 
1.1.1 The actors and the story 1 
1.1.2 The technology 3 
1.1.3 Organisational and political conflicts 4 
1.2 Statement of the area of concern 6 
1.3 Purpose and objectives 7 
1.3.1 Failures? 7 
1.3.2 The technical and the social 8 
1.4 Theoretical frameworks 9 
1.4.1 IS interpretive research 9 
1.4.2 Critical research 11 
1.4.3 Sociology of technology 12 
1.5 Research questions 14 
1.5.1 Sociological analysis 14 
1.5.2 Technology and change at SNCF 14 
1.6 Assumptions and limitations 15 
1.7 Organisation of the remainder of the study 16 
CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 21 
2.1 Failures 22 
2.1.1 IS failures 23 
2.1.2 Reasons for failures and successes: shifting the blame 25 
- From technology to people 25 
i 
2.2 
2.3 
- From people to systems 26 
- From systems to organisations 27 
2.1.3 IS failure models 28 
- Stakeholders 28 
- Configurational fit 29 
- Contingency 30 
- Contextual 'factors' 31 
2.1.4 Management failures 32 
- Crisis management 32 
- Enactment: rational decision-making? 33 
- Escalation decision-making: the example of Taurus 33 
2.1.5 Technology failures 35 
- Contrasting two approaches 35 
- Repeated past successes: the Challenger disaster 37 
2.1.6 Not just failures 39 
- Beyond Tationalist accounts 40 
Sociology of technology 40 
2.2.1 Symmetry and failure 41 
2.2.2 Actor network theory 43 
2.2.3 Sociology of translation 44 
2.2.4 IS and actor network theory 46 
2.2.5 Limitations of action network theory 47 
- Social structures 
47 
- Human and*non-humans 
47 
- Amoral and apolitical 
48 
- Description 
48 
2.2.6 IS, ANT and structuration theory 49 
Power and politics so 
2.3.1 Power/Knowledge 50 
2.3.2 Politics 52 
2.3.3 Institutionalisation of IS 54 
2.3.4 Clegg's Circuits of power 55 
2.3.5 Macro/Micro 58 
- Unintended consequences 
59 
- Micro/macro and actor-network theory 
60 
- Macro, meso and micro? 
61 
ii 
2.4 Research methodology 62 
2.4.1 Fieldwork 66 
2.4.2 Data analysis 71 
CHAPTER 3 - THE HISTORY OF SOCRA TE: A STRATEGIC TRANSLATION 
FROM RAIL TO AIR 75 
3.1* Origins of the Socrate project 75 
3.1.1 Technical reasons? 76 
- Capacity 76 
-A modem distribution system 77 
- Inflated demand projections, 77 
- Choice of software 78 
-A fascination with air 79 
3.1.2 Importing Sabre: American Airlines' classical strategic success 80 
- Three generations of airline computerised reservation systems 80 
- IS and competitive advantage 83 
- Socrate as a (national? ) strategic vision 84 
3.2 Software changes: from air to rail 86 
3.2.1 Adapting software 86 
- Not a software development failure? 89 
3.2.2 Operational differences: the example of Greyhound Lines Inc. 90 
3.2.3 Socrate architecture 91 
Aristote: commercial and accounting software 92 
Thalýs: optimisation software 94 
3.3 Yield management 97 
3.3.1 Cornputerised reservation systems and global distribution systems 97 
3.3.2 Yield management techniques 98 
3.3.3 Yield management in US airlines 99 
3.3.4 Yield management and reservation systems: from simple to complex 
fare structures 101 
3.3.5 Forecasting and decision support 101 
3.3.6 Optimisation models 102 
- Static models 
103 
- Dynamic models 
103 
- Flight legs 103 
- Non-independence of fares 104 
iii 
3.4 Yield management at SNCF 105 
3.5 Implications of yield management: the social and the technical 110 
CHAPTER 4- SOCRA TE AND SNCF STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT - 
OF TRANSPORT DEREGULATION: A POLITICAL 
TRANSLATION (FROM MACRO ... 114 
4.1' Rail transport deregulation 114 
4.1.1 Transport deregulation in general 115 
4.1.2 US air deregulation: pioneers? 115 
4.1.3 Tensions in European deregulation: harmonisation or liberalisation? 116 
4.2 US air deregulation and European rail deregulation 117 
4.2.1 Competition, co-operation and complementarity: comparing the 
US and Europe 117 
- Intermodal competition 117 
- Intramodal competition 118 
- The political conflicts of European, national and 
regional development 118 
4.2.2 A controversial translation: cultural, economic and social differences 
between the US and Europe, and between air and rail 119 
- Different national markets 120 
- European transport policies: different liberalisation regimes 120 
4.3 SNCF, the French government and European transport 122 
4.3.1 French rail and SNCF 123 
4.3.2 SNCF and European transport infrastructures 126 
4.3.3 SNCF: recent developments post Socrate 130 
4.3.4 A redefinition of public transport? 131 
- The TGV and regional development 131 
- "Plan Rail" 132 
4.3.5 Liberalisation via the back door? 132 
4.3.6 Socrate, politics and liberalisation 133 
4.4 Deregulation and CRS 136 
4.4.1 Computerised reservation systems for air and rail 136 
- US concentration 136 
iv 
4A. 2 CRS and electronic markets: a model? 138 
CHAPTER 5- CONTROVERSIAL PRICING: TRANSLATION TO 
A CUSTOMER ETHOS AND ASSOCIATING SOCRATE TO 
THE TGVSUCCESS (-MACRO TO MICRO. -) 
5.1 Pricing differentiation, market segmentation and ticketing 141 
5.1.1 History of SNCF pricing tactics 141 
5.1.2 Sophisticated price differentiation through yield management 143 
5.1.3 Towards the identification of 'marketable products': a problematic 
segmentation 146 
5.1.4 Complex new ticketing 149 
5.2 Ratio nal buying behaviour: a new culture of access to transport 152 
5.2.1 Consumer confusion 152 
- Rational consumer behaviour? 154 
5.2.2 Public relations 155 
5.2.3 Access to transport, technology and progress 158 
5.3 The TGV as an antecedent to Socrate 160 
5.3.1 Socrate and the TGV 161 
5.3.2 SNCF and the TGV innovation 162 
5.3.3 The TGV success 163 
5.3.4 From the TGV success to Socrale failure 164 
CHAPTER 6 - SNCF AND SOCRA M ORGANISATIONAL TRANSLATION 
FROM PUBLIC SERVICE TO SELLING (-. MICRO. -) 168 
6.1 Organisational transformation 168 
6.1.1 Organisational structure and management control: tabula rasa? 168 
-A new -Direction Commerciale" 171 
6.1.2 Cultural change: a new managerial ethos 171 
6.1.3 Degradation of consultation with staff and unions 173 
- GARP and social dialogue: a sham? 174 
- Unions: ripe for Socrate 176 
6.1.4 Internal tensions over the introduction of Socrale 178 
v 
6.2 Socrate and sales staff 180 
6.2.1 Controversial pilots 180 
- Deliberate lack of user involvement? 182 
6.2.2 Interface design and dialogue between sales staff and passengers 183 
- Terminal Point de Vente 183 
- Travel agencies 185 
- Automate Point de Vente 186 
- Minitel 186 
-A changed task and dialogue with clients 187 
6.2.3 Staff training and skills 189 
- Skills and qualifications 189 
- New work organisation: sales teams 190 
6.2.4 Not against Socrale: another way of using it 191 
6.3 Flexibl e Infrastructures: the logic of IT-induced market structures 192 
6.3.1 SNCF restructuring: strategic/organisational fit 192 
6.3.2 Split between infrastructures and operations: information gathering and 
market segmentation 193 
6.3.3 Global electronic tourism systems 195 
6.3.4 Information systems, managerialism and the segmentation of transport 195 
CHAPTER 7- TOWARDS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT OF 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE 197 
7.1 A series of translations: partial successes and failures 198 
7.1.1 Strategic translation 198 
7.1.2 The socio-technical role of yield management 199 
7.1.3 Transport deregulation, economic relations and political translation 200 
7.1.4 Pricing, customer ethos and consumer rationality 201 
7.1.5 The TGV as an antecedent innovation: similar modem cultural connotations 201 
7.1.6 Organisational culture, systems and actors and managerial transformation 202 
7.1.7 Potential IT-induced market restructuring and electronic markets 204 
7.2 Failure and translation 205 
7.3 Failure and power 207 
vi 
7.4 Comparing with traditional accounts of IS failure: 
potential theoretical contribution 211 
7.4.1 The questionable notion of failure 211 
7.4.2 IS research: richness vs rigour 214 
7.4.3 The problem with exogenous contingencies: macro, meso, micro 216 
7.5 Further Issues and future research 218 
7.5.1 National sovereignty 218 
7.5.2 Public service and national policy-making 219 
7.5.3 Trains, planes and computers 220 
7.5.4 Transnational technology 220 
7.5.5 Techno-nationalism 221 
7.5.6 systems as intervening in transport 222 
7.6 Evaluation and limitations 
APPENDICES 227 
Appendix I Tettre aux: Voyageurs'. Poster, SNCF, 1993 228 
Appendix 2 Interviewing schedule 229 
Appendix 3 List of interviewees (Paris, 1994-95) 233 
Appendix 4 Identifying categories in Interview data 237 
Appendix 5 'TGV Oui! Autres trains sacriflis Non! ', Union poster, CGT, 1993 243 
Appendix 6 "Les cherninots CGT de Paris Montparnasse s'adressent i vous", 3 juin 1993 245 
REFERENCES 248 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 
Figure 1.2 
Figure 2.1 
Figure 2.2 
Figure 23 
Figure 3.1 
Figure 3.2 
Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.4 
Figure 3.5 
Figure 3.6 
Figure 3.7 
Figure 3.8 
Figure 3.9 
Figure 3.10 
Figure 3.11 
Figure 4.1 
Figure 4.2 
Figure 4.3 
Figure 5.1 
Figure 5.2 
Figure 5.3 
Figure 5.4 
Figure 6.1 
Figure 6.2 
Figure 6.3 
Figure 6.4 
Figure 6.5 
Figure 7.1 
Figure 7.2 
Actors and levels of analysis 7 
A series of translations 20 
Evolution of understandings of failure 21 
A classification of theoretical approaches to technological change 53 
The circuits of power 57 
Socrate calendar 86 
Socrate functional architecture 92 
Implementation of Aristote 94 
Aristote and Thalis architecture 96 
Yield management, CRS and GDS 98 
London-New York return fares, October 1993, British Airways 100 
Threshold curve 102 
Optimisation model and variables 105 
Information flows for yield management at SNCF 107 
Quota management 109 
Yield management, marketing, operations and distribution 109-110 
French rail passenger network October 1980 125 
Trans-European Networks 128 
The TGV and classical trains 135 
Revised unique ticket, SNCF, 10 September 1993 151 
Gare de Lyon ticket hall, Paris, April 1993 153 
Cartoon of ticket staff strike at SNCF, 1993 156 
High speed rail national plan: future evolution of travelling times 
by rail from Paris 165 
Screen example of availability for return tickets 184 
Customer profiling 185 
Privileged relations 185 
Gare de Lyon ticket office, Paris, March 1993 188 
Ticket consultant, Dr B. Ching, Private Eye, 2000 194 
Power struggle in episodic circuit 208 
Obligatory passage point 210 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 3.1 Reservation forecast for 1995 
Table 4.1 Comparison of US and European air and rail transport 
Table 4.2 Summary of deregulation contextual factors 
Table 4.3 European transport politics: eleven dimensions 
Table 4.4 Major CRS in airline companies 
Table 5.1 TGV-Nord Paris-Lille prices, SNCF, 1993 
Table 7.1 Exogenous contingencies 
Table 7.2 Episodic power 
Table 7.3 Social integration 
Table 7.4 System integration 
78 
119 
122 
129 
137 
145 
207 
208 
209 
209-210 
Ix 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AA American Airlines 
AADT American Airlines Decision Technology, an operational research 
subsidiary of the AMR group 
AC Agent Commercial 
ACM Agent Commercial Moniteur 
ACT Agent Comn rcial Train 
AMR Corp. American Airlines' parent company 
AMRIS AMR Information Services 
ANACT Agence Nationale d'Analyse des Conditions de Travail 
APEX Advance Purchase EXcursion 
APV Automate Point de Vente 
ANT Actor-Network Theory 
Aristote Am6lioration de la Restitution d'Information par un Systýme 
Transactionnel Optimisi sur le Trafic d'Entreprise (Socrate 
accounting software) 
BIR Bureau Information R6servations 
BR British Rail 
CAA Civil Aviation Board 
CCE Comitd Central d'Entreprise 
CFDT Conf6ddration Franqaise Des Travailleurs 
CFTC Confid6ration Frangaise des Travailleurs Cadres 
CGC Conf6diration G6n6rale des Cadres 
CGT Conf6d6ration G6ndrale des Travailleurs 
Corail Trains Corail, 'classical' intercity trains (orange-coloured) 
CRS Computerised Reservation Systems 
CRTV Centre Renseignements T616phoniques Voyageurs 
DATAR Direction i I'Am6nagement du Tenitoire et i I'Action Rdgionale 
DB Deutsche Bahn 
DCV Direction Commerciale Voyageurs 
DG Direction Gin6rale (SNCF) 
DG Directorate General (European Commission) 
DGL Direction Grandes Lignes 
Dinamo Dynamic Inventory and Maintenance Optimizer 
EC European Community (pre EU) 
EC European Commission 
ECU European Currency Unit (pre EURO) 
EU European Union 
EPIC Etablissement Public d'IntirEt Commercial 
European Passenger Services (Eurostar Channel tunnel 
high speed train) 
EsteTel Data network for SNCF transactions with travel agents 
EWS England, Wales and Scotland (UK rail freight company created after privatisation) 
FGAAC Fid6ration G6n6rale Autonome des Agents de Conduite 
FMC Fiddration des Malitres Cadres 
FNAUT Fiddration Nationale des Associations d'Usagers de Transport 
FO Force Ouvri6re 
DGL Direction Grandes Lignes 
GARP Groupe d'Animation et de Riflexion sur le Projet d'Entreprise 
GDS Global Distribution Systems 
GL Grandes Lignes 
HARPS Hotel Analysis, Reporting and Planning System 
Herm6s European rail data network providing access to reservations 
across rail companies 
HST High Speed Trains 
ICE Inter City Express (German high speed train) 
IdF lie de France 
LOTI 'ý:. Loi d'Orientation des Transports Intdrieurs 
O-D Origin-Destination 
OPP Obligatory Passage Point 
PARS Programmed Airlines Reservation System 
PBKAL Paris Brussels K61n Amsterdam London 
PV Point de Vente 
RATP Rdgie Autonome des Transports Parisiens 
RER Rdseau Express Rdgional (Paris urban/suburban train) 
RESA First SNCF computerised reservation system, short for REServAtion 
RFF Rdseau Ferrd de France 
Sabre Initially Saber, Semi-Automatic Business Environment Research 
Sage Semi-Automatic Ground Environment 
SDS Syst6me de Distribution SNCF 
SDS Sabre Development Services 
SMARTS American Airlines' Sales Management and ReportingtTracking System 
SNCF Soci6td Nationale des Chemins de fer Frangais 
SNCB Soci6td Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges 
SOC Syst6me d'Optimisation Commerciale 
Socrate Syst6me Offrant i la ClienWe des Rdservations d'Affaires 
et de Tourisme en Europe 
SRV Services Rdgionaux Voyageurs 
TC Technicien Commercial 
TEN Trans European Networks 
TER Trains Express Rigionaux 
TGV Train i Grande Vitesse 
Thal6s Traitement Heuristique Algorithmique et Logique des 
Espaces de Service (Socrale optimisation software) 
TPV Terminal Point de Vente 
xi 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
ý- Professor Trevor Wood-Harper has been an extremely patient and supportive colleague and 
supervisor over my years at the University of Salford. He always had confidence in me, despite the 
various crises, which was invaluable. I relied and will continue to rely on him for advice, guidance and 
understanding. I thank him too for organising a Salford University research award that contributed 
towards the cost of my fieldwork. My gratitude too to my two external examiners, Professors Duane 
Truex and Colin Diva]]. 
I was incredibly lucky in the welcome I received at SNCF and must thank EC for his enthusiasm, 
support and willingness to help; he instantly understood the type of work I was intending to carry out and 
acted extraordinarily efficiently and quickly in locating and persuading many of my SNCF interviewees. 
All interviewees were extremely generous with their time, in providing further information and were very 
open to questions and discussion. 
My gratitude to several Salford ex-colleagues for their never faltering support and fiiendship, for 
sharing coffees and pints in the Gallery and the Crescent to get away from it all, for having a great sense 
of humour, being perceptive sounding boards, and more recently providing beds to crash on 'up North': 
especially Francis Wilson, Debra Howcroft, Bruce Robinson and Sheila Bartlett, thank you for always 
being there and keeping me sane; and also Ruth Aylett, Gillian Hardstone, Chris Holland, Richard 
Vidgen, Sundeep Sahay, Andrew Basden, Kath Mitchell, Frances Bell, Frank Nagy, Flora Hancock, Carol 
and John Flynn, and Nuala Nevill. Some students proved to be real assets during the ITI years, in 
particular: Miguel Mateus, Sharon Kerkham, Anne Marsh, David Russell, Cliff FyIe, Alan Tracey, Ian 
Wilson, Alan Cameron, and Heather Watson. Some of the 'new' ISI crew has also been around for a while 
to share thoughts and plans: Alison Adan-4 David Allen and Ben Light. 
My new LSE colleagues, Edgar Whitley, Susan Scott, Lucas Introna, Mike Cushman, Tony 
Comford, Shirin Madon, Steve Smithson, Chrisanthi Avgerou, Ian Angell, Gus Hosein, Jonathan 
Liebenau, Sophia Avgerinou, Emma Peel and Cheryl Edwardes have made me feel part of the place, have 
provided help and encouragement and have trusted me for getting there. 
Colleagues elsewhere have at various fimes discussed research ideas, brought valuable insights 
and invited me to present my material to varied and stimulating audiences - academics and practitioners in 
information systems, innovation studies, history and sociology of technology, and transport: Melanie 
Wilson, Mike Newman, Eleanor Wynn, Michael Myers, Janice Bums, Chris Holland, Geoff Walsham, 
Carole Cohen, Peter Lyth, Colin Divall, Jonathan Tyler, Penny Ciancianelli and John Howell. 
xii 
Nends and family will sigh vAth Telief as it is all over. I hope to spend moTe time with them 
now, having neglected them for the last six years. I could not have done it without them: Claude et Tocho, 
Pierre et Dominique, Katia et Tristan, Pascale, Madeleine, Lizzie and Alex, Sonia, Penny, Philippa and 
Miranda, Genevi6ve, Andy and Jannecke, Ruth, Laura, Cicile et Claude, Patricia et Patricia, DanWe et 
Sylvain, Frangoise et Jean-Jacques. 
A very very special thought to Mich6le Lacoste for pointing me in the right direction all those 
years ago. 
And finally to Chris who ceaselessly and determinedly provided me with support, reason, 
comfort, balance, reassurance, energy, direction, humour, criticality, care, real food and food for thought. 
All my love. 
xiii 
ABSTRACT 
. This 
in-depth case study examines the troubled introduction of a new computerised reservation 
system at French Railways. Socrale, based on the American Airlines Sabre system, had a disastrous 
beginning. It was badly received by the French public, led to strikes and government inquiries, and had to 
be modified substantially. The literature on information systems failure is reviewed from functionalist to 
social constructivist and critical perspectives and the thesis aims to challenge beliefs and assumptions 
about technological success and failure. The notion of 'symmetry' from the sociology of technology 
emphasises that failures express the same dynamics as successes, showing how technological choices are 
not obvious or unproblematic. 
Differences between air and rail transporý between American and European transport 
deregulation and between the needs of national identity, regional development and public access to 
transport are all reflected in the question of yield management. Yield management is a crucial component 
of computerised reservation systems and was first adopted during the deregulation of the US air transport 
industry in the early 80s. It requires complex optimisation software designed to manage passenger 
revenues and control demand, by manipulating the availability of full and discounted fares according to 
monitored demand and statistical analysis. 
Latour and Callon's sociology of 'translation' helps analyse how the Socrate project was 
undertaken and interpreted as: borrowing from airline pricing, aiming to gain competitive advantage, 
associating Socrate to the success of high-speed trains, attempting to change passengers' buying and 
travelling behaviour, transforming the organisation and helping identify profitable market segments. A 
non-essentialist stance helps understand how social and technical distinctions are socially constructed and 
how the differentiation between what is technical and what is social, for instance in the conception and 
application of yield management, is a matter of power and politics. Clegg's circuits of power are used to 
complement the sociology of translation in examining how power and political factors contribute to 
information systems becoming (or not) obligatory passage points. 
Politically controversial changes in French rail transport are associated with the role of computer 
technology in deregulated European and global electronic markets and its effects on the concept of 
national identity and sovereignty in transport policy-making. 
x1v 
Chapter I 
CHAPTERI 
SOCRA TE AS A FAILURE? 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
This thesis attempts to analyse the implementation failure of a computerised reservation system 
in an organisation. It is based on an intensive case study and adopts a non-essentialist stance to analyse it. 
Providing a rich description of micro-level, organisational and macro-level events enables us to depart 
from a mamgerialist and technicist account of the failure. The analysis draws on constructivism and the 
sociology of technology, more specifically actor-network theory (ANT), and an effort is made to 
complement its limitations and combine elements of both the global or macro and the local or micro by 
incorporating a more critical analysis, which includes notions of power and politics. 
A very brief sununary of the failure story is first given to set the scene. It is then easier to state 
the general area of concern. The purpose and objectives, theoretical frameworks, research questions, 
assumptions and limitations of the thesis are then outlined. 
1.1.1 The actors and the story 
SNCF (Socidtd Nationale des Chemins de Fer Frangais) introduced Socrate (Syst6me Offrant A la 
Client& des Rdservations d'Affaires et de Tourisme en Europe), a computerised reservation system 
(CRS) in April 1993. SNCF bought Sabre from American Airlines in 1989 in order to build Socrate; one 
of its aims was to transform its commercial activities through the instigation of a new philosophy of 
selling, based on a technological investment importing techniques used in the airline industry. One of the 
marketing slogans used by SNCF, "Avec la SNCF tout est possible"' [Naulleau 1993) seems ironical since 
even the worst proved to be possible: Socrate is perhaps the first software system which provoked nation- 
wide strikes when it was introduced and which attracted massive negative media exposure. For such an 
ambitious project, and perhaps because of it, the number and type of problems encountered were rather 
spectacular: problems in its analysis and design, development and implementation, consultation, 
1 "With SNCF everything is possible". 
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ergonomics, training, linked to a highly controversial conunercial strategy and to conununication 
blunders. 
SNCF started the Socrate project in 1989. The aim was to reposition the enterprise in a new 
European competitive envirom-nent, which would involve a substantial traffic expansion. Socrate would 
offer a better quality of service, and support the diversification of services [Bentegeat 1991]. The 
initiators of the project also explicitly emphasised the importance of an appropriate policy for maximising 
revenue, since SNCF had been an industrial and commercial establishment since 1982 (a 'semi-public' as 
opposed to a strict public sector nationalised utility). One of their most important objectives was to 
instigate a "new philosophy of selling" based on yield management techniques [Bromberger 1993]. SNCF 
bought Sabre (initially SABER for Semi-Automatic Business Environment Research), the American 
Airlines computerised reservation system and classic example of a successful strategic information 
system. Several years were spent adapting this software developed by a private air company to the context 
of the rail industry and of a national serni-public sector institution. 
When first implemented, however, SNCF staff and customers rejected this new technical tool and 
its underlying ticketing, pricing and selling policies. These implementation problems were widely reported 
and examined by: SNCF itself (SNCF 1993a; SNCF 1989], French trade unions [CGT et al 1994; FO 
1994], business consultants [APST 1991; Causa Rerurn 1993], passengers' associations [FNAUT 1993], 
by the French government which commissioned a public inquiry into its failed implementation 
[Moissonier 1993; Cuq and Bussereau 1994], and by the media [Faujas 1993a; Penicault and Riche 1993; 
Henno 1993]. Technical malfunctions, political pressure, poor management, unions and user resistance led 
to an inadequate and to some extent chaotic implementation (Eglizeau et al 1996; Mitev 1996). The 
project management team gave a rather secondary importance to the databases and input sets; staff 
training was inadequate and did not prepare salespeople to face real-life problems such as tariff 
inconsistencies and printing problems; the user interface was designed using the airlines logic and 
therefore was not at all user-friendly; the new ticket proved unacceptable to customers; public relations 
failed to prepare the public to such a dramatic change. The inadequate database information on timetable 
and routes of trains, inaccurate tariff information, and unavailability of ticket exchange capabilities caused 
major problems for the SNCF sales force and customers alike. Impossible reservations on some trains, 
inappropriate tariffs and wrong train connections led to large queues of irate customers in all major 
stations and to a major public outcry in France. Online reservations available through the Minitel public 
network failed, booked tickets were for non-existent trains whilst other trains ran empty, railway unions 
went on strike [Devillechabrolle 1993], and passengers' associations sued SNCF (DAufresnes 1993; 
Faujas 1993b]. 
These events, widely reported in the media, [e. g. Christie 1993; Dutertre, 1993; Langley 1993; 
Maleysson 1993), showed that such a project contributed to the upheaval of the French railways scene, 
2 
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which had been relatively unchanged, particularly regarding the services on offer and the ensuing 
passengers' practices. The new ticketing and pricing policies introduced through Socrate radically 
changed railway users' and rail workers' practices, which were grounded in important cultural dimensions 
of French society. In contrast to previous technical changes (which had so far taken place in a stable and 
well-established SNCF), Socrate began to indicate a new phase of forced global innovation in an 
enterprise facing strategic imperatives. The competitive environment became that of European integration, 
which opened the area of transport to deregulatory moves and to the growth of competition across 
transport modes (rail, air, road). 
1.1.2 The technology 
As a response to a growing dernand for reservation management, the previous computerised 
reservation system RESA [Monnet 1987], was implemented in the early eighties at SNCF ticket offices, 
and was also made available in private homes through the Minitel public network. It needed to be 
improved and extended since it was reaching saturation point (50 million reservations a year). It was 
projected that there would be a need for 130 million reservations a year as soon as 1995 [Bouchd et al 
1993]. SNCF therefore decided in 1988 to completely change its computerised reservation system. 
Important decisions about pricing strategies were also taken in parallel, which contributed to the 
difficulties experienced in 1993. 
One of the most fundamental changes in design was the disappearance of the railway station as 
the basic 'unif or entity, which was replaced by a concept of the 'relation' between two stations (origin- 
destination), derived from air reservation systems. Design difficulties arose since Sabre was written for a 
maximum of 80 relations with very few intermediate stops. SNCF discovered that it had to be rewritten to 
cope with the 22,000 most important relations in the French rail network and its 2,400 stations. If the 
relation has not been pre-recorded (not enough demand in small stations) the transaction has to be done 
semi-manually by the sales staff and takes twice as long. This important fact, especially for sales staff and 
passengers, was overlooked; only a small number of relations was pre-recorded for the launch in March 
1993. This was one of the main reasons for the queues in the stations, and SNCF had to rapidly deploy 
input staff to record more relations and facilitate the work of sales staff. Another problem with Sabre was 
that it was designed for fare structures for air travel, which are much simpler than for rail travel. American 
computer scientists had to be brought in to help adapt the systený4 and Socrale had cost 1.3 billion francs 
by 1993 [Bouchd et al 1993]. Design and programming were carried out in the Paris area and in Lille, 
where three super computer mainframes are centralised and control the network of sales workstations and 
automatic ticket machines in rail stations at SNCF prernises. They are also connected to the SNCF server 
accessible via the Minitel public data communications network and global distribution systems. Socrate, 
3 
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like Sabre, 4madeus and Galileo (American Airlines, Air France, British Airways respectively) which run 
air CRS for travel agents, is a global distribution system [Colornbin 1994). It is linked to Hermes and 
Esterel which enable connections with European and global CRS for travel and tourism distribution 
channels. 
.. 
Socrate was envisaged as a technical tool which can also manage, control and modify demazid in : Z. - 
order to maximise profits. By using a database management system together with a conunercial 
optimisation systern, SNCF hoped to reproduce the success of American Airlines. Yield management 
techniques used in Sabre were applied to ensure optimal filling of trains, combined with as great a profit 
as possible for each seat filled, through optimising the average price/rate of occupation ratio per seat. 
Beyond booking and ticketing, the optirrisation software aims at redirecting demand not by altering prices 
but by changing the number of seats on offer at normal and reduced prices (the pricing mix) according to 
demand [Daudel and Vialle 1989]. This system limits access to certain prices, particularly reduced prices, 
train per train, and is intended to make customers book their seats as early as possible; if customers buy 
their tickets near the time of departure, they are unlikely to be entitled to reductions, such as reductions for 
old age pensioners, children, families, etc. This highlights an important difference between European train 
and air travel, namely that there is a social dimension to rail travel which is not present in air transport. 
Socrate also includes some software (called Thalis and Aristote) which accumulates statistical profiles of 
types of seats sold and fares paid per individual train, in order to modify the pricing mix on offer in the 
future, for each individual train. The pricing n-dx for each train is therefore defined according to analysis 
of past statistical data, marketing surveys, socio-economic characteristics of each origin-destination 
relation, air and road competition on that O-D (origin-destination) relation, and the value customers find 
in the service. 
1.1.3 Organisational and political conflicts 
Union organisations condemned the new SNCF strategic objectives as early as December 1991 
with arguments about social costs and environmental consequences (under-utilisation of rail 
infrastructures, road traffic saturation, pollution, accidents) [FaYta 1993a]. They suggested that, instead of 
competition across different transport sectors, there is room for co-operation and complementarity in the 
interest of the public and that Socrate could be used to support this objective instead and integrate 
different transport modes as well as consider social aspects. Unýions were also keen not to be seen as 
blaming the technology. Unions saw Socrate as an opportunity taken by SNCF and the government to 
realise their own political agenda and as a way of replenishing the public coffers and tackling the SNCF 
budget deficit, prior to privatisation. Some contended that it was also inconsistent in the medium to long- 
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term: fare increases for captive travellers on profitable lines, such as the Paris-Lyon and Paris-Lille lineS2, 
improve profits; but if increases are carried too far and on too many lines, the balance is broken, demand 
diminishes and passengers choose to travel by car instead. This was one of the reasons why the number of 
sales dropped after Socrate was actually introduced [Adine and Lewino 1993). This decrease in sales 
numbers was also due to the technical problems outlined above, which turned passengers away, as well as 
the ensuing problem of public image and lack of public confidence in SNCF. The economic recession was 
also a contributing factor. 
The strategic choice was also in opposition to existing organisational cultures and skills within 
SNCF, which were ignored. The technological choice of Socrate, which is closely related to the new 
strategic direction adopted by SNCF, was not well accepted by some of the computer staff, managers and 
workforce since it was perceived as based on financial motives rather fl= principles of public service. 
The interests of various SNCF divisions diverge, particularly those of regional and inter-city transport. 
Conflicts arose since Socrate concentrated on inter-city connections. Regional trains suffered because 
regional timetable information was not readily available through Socrate and reservations for regional 
trains were semi-manual and time-consuming since they had not been pre-recorded in the first Socrate 
version. The organisational climate became tense, conflictual, rivalries between divisions worsened, staff 
became dernotivated. Sales staff was particularly exposed to dernotivation. Before the launch of Socrate, 
training sessions were organised which lasted five days; three days were spent explaining the new 
commercial policies and the rationale for the new pricing structures. It was judged inadequate by staff and 
unions since it did not provide enough information on the user-computer interface and too little time was 
spent explaining the technical and user-computer interface aspects. Unlike its predecessor, which was 
almost self-explanatory and 'transparenf, the new system required a thorough understanding of what 
happens 'behind the screen!. A computer-based simulation was used but it was criticised for being 
simplistic and unrealistic and it was soon abandoned [Foot 1993]. Sales staff qualifications and 
promotions were structured around a thorough knowledge and understanding of fare structures and their 
professional ethos was to create good relationships with the passengers and search the best possible routes 
and fares for them. For sales staff their knowledge of fares became irrelevant, the computer system having 
taken over that role. The dialogue with clients became difficult since staff had to keep looking at a 
2 The date of I st April 1993 as the launch of Socrate was seen as crucial by SNCF management as it 
coincided with the opening of the new Paris-Lille TGV Nord connection. SNCF wanted to launch Socrate at 
the same time at TGV Nord as a publicity exercise and in order to accumulate information about travel 
patterns on that new line as soon as it was opened; it was considered a highly strategic line, leading to the 
North of Europe and to the opening of the Channel tunnel rail link in 1994. Monitoring demand and 
influencing travelling patterns as soon as the line was open was considered a top priority. It was argued by 
many afterwards that this strategic imperative was the reason for many rushed decisions, which had dramatic 
consequences. Many SNCF managers agreed that they should have started Socrate on only that line in April 
1993, instead of launching it on the whole SNCF network. 
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complicated and cluttered screen, and their role became one of reporting to the clients what was displayed 
on the screen. Customer choice became more complex and paradoxically the staff-client dialogue was 
made more difficult, being framed through a difficult and complex staff-computer dialogue. SNCF 
management argued that since staff do not look at the screen whilst talking to the customers, work breaks 
were not necessary. This added to stress levels experienced by sales staff, who had to deal with large 
queues of angry and confused customers. This was also in contradiction with the new commercial attitudes 
staff were expected to adopt, for instance through the use of words such as customers and clients instead 
of passengers or users. At the same time as introducing the new computerised systern, SNCF implemented 
a monitoring systern, which keeps track of the number of transactions, the time taken for each transaction, 
the types and prices of tickets sold, for each sales employee. Sales staff was therefore subjected to a 
change of computer system and its user interface together with changes in training, role, qualifications, 
promotions and job prospects (cheaper, part-time and less qualified staff could now do the same work), 
professional ethos, working conditions, handling of performance monitoring and reporting. It is little 
surprising that they took the side of the passengers-turned-customers, joined in protests and went on 
strike, by issuing open tickets. Ticket controllers and train agents refused to inspect tickets, which was 
also very popular with passengers' associations and the general public. 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE AREA OF CONCERN 
This failure story raises interesting questions: How should one analyse information systems case 
studies? Are there inherent differences between successful and unsuccessful ones? Are there 
methodological points that should apply when investigating and describing such cases? It is argued here 
that only an in-depth, rich' description and detailed examination of the various actors, their histories, 
interactions, intentions, actions and effects on each other, can do justice to the complexity of this case 
study; can help analyse how information systems relate to people, organisations and markets; and help 
understand how the technical and the social keep being negotiated and constituted. 
The following figure (Figure 1.1) shows the human and non-human actors involved and 
summarises the levels of analysis necessary to craft as complete an account as possible: from a micro- 
level, in which individuals and artefacts interact; an organisational level in which groups, techniques, 
systems and expertise shape events; to a macro-level environment in which the organisation is situated and 
with which it interacts. 
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Figure 1.1 Actors and levels of analysis 
1.3 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
1.3.1 Failures? 
The general purpose of this thesis is to understand the initial failure of the Socrate 
implementation at SNCF. It is argued here that this requires the appreciation of issues at micro, 
organisational and macro levels and of how they relate to each other, as introduced above. Beyond 
explaining this particular failure, the stance taken here is that the usual notion of failure is unhelpful. It 
belongs to a managerial and technicist discourse in which technology is seen as unproblematic. Managers 
and IS practitioners tend to envisage their technology as being neutral and evidentý and these beliefs and 
7 
Chapter I 
assumptions of obviousness need to be questioned. Reasons for failures are often expressed in statements 
such as: "the company obviously did not know how to manage change", "users showed resistance", "there 
was no leadership or vision", "the technology and business strategies were not aligned", etc. These, often 
retrospective, statements usually draw on the latest management fad, from total quality management, 
excellence, strategy, change management, reengineering, to empowerment and the virtual enterprise. Each 
new managerial discourse, usually devised by a management guru of some kind, competes with the 
previous one in its claim to solve and explain management problems, and introduces a series of new 
techniques, textbooks, measurements, tools, training packages, jargon, consultants and experts. What 
these managerial discourses have in common is a truncated understanding of organisations characterised 
by: a belief in 'rational' management; a denial of the permanent existence of power relations and conflict; 
a desire to eliminate organisational politics, for instance by using technology; a tendency to see 
organisations as individual closed entities, which have to survive in a hostile environment; a limited focus 
on the business environment (i. e. customers, competitors, suppliers) which ignores broader social, 
political, cultural, economic and historical perspectives. This narrow understanding of organisations 
colours the telling and explaining of failure and success stories. The explanations found in the 
IS/management literature are as simplistic for successes as they are for failures. They often take the form 
of lists of naive prescriptions; in the case of successes (e. g. have a champion, manage change, 
communicate the corporate vision to staff, etc. ); in the case of failures they retrospectively try to find 
something/someone to blame, as if using ITAS was a neutral, objective, rational exercise, which in the 
'normal' course of event is successful and unproblernatic. Often IS implementation activities are only 
partial successes/failures. What is a more useful exercise is unearthing the accounts various groups make 
of these stories at different times and for what reasons; this should lead to a much richer, more complex, 
and less manichaean picture of the use of information systems in organisations. Our analysis must 
therefore move away from managerialist and technicist explanations, not lirnit itself to the organisation as 
a closed entity and include the broader environmental perspectives mentioned above. 
A first research objective is therefore to move beyond common (Isensical) explanations offailure and 
success, and find more complex and richer ways of describing and understanding the, in this case 
study, controversial use of information systems in organisations, through the inclusion of broader 
social, economic, political, cultural and historical perspectives. 
1.3.2 The technical and the social 
One of the current debates about IT failures is whether they are management or software failures 
[Flowers 1996]. Technologists blame management and managers get carried away with what they are told 
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the technology can do for thern. This reflects a convenient dichotomy between the technical and the social. 
It is argued here that another way of looking at it is not to see the technical and the social as separate a; d 
stable entities. Technical and social choices are constantly negotiated and constructed, and their 
construction follows the same logic in successes and failures. Conversely, disentangling the interplay of 
actors. and the construction of technical and social choices can be done by focussing on 'failure' studies 
since they can show that at the beginning of and during a project, choices are not obvious or 
unproblematic, unlike what they appear to be in a successful project. Failure studies also allow for more 
complex explanations from actors (some interviews with SNCF staff lasted more than three hours and 
interviewees, having just lived a very traumatic experience, were incredibly soul searching and 
questioning). This leads to richer verbalisations of the complex links between technical choices and the 
social environmentý and more readily so than in the case of 'successes' (such as Sabre at American 
Airlines), where choices tend to be seen as obvious. 
"The sociology of technology has borrowed from the sociology of science its programme - the 
analysis of the production of artefacts, as that of scientific facts - and some of its methods, 
whether in following scientists at work to describe the mechanisms by which they mobilise 
various entities, or in studying controversial cases to show how the social and the technical are 
allocated and constituted" [Akrich 1993: 35, my translation]. 
"Like the sociology of science, the sociology of technology has chosen as its methodological 
principle to use the same explanatory resources when reporting on successful and unsuccessful 
innovations. However, to challenge the impression of obviousness which can be given by 
technical choices that lead to devices which 'perform well', there is no better strategy than 
concentrating on failure cases to show that it is impossible to distinguish between good and bad 
decisions. Moreover, in failures and controversial cases, actors facilitate the researcher's work 
since they express the more complex relationships between technical choice and social 
environment" [Akrich 1993: 36-37, my translation]. 
A second research objective, therefore, is to investigate how the technical and the social are combined 
and constructed when introducing an information system in an organisation., using the failure and 
controversial aspects of this case study. 
1.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS 
1.4.1 IS interpretive research 
In order to find more complex and richer waYs of describing and understanding the use of 
information systems in organisations, which can be used to analyse this failure case study, it is necessary 
to draw on several disciplinary bodies. The most immediately relevant academic tradition is the 
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interpretive work in IS research [e. g. Myers et al 1997; Walsham 1993; Walsham 1995a; Orlikowski et al 
1996; Lee et al 1997]. Orlikowski and Baroudi [1991: 10] observe that in the positivist tradition, when 
conflict occurs, it is seen as dysfunctional to the social system and is something to be suppressed or 
overcome. This is related to the theoretical perspective that human action is intentional and rational, and 
to the quest for universal laws, which disregard historical and contextual conditions as possible triggers of 
events or influences on human action [Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991: 12]. In contrast to positivist rational- 
economic interpretations of organisational processes, interpretive methods of research aim at producing an 
understanding of the context of the information system, and the process whereby the information system 
influences and is influenced by its context. 
"Context is concerned with the multi-level identification of the various systems and structures 
within which the IS is embedded. This can include such obvious elements as the organisational 
department within which the system is being used, the organization as a whole, and the various 
sectoral, national and international contexts within which the organization is located. ( ... 
) Hun= 
actors draw on elements of context, such as resources or perceived authority, to carry out actions, 
and this activity can reinforce existing systems of resource distribution or power, or can create 
new systems of authority or meaning. Thus human action draws on context or structure and, in so 
doing, reinforces existing structures or contexts, or creates new contexts. An investigation of this 
dynamic process of action/context interweaving is fundamental to an understanding of the 
process of organizational change within which the IS is one element" [Walsham 1993: 5]. 
Within the interpretive tradition, the study of the interaction between IS and organisations has led 
to the development of many theoretical models. Markus [1983] is one of the firsts to have questioned 
commonly used explanations and assumptions about the implementation of information systems in 
organisations, particularly the notion of user resistance. She developed an 'interaction theory' as opposed 
to a people-determined approach (changing the people), a system-determined approach (fixing technical 
problems), or a people-plus-system approach (pick and choose from both). She states that there are no 
tactics which are useful in every situation [Markus 1983: 44 1] and she draws on the concepts of power and 
organisational politics. However, her aim is still to predict resistance and generate strategies that will help 
to prevent resistance and deal with it, which may seem presumptuous. Markus and Robey (1988] exan-dne 
the causal structures found in theories about the relationship between information technology and 
organisational change. Causal agency is classified into the technological imperative (technology as the 
causal agent), the organisational imperative (humans as agents of social change) and the emergent 
perspective (indeterminate interactions between technology and human actors). Markus and Robey state 
that the logic of change is either based on variance theories (antecedents are necessary and sufficient 
conditions for outcomes) or process theories (antecedents are necessary but not sufficient). Levels of 
analysis can be macro (societies and organisations), micro (individuals and groups) or a niixed macro- 
micro analysis. 
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The present thesis is strongly based on the emergent perspective, the process theory and mixing 
levels of analysis. This enables the exploration of the dynamic interplay among individuals, technology 
and larger social structures. Orlikowski (1992) uses Giddens' structuration theory and proposes a 
structurational model of technology, which underscores its socio-historical context, and its dual nature as 
objective reality and as a socially constructed product. The interaction of technology and organisations is 
"a function of the different actors and socio-historical contexts implicated in its development and use" 
[Orlikowski 1992: 405]. 
1.4.2 Critical research 
Ontologically, interpretive information systems research assumes the social world is not 'given' 
and that it is produced and reinforced by humans through their action and interaction. It is useful in 
capturing complex, dynamic, social phenomena that are both context and time dependent. Critical 
researchers, however, contend that the interpretive research philosophy does not recognise the inherent 
conflict and contradiction in social relations. Orlikowski and Baroudi [1991: 18] identify four deficiencies 
in interpretive research: 
It does not examine the conditions, often external, which give rise to certain meanings and 
experiences; 
It ornits to explain the unintended consequences of action; these unintended consequences of 
action are often a significant force in shaping social reality; 
It does not address structural conflicts within society and organisations, and 
ignores 
contradictions that may be endemic to social systems; 
It neglects to explain historical change; how a particular social order came to 
be what it is, and 
how it is likely to vary over time. 
The critical research perspective offers a different view of the world than those of positivist and 
interpretive perspectives. Where the positivist and interpretive research perspectives are content to predict 
or explain the status quo, the critical perspective is concerned with critiquing existing social systems and 
revealing any contradictions and conflicts that may inhere within their structures [Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991: 19]. System developers, for instance, exist only in the context of a society investing in IT as a form 
of production. Organisations cannot be studied in isolation of the industry, society, and nation within 
which they operate, and which they in part constitute. Burawoy comments that generalisation in critical 
research "seeks to illuminate the forces at work in society as a totality ... (an] extension from the micro 
context to the totality that shapes it" (quoted in Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991: 20]. Critical organisational 
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sociologists [e. g. Knights and Willmott 1988; Knights and Murray 1994; Edwards 1979] argue that new 
technologies are designed and used to serve particular interests and they see organisations as a locus of 
conflict. Disagreements over technical changes are therefore an inevitable feature of organisational life, 
and not a consequence of poor inariagernent or resistant users. Gender aspects can be considered as a 
particular set of interests and Wilson and Howcroft [2000] for instance explore the role of gender in user 
resistance and IS failure. Academics in the field of critical management studies more specifically [e. g. 
Alvesson and Wilhnott 1992], maintain that management literature has been dominated by'one best way' 
organisational models of change, which take the form of lists of prescriptions [e. g. Bumes 1992]; and that 
the dominant line in management texts presents politics as an aberration from a rational norm. They argue 
that change is a political process requiring the capacity to mobilise power resources. On the other hand, 
critical research has been challenged in that it may tend to be totalising or deterministic, assuming for 
instance that class is the primary determinant of antagonistic social relations. (Orlikowski and Baroudi 
1991: 23] claim that the form of theory and knowledge in this tradition is uncertain. 
1.43 Sociology of technology 
Another theoretical approach of interest is the sociology of technology. One of its constituent 
perspectives is the social shaping of technology [MacKenzie and WaJcman 1985] which points, like 
organisational sociology, to the socially contingent form of technology itself It seeks to identify factors 
that influence the form or content of technology and the direction of technological innovation. For 
instance it argues that some technologies (e. g. typesetting machinery) are a reflection of rmle dominance 
in the labour market and society at large. Another branch of the sociology of technology, the social 
constructionist approach (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1987], has its origins in the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, which seeks to reveal key points of ambiguity or controversies between competing scientific 
claims and how one interpretation prevails over others. One of its principles is that all 
knowledge claims 
must be treated 'symmetrically' and that the explanation for their creation and acceptance rests on social 
factors, not the natural world. This relates to the earlier point made about treating 
failures and successes in 
the same way, symmetrically. A more extreme form, the relativist approach [Grint and Woolgar 1997], 
suggests that identifying circumstances such as the interests of particular social groups, which become 
embodied in technologies, is problematic, and is subject to interpretive flexibility. It is clear that recent 
work has tried to develop alternatives to technology-deterministic explanations, and to the essentialist 
perspective which sees technical capacity as inherent to the technology. Anti-essentialist positions such as 
social shaping, and social construction of technology share the view that "antecedent circumstances, i. e. 
design, manufacture and production, are said to be 'built into' and/or 'embodied' in the final product; the 
resulting technology is 'congealed social relations... [Willcocks and Grint 1997: 103]. 
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Some important issues are however currently being debated within the sociology of technology 
field (for instance between Woolgar and Grint, on the one hand, and Kling, on the other, see [McLoughlin 
1997]). The extreme relativist approach is criticised in that the influence of broader social structure and 
the roles of competing stakeholder interests are viewed as superfluous to the analysis of technology 
[McLqUghlin and Harris 1997: 17]. 'Strong' constructivism believes that technology sociologists should not 
adjudicate between different claims and constructs of technical capacity. In strong constructivisni, the 
process of technological change and its outcomes, is seen as almost entirely locally constructed, 
negotiable and contingent. Technical capacities are not fixed but indeterminate and open to interpretive 
flexibility, not only during conception, design and development but also in its use. The problem revolves 
around how technical capacities (associated to the notion that, once technology is socially shaped, it 
becomes stabilised and can have independent effects) are perceived. Kling thinks technical capacities (of 
computing and information systems speciflcally) influence how technology is used; Woolgar and Grint 
think this is technicist and unacceptable, and that, ironically, it becomes technological determinism in that 
the "artefact has a definitive character and effect" (Woolgar and Grint, quoted in McLoughlin 1997: 214]. 
On the other hand, constructivists are criticised for denying a 'critical dimension' to social analysis and its 
ability to challenge "traditionally held views about the political neutrality of technologies and the links 
between social advantage and technological innovation" [Kling 1992: 351], and for their scepticism 
towards broader social and economic structures of power and interest: 
"These 'material' or'structurar phenomena, just as with technological artefacts and systems, are it 
is insisted created anew by social actors within the context in which they act (... ) [It is suggested] 
that factors such as class, power and politics should be seen as 'effects' and not 'causes' of social 
action" (McLoughlin 1997: 216]. 
It is clear that, as Orlikowski [1992] has remarked, theory and research on the question of the 
relationship between technology and organisations remain at best "ambiguous and conflicting". 
Organisational sociologists are blamed for over-stressing social choice at the expense of technological 
influences. At the other end of the spectrurn, constructivists are accused of seeking to eliminate any 
distinction between the social and the technical. This thesis is not intending to address the 
in/commensurability of paradigms and different theoretical approaches; on the other hand, this debate 
highlights some important issues in investigating organisational changes, such as those involving 
computing and information technologies. 
The specific case study investigated in this thesis is also an appropriate challenge: it clearly 
involves actors and their interpretations of organisational situations, the social configuration and 
reconfiguration of technological systems in both their production and consumption within adopting 
organisations, as well as their interaction with broader social and economic structures of power and 
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interest. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1.5.1 
:. 
Sociological analysis 
Research on information systems and organisations has only recently moved away from 
managerialistic and technicist interpretations and positivist and essentialist ontologies. IS researchers have 
only begun to explore the use of interpretive sociological approaches such as structuration theory 
[Walsham 1993], hermeneutics, critical social theory, relativism [Sahay et al 1994; Wilson 1999], social 
shaping, social construction, constructivism [Whitley 1999] and actor-network theory [Walsham 1997]. It 
is hoped that the complexity of this case study can provide enough material for pursuing a similar line of 
enquiry. Conversely, an important research question is to assess how current forms of sociological 
analysis, of technology more specifically, can make better sense of this material than the common 
explanations found in the management and IT literature. The initial research objectives (Section 1.3 
above) have already used the notions of symmetry (between failure and success) and of the construction of 
the social and the technical, which originate in the sociology of technology. Actor-network theory, in 
particular, tries to avoid both forms of extreme determinism, social determinism and technology 
determinism. It attempts to transcend the distinction between the so-called 'social' and the so-called 
'natural' world (Callon 1986] and stresses the contingent nature of networks and network building. An 
actor network is configured through the enrolment of allies (both human and non-human) into a network 
by means of negotiations; the 'sociology of translation' ainis to describe, rather than explain, the many 
transitions taking place when networks are constructed. 
Thus, the major research question this thesis seeks to address is whether and how an anti-essentialist 
sociological analysis can be used to describe the translations and negotiations 
leading to the socio- 
technical actor network of the introduction and use of Socrate at French Railways; what further 
insights this can provide compared to essentialist managerialist and technicist accounts; and what are 
its associated difficulties and challenges, in particular, how it can accommodate or be reconciled with 
more critical concerns ofpower and interest issues. 
1.5.2 Technology and change at SNCF 
A scientific statistical computer model was used by SNCF to redesign computerised ticketing and 
reservation systems, address fmancial objectives and redefline the notion of transport. This considerable 
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shift was envisaged as a purely technical change and was assumed to be unproblematic in practice. This 
proved to be a serious mistake since social and political factors and power relations cannot be suspended 
and a technical solution imposed. Implementation difficulties and market, economic, political and cultural 
differences in the transfer of Sabre from American Airlines to French Railways illustrate how complex 
change, the use of technology and the development of socio-technical actor networks are. The research 
:L- 
seeks to understand the links between the strategic and political aims and the technical choices and how 
actors interpret and appropriate technical tools. It attempts to describe events as they unfold from the 
perspectives of actors and networks involved. Although problematic in that it interprets events using 
perhaps artificial categories, more specific research questions are formulated in the three following 
groupings: 
At an a&ganisadonal Lev how the transfer of an American airline reservation system was 
perceived at SNCF to play a crucial part in the changes brought forward and witnessed by 
staff and customers; 
At a micro-ley how this system was associated with a dramatic change to the ticketing, 
pricing and selling policies and practices, and how this change was carried out (or noo and 
experienced; 
At a marrodev how these changes are related by actors to the more general political and 
economic context of deregulation in the European transport industry and how this type of 
software is seen as intervening in the competition between rail, air and road transport 
markets. 
1.6 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This thesis concentrates on the introduction of Socrate in 1993 and its immediate aftermath, as 
well as the subsequent events, until the beginning of deregulatory measures at 
SNCF with the split 
between infrastructures and operations in 1997. The antecedents and historical context of Socrate are also 
examined, going back to the early 80s when the first computerised reservation system RESA was put in 
place at SNCF, and when TGVs were first introduced together with some differentiated pricing. It 
includes some history of CRS, Sabre in particular, and US airline deregulation in the 80s. The aim is to 
study some of the 'antecedent circumstances' of technology, using Grint and Woolgar's [ 1997] expression, 
although as they point out, there is a fundamental dilernma in trying to "locate the origin of action and 
behaviour either in the essence of an entity or in the circumstances antecedent to the entity" (Grint and 
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Woolgar 1997: 69]. They also warn about "the temptation to get wound up in disputes about whether one 
of another category of antecedent circumstances is the more appropriate essence of the machine" (Grint 
and Woolgar 1997: 114]. It is clear that the choice of antecedents in this thesis is subject to debate. 
However, there is no 'true' representation of the world and we are interested here in histories, 
narratives and representations of technology, so as to analyse the way in which certain technologies gain 
specific attributes. Moreover, Czarniawska-Jorges [1995], an organisational sociologist, argues against the 
distinction between the logo-scientific mode of knowing (which requires proof of truth and falsity) and the 
narrative mode of knowing (or everyday knowledge) and claims that they might have more in common 
than anybody wishes to admit. She reasons that by overcoming this distinction "one can envisage an 
alternative of creating an interpretive space which will be able to contain many approaches and relate 
them to each other without ascribing them strict positions" [Czamiawska-Jorges 1995: 14]; and that this 
might generate a dialogue between practitioners' realist narratives and researchers' theoretical 
interpretations. In fact, she found that: 
"When in the field ( ... ) researchers picked [narratives] up when nobody was 
looking in order to 
take them home and beat them into a scientific shape. In final reports, narratives were serving a 
subordinate role: filling in the gaps, providing illustration and entertaining the reader when the 
main argument became too heavy" [Czamiawska-Jorges 1995: 14). 
This stance implies that explanation or interpretation depends on the intentions of the narrator. The 
present author therefore is left with the task of trying not to offer (or think of it as) a 'true' representation, 
but of proposing convincing enough representations and a persuasive enough argument as to how different 
interpretations construct rather than reflect the phenomenon at stake [Grint and Woolgar 1997: 331. 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE STUDY 
The literature review in Chapter 2 concentrates first on IS failures analyses and shows how their 
focus has shifted from individuals and systems to organisations. IS failure models have also evolved from 
stakeholder models, structural models, to contingency and contextual models. Similarly, the analysis of 
management failures has developed from functionalist to more radical analyses of rational decision- 
making, best illustrated by Drummond's research on Taurus [1996]. Two contrasting analyses of 
technology failures demonstrate the superiority of rich ethnographic research and of an interpretive 
sociological perspective that ties social structures, culture, managerial decision-making, power, 
organisations, and technology together. To gain such a rich understanding, we must acquire better tools 
for analysing failures, and it is therefore necessary to explore relevant elements of various social theories. 
The sociology of technology is introduced, with specific attention given to actor-network theory, 
the notion of synunetry between the social and the technical, and the sociology of translation. Critiques of 
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actor-network theory are then reviewed, leading to an overview of critical approaches such as politics, 
power/knowledge, institutional analysis, frameworks of power, and unintended consequences, and to the 
theoretical debate about micro and macro approaches to sociology. Following Drummond's example 
[ 1996], the distinction between macro, 'meso' and micro levels of analysis shows promise in fulfilling this 
thesis's objective. The chosen research methodology attempts to do justice to the complex realities of 
social life in organisations and their wider social and historical context. It is typical of longitudinal in- 
depth case studies and includes a variety of techniques: audio-taped intensive interviewing, group 
diswssions, observations and hands-on experience, research material such as public domain official 
reports and analyses, secondary sources and press reports, internal documentation such as technical 
reports, training material, memos (some confidential), audit reports, as well as specialised transport 
literature. 
Chapter 3 starts at the organisational level by outlining: the reasons SNCF management gave 
for the purchase of Sabre (e. g. need to increase capacity); the history of this system at American Airlines 
and how it was seen (and is still seen) by many IT academics and practitioners as a major strategic 
success; the modifications carried out on the US air reservation software to turn it into a French rail 
computer reservation system; and the new yield management and optimisation techniques the software 
included. A first translation therefore concerns the appropriation of an air computer system for a rail 
company and can be referred to as a strategic formulation or interpretation of the purpose and use of this 
technology on the part of SNCF. It also relates to macro issues, which link socio-economic conditions to 
organisational analysis and individual and group action [Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981 ]. 
Chapter 4 examines some of these broader macro perspectives which were called upon as a 
justification for introducing Socrate: how the French rail industry is evolving from a public monopoly 
situation to one of increased inter-sectorial competition; the deregulation of European transport and the 
planning of high-speed trans-European networks; the different liberalisation regimes in European member 
states; the issues of European, national and regional economic development. 
The political debate about the deregulation of public transport is then explored by comparing US 
air and European rail transport deregulatory moves. It highlights the social and economic conflicts 
between competition, co-operation and complementarity in inter-modal and intra-modal transport. The 
transferability of the deregulation model from the US to Europe, and from air to rail is questioned. The 
role computerised reservation systems are claimed to have played in the restructuring and deregulation of 
the US airline market is examined. The complexity of these changes underlies SNCFs strategic choices 
and its decision to buy Sabre, which was seen as a mechanism through which American Airlines 
responded to similar market changes in order to gain competitive advantage [Hopper 1990; Doll 1989]. A 
second political translation therefore complements the strategic translation from an air to a rail reservation 
system, reflecting a certain political reading of environmental changes and construing the technology as an 
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independent agent capable of intervening in this envirorunent. 
Chapter 5 returns to the organisational level of analysis by exarnining the new cormnercial 
techniques to manage passenger travel, which can be traced back to differentiated pricing techniques 
initiated by SNCF (when it launched its fast TGV trains) in the early 80s. More sophisticated 
differentiated pricing was made possible with Socrate and its yield management techniques and is 
intrinsically linked to, and inconceivable without, the use of powerful computer and information systems. 
From an economic and financial perspective, not only does the use of yield management techniques and 
sophisticated information systems fulfill a need to balance the books, it can also become a management 
tool for maximising profitability through market segmentation. It is shown that this erodes cross 
subsidising and leads to new controversial notions of access to transport and pricing, towards which the 
new information systems are geared. At a micro-social level, for passengers, these systems were 
associated with a new marketing culture which implied an unwelcome change in buying and travelling 
patterns; this is a third translation for passengers, who interpreted the technology as facilitating demand 
control and price discrimination, which led to resistance and problems. 
Chapter 5 explores the link between Socrate and the successful TGV innovation as the latter can 
be seen as an important antecedent to Socrate through pricing primarily. Revisiting this past success 
enriches the understanding of the CRS failure. It helps see how innovation is a complex and uncertain 
process with unpredictable elements, that emerges when various entities are associated to a problem with 
rnany aspects which interest them all, even if these interests are different. Both innovation processes were 
situated in similar contexts, leading to similar negotiations, perceptions and conflicts about the survival of 
rai I and the 'modem' nature transport. 
Chapter 6 highlights that the rnicro-social level, as represented in the interactions between 
management, technical and sales staff, passengers and the computer systern, is related to the previous 
macro and organisational levels. As actors, sales staff not only reacted to the technical system but acted in 
a much broader and problematic organisational and economic context which can be described as one of 
maximising profits, implementing productivity gains, reducing over-capacity, streamlining unprofitable 
lines, etc. A fourth translation takes place in that the technology is seen as associated with a change in the 
organisational culture, away from a public service ethos (particularly for the sales force), leading to 
tensions and clashes. This chapter concentrates on the individual and group level as follows: 
How these changes are interpreted, experienced and appropriated by SNCF employees, managers, 
passengers (now 'clients' who are expected to become rational customers), pressure groups, consumer 
associations and public opinion at large; the activities of SNCF sales staff and of distribution outlets; 
the regional actors, government officials, union and political representatives. 
In terms of skills, competencies and human capital within the organisation, the transformation of 
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certain jobs reflect and oppose different rationalities. For example, the yield management expert 
straddles the lines between marketing, operations and distribution. Sales jobs are now heavily 
standardised and monitored through a complex computer interface. Together with ticket inspectors, 
sales staff now has to control as well as assume a commercial and marketing role with customers. 
Focussing on the organisational. and nmcro levels again, Chapter 6 also examines how these new 
information systerns are credited with generating organisational, industrial and market changes in terms of 
infrastructures, operations and transport planning. At an organisational level, a traditionally engineering- 
orientated company, SNCF is beginning to give predominance to computer specialists, accountants and 
marketing experts. And now that the marketability of specific route segments is supported by the 
information systems in place, different organisational forms are emerging within French Railways and in 
the European rail transport industry. One of the tenets of rail deregulation is that infrastructure costs and 
the running of trains operations should be accounted for separately; through the accumulation of data in 
the computerised reservation systems, it is possible to link profit and cost information much more 
precisely and accurately for each route segment. In a final translation, this technology is therefore seen as 
transforming and restructuring this market sector. 
In conclusion Chapter 7 reviews the main findings of the thesis and summarises analytical 
insights about each translation: 
- Strategic translation and the socio-technical role of yield management; 
- Transport deregulation, economic relations and political translation; 
- Pricing, customer ethos and consumer rationality; 
- The TGV as an antecedent technology with modem cultural connotations; 
- Organisational culture, systems and actors and managerial transformation; 
- Potential IT-induced market restructuring and electronic markets. 
Clegg's circuits Of power are used to complement non-essentialist actor-network theory and the 
sociology of translation: by identifying the effect of power relations on the constitution of successful and 
unsuccessful obligatory passage points through failed problematisation, mobilisation and dissidence. 
Social constructivism is concerned with how actors' claims about technical capacities are constructed. 
Discourses and preoccupations related to transport are the link between technology and globalisation, and 
the concept of techno-nationalism. They are drawn upon as social explanations and are examples of a 
blurring of boundaries between the social and the technical. They are briefly addressed in relation to the 
case study, before contributions, Iiinitations and areas of further research are suggested. 
For ease of understanding, and to structure the analysis into a coherent argument, the remainder 
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of this work retains the distinction between micro, macro and organisational ('meso') levels of description 
and analysis. The concept of 'translation! from one set of interpretations to the next is also used throughout 
the thesis, to build a series of translations which help understand the formation of this complex actor 
network. Each chapter of the thesis represents one of these translations, as represented in [Figure 1.2]. 
PROVIDE CHANGE COMPANY INDUSTRY 
STRATEGIC ETHOS AND TRANSFORM RESTRUCTURING 
ADVANTAGE ORGANISATION 
IDENTIFY 
PROFITABLE 
INTRODUCE SEGMENTS 
AIRLINE 
PRICING CHANGE BUYING 
AND TRAVELLING 
BEHAVIOUR 
ACCUMULATE 
CUSTOMER AND 
ASSOCIATE MARKET DATA 
INCREASE CAPACITY Socrate 
AND REVENUES with TGV 
ORG. MACRO ORG. MICRO ORG. MACRO 
Strategic Political Customer Organisational Industry 
translation translation translation translation translation 
(from air (transport (pricing) (from public 
(data gathering 
to rail) deregulation) service to selling) 
for restructuring) 
Chap 3 Chap 4 Chap 5 Chap 6 Chap 6 
Figure 1.2 A series of translations 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
'Me research literature on failures is first reviewed. It is clear that the disciplines of engineering 
and information systems and their functionalist epistemologies have only provided limited explanations of 
failures in the past. Nevertheless, they have evolved from trying to allocate blame onto individuals, 
perceiving failure situations as systems, to identifying causes as coming from organisational factors, and 
considering stakeholders, organisational structure and culture, contingency and context. In doing so, they 
have drawn upon other disciplines such as management and organisation theory. Furthermore, technology 
failure analyses such as Vaughan's [ 1996], use an interpretive and ethnographic approach to understand 
the actors' views in order to build a complex understanding of the Challenger's disaster; and Drummond 
[1996] adopts a quasi-critical perspective to question the notion of managerial rationality in the decision- 
making escalation which led to the Taurus fiasco. As exemplified in these two major studies of technology 
failures, sociological frameworks enable us to move beyond functionalist explanations of failure. The 
chapter discusses the evolution of understandings of failure, and contends that it is structured along the 
tluee dimensions represented in Figure 2.1 below. 
Disciplines 
Sociology of technology 
Management and 
Organisation theory 
Information Systems 
Organisafions 
Engineering '0' 
Individuals Culture 
Functionalism ITechnology 
Context 
Interpretivism, Power 
Systems 
Constructivism Structure 
Critical theories 
Epistemologies 
Stakeholders 
Politics 
Models/understandings of failure 
Figure 2.1 Evolution of understandings of failure 
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A particular sociological framework that pays great attention to technology is actor-network 
theory. It is a constructivist approach to the sociology of technology, and is reviewed next with a 
particular emphasis on symmetry and the sociology of translation, both of relevance to this thesis. Truex 
and Baskerville [1998: 99] argue that: 
"importing (.. ) theoretical constructs from one discipline to another is intellectually stimulating 
and inherently healthy for expanding both the generality of the construct and the understanding 
within the receiving discipline" but that "however when such constructs are first borrowed, they 
must be abbreviated extensively as it is problematic to import an entire, fully developed 
paradigm at once". 
Truex and Baskerville [1998: 110] also wam that "in so borrowing concepts ( ... ) that are not 
taken for granted, [one also] borrows the controversy". ANT has been criticised for disregarding macro 
social structures and for its weak capacity for explanation (as opposed to description). Accordingly, 
elements of social theories relating to politics, power/knowledge, institutional analysis and unintended 
consequences are selected for review as they relate to the case study material. The macro-rnicro question 
is shown to be complex and unresolved. The strength of actor-network theory (ANT) is in its 
methodological approach and as an analytical device, in that describing a network in detail is a good 
contribution to building an empirical base. It is therefore useful as a theoretical framework, and a variety 
of research methods were used to build as close an account as possible to a rich longitudinal in-depth case 
study and its wider social and historical context. 
2.1 FAILURES 
Research work on technology-related changes, on the relationship between organisational change 
and information technology, and on implementation failure issues has been carried out by academics (e. g. 
Fortune and Peters [1995], Latour [19961, Vaughan [1996], Drummond [1996], Sauer (1993], Flowers 
[1996]) in many industrial and commercial sectors, such as the health service (e. g. Beynon-Davis [1995], 
Robinson [1994], Bloomfield [1995]), the public sector (Myers [1994]) and the financial services sector 
(Knights and Murray [1994]). This work reflects many different theoretical perspectives: managerialist, 
sociological, ethnographic, positivistic, systemic, interpretive, the sociology of technology and innovation, 
the sociology of mistake, decision-making theories, etc. 
It is clear that failures in general (technology or IS) emerge from a complex interaction between 
human and technical components, and, unlike Sauer [ 1993: 2 1 ], it is believed here that the study of IS 
failures can learn a great deal from existing work on 'other' failures. In this chapter, IS or computer 
failures in general are first examined and the progressive shift of focus from technology to people, systems 
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and organisations is reviewed. Failure models suggested by IS researchers are then summarised, leading to 
a foray into management failures through the ex=ple of escalation of decision-making during the Taurus 
project. Finally, two approaches are contrasted to illustrate how technology failures can be analysed using 
systemic and sociological perspectives. The latter ethnographic work illustrates how the Challenger 
disaster can be analysed using the notions of power, structure and culture in order to go beyond a 
managerialist and rationalist account. 
2.1.1 IS failures 
Information technology failures have attracted renewed public attention in recent years, due to a 
series of spectacular cases in the UK: the failed and tragic introduction of a computer-aided dispatching 
system at the London Ambulance Service (Watts 1992; LAS 1993; Beynon-Davies 1995; Robinson 1994; 
Flowers 1994]; Taurus (Transfer and Automated Registration of Uncertified Stock) at the London Stock 
Exchange [Willcock 1993; Drummond 1996]; the failed integration of computer systems at Wessex 
Health Authority [Kelsey and Brown 1993]; the alleged L77M write-off of a computer system at the 
Foreign Office and a computer project abandoned at the Ministry of Defence at a cost of fI OM [Kelsey 
1993a]; the controversial cost of energy settlements information systems in the privatised electricity 
industry (Kelsey 1993b]; nurses' difficulties with data collection for NHS information systems [Brindle 
1995]; the collapse of the Read project intended to facilitate the creation of an individual's medical 
computer record [Brindle 1996]; another City computer 'bungle' [Murphy and Saigol 1997]; the Inland 
Revenue's legal battle with EDS over the embarrassing failure in the processing of the 1997 income tax 
self assessments [Farrell 1997]; and more recently the Passport Office fiasco which delayed and ruined the 
summer holidays of people applying for passports in 1999 [Hencke 2000]; also outside the UK, 
for 
instance in France with the computerisation of the French judicial system abandoned after having wasted 
3.4 billion fi-ancs (Chemin 1993; Jacquin. 1993; Leclerq 1993] and the difficulties with the 
computerisation of the child benefit allocation systems [Canard Enchaind 1995]; the 
loss of the European 
Ariane V rocket which exploded after take-off due to a major software design flaw 
(Irwin 1996; Phillips 
1996]; and in the US with the failed implementation of an automated baggage-handling system at the 
Denver International Airport (Montealegre 1995]. 
As early as the 1960s, computer specialists began to be concerned that computer software 
development was being marred by overspends, delays, inefficiencies, and operational problems ranging 
from bugs to catastrophic failures. In 1994 an ESRC-PICT (Programme on Information and 
Communication Technologies) Policy Research Forum gathered world experts to discuss information and 
communications technologies (ICT) failures and make some recommendations to help avoid failures in the 
future [Dutton el al 1995]. A shorter version was later published in (Peltu et al 1996]. They examined 
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three case studies, the London Ambulance Service and Taurus mentioned above, and the USS Vincennes 
shooting of an Iranian Airbus in 1987. One of the experts involved, MacKenzie [1994] found that despite 
the many worries about future failures, the actual record of ICT-related accidents and deaths (up to the 
end of 1992) compared favourably with the history of general engineering developments. However, some 
experts warned that "increasing pressures to earn money in highly competitive markets could still lead to 
bigger and bigger mistakes' as the use of complex and interrelated ICT systems escalates" [Dutton et al 
1995: S]. 
Attempting to classify ICT disasters was inconclusive; but a number of contrasting kinds of 
systems and environments were offered to "show the way in which disasters tend to be contingent on 
organisational settings" (p. 7), such as the complexity of the system, how tractable the problem was, 
radical versus incremental progress, mandatory versus voluntary change. There was some disagreement as 
to how information technology differs from other technologies, although it was clear that this should not 
inhibit learning from the experiences of others (p. 8). It was noted that people at operational levels, for 
instance pilots and drivers, tend to be blamed for failure, "whereas more fundamental management and 
systemic flaws are often the root cause of the rnany problems caused by increasing use of complex 
integrated socio-technical systems" (p. 23). 
In the context of IS, systems developers and software engineers are often the ones blamed for 
failure, like 'pilots and drivers'. More specifically, when the implementation of an information system in 
an organisation fails, it may be attributed to a technical failure in inforniation gathering and made the 
responsibility of specific developers. Clarke [ 199 1] argues that the approach that characterises systems as 
products for and by individuals obscures the social nature of work and organisations. In other words, the 
social relations of power invested in systems development mean that 'problern! individuals are located as 
the cause of systems failure; whereas information systems development should be viewed "as a set of 
social practices intervening in organisational discourses", and deliverables should be viewed "as texts 
implicated in the social construction of meaning in organisations" [Clarke 1991: 60]. He claims that 
commonsensical 'liberal-humanist' discourses obscure problerns and contradictions revealed in practice, 
"which might explain how system failure is often explained away as a failure to collect enough data" 
(Clarke 1991: 62]. 
The PICT experts noted a growing acceptance that technical risk factors "cannot be extricated 
from 'softer' psychological, social and organisational influences" [Dutton et al 1995: 8] which are less 
amenable to definitive solutions. Some felt that political, social, economic, technical and organisational 
factors are so interwoven that they must be considered together at all stages; and that is why "there is no 
magic 'silver bullet' such as a new regulatory regime or a set of technical fixes which can solve problems 
in all circumstances" (p. 9). "Too many computer scientists believe software and organisational design can 
be represented by two dimensional drawings and mathematical models, although these can never 
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adequately represent the myriad social interactions involved" (p. 28). Many decisions in the lead up to ICT 
disasters may be rational in terms of their specialist domains, but these interact to produce failure. Despite 
these observations, the PICT report prescribes standard management techniques such as informed 
decision-making, leadership, project management methods, quality management risk management, 
training, regulation and standards. More interestingly, some of the dilemmas recognised during the Forurn, 
and of relevance to this thesis, are as follows [Dutton el al 1995: 48-49]: 
A pragmatic desire for relatively simple prescriptive solutions versus the acceptance that ICT 
systems are intrinsically complex and context-dependent; 
Seeking 'best practice' guidelines versus analyses based on specific cases and contexts, which 
view such guidelines as 'cookbooks of bland platitudes; 
Studying the uniqueness of ICT systems versus exploring the ability to share knowledge from 
other technologies and disciplines. 
This thesis aspires to avoid prescriptive solutions, cookbooks and platitudes and to learn from 
other technologies and disciplines. The Forum reconunends the promotion of multi-disciplinary research 
projects. Two of the 'cross-cutting' themes (p. 53) identified are of interest here: the way in which 
innovation progresses and how management cannot assume a predictable translation of ideas into 
successful working systems; and approaching the 'politics of blame' with caution as it often reinforces the 
interests of powerful actors and deflects attention from the underlying causes. This thesis is not concerned 
with some of the other themes suggested by PICT, for instance, the emphasis on the psychology of 
organisational decision making, cognitive dissonance and individuals' mental models of reality. Common 
explanations of IS failure and success are critically examined next. 
2.1.2 Reasons for failures and successes: shifting the blame 
When perceived as technology failures, purely technical solutions are often suggested, such as 
computer simulations, which can show how a complex computer system will work before any money is 
spent on development or installation [Moran 1994]. MacKenzie [1994: 234] states that it is too narrow to 
include as computer-related only cases of 'technical' failure of a computer systen-4 and that cases where 
there has been a breakdown or error in human interaction with the system should be incorporated. The 
emphasis on people as opposed to the technology itself, inappropriate or faulty, is present in various forms 
in the literature. Poor management, ignorance of information technology, human error, poor training, lack 
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of consideration of human factors, are some of the explanations commonly put forward. A typical 
recommendation is to get human factors and organisational design specialists' advice at the system design 
stage (ACOST 1993; Patel 1993]. However, the following view is still quite common. Jones [1995] 
examined six software industries and found that poor software development management tends to be the 
primary root cause for many failures. He recommends good software development practices such as 
softwaFe and professional standards, training, software metrics, software quality norms, licensing and 
accreditation. He argues that software engineering has not yet reached maturity, like medical practice in 
the 1890s [Jones 1995: 264]. This argument, often vocalised by software engineers, shows a naive faith in 
a 'nomal' and scientific road to engineering progress and perfection. This is highly questionable: the 
medical profession is not particularly immune to accidents and failures and the sociology of professions 
(McDonald 19951 has a much more sophisticated account of the emergence of professional expertise... 
Jones's account [19951 supports a belief in professional remedies such as project management and quality 
control techniques, which leads to blaming the 'pilots and drivers' (as covered above) for not knowing or 
applying these techniques properly. 
In a similar vein, Neumann (1995] studying computer-related risks in a series of sectors (e. g. 
telecommunications, aviation, medical health, military) found that problems which occur during system 
development "often involve people as an underlying cause" (p. 6). Requirements are inconsistent, design is 
misconceived, maintenance is sloppy, and outputs are misinterpreted. He suggests well-defined and 
socially enforceable social policies such as codes of ethics, educational processes, more enlightened 
management and responsible employees and users. He concludes: "technology by itself is not the answer 
to any vital social questions ( ... ) More fundamental human issues must be considered ( ... ) technology can 
have a constructive role to play if it is kept in perspective" [Neumann 1995: 306). This seems reasonable 
and cautious liberal-humanist advice; but the blame is put on fundamentally flawed humans who include 
users, managers, employees as well as designers, and who have to be disciplined to use an intrinsically 
objective and useful technology. 
Perrow [1984: 5] presents a more convincing analysis by coining the term "nonml accident" 
which signals that, given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failure are 
inevitable and that the cause of accidents is to be found in the complexity of systems. Researching the 
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, Perrow [ 1984: 7] suggests that each individual failure (e. g. procedures, 
design, operators) is trivial by itself and that it is the interaction of the multiple failures that explains 
accidents. Accidents cannot be entirely avoided and quality control, training, design experience will not be 
sufficient. He explores the links between complexity, tight and loose coupling, and de/centralisation of 
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organisational structures and control (p. 330). His theoretical approach is to see human constructions as 
systems, not as collections of individuals (p. 351), whether designed by engineers and corporate 
presidents, or the result of unplanned, unwitting, slow evolving human attempts to cope. As human 
constructions, humans can destruct systems or reconstruct them, which leads to his quite sensible 
recommendations: abandon a project if it is beyond your capabilities; redesign a faulty project, regardless 
of shmi-run costs; regulate a project, regardless of the imperfections of regulation (p. 35 1). The value of 
Perrow's work is in how problems are seen as not coming from individual motives or errors, and how he 
redirects attention towards systerns, technological and economic. Certain technologies are so inherently 
unsafe that what is called "operator error" is actually made inevitable by the way in which parts of a 
system are related. 
The notion of system has been broadened by many researchers to include the 'behavioural and 
organisational factors', seen as essential ingredients of successful - and by iniplication causes of 
unsuccessful - implementation and use. Of the hundreds of studies that have been conducted on the 
successful implementation and use of information systems, there are almost as many different measures of 
success as there are research studies. Pinto [1994] has assembled some of the most commonly identified 
critical success factors (CSFs), from literature based on surveys of IS projects in a broad range of 
organisational sizes, types and environments in the UK and the US. Some of these CSFs are: management 
decision rules and procedures (p. 47); use and acceptance of the new system by the intended users (p. 47); 
consensus (p. 45); effective management control over the political and cultural aspects of implementation 
(p. 45); balance between technical focus and human side (pp. 59,65); clear objectives, personal/team 
motivation, client/top management support, personal ambition, financial support, leadership (pp. 61-63); 
organisation enthusiasm, satisfaction with project, project manager's human skills, team capabilities, job 
security (pp. 64-65); project mission, client consultation, monitoring and feedback, communication (p. 73). 
Some [Wastell and Newman 1996] even diagnose failure and user resistance as related to stress and 
recommend the use of psycho-physiological techniques for monitoring psychological pressures during IS 
development. 
The success or failure of technological systems is not due to individuals only and is now related 
to lbehavioural and organisational factors' such as organisational politics, culture, psychological concerns, 
managerial competence, user participation, training and human resource management. The 'problem' areas 
within project implementation have moved from individuals to 'organisational' factors. The next section 
concentrates on how some IS researchers have tried to analyse failure in this organisational perspective 
and some of the models they have developed are critically assessed. Approaches from other disciplines are 
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then discussed in the following sections. 
2.13 IS failure models 
Lyytinen and Hirschheim [1987] offer the concept of 'expectation! failure, a notion which 
encompasses correspondence (system does not fulfil objectives), process (failure to produce a system) and 
interaction failure (users do not use the system). They define it as "the inability of an IS to meet a specific 
stakeholder group's expectations" (p. 263). Sauer [1993: 24] criticises this notion in that it belongs to the 
"politically equitable stance of total pluralism", whilst he recognises its value in making explicit the fact 
that failure is relative to interests which may differ among stakeholder groups, and in that it makes it clear 
that failure is an evaluation rather than a description. 
A model suggested by Sauer [1993] is that of a 'natural' system in which IS project organisations 
pursue their survival through their work on an IS which is intended to serve supporters well enough to 
yield the support needed for the project to survive. He uses a 'triangle of dependences' in which the IS 
depends on the project Organisation, the project Organisation depends on its supporters, and the supporters 
depend on the IS [Sauer 1993: 30]. The task of the project Organisation is twofold: the process of 
developing and operating the information system, and the process of managing support. "Thus it is the 
interaction of difficulties in the irmovation process and difficulties in managing support that leads to 
failure, not the one, nor the other" [Sauer 1993: 318); lacking a base of power from which to negotiate, the 
project Organisation will be unable to offer any incentives to supporters. Sauer suggests (p. 321) that 
"further research is needed to examine in toto the behaviour of all relevant supporters". This is similar to 
PICT experts' advice to focus on the humans involved in the process rather than on formal project 
management methods, in order to secure sufficient resources, influence decision makers and shape 
policies [Dutton et al 1995: 33]. 
Throughout these formulations of failure, there is an undercurrent which assumes that, if it was 
not for stakeholders' conflicting interests and judgements which lead to lack of support, 
IS development 
and use would run smoothly. Sauces aim [1993) is to develop the 'right! management strategies that can 
enrol the 'right! amount of support from the 'right! stakeholder groups. His model is intended to provide 
"a 
basis for the analysis of the strategies by which the project organisation can attempt to manage the support 
it receives" [Sauer 1993: 318]. He suggests a "support-power analysis to determine who has the power to 
provide the support required" (p. 322) and, if necessary, the appointment of a "support manager" within 
the project organisation executive. This is problematic in that support (or lack of it) is not just a matter of 
how (rightly or wrongly) stakeholders interpret the impact of IS and how they can be persuaded (or not) of 
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its value. Stakeholders are not equal; support cannot be 'managed!; how are the 'righf stakeholders chosen? 
What happens tothe 'wrong' stakeholders? Eliminating some stakeholders ensures that the remaining ones 
are all satisfied. Perhaps more fundamentally, interpretations and actions cannot be anticipated and 
therefore 'managed'. 
Another organisational. view of IS failure derives from the debates about strategy, systems and 
structure in the organisational theory literature. Sauer et al [ 1997) propose a configurational theory which 
conceptualises IS projects as part of a management choice about the way it organises IS projects and 
which is based on the belief that their outcomes are influenced by the way the whole organisation is 
managed. Sauer et aPs core proposition "is that 'weale configurational fit causes failure modes by 
encouraging behaviours; conducive to failure" [1997: 1]. Weak fit creates competing motivations for 
different people in different parts of the organisation and there is tension between strategy and structure. 
Top management intervention may be required to break down the barriers created by weak fit. 
Configurational 'incompabilities' are identified along, for instance, strategy-structure-skills and structure- 
roles fits, drawing on organisational structure and behaviour constructs such as bureaucracies, 
decentralisation, change skills. It states that 'dysfunctional' behaviour arises from confusion from a 
configuration in weak fit. The focus is at the organisational level and is complementary to individual 
explanations. In other words, there is an evolution from the model above [Sauer 1993] in that the blame is 
not on individual stakeholders anymore, but their 'dysfunctional' behaviour is now understood to be 
caused by structural phenomena. Altering structures therefore should guarantee 'good! behaviour. This is a 
typically functionalist way of thinking. It presumes that conflict-free organisations can be engineered and 
that, by altering structural conditions, one can prevent conflict, manage behaviour and risk. So it still 
shares a rationalist and managerialistic philosophy with the previous model. 
Instead of structure, Gallivan [1997] concentrates on the cultural aspects and on "the importance 
of fit between a technology and the adopting organisation by characterising IT systems as 'culture bound', 
indicating that the same system may be subject to different interpretations across different contexts" 
(p. 246). He thereby adheres to an interpretive stance. He believes that implementation outcomes are 
unpredictable, because "the meaning and appropriation of a technology depends on the fit between the 
culture that system designers assume to exist and the actual culture of the organisation" (246). He also 
reports that there is disagreement as to whether organisational cultures can be changed and whether 
managers should abstain from attempting to change them. Where a mismatch or conflict of organisational 
incentives exists, it is unrealistic to expect that technology alone will create the necessary catalyst to 
change a social system (Gallivan 1997: 252]. Managers can recognise the misfit and reject the technology, 
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for fear of dire consequences to users (frustration, unrest and hostility among workers). Even if the 
technology is used and does become routine, the notion that it will lead to desirable or appropriate 
changes in the social context is to accept technological deterrninism 
Some IS research has demonstrated that change is emergent unpredictable, and often 
accompanied by contradictory outcomes in different contexts. Gallivan's evidence (1997: 254] suggests 
that "where a mismatch exists between the features supported by the system and users' beliefs and 
assumptions regarding the activities that are rewarded by the organisation, the intended users will reject or 
ignore the system". He suggests a cultural analysis (innovation and action orientation, level of individual 
autonomy, performance orientation, reward orientation, integration and lateral interdependence). This 
determines whether the organisational culture in which the intended users reside is ready for the system 
(either because there is a natural fit or the necessary changes to the social system are made proactively) to 
assess whether the technology is more likely to be used. We agree with Gallivan that the outcomes of any 
intervention are not predictable or controllable, but emergent and contingent. 
Poulymenakou and Holmes [ 1996) state that we need to understand the relationship of IT with its 
organisational context, in order to meet effectively the challenges that systems failure presents, and that 
the study of failure should move away from attempts to define 'silver bullets'. Their theoretical approach is 
that failure should be considered ftorn a contingency viewpoint: "failure is highly situational ( ... ) and 
dependent upon a number of environmental factors which, although common to the study of failure, 
manifest themselves very differently in different circumstances" [Poulymenakou and Holmes 1996: 37]. 
They classify contextual factors into macro contingent and micro contingent variables. They question the 
common assumptions that technology will resolve all problems, and claim that organisational and political 
issues are perceived to be non-existent, thereby creating a situation where technocratic utopianism 
dominates and projects fail (p. 38). They suggest various areas that can help the adoption of the 
contingency perspective: the adoption of learning principles, implementation issues and project 
management (p. 42). Developing a learning culture, involving people with the change process, using risk 
management, motivating staff, evaluating projects all contribute to "creating a sufficiently open culture to 
permit failure to be recognised, openly discussed and resolved" (p. 44). 
Although it seems that the contingency perspective is a definite progress when compared to 
technological determinism these statements are as managerialist and functionalist as earlier ones in this 
section. They depict not a technocratic utopia but an organisational and cultural one, in which people 
listen to each other, do not seek to blame anybody, do not play politics, are rational, open and presumably 
equal. 
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Context al Tantors' 
As Sauer (1993] points out, it is impossible to determine which techniques, tools and 
recommendations can overcome failure. Both practitioners and empirical researchers often "presume that 
the caises of (and actions to prevent) failure can be fairly simply identified, either by casual inspection or 
by relatively simple factor analysis ( ... ). Too often books offer case studies which ( ... ) demonstrate a 
particular point or which are carefully filtered so as to bring out some points at the expense of simply 
ignoring others" [Sauer 1993: 3]. Examples of some such points have been so far the enrolment of 
stakeholders' support, the modification of organisational structure, project management and cultural 
change. It is clear that there are no sftnple models and generally applicable solutions to IS implementation 
problems. One possible reason is that existing models of IS failures in organisations fall short of analysing 
the relationship of humans to technology within organisational, social, economic and political 
environments. 
Whilst many IS researchers share the view that an information system is a social system that uses 
information technology, the social and contextual components selected are often limited and/or perceived 
as exogenous 'factors' to be circumvented, controlled or eliminated. Classifications of environmental 
factors, such as Poulymenakou and Holmes's (1996) into macro variables (i. e. organisational culture, 
systems planning, accountability, irrationality and evaluation practices) and micro variables (i. e. power 
and. politics, resistance, development practices) are debatable: organisational culture could be micro, and 
power and politics macro, depending on one's theoretical perspective. Similarly, Davis et ats [1992] 
chosen 'social' components in their analysis of IS failure are: "reactions to the technical system! ', 
"performance indicators" (measurement of system inadequacy), "development processes" (processes 
through which the technical system is designed) and "theories in use" (ideas and beliefs about the 
technical system). These could be interpreted as concentrating primarily on, or at least starting frorn, the 
technical aspects. Others are often limited to the interactions between the technology and individuals 
and/or small groups and take the technology as given. 
Perhaps more importantly, construing these contextual social factors as exogenous separates 
them from, and isolates/insulates, the technology and implies the pre-existence of a technological 'natural 
trajectory' [MacKenzie 1988] independent of external social 'contexts'. MacKenzie argues that technical 
trajectories do not exist but are actors' constructs, that technology is never self-directing and that a 
technological trajectory is a self-fulfilling prophecy. This concept of a natural trajectory is illustrated by 
Newman and Robey [1992] when they express the hope that IS practitioners can use models to diagnose 
and predict problems in order to move projects in the 'right' direction. This assumes that there is a normal, 
successful, natural, right way of using technology and the objective is to trace evidence of failure in terms 
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of discrepancies from this natural and inherent technological development. MacKenzie [1988] suggests 
that the term natural can be read as 'asocial'. 
Having critically examined existing analyses of IS failures, it is now useful to compare them to 
management perspectives, particularly when IS researchers express such confidence in the possibility of 
controlling and mastering the organisational future, as in the following two quotes: "As our understanding 
of the IS process improves over time, we may expect that practitioners will acquire more control over the 
problems they face" [Sauer 1993: 334]; and "Future research will ultimately result in the demise of IS 
failures" [Lyytinen and Hirschheirn 1987: 301]. 
2.1.4 Management failures 
In an effort to prevent crises and ensure success, writers such as Augustine [1995] and Mitroff et 
al (1996] suggest ways to: assess a company's strengths, vulnerabilities and 'level of crisis preparedness' 
before a crisis ever happens, how to handle a crisis effectively once it hits and how to learn from a crisis 
so that future problems can be minimised. Some of their proposed techniques are: anticipating and 
managing the media, containing the damage, assuming (or not) responsibility, delaying response, training 
in security, human relations, quality assurance, corporate communications and law, and building a culture 
committed to crisis management amongst all stakeholders [Mitroff el al 1996: 115]. They believe thatý like 
Total Quality Management (TQM), crisis management is a systemic process [Mitroff et al 1996: 75]: 
"crisis management is systemic because crises not only affect a system as a whole but also result from the 
breakdown of systems as a whole" (p. 117). 
Again, the notion of systerns and their increased complexity is called upon (see Section 2.1.2) 
and factors perceived to be present in every crisis and to be 'managed' include: technology, human 
factors, organisational structure, culture, top management psychology (p. 48), mirroring some of the 
organisational factors identified by IS researchers and their associated shortcomings considered above. 
Additionally, Gallivan [1996) found that managers are being offered contradictory advice when 
confronting crises and that there are inconsistencies in the literature. He claims that the classical view of 
crisis is narrow; and that practitioners and researchers alike may benefit from the insight of research in 
organisation behaviour, decision-making and strategy to provide a different interpretation of crises and to 
refute the need to blame individuals (for failure) or praise senior management (for success). Gallivan 
[19961 suggests more specifically the use of research on the enactment view of managerial sense making 
in a crisis, and the escalation of commitment effect, which both provide useful lenses to interpret crises. 
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iFnantment- ratinnal clerkinn-making? 
Weick (1988] examined Union Carbide's procedures for dealing with gas leaks during the Bhopal 
disaster to explore sense making in crisis situations. He uses the enactment perspective, which 
concentrates on how individual actions are implicated in industrial crises and according to which people 
i. - think By acting and action tends to confirm preconceptions. His objective is to prevent crises through 
smarter management since "human errors cannot be designed away" [Weick 1988: 308). Enactrnent affects 
crisis management through several means such as the psychology of control, effects of action on stress 
levels, speed of interactions, and ideology (p. 315). 
He found that enactment is labour-intensive and that knowledge was reduced, not because of 
automation, but because of understaffing. This is related to "institutional memory" (p. 312) and has serious 
implications for organisational learning and the use of IS in organisations. The enactment perspective 
urges people "to include their own actions more prominently in the mental experiments they run, to 
discover potential crises of which they may be the chief agents" (p. 316). However, "justifications 
prefigure both perception and action", which means they are often "self-confirming" (p. 3 10). Even though 
this is an extremely brief and succinct overview, it is clear that this approach exposes the complex 
relationships between acting, thinking, perceiving, knowing and learning (or not), and by extension, 
justifying, diagnosing, deciding and preventing. This leads to questions about rational decision-making, as 
several researchers have investigated in relation to a reluctance to abandon failing projects. 
Escalation situations are those in which decision makers have continued conuTitment to a 
specific course of action, despite information suggesting that the course of action is failing. Cornmon 
explanations are over-conirnitment, equivocality of the situation, expectancy theory, self-justification, 
feedback from previous decisions made, entrapment (ftirther expenses justify already sunken costs); 
Nulden [1996] found that it is unclear whether the determinants are psychological, social or 
organisational. Having studied two case studies of over-commitment, he recommends to "be open to 
disrniss particular solutions", to "invest in face-to-face meetings to evaluate risks" and to use formal 
methods to monitor progress (p. 71). This may seem simple and rational commonsense but it provides a 
limited account of escalation stories. 
Drummond [ 1996] criticises the socio-psychological literature for assuming that decision criteria 
are objectively verifiable and for confusing the causes of escalation with the symptoms (p. 185). In her in- 
depth, qualitative and very detailed investigation of the failure of Taurus at the London Stock Exchange 
[Drummond 1996], she found that there was no clear dividing line between the rational and the irrational 
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in decision-making (p. 82), and that information was equivocal and part of the 'ritual' of decision-making. 
She suggests that decision criteria are simultaneously rational and flawed (p. 77). Decision dilemma 
theorists predict that market forces eventually curb unwarranted persistence. Social-psychological 
perspectives, on the other hand, assert that market forces are too slow to act and that decision-makers 
persist with failing projects long after the rational point for withdrawal has been reached. Drummond 
departs from both these theories by researching how rationality is reasserted rather than enquiring into 
what reasons caused withdrawal (p. 159). She states that it is "necessary to look beyond decision dilemma 
theory and social-psychological theory in order to understand how organizations become 'locked in' to 
highly questionable ventures" (p. 92). Institutionalised behaviour is escalatory because it leads to attention 
riveted upon solving the problem rather than questioning the problem itself, and "decision-makers respond 
by applying 'more of the same', that is, they try another engineering technique, or demand more detailed 
information" (p. 124). However, information may lead away from the truth rather than towards it (p. 125). 
Her study highlights "how decision debacles may be caused not by a breakdown in rationality so much as 
by rationali itself' (p. 125, original emphasis) and how the process is clothed in a rhetoric of scientific 
objectivity (p. 132). 
A functionalist approach would investigate what factors cause escalation; an interpretive 
perspective would convey what escalation is for participants. Drummond adopts a "quasi-radical" stance 
and examines the roots of escalation. She asserts that the root of escalation was the changed balance of 
power in the City following deregulation (p. 31) and that escalation was an attempt to maintain the 
dominant viewpoint. Accordingly, the notion of escalation is "simultaneously rational and irrational, 
bound up with power, politics and opportunity, and influenced by the vagaries of project and 
organization" [Drummond 1996: 89]. It was rational in that settlement was potentially a lucrative business 
and the London Stock Exchange had to take initiative to maintain its reputation; and irrational in that it 
ignored the new balance of power in the City post-'Big Bang'(p. 77). 
This fundamental contradiction explains how everyone acted logically, according to their 
circumstances, and that decisions turned on political acceptability (p. 81). Staff adjusted to a new culture 
whereby price rather than relationships became the new business imperative - some are quoted as saying 
that "the fan went out of the City" (p. 50). Conflicting priorities were apparent in that participants soon 
learned that the operant principle was to fight one's own comer regardless of the common good and that 
the majority wanted "none of it" (p. 56). Taurus was driven by financial institutions and the rebellion was 
spearheaded by the listed companies. Various sectors of the securities industry attempted to chisel further 
advantage for themselves. No-one was prepared to speak out publicly, for Taurus had become sacrosanct 
and vital to London's preminence as a world financial centre (p. 64). The cumulative effect of everyone 
behaving rationally resulted in the transformation of the 'horse' into a 'camel' (p. 9 1). Drummond concludes 
that: "Taurus went ahead because of the impact of the settlements crisis, the ambitions and competitive 
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weaknesses of the Stock Exchange, and the irresponsible cynicism of the market" (p. 92); and that the 
eventual withdrawal is best understood as a process, a power struggle whereby one myth competes with 
another for dominance (p. 160). She therefore views withdrawal as the reassertion. of rationality and this 
highlights the critical role of power in constructing a new reality (p. 173). She finally comments that 
Iforganisational weaknesses are significant but so too are politics, the organisational ethos and more 
deeply rooted forces, notably the institution of management" (p. 185). Drummond's analysis is grounded in 
a substantial exploration of the context and the actors, and the next section contrasts Vaughan's 
comparable use of sociological concepts and interpretive standpoint to Fortune and Peters' functionalist 
approach. 
2.1.5 Technology failures 
rnntra. ding twn apprnarlheq 
Examples of technology failures (as opposed to IS failures), which have been analysed using two 
fundamentally divergent theoretical approaches are by (a) Vaughan [1996] who studied the Challenger 
disaster, and by (b) Fortune and Peters [1995] who analyse several failure cases. Vaughan [1996] seeks a 
sociological explanation Whilst Fortune and Peters, since people do not learn from mistakes, present a 
"highly developed and well-tested ( ... ) systems methodology" which they claim can be used to analyse, 
understand and predict failures [Fortune and Peters 1995: 2]. 
Vaughan! s research into the Challenger disaster was carried out over a period of nine years (p. 
465). It took the form of a historical ethnography, based on archival documents and interviews and 
resulting in a very thick and rich description, that draws on and contributes to the social history and 
anthropology of modem complex organisations (p. iii). By contrast Fortune and Peters expand on a 
method derived from the systems discipline, already outlined in an earlier book [Bignell and Fortune 
1984] which applied the method to several failure case studies: Three Mile Island, Humber Bridge, 
Norniansfield Hospital, the capsizing of the Kielland rig, and the pricing of South Yorkshire buses. Their 
more recent book similarly analyses several other case studies to illustrate the use of their method, named 
the Systems Failures Method (SFM). The case study material seems to be derived mainly from other 
people's accounts and public inquiries, with also some of the authors' own consultancy work, and covers: 
the aircraft fire at Manchester Airport, the Union Carbide gas leak at Bhopal, an electronic patient records 
systeM and the safety of the Channel Tunnel. 
The material is presented in a step-by-step instructional style in which SFM (a) is shown to 
explain the reasons for failure at the Manchester Airport fire and at Bhopal and (b) demonstrates its power 
of prediction for potential failure of the patient records systern. Having seen the light, the reader can then 
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apply SFM to predict potential safety failures at the Channel Tunnel in a didactic way. SFM relies on 
traditional systems concepts and techniques such as worldviews, holisrn, closed and open socio-technical 
systems, conceptual and idealised modelling, rich pictures, representation of structure and process, 
cybernetic control, feedback, input-output diagrams, etc. The model of the 'real world' failure is compared 
to the model of an ideal 'robust! system which represents how "the situation should be structured and 
managed if it is to be capable of operating without failure" (p. 109). The failure is regarded as an output 
deficiency of a faulty "transformation process" (p. 99), and recurring themes, identified through 
comparing 'real world' models of failure and 'ideal' models are: lack of performarice-measuring and 
control, no clear statement of purpose, lack of communication, environmental disturbances (p. 113). It is 
hardly surprising that Fortune and Peters 'find' these systems-related themes since they are the very themes 
they bring prior to their analysis, through the lens of their systems approach. A clear case of finding what 
you are looking to find. The case material seems almost incidental, and the authors discount all other 
approaches as too narrow because they concentrate on the background of the people involved or the 
context in which they act (p. 29). They argue that this obscures the common features which are not 
specific to the failure situation (p. 29). 
Fortune and Peters' approach betrays a mechanistic and simplistic standpoint on organisations, 
viewed as animals or humans who display adaptability to their environment (p. 5), as well as a 
controversial managerialistic stance, for instance: "everyone [in organisations] must pull in the same 
direction" (emphasis added, p. 7); or the view that disagreement in organisations is simply a breakdown 
in communication (p. 132) which can be remedied through designing robust communication networks (p. 
134) or better links between subsystems (p. 191). Fortune and Peters' use of the systernic approach to 
analyse and diagnose, and even predict, failures is problematic. Considering underlying organisational 
structure and behaviour, which they claim they do (p. 17), cannot be seriously achieved if the massive 
amount of existing literature and research on management and organisations other than systems thinking 
material, is disregarded (p. 41), and if critiques of the systems approach are simply ignored. For example, 
the concepts of conflict and power are conveniently disposed of in one line by recommending hierarchical 
sub-systems (p. 113). 
Moreover, the authors' quest to explain all disasters in one stroke (p. 53) through the 
"disciplined approach of systems engineering" (p. 61) epitomises a belief in universal and scientific 
solutions. The nature and origin of the 'ideal', robust and successful models proposed to rectify the failures 
go unquestioned, when it is clear that they represent technically inspired managerial solutions. It is 
unsurprising that the lessons learned are so broad and superficial (and sometimes even contradictory, see 
below) as to be universal. For instance: organisations should encourage involvement and commitrnent and 
resolve conflict without causing alienation (p. 139); different interfaces should be designed to suit 
different information needs between people (p. 199); criteria for assessing the 'rightness' of the climate 
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should be established (p. 200); management interference should be avoided (p. 242), which contradicts the 
first recommendation above; putting in place performance-measuring subsystems and acting on feedback 
information; and finally resorting to quality and zero-defect approaches (p. 253). It is perhaps more 
surprising that the authors believe that such superficial recommendations can prevent future failures, even 
if such broad advice may enable them to say that they could have predicted it when failures do take place. 
By contrast Vaughan [1996] relies on a sophisticated and extremely detailed exploration of the 
Challenger case study to try to go beyond the historically accepted retrospective version of this tragedy 
and she slowly builds a complex understanding of its causes. Instead of outside experts using 
predetermined techniques and models to analyse and correct the situation, she is concerned with 
understanding the 'native' view of events and believes that explanations have to rest on the presentation of 
detail (p. 73). She achieves this by: giving a chronological account of the history of the decision-making; 
resituating controversial actions in the stream of actions in which they occurred (for instance by extensive 
examination of paper trails, p. 56); restoring the launch decision to its position as one decision in a stream 
of decisions; and examining the connection between the environment, organisation and individual choice 
(p. 73). Through this meticulous disentanglement of the detail, she exposes micro-macro links, and reveals 
a very complex picture that shifts the attention from individual causal explanations to the structure of 
power and the power of structure and culture, "factors that are difficult to identify and yet have great 
impact on decision making in organisations" (p. xv). One of the interesting outcomes of this rich 
ethnographic work is that it contradicts conventional interpretations of the Challenger disaster, which can 
be found in, for instance, the US Presidential Commission reports which saw it as a technical failure due 
to managerial wrongdoing and production pressures. 
Starbuck and Milliken [1988], amongst others, had analysed the Challenger disaster as due to the 
effects of repeated successes, gradual acclimitisation, and differing responsibilities of engineers and 
managers (p. 320). They reason that engineers and managers who had successfully launched 24 
consecutive shuttles may well have inferred that the next flight had a very very high probability of success 
(p. 322). For Starbuck and Milliken (1988], repeated successes nurture complacency, confidence, 
inattention, routinisation and habituation (p. 323). Accordingly, "success makes a subsequent success 
appear more probable, and failure makes a subsequent success seem less likely" (p. 323). 
Investigating the meaning actions and decisions had for participants at the time those actions 
were taken, enables Vaughan to understand many of the actions which were eventually seen as 
controversial and were not understandable after the accident, since they were judged retrospectively and 
with hindsight. It enables her to undermine the common explanation of managerial wrongdoing and 
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complacency put forward, for instance, by Starbuck and Milliken. To surnmarise it somewhat, the 
Challenger disaster is seen through Vaughan's account as a mistake embedded in the banality of 
competition, an unprecedented, uncertain technology, incrementalisin, patterns of information, 
routinisation, organisational and inter-organisational structures, and a complex culture (p. xiv). 
The argument therefore illustrated is that mistakes and disasters are socially organised and 
produced by social structures and culture. "Social forces and envirorunental contingencies impinged on 
and changed organisational structures and culture, routinely affecting the worldview that decision makers 
throughout the organisation brought to their interpretation of technical information" (p. xiii). Her 
contribution to the analysis of failures is particularly interesting in that it illuminates how incidents, that 
when abstracted from context contributed to an overall picture of managerial wrongdoing, becarne 
ordinary and non-controversial (p. 60); and in how she discovers that actions defmed as deviant after the 
tragedy, can be seen as conforming to rules and culture at the time. For researchers this is of importance, 
since it goes beyond oversimplifying managerial action: either by (a) singling out managers for failing to 
assess risk properly or adhering to outdated goals and beliefs in the case of disaster, or (b) conversely, by 
celebrating managerial vision, wise risk-taking and well-conceived goals, in the case of successes. It 
enables a move away from focussing on individual decision making and reintroduces the complexity and 
ambiguity of the tasks and environments that people face. 
Another interesting facet of her work is how she refutes a scientific approach to organisational 
decision-making, through exposing the importance of understanding the position - historical, political, 
cultural, gendered, organisational and professional - of the NASA managers and engineers, and thus 
something of the worldview they bring to the interpretation of information (p. 76). Vaughan draws on 
authors concerned with social structure and culture such as Merton, Berger and Luckrnann, Short; with 
complex technical systems and risk such as Perrow; sociologists of science, technology and innovation 
such as Latour, Woolgar, Bijker, Pickering; and organisational theorists, anthropologists and sociologists 
such as DiMaggio and Powell, Goffinan, Geertz, Schein, Starbuck, Giddens, Smircich, Douglas, 
Bourdieu. The main themes occupying her book are the production of a work group culture, the culture of 
production and structural secrecy (patterns of information, organisational structure, the structure of 
regulatory relations). 
In three chapters, details about the technological aspects (e. g. the solid rocket booster joints from 
1977 to 1985), the engineering methods, NASA language, organisational procedures, institutional history, 
technical diagrams and other cultural artifacts, are used to reconstruct the production of culture in work 
groups; and to show how the institutional history of competition and scarcity created structural effects 
that impinged on decision making and the culture of production. Vaughan shows how historic changes 
altered the structure and emphasis of the space agency and created a problematic culture dominated by 
three imperatives: those of the original technical culture, bureaucratic accountability and political 
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accountability (p. 198). A business ideology emerged, infusing the culture as if NASA were a corporate 
profit seeker (e. g. contracting outý increases in non-technical staff, paying its own way) and eroded the 
strong research-oriented technical culture of Apollo (p. 210). Top NASA administrators were absorbed 
with 'myth management' seeking legitimacy by projecting and living up to a cultural image of routine, 
economical spaceflight (p. 212), which was far removed from the normal and unruly, characteristics of 
technical systems and costs. "Banking on past technical achievements, the new elites were far removed 
from hands-on technology" (p. 213). Project managers faced constant pressure to meet the demands of all 
three cultural imperatives (p. 219) and 'impressioW management (see also Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982] 
created intense preoccupation with procedural conformity (p. 220). Computerised reporting systems 
exacerbated the situation through information overload (p. 184), in a context in which the practices 
associated with the original technical culture (typically concerned with safety) were more difficult to carry 
out because of increased accountability. This book clearly and convincingly demonstrates how structures 
of power can alter the environment of decision in the workplace. The research questions raised about the 
intersection of the social and the technical, and about the relationships between power, structure and 
culture, are of paramount importance to any researcher investigating how organisations design, 
manufacture, produce and use technological products. 
2.1.6 Not just failures 
The relationship between success and failure in implementing and using technology is obviously 
not a straightforward one (Davis et al 1992]. Starbuck and Milliken [1988) believe that drawing useful 
insights from success stories is more difficult than drawing lessons from failures. Organisations learn more 
readily from failure than from success, because the causes of failure are more easily identifiable than the 
causes of success. However, it is easy to believe that success demonstrates competence and that failure 
reveals deficiencies. Managers attribute success to themselves rather than to luck. Moreover, Vaughans 
account clearly shows that failures cannot be seen as deviations from a successful norm, and that "failures 
may express exactly the same dynamics, motives, interests and logic as successes" [Robinson 1994]. 
Failures are best seen as a methodological convenience: controversy surrounding failure tends to 
reveal processes that are more easily hidden in the case of successful projects and institutions [Bijker and 
Law 1992: 22]. Particular cases may be publicised as success stories, but their evaluation may well be 
more qualified [Sauer et at 1997]. It could be argued that a system doesn't either succeed or fail and that 
partial successes/failures are probably the norm, at least not when deaths occur, such as in the Challenger 
case. Computer professionals have shown commendable zeal in searching for and publicising cases of 
computer-system failure leading to accidental deaths [MacKenzie 1994]. However, under-reporting of 
computer-related failures is the more intractable problem as there is no straightforward way of 
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investigating its extent. Many cases are culled from press coverage, only a minority from primary research 
[MacKenzie 1994: 236]. Cases take place with employers who may have no wish to see them widely 
publicised; some may be considered as too routine by the media to be worth extensive coverage. 
The failure aspects are not the only focus of attention in the present thesis. The attraction of the 
Socrate case study as a 'failure' is that it can show that choices are not obvious or unproblernatic, unlike 
what t9ey appear to be in a successful project. Compared to successes, failure studies often make it easier 
for the researcher to elicit more complex explanations from actors and to disentangle how technical and 
social issues are constructed and delineated [Akrich 1993]. For instance, claiming that the reasons for 
failure are that SNCF users showed resistance to the system or that managers couldn! t manage change 
properly, is unhelpful. It also has an implicit agenda which, by separating the technical from the social, 
often exonerates the technology. A good (transport-related! ) example is how car manufacturers dissociate 
the technical from the social when claiming that road congestion is not their problem but a social issue. 
Shnilarly, implementing information systems is not a neutral, rational and objective exercise, which in the 
'normal' course of events is successful and unproblernatic. 
Not only is the dernise of IS failures highly implausible, as Sauer points out [1993: 32], but the 
idea that failures ran be eradicated reveals the underlying assumption, often found in the IS and 
management literature, that failures are atypical and irrational and that they can be corrected using 
managerial and/or technicist means. The dominant trend is to see the introduction, design and 
development of information systems as a rational decision-making process carried out on behalf of 
management. Much of the literature on organisational issues in relation to IS "reflects a rational-econornic 
interpretation of organisational processes, and a positivist methodology" [Walsharn 1993]. Designing IS is 
equated to engineering, and it is believed that if the practices of the engineering professions are adopted 
there will be a decline in the number of failed projects in IS [Ewusi-Mensah and Przasnyski 1995]. As 
Knights and Murray [1994: 244] comment, "we note the utility of processual approaches emanating from 
within the functionalist tradition that begin to dissect the practical actions of managers, albeit from a 
perspective that usually ignores those larger contextual conditions that are a condition and consequence of 
such action". In order to help us go beyond functionalist accounts, other approaches to be considered are 
presented below. We shall concentrate on the constructivist and critical traditions, starting with the 
sociology of technology and in particular the notion of symmetry and how it relates to 
failure, actor- 
network theory and the sociology of translation. 
2.2 SOCIOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY 
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Over the last twenty years the sociology of tecbnology (e. g. Latour and Woolgar (1986], Collins 
and Pinch (1993]) has argued that there is no such thing as a social problem that does not have 
technological components; nor can there be a technological problem that does not have social 
components, and that any attempt to make such a division is bound to fail. Sociologists of technology 
theref6r-e argue that the development of technological devices should be interp-reted within an analysis of 
the struggles and growth of 'systems' or 'networks'. The constructivist approach to the study of technology 
moves away from making distinctions among technical, social, economic and political aspects of 
technological development; and uses the 'seamless web, 'systern! or 'actor-network! metaphors, which 
stress the importance of paying attention to the different but interlocking elements of physical artefacts, 
institutions and their environments, linking the micro- and macro-levels of analysis. However, it can be 
argued that in order to make sense of the complexity of thickly described case studies, it is necessary to 
employ some structuring, if simplifying, concepts. 
There are various strands of social constructivism of technology, for instance, Callon, a 'strong, 
constructivist, who refuses to categorise the elements in a system or network "when these elements are 
permanently interacting, being associated, and being tested by the actors who innovate" [Callon, 1989: 11 ]. 
Callon [1986,1991), a major advocate of the 'actor-network' approach to the sociology of technology, 
uses a higher abstraction, 'actors', that subsumes science, technology, economics, politics. 'Human' and 
, non-human! actors are the heterogeneous entities that constitute a network. By contrast, Bijker, Hughes 
and Pinch are 'weak! constructivists who preserve the social environrnent and argue that the social groups 
that constitute the social environment play a critical role in deflining and solving the problems that arise 
during the development of an artefact. Problems are deflined within the context of the meaning assigned by 
a social group or a combination of social groups. Because social groups derme the problems of 
technological development there is flexibility in the way things are designed, not one best way [Bijker, 
Hughes and Pinch, 1989: 14]. 
2.2.1 Symmetry and failure 
The sociology of scientific knowledge has, as its focus, the ways that scientific facts are created 
and used [e. g. Barnes 1996; Collins 1994]. It has arisen through the in depth study of the methods and 
techniques of practising scientists. These studies showed that methodologically it was important that they 
applied a principle of symmetry. The sociologist studying the work of a particular group of scientists 
should use the same methods, explanations and resources to explain those scientists who were 'successful' 
as those who were 'unsuccessful'. At the start of the investigation, there is no way of knowing whether the 
scientists under study are going to succeed or are going to fail. Either outcome is, in principle, equally 
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likely. Collins and Pinch [1993] applied this notion of symmetry in their study of parapsychology, which 
many scientists would regard as a 'pseudoscience' that does not follow scientific method. Their study, 
however, demonstrated that the para-psychologists were often as rigorous as their more traditional 
colleagues, if not more so, a result which could not have been found if an a priori assumption about the 
result was made. 
Borrowing from the sociology of scientific knowledge, that calls for sociologists to be impartial 
to the truth or falsity of scientific beliefs so that they can be explained 'symmetrically', historians and 
sociologists of technology therefore have argued that technology failures are of as much interest as 
success stories. Moreover, you cannot, at the start of a project, tell if it is going to succeed. This implies 
that the same methods of analysis should be used to describe successful and unsuccessful projects and 
hindsight should not be used to describe the problem. The sociology of scientific knowledge also 
recommends; that scholars interested in the development of science and technology choose controversy as 
one important site for research. The controversy is about the truth or falsity of scientific belief, or about 
the success or failure of a technology in solving problems. Different groups will define not only the 
problem differently but also success or failure, and there is not just one possible way, or one best way, of 
designing an artefact [Bijker, Hughes and Pinch 1989: 14]. The notion of symmetry helps dismantle beliefs 
and assumptions of obviousness (Akrich 1993] (in French, 'Timpression d'evidence"), as illustrated in 
Akrich's quotes in Section 1.3.2. For instance, it would be inadequate to say that Sabre was more 
efficient, socially acceptable and better designed technically than Socrate, since "all of the former's 
qualities and all of the latter's defects are irt-slilts and not rainses" (Latour [1993: 382] original emphasis) of 
the success of Sabre and the lack of success of Socrate. 
Latour's investigation [1992,1993] into the abandonment of a new revolutionary subway 
transportation system planned in the South of Paris, Aramis, is a good example of how to tackle 
symmetrically the failure story (Aramis) and the success story (VAL, a working automatic suburban train 
in the Northern city of Lille). Trying to explain only Aramis, since it has been a failure, whereas VAL has 
turned out to be a success, would be "asymmetric since it would look for social explanations only when 
something goes wrong - the straight path of happy technical development being, in contrast, self-evident 
and self-explanatory" [Latour 1993: 383]; both projects fie together many interests, and in both cases, 
these interests do not exist independently of the projects and (potential or eventual) artefacts. In following 
the design and redesign of Aramis, and all the interested groups and actors, and in gathering what they 
said, did and didn't do throughout the project, Latour assembled not only one explanation but at least 
twenty; however, he claims that he does not practice two different interpretations, one about the nature of 
the artefact and the other about the meaning it has for social groups: "it is the same task to define the 
artefact tying together the various groups or the groups tying together one artefact" [Latour 1993: 38 1]. 
His theoretical premise is what he calls "distributed monism" which he opposes to dialectical 
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arguments or dualism and, through which he believes he can render a more precise and fuller account of 
this "twofold move of people assembling around things and things forcing people into assent" [Latour 
1993: 388]. More fundamentally, "explanations in terms of social forces or in terms of technical 
trajectories are excluded since they would be asymmetrical or dualist" [Latour 1993: 383]. In other words, 
social actors are not considered as simply pressing their wills on inert passive things, and, at the other 
extreme, artefacts are not autonomous technologies [Winner 1997] pressing their goals onto human actors. 
Investigating Aramis in such a manner avoids dualistic and simplistic explanations about 'better' 
technologies or 'better' social environments. It bypasses the dialectical movement between those who tie 
their fate to the object, and those who are tied by the object. It refuses to set the failure in the following 
dualistic terms: is it because Aramis failed that the interpretations diverged so, or because the 
interpretations are so divergent that the project never became an institution, a stabilised thing? The next 
section expands upon these theoretical foundations by focussing on the notion of actor-networks, human 
and non-human actors, and translation. 
2.2.2 Actor-network theory 
Work in the sociology of scientific knowledge and social studies of technology has contributed to 
an understanding of technology as an integral part of social life. In the actor-network theory articulated by 
Latour [1987; 1989; 1991) and Callon [1986; 1992], technological innovation is viewed as an attempt to 
build and stabilise a diffuse system of allies composed of both human and non-human entities. The idea of 
an actor-network centres on the notion that the development of technology involves the building of 
networks of alliances between human and non-human actors. This corresponds to a breakdown of the clear 
divide between science and society, and it argues that there is no such thing as a social problem that does 
not have technological components, nor is there a technological problem that does not have social 
components. No project is purely technical, nor is it purely social. Actor-network theory proposes the use 
of networks of interrelated human and non-human actors who shape the way things are, 'actor-networks'. 
This enables to circumvent technological determinism in which technical projects and innovations proceed 
naturally unless they are actively stopped, and replaces it with the idea that things do not happen unless 
human and non-human actors make them happen. Techno-economic networks mix humans and non- 
humans actors. Callon [1991] contends that networks can rarely be cut up into simple descriptive 
frameworks and he suggests that, when the clouds from Chernobyl spread over Europe and contaminated 
the Lapp reindeer, then the plant as actor gained the upper hand over the plant as intermediary. According 
to Callon (19911, this explains how the discourse presenting technology as an uncontrolled and 
autonomous force [Ellul 1965, Winner 1977] gained ground over discourse that had reduced it to being a 
mere instrument that people in society used for better or for worse. 
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One of the strengths of the actor-network approach is the systematic avoidance of what can be 
called 'methodological dualisin!: the making of a priori distinctions between what is 'technical' and what is 
not (and is therefore by implication 'social') [Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1997: 85]. "Rather than assuming 
that we are dealing with two separate, but related, ontological domains - technology and organisations, - 
we propose to regard them as but phases of the same essential action" [Latour 1991: 129]. The presumed 
separation between technology and organisation is a sense-making device, one of the means by which we 
orient ourselves in the world [Bloomfield and Vurdubakis, 1994]. In ANT, identities are negotiated 
through the deployment of various human and non-human intermediaries, which thereby mediate the 
relationships between actors. Intermediaries are passed between actors. This can imply a distinction 
between actors who have agency, and intermediaries which are seen as essentially passive. However, it 
should be noted that attributions of agency versus passivity are context-dependent, made for particular 
purposes [Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1997: 106]. For instance, in the case of the use of IT in the NHS 
studied by Bloomfield and Vurdubakis (1997: 89], the intermediation between the domain of technology 
and the (social) world of the organisation is interlinked with the intermediation between the professional 
groups of management and clinicians, and their respective rationalities (medical/administrative). Thus in 
addition to constituting/negotiating the boundary between the 'technical' and the 'social', the IT-review at 
the NHS is an intermediary device which effects translations between the worlds of management and 
medicine, the cornmercial ethos of management consultancy and the public service orientation of the NHS 
[Bloomfield and Vurdubakis 1997: 89]. 
2.23 Sociology of translation 
Latour's [1991] alternative to technological determinism in which things do not happen unless 
other actors make them happen, implies that each actor who takes the project further may take it in a 
different direction than that intended by the previous actor. As the study of science has shown [Knorr- 
Cetina and Cicourel 1981: 37], to construe a certain representation of the world is in principle always at 
the same time a matter of truth and-a matter of political strategy, that is imposing one's say and of 
instituting certain consequences mdth or ngains, others (original emphasis). Latour uses the term 
Itranslation' to describe this effect, playing on both of its meanings. The innovation is translated or carried 
from one position to another in the sense of a mathematical manipulation; the innovation is also 
interpreted or transposed from one position to another in the linguistic sense of the word translation. 
Translation operates between actors: an actor gives a definition to another actor, imputes him/her/it/them 
with interests, projects, desires, strategies, reflexes, afterthoughts (Callon 1991]. An actor might be the 
company that has conceived, produced and distributed a machine, and another actor its users. The 
translation operation is regulated by conventions that are more or less local, and are always revisable 
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[Callon 1991). The final shape and position of the innovation is unlikely to be that of the original 
developers. In each stage of its life, the project is taken and adapted by the actors that become involved in 
it. Only in the rare case when the future users can be persuaded to follow the initial goals, does the 
innovation proceed as originally planned. All too often, however, the issue becomes sidetracked and 
unintended effects occur. 
In one stratagem to achieve a translation, the actor may suggest that it shares a 'common' problem 
with putative allies; that is, it may draw an equivalence between its problem and the problems which 
preoccupy others. This is known as 'probldmatisation' [Callon 1991]. If the actor can convince the allies 
that it has the necessary skills, knowledge, or other resources to devise a solution to their 'common' 
problern, then it may come to be seen as indispensable. It will have translated both the allies and their 
problern. The original problem is renegotiated while the allies become actors with a network defined by 
their common ownership of the translated problern. The negotiation of the identities of the various actors 
inside and outside an actor-network ('intdressement') is an intrinsic part of network building. Intdressement 
is: "the group of actions by which an entity ( ... ) attempts to impose and stabilise the identity of the other 
actors it defines through its probldmatisation" (Callon 1986: 207-8]. In order for an actor to secure or win 
the support of others (potential allies) it must in some way make itself indispensable to them by translating 
their interests and enrol them; it must become an 'obligatory passage point! [Callon 1986]. A successful 
negotiation/ translation of an obligatory passage point is a condition of network stabilisation (Latour 
19891. The process which 'folds up' (or stabilises) an entire network so as to transform it into a point in 
another network (which at the same time becomes more general and more encompassing), is the basis of 
the progressive passage from the micro to the macro. 
Of particular interest are the related concepts of stability, irreversibility and obligatory passage 
points. Network building is a search for stability which is enabled to the extent that changes set in train 
during network construction become irreversible [Callon 1992]; either because it would be too costly to 
reverse them or because to do so becomes unthinkable. According to Callon (1991], convergence and 
irreversibility of techno-econornic networks are both involved in the acts of translation and the networks 
that they sometimes succeed in forming. Convergence is the degree of accord (alignment and co- 
ordination) engendered by a series of translations. Controversies are translation as betrayal. The network 
is constructed according to the translations' own logic. "The more aligned and co-ordinated a network is, 
the more the actors composing it work together in a common enterprise without their status as actors being 
under constant challenge" [Callon 199 1 ]. A translation is irreversible in that it is impossible to return to a 
previous situation. Convergence can increase or decrease, and the same holds for irreversibility. Ilie 
impossibility for other (past or future) translations to develop and impose themselves is a battle, a fight 
that is never definitely won. Irreversibilisation, taken as the predetermination of translations and as the 
impossibility of a return to competing translations, is synonymous with normalisation. A network which 
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irreversibilises itself is a network that has become heavy with immutable, durable devices (frozen 
elements or 'black boxes') and inscriptions, norms of all sorts, and which as a result slips into a codified 
metrology and information system. 
2.2.4 IS and actor-network theory 
Many of these concepts can be related to understanding attempts to build socio-technical 
information systems which 'deviate' or fail; and to how that cannot be explained solely by recourse to 
mere technical factors, nor by reference to the supposed effects of some powerful social forces which were 
always there but somehow mysteriously overlooked [Bloomfield et al 1997: 130). Instead, to explain these 
deviations in information systems development, use and implementation, we can consider several of the 
processes inherent in the building of heterogeneous actor-networks. The notions of intermediation and 
translation were used with good effect in the research mentioned above on IT at the NHS by Bloomfield 
and Vurdubakis [1997]. Attempts to apply actor-network theory in other disciplines can also be found, as 
represented in the "Actor-Network Theory and After" conference in July 1997 at Keele University, in for 
example: sociology (Barry and Elam 1997], health ethics and policy [Berg 1997], ecology [Cussins 
1997], history [Harris 1997), cultural studies (Hatt 1997], medical technology [Lehoux 1997), urban 
planning [Murdoch 1997], linguistics (Myers 1997] and geography [Soderstrom 1997). A selection of the 
conference papers has recently been published as a monograph [Law and Hassard 1999]; and a recent 
issue of Organization includes a therned section on actor-network theory and managerialism, in which 
several papers discuss how actor-network theory can be used for organisational analysis [Hassard, Law 
and Lee 1999]. Also, organisational theorists at Gothenburg University are applying ANT, and in 
particular the sociology of translation, to organisational processes, institutional transformations, 
management and organisational identities [e. g. Czamiawska 1998; Adolfsson 1998; Dobers 1998]. 
In a discussion of actor-network theory and IS research, Walsham. [1997: 469] observes that 
software devices can be seen as network elements which display strong properties of irreversibility and are 
mobile inscriptions across time and space. He also reviews several recent applications of actor-network 
theory to IS empirical research, some of which were contained in the proceedings of the IFIP Working 
Group 8.2 Conference in Cambridge [Orlikowski et al 1996]. They range from: the inscription of work in 
a classification scheme for nursing work [Bowker el al 1996]; the process of translation in activity based 
costing and accounting technology [Boland and Schultze 1996]; the processes of inscription and 
translation in the role of standards in EDI systems in the Norwegian health sector [Monteiro, and Hanseth 
1996]; the attempted translation of interests in a car parking system [Vidgen and McMaster 1996]; as well 
as his own work with Sahay [Walsham and Sahay 1997] which describes how and why the attempts at 
translation and alignment of interests around the development and use of administrative geographic 
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information systems in India were a relative failure. 
However, Walsham conunents that some of this IS and actor-network research either explains 
the technology at the expense of social interactions, or conversely portrays social interactions without 
giving detailed descriptions of the technological inscriptions. Walsharn (1997] also outlines some of the 
existing criticisms and limitations of actor-network theory and classifies them into four broad strands: 
limited analysis of social structures; amoral stance; the problem of generalised symmetry; and the problem 
of description. The next section will draw and expand on WalshanYs paper and bring in other authors' 
critiques of actor-network theory, which are relevant to information systems research in general and to this 
thesis. The airn, as suggested by Walshani [1997: 473], is to combine the methodological approach and 
conceptual ideas of actor-network theory with insights and analyses drawn from other social theories. 
2.2.5 LMtations of actor-network theory 
The four broad strands of criticism identified by Walsharn ( 1997] are briefly reviewed first. One 
of the strengths of actor-network theory is in its methodological approach, which will be covered in a later 
section (Section 2.4). Criticisms of actor-network theory relate to its disregard for social structures, its 
levelling and neutralising of the role of human actors, its lack of political and moral analysis, and its 
descriptive power as opposed to its capacity for explanation. These limitations point to a need to 
complement it with some form of social theory and some theories of power and politics are suggested. 
Actor-network theory has been criticised for concentrating on how things get done to the 
detriment of how broader social structures shape socio-material practices, for giving interesting accounts 
of local contingencies and material arrangements, without taking into account macro social structures. In 
response to these criticisms, Latour [1991] has replied that the actor-network methodology can be used to 
move between levels of analysis, that the macro-structure is made of the same 'stuff as the micro-structure, 
and that macro-structures can be investigated with the same methodological tools as micro-structures. 
The symmetry between human and non-human actors, which is related to the symmetry between 
the social and the technical, society and nature, politics and science, values and facts, has been criticised 
for having gone too far in erasing all distinctions and reducing people to the status of things. In other 
words, there are political implications of levelling human and non-human differences. 
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The disregard for macro-structures has led to criticisms of actor-network theory, and of strong 
social constructivism and relativism in general, for being amoral and apolitical in how it leads to ignoring 
i., - the political biases that can underlie the spectrum of choices for relevant actors [Winner 1993). Star 
(1991] refers to the "networks of the powerful" and to how irreversible networks are only stable for some 
and discriminate against those who don't belong to the community of practice who form, use and maintain 
the network. Latour [ 199 11 responded to criticisms of apoliticism and moral relativism thus: 
"Refusing to explain the closure of a controversy by its consequences does not mean that we are 
indifferent to the possibility ofjudgements that transcend the situation. For network analysis does 
not prevent judgement any more than it prevents differentiation. Efficiency, truth, profitability, 
and interest are simply properties of networks, not of statements. Domination is an effect not a 
cause. In order to make a diagnosis or a decision about the absurdity, the danger, the amorality, 
or the unrealism of an innovation, one must first describe the network. " [Latour 1991: 130] 
The argument put forward by Latour is that social constructivism is not in itself amoral, and that 
describing the network is not only a prerequisite but the only wa to get at explanations: 
"The explanation emerges once the description is saturated; if we display a socio-technical 
network - defining trajectories by actants' association and substitution, defining actants by all the 
trajectories in which they enter, by following translations and, finally, by varying the observer's 
point of view - we have no need to look for additional causes. Explanation is the stabilisation. of a 
network. If one is capable of explaining effects of causes, it is because a stabilised network is 
already in place" [Latour 1991: 129]. 
This is related to the criticism that actor-network theory is a method for describing, but not for 
explaining. Callon's answer [1991] is that explanations are only offered by networks which increase their 
convergence and irreversibility (an agreement getting firmer), and that the descriptions delivered by 
intermediaries turn into explanations (and even predictions). This leaves the question of how to explain 
the failure to converge in the case of a divergent, reversible and unstable network, which consequently 
cannot offer an explanation (but maybe a series of conflicting explanations? ). If all explanations are the 
result of a stabilised network already in place, one assumes that one (and actors too? ) could use 
explanations of other (previous? ) stable overlapping and neighbouring networks, but then the problem is 
transposed to where does one stop? As Walsham [1997: 476] observes, identifying all of the 
heterogeneous associations within an actor-network is difficult enough, let alone those of overlapping 
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networks. 
2.2.6 IS, ANT and structuration theory 
Walsharn [1997: 476] acknowledges that Latour's extreme position is useful in forcing us to 
rethinlýissues and is a valuable analytical device, and that describing the network in detail is a good 
contribution of actor-network theory to building an empirical base. However, he thinks that it does not 
contribute directly to debating moral and political issues. He asks the question: "where do the moral 
judgements come from if not from ideas that transcend the situation? " and adds that political and ethical 
theories cannot come from the basis of the network alone (Walsharn 1997: 475]. He suggests to 
complement actor-network theory with Giddens' structuration theory which, he asserts, offers 
sophisticated models of social action and structure from individual to global levels: structure constrains 
actions, but at the same time, human action serves to establish structure; modalities link action and 
structure. There are three modalities: interpretative, facility and norm. Interpretative refers to how agents 
understand; facility refers to the mobilisation of resources of domination and IT can be said to constitute a 
system of domination; norms guide action through sanctions and IT codifies norms, therefore information 
systems are power instruments because they have embedded rules. 
However, Monteiro and Hanseth [1996] argue that conceptualisations of IT based on Giddens' 
structuration theory [e. g. Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski and Robey 199 1 ), despite being very convincing, 
"lack in precision regarding the specifics of the IS" (p. 326); and "are not fine-grained enough with 
respect to the technology to form an appropriate basis for understanding" (p. 328). They claim that actor- 
network theory is more effective for describing how minute, technical design decisions are interwoven 
with organisational issues. In their study of information infrastructure standards, actor-network theory 
proved useful in "accounting for how standards acquire stability, how they become increasingly 
, irreversible"' (p. 327); another important aspect of actor-network theory for Monteiro and Hanseth is its 
"potential to account for how restricted interpretative flexibility across great distances can be obtained" 
(p. 332). Nevertheless, they believe that the superiority of actor-network theory over structuration theory 
only applies to the issue of "being specific about the technology" (p. 330) and they conclude that actor- 
network theory cannot properly deal with institutions (p. 339). More recently, Hanseth and Monteiro 
[1998] have complemented actor-network theory with: (a) new institutionalism, after Powell and 
DiMaggio, to understand how institutions become stable and reproduce themselves; and (b) with 
Bourdieu's theory of practice and his notion of 'habitus' to account for the stability of action, in order to 
examine the design and use of electronic patient records in Norwegian hospitals. 
One of the difficulties anticipated in using actor-network theory to analyse the Socrate case 
study, is how to deal with not only one but large numbers of actor-networks and how they connect and 
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interact. In their analysis of power and conflict in IS strategy within UK local government, Kawalek and 
Hackney [ 1998: 12 10] refer to Giddens' central tenet of agency, and how this has been used to determine 
action based around internal organisational politics, resulting from the imperatives of the market and the 
goal of profit maximisation. However, they argue that operationalisations of the agency concept have 
tended to ignore wider societal issues of conflict, particularly in the management and ISAT literatures; in 
fact, Giddens' view of structure is multidimensional in that "capitalist priduction is a complex 
cohesion where key social issues such as ethnicity, gender, class, knowledge and the state play a key 
conflicting role to generate structure" (p. 1211). Kawalek and Hackney [1998] suggest to reconsider 
Giddens' work which they think "provides a theoretical scheme with the potential of being applied to 
many contexts at an organisational and societal level" (p. 1212). In their analysis of IS strategy in local 
government, Kawalek and Hackney (1998] bring in the doctrine of competitiveness and recent legislation, 
the structuring of organisations and initiating of change as the privilege of the powerful, and the link 
between institutional and managerial action. They aim to achieve a "wider critical historicism" (p. 122 1) 
and transcend the distinction between inter and outer organisational politics and social structures through 
issues of power and politics. Other authors, reviewed next, have suggested to apply the notion of 
power/knowledge, after Foucault, and to draw on political approaches to power in organisation. 
2.3 POWER AND POLITICS 
2.3.1 Power/knowledge 
What seems to be missing in actor-network theory and which, as shown above, researchers have 
tried to redress, is a recognition of the role of power and its relationship to networks and knowledge. 
Power has also been the topic of recent major IS conferences panels e. g. Hanseth et al [1999] and Butler 
et al [ 1998] and of books [Knights and Murray 1994; Introna, 1997]. According to Law [ 1991: 18] power, 
whatever form it may take, is "recursively woven into the intricate dance that unites the social and the 
technical". To go ftu-ther, one way of including power is to suggest that translation is a political 
representation. Callon and Latour say: 
"The scattered wills are recapitulated in the person of the sovereign who says what we want, and 
whose word has force of law and cannot be contradicted. ( ... ) After political science, the science 
of econornics also claims to be able to say not only what the goods, services and people 
desire, but also what they are worth" [Callon and Latour 1981: 296]. 
Knights, Murray and Willmott [1997: 151] show that the sociology of translation is useful for 
exploring the processes through which support for an electronic trading system in the UK life insurance 
so 
Chapter 2 
industry has developed, been sustained and was rendered virtually irreversible. However, they find that 
Calloes conceptual framework "marginalises consideration of the wider structures of inequality that are a 
condition and consequence of the reproduction of power/knowledge relations" (p. IS 1). They suggest to 
complement Callon's analysis of the dynamics of network building with a Foucauldian appreciation of 
how power and knowledge circulate throughout organisations and societies, as a principal medium of 
network construction and reproduction. Network-building activities require considerable reflective and 
political activity, however, and even the most astute actor can be blown off course by unpredictable events 
and the emergence of new actors on the network stage. Knights, Murray and Willmott [ 1997: 153] suggest 
that "new 'regimes of truth! ( ... ) undergo a process of multiple translation and accident as their champions 
rethink, and are challenged, subverted and blown off course by recalcitrant actors and unexpected 
intermediations". 
According to Bloomfield el al (1997], the distinctive property of information systems is their 
capacity to create rather than merely report organisational reality. "The implication of this constructivist 
dimension of the development and use of IT is that the nature of management control takes on a different 
modality as a result of attempts to implement it through the medium of IT" [Bloomfield et al 1997: 114]. 
Similarly to Knights, Murray and Willmott [1997], Coombs et al [1992] argue that a disciplinary 
conception of power, inspired in part by the work of Foucault, provides a more substantive way of 
accounting for these properties of IS. The power examined here relies on the self-disciplinary effects of 
reconceptualisations of practice and professional identity [Coombs et al 1992]. While IT is the very 
medium through which social relations may be articulated, forms of knowledge intersect with power, and 
this means engaging in a'regime of truth', in which the world is made meaningful (represented) according 
to a particular set of interests. Such information resources are not divided equally in organisations, of 
course; hence, the introduction of IT to mediate data provision also serves to reaffirm an institutional 
order of authority (Orlikowski and Robey 1991]. IT is chronically implicated in the modalities through 
which structures of don-driation and legitimation are reproduced. 
As illustrated by Bloomfield et al [1997] in their fieldwork on IT in the NHS, the introduction 
and application of concepts previously associated with commercial organisations; have been the object of 
ongoing struggles and renegotiations; and "the internalisation of such constitutive concepts as costs, 
overheads, assets, customers, quality, etc. and the willingness of an organisatioes members to construct 
their world and their work in terms of these concepts, is an instance of the exercise of disciplinary power" 
(p. 115). 
2.3.2 Politics 
Of particular interest is Knights and Murray (1994]'s emphasis on the political context of IT 
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implementation and how management practice is influenced by, and has consequences for, broader socio- 
political, economic and organisational conditions. They argue that "it is largely through the social 
interpretation, construction or reconstruction of these conditions and what they mean for the organisation 
that specific political alliances are mobilised and particular information systems are made possible" 
[Knights and Murray 1994: xii]. They criticise constructivist and actor-network approaches for their 
unwillifigness to bring into consideration general socio-economic conditions and theorise the basis of 
power in contemporary society. However, Knights and Murray do draw upon actor-network analyses of 
the social achievement of technological innovations through the construction of webs or networks of 
actors. They also value actor-network insistence that technologies are constructed through social process 
comprising accident, fortuitous circumstance and political action. 
In examining the different perspectives to technological and organisational change, Knights and 
Murray propose a two-dimensional framework, derived from Burrell and Morgan, that "differentiates 
theoretical approaches by their analytical focus (global or macro versus local or micro) and their view of 
politics (abnormal or disruptive versus normal or inescapable). " [Knights and Murray 1994: 244). Using 
this framework it is possible to understand the diverse range of positions taken by the technological 
change literature. I have added to this framework the items printed in italics in (Figure 2.2], as they are of 
interest to the present thesis and are reviewed above (structuration theory in Section 2.2.6, 
power/knowledge in Section 2.3.1) and below (institutionalisation theory in Section 2.3.3, power in 
Section 2.3.4). In terms of methodological focus, global studies tend to rely on systemic or structural 
factors such as innovation, class or gender. Micro studies tend to produce dense descriptions of 
technological and organisational change but at the risk of loosing their analytical power, although most 
studies combine elements of both the global and the local. On the other hand, authors tend to see politics 
in one of two ways: either as disruptive to the smooth and rational management of an organisation or as an 
inescapable fact of organisational life [Knights and Murray 1994: 3]. Knights and Murray [1994: 244] 
position themselves primarily in the segment that combines a focus on localised events and that regards 
politics as an essential feature of organisational life. 
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Af 
rp%parch Structuration theory 
Instimionalisation theory 
Technological detenninism Social shaping of technology 
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Figure 2.2 A classification of theoretical approaches to technological change 
[adapted from Knights and Murray 1994: 2] 
However, they see local sites of social process as part and parcel of the global relations that 
condition and are reproduced in those localities. They particularly see information as socially constructed 
"to convey politically charged messages to politically motivated people" (p. 252). Organisational change is 
a political process; change has several objectives, some of them contradictory in their implications, and 
many giving expression to opportunistic and implicit tactics, agendas or strategies. De facto change 
emerges from conflicts at tactical level, ad hoc management decisions, and accidents, rather than from a 
rational planning process. "Although dominant coalitions will probably be involved, strategy [or change 
or resistance] can emerge from anywhere in the organisation. Organisational goals are not unitary, may be 
conflicting, and are frequently left unstated or unclear for political reasons" [Knights et al 1997: 28]. 
By contrast, the IS literature is predorninantly rationalist and subscribes to prescriptive 
managerialism, which claims to offer advice on how to manage IT using a descriptive norrn. It does not 
make reference to the political character of IT developments and their essential contestability (Knights 
and Murray 1997: 37]; whereas they have found that: "tensions surrounding IT management are 
systematically related to complex sets of power, managerial and market relations" [Knights and Murray 
1997: 37]. Strategy and change are a contested terrain of discourse rather than a description of a rational 
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process or a prescription for rational action. Knights el al [1997: 30] recommend that we should 
concentrate on the internal political context, as well as on the social and institutional aspects of the 
external context; and that we should not neglect the way in which organisations, both reflect and 
reproduce the major social inequalities in society and hence the essentially contestable nature of 
organisational relations. 
Knights and Murray's understanding of power is opposed to the individual conception of power 
as a property or capacity of individuals or institutions. Power is synonymous with social relations [Knights 
and Murray 1997: 42]. Conflict is conditioned by, and regulated through, the exercise of material and 
symbolic power. This power can be used to mobilise particular views of the market and technology in 
order to legitimate choices that may have more to do with specific individual and/or collective interests 
than corporate objectives [Knights and Murray 1997: 43]. The formulation and implementation of IT 
strategies is a social process in which political activities are related to the choices being made, the 
structures of organisational control and co-ordination, and the changes taking place in the organisation! s 
broader environment [Knights and Murray 1997: 44]. 
2.3.3 Institutionalisation of IS 
Similarly to Knights and Murray [1994], Silva [1997] believes that organisations do not have 
power structures but are comprised of power relations, which determine information systems, "and that an 
adequate interpretation of such relations underscores the success or failure of technology-based systems" 
[Silva et al 1997: 512]. They criticise Walsharn [1993]'s use of structuration theory in that he claims that 
IS are power instruments but does not spell out the relationship between IT and power (Silva et al 
1997: 513]. Although they value Walsharn [1993] and Orlikowski's [1992] use of structuration theory in 
taking into account the relation between action and structure, Silva and Backhouse [1997: 394] state that 
Orlikowski, for instance, does not discuss fully the political factors that influence the institutionalisation 
of IS. Silva [1997] and Silva and Backhouse (1997] believe that the institutionalisation of information 
systems is an outcome of power relations, and they propose a framework that can provide a starting point 
for researching the legitimisation, control and political dimensions of information systems. 
Their framework draws on actor-network theory and the sociology of translation, but they 
complement it with institutionalisation theory and the model of 'circuits of power' proposed by Clegg 
[ 19891. They select the brand of organisational institutionalisation theory (after Meyer and Rowan) which 
concentrates on the processes that lead to the institutionalisation of rules and how they become legitimate. 
The other brand of institutionalisation theory (after Powell and DiMaggio) focuses on how organisations 
structure themselves by taking elements from the environment, and seeks to explain similarities among 
organisations [Silva and Backhouse 1997: 392]. By contrast Hanseth and Monteiro [1998] mentioned 
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Unlike Markus [ 1983] and others, who adopt a voluntaristic approach to power which explains 
power via mechanical metaphors (e. g. individuals or groups affecting other individuals or groups), Silva 
and Backhouse [1997]'s approach is closer to Foucault's concepts of power and knowledge (see Section 
2.3.1):.. they wish to explain "the process of how an information system becomes objectivised and taken- 
for-granted knowledge" (p. 393). They assert that their research is also complementary to, for instance, 
Knights and Murray's (1994] valuable work on the political features of implementation and design of 
information systems [Silva and Backhouse 1997: 393). They agree with Monteiro and Hanseths [1996] 
criticism of Orlikowksi and Walsham for not describing the influence of social factors on IS and how 
interests are inscribed in IS to make them irreversible or durable, the latter of which Monteiro and 
Hanseth do using actor-network theory. 
On the other hand, Silva and Backhouse [ 1997: 3 94] estimate that Monteiro and Hanseth's ( 1996] 
explanations of the institutionalisation of IS do not focus on the political elements. Hanseth and Monteiro 
[1998], though, have since incorporated 'new' institutionalism (Powell and DiMaggio or 
institutionalisation of organisational structures) to enrich their analysis, again in contrast to Silva and 
Backhouse [1997) who use the first form of institutionalisation theory (Meyer and Rowan or 
institutionalisation of rules and legitimation), as mentioned above. Silva and Backhouse (1997] believe 
that "power is a concept with many approaches and theories in social sciences and (... ) that some of these 
theories are not mutually exclusive but complementary" (p. 395). Their circuits of power framework is an 
attempt to integrate several of these theories of power. 
23.4 Clegg's circuits of power 
According to Silva and Backhouse (1997: 395], Clegg's [1989] frameworks of power "should 
lead us to understand the relationship between the authority and politics of organisations". The circuits of 
power framework considers power as circulating in three different circuits: the episodic circuit; the social 
integration circuit; the system integration circuit, which are all linked by obligatory passage points (Clegg 
1989; Silva et al 1997: 513; Silva and Backhouse 1997: 395), see [Figure 2-3). 
In the =iqndic circuit of power (which represents causal power), agents struggle to control 
resources and other agents may resist. The circuit will be completed (the information system designed and 
implemented) when the recognition of the resources utilised to carry out the outcomes are identified. 
However, information systems will affect organisations in two other dimensions. They may change the 
organisational norms, meanings and membership of groups (social integration); and they will affect the 
way jobs are performed (system integration). Those agents who successfully control resources will be the 
ones with a stronger power base. The power base of agents is given by the circuits of social and system 
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integration. 
RI nnial integmtion (dispositional power) refers to rules for meaning, group relations and 
membership [Silva el al 1998: 514] and is therefore related to institutional order. Bringing about this 
circuit will lead to the identification of the legitimate and illegitimate dimensions of power within the 
organisation. The circuit of social integration will comprise the norms, rules and meanings that identify 
i. - and allow the integration of a particular group. 
SI rms of the material conditions: the ygern integration (which facilitates power) is defined in te 
material means of production, but also the material means of organisation and violence, or in other words, 
the techniques of production and discipline [Silva et al 1998: 515), which, according to Clegg, cannot be 
separated. New techniques of production and discipline, such as inforination systems, imply new agencies 
and new obligatory passage points "that the social integration circuit niight find difficult to resolve" [Silva 
et al 1998: 515]. 
Whenever an innovation is introduced in organisations, this creates new meanings and therefore 
disturbs the circuit of social integration. Success in implementation will depend greatly on the ability to 
translate the new rules and norms implied by the system into pieces of discourse that other members of the 
organisation can understand and accept. The new meanings are fixed in obligatory passage points. An 
nbligato ,. _. 
int (Section 2.2.3) is a rhetorical device that presents the solution for a problem and 
that will allow the formation of alliances and the control over resources that agents need to achieve their 
outcomes. Information systems can be considered as obligatory passage points [Silva and Backhouse 
1997: 400). In the case of this thesis, computerised reservation systems are an example of an obligatory 
passage point since commercial airlines in effect present them as an unavoidable way for travel agents to 
do business. 
one implication of this framework is that "analysts should focus on how information systems are 
used as a means of control and discipline" [Silva et al 1998: 516), and this is strongly related to the 
Foucauldian notion of power/Imowledge outlined above [see Bloomfield el al 1997]. Silva et al [1997] 
also incorporate the actor-network concept of translations already outlined in Section 2.2.3. The concept 
of obligatory passage points originates from the sociology of translation. 
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Figure 2.3 The circuits of power 
[based on Clegg 1989: 214 and Silva et al 1997: 514] 
Silva and Backhouse [1997] use this framework to analyse the London Ambulance Services 
computer-aided dispatch failure, already mentioned above. They found that exogenous environmental 
contingencies (e. g. managerial discourses available about strategies supported by IT) influence the circuits 
of system and social integration. Using the episodic circuit of power enables an analysis of the power 
struggle dynamic between LAS management and staff. But using the episodic circuit of power on its own 
would not explain why the system was rejected, which is explained by the fact that the circuits of system 
and social integration were not fixed in a successful obligatory passage point [Silva and Backhouse 
1997: 404]. In terms of social integration, the new rules sternming from the new tasks were not translated 
successfully [Silva and Backhouse 1997: 406]. The authors conclude that: the translation of the actors in 
the obligatory passage point, the computer-aided dispatch system, failed, despite managers having the 
power in terms of money and decision-making; this "shows how risky it is to prematurely consider 
information systems as black boxes producing outputs such as change in culture and power structures 
without considering the social and system integration" [Silva and Backhouse 1997: 408-409]. 
Silva et al [1997] also apply the circuits of power framework to the case of the introduction of a 
federal IT infrastructure by a UK borough council wanting to become a 'networked' local authority. The 
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translations of this federal 'networked' model, the obligatory passage point gave rise to contradictory 
interpretations, made clear through the analysis of the social integration circuit, and failed. Perhaps most 
interestingly, the authors found that "both system and social integration were affected by exogenous 
contingencies" in the form of "economic crisis, internal market ideas, and maxiagerial practices supported 
by IT", i. e. cost-benefit and cost-effective techniques, leading to staff redundancies and outsourcing (Silva 
et al 1997: 522-523]. 
2.3.5 Macro/Micro 
Using Clegg's circuits of power helps describe and analyse how inforination systems are situated 
within power circuits and authority relationships in organisations. The issue of 'macro' social structures, 
and in particular the correlation between macro factors, power and politics within organisations need to be 
considered further, and this is related to the broader and ongoing debate about micro and macro 
approaches to sociology. 
Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel [1981] defme micro-sociology as the study of the rr&ro-processes of 
social life and includes symbolic interactionisrn, ethnomethodology, social phenomenology and cognitive 
sociology; and they describe macro-sociology as the study of society, social institutions and socio-cultural 
change. These authors, amongst many, have advocated an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies 
through a re-construction of macro-social theory and methodology based upon a micro-sociological 
foundation since: "concrete social interactions may be considered the building blocks for macro- 
sociological conceptions" [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 7]; and "macro-social phenomena are unknown and 
unknowable unless they can be based upon knowledge derived from the analysis of micro-social 
situations" [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 8]. The last thirty years have seen a rejection of macro-sociology and its 
perceived social determinism (the social whole determines matters for the individual). Many have been 
attracted by micro-sociologies, which turn to interactions in social situations as the relevant 
methodological 'units, and to how actors's meanings are constituted with social relationships through the 
"interlocking of intentionalities" [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 9]. In parallel, micro-sociologies have grown more 
concerned with the additional element of the context in which interaction is embedded and how actors 
manipulate contextual limitations and increase their contextual knowledge [Knoff-Cefina 198 1: 10-11 ]. 
Contexts (settings, occasions) are not viewed as 'external environments' to which individuals 'adapf but 
are themselves seen as (re)constructed in social action through an interpretive process based upon 
presupposition and knowledge of broader societal institutions concepts [Knorr-Cefina 1981: 12]. 
For instance, MacKenzie (1988] states that, though traditional macro-sociology is more relevant 
politically than micro-sociology, "the former is insufficiently puzzled by the phenomenon of structural 
power". He claims that the 'micro' concerns have great relevance to an understanding of power, for 
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example in investigations of scientific and technical change, through connections of power and knowledge 
and/or machinery. He argues that: the micro/macro distinction is probably a false and potentially 
damaging dichotomy; that structural power, science and technology all involve local situations; that it is 
worth investigating what is implicitly political in localities; and that there is a direct link between a local 
situation and questions of knowledge and power in its mostmacro' sense. 
Many sociologists and social constructivists in particular have therefore dismantled the 
traditional dichotomies between the notions of power/powerlessness, structure/action, 
collectivity/individuals, usually associated with macro/rrdcro, and power is now seen as emerging from 
local arenas of action. Foucault, for instance, has argued that power must be analysed as a microprocess of 
social life. Macro-influences cannot be known through direct evidence, local social situations are seen as 
the product of multiple forces and powers associated with strategic positions, of techniques of persuasion 
and tactical moves, conversations, implicit alliances, negotiations, interest affiliations, and rnicro-elernents 
of social reality include interaction, relationships, internal environments, power, etc. 
In this revised micro/macro climate, Knorr-Cetina [1981: 25) points to two emerging conceptions 
of macro-social phenomena: the aggregation hypothesis and the hypothesis of unintended consequences, 
which both attempt to reconstruct macro-sociology from a micro-sociological perspective. The 
aggregation and unintended hypotheses both regard the macro-order as an emergent phenomenon 
composed of the sum or the unintended effects of micro-events [Knoff-Cetina 1981: 40]. 
According to the first hypothesis, all evidence regarding macroscopic phenomena must be 
aggregated from micro-episodes or micro-situations in which situated interactions are partially structured 
by past definitions, and at the same time always open to reinterpretations [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 26]. 
According to Callon [ 199 1 ], aggregation is not a procedure invented by the observer in order to simplify 
the complexity of reality, it is the very movement of social life. 
The second hypothesis is of particular interest here in that it relates to the failure debate outlined 
at the beginning of this chapter. Social situations exhibit chains of events and local interventions, which 
are the interrelations of scenes of action and agents construed through complex representations of mutual 
knowledge, intentions, projects, interests, etc. which lead to unintended outcomes, in addition to intended 
outcomes [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 33]. This draws on Harrd's [1981] analogy with the emergent properties 
manifested by a whole but not by its parts in the natural sciences; and on Giddens's [1981] argument that 
the formation and transformation of social institutions must be seen in the light of the unintended 
consequences of social action, which condition social reproduction and determine the process of 
structuration through which systems are maintained and change over time. The organisational sociologists 
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Knights and Murray [1997: 44] also draw on this notion when they say that there is an "on-going cycle of 
decision-making and implementation, each stage of which necessarily generates unforeseen consequences 
and open-ended social interactions and developments" when implementing information technology in 
organisations. 
Curiously, the idea of unintended consequences has being recycled recently, in a somewhat 
distortýd manner, by some authors, one of which is Tenner [1996). He holas that major technological 
advances lead to paradoxical, unforeseen and unintended effects, and that the technologies we have 
created are getting even and 'biting bacle, and that, as we complicate the systems which govern our lives, 
'revenge effects' multiply. He presents a kind of technological pessimism and gloom and doom vision 
when stating that new disasters (as opposed to classical and predictable ones) "may be global and gradual, 
from radioactive isotopes in milk in the 1950s to climate change in the 1990s" [Tenner 1996: 24-25]; and 
that "new disasters may ( ... ) be unintended consequences of prior solutions" [Tenner 1996: 256]. However, 
this approach seems based on deterministic (essentialist) and contradictory assumptions about nature and 
culture. For example, the notions that nature has a "tendency to strike back" (p. 273) when abused, and that 
"human culture" has created most revenge effects through greed and arrogance "not some inherent will of 
the machine" (p. 276) or 'natural' characteristic, are problematic. 
The reformulation of the macro-micro question is one of the underpinnings of actor-network 
theory in its adoption of a "birdseye perspective to reconstruct the network of interrelated affairs" [Knorr- 
Cetina 1981: 33], and in its rejection of the macro as an explanation. "The macro appears no longer as a 
particulair Inytr of social reality an top of rnicro-episodes composed of their interrelation, their 
aggregation or their unforeseen effects. Rather, it is seen to reside within these rnicro-episodes where it 
results from the stairturing prartires of agents" [Knorr Cetina 1981: 34, original emphasis]. Callon and 
Latour [1981: 277] also conceive of the macro as actively construed and pursued within micro-social 
action. They comment that: micro-actors "blow themselves up to a macro-size by making themselves the 
spokesmen of inany others whose following they enlist, through their summary representations" (which 
Knorr-Cetina refers to as the representation hypothesis, p. 40); and that the macro-order consists of micro- 
actors who have successfully translated other actors' wills into a single will for which they speak, and 
because of the forces on which it can rely. 
Furthermore, structures do not simply reside in the actions of people, they exist in a network of 
heterogeneous material arrangements. Latour [1991: 129] urges to abandon the divide between material 
infrastructure and social superstructure and claims that, when actors and points of view are aligned, we 
enter a stable definition of society that looks like domination ("society made durable"). However, Knorr- 
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Cetina [1981: 41, original emphasis] remarks that, pushed to its extreme, this "denies the existence of a 
macro-order apart ftam the macro-representations which are accomplished in micro-social action". In this 
perspective, macro-structures are created by routine inferences, interpretation and summary procedures, 
and do not control micro-events (p. 51). In other words, the degree to which macro-structures control 
micro-events is a continual matter of controversy and struggle in social life (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 39]. 
Avoiding taking the macro-order at face value is a strong motivation and a sound basis for 
wanting to study its production in micro-social environments instead. Knorr-Cetina (1981: 40] argues that 
this does not "neglect the issue of power which hides beneath everyday differentiations between 'big' and 
'small' actors" and that, instead, it "relocates and redresses questions of power". On the other hand, she 
warns that a microscopic recording of face-to-face interaction may not allow us to grasp whatever is the 
whole of the matter, even if she contends that "it may be enough to begin with [in order] to hear the 
macro-order tick" [Knorr-Cetina 1981: 42]. 
Mse-ro, mt--.; n and mirrO 
Other authors have suggested that transforrnations of social reality occur between levels. Duster 
[1981] studied income tax regulation and community-based programmes dedicated to the enactment of 
this regulation, according to different levels of abstraction of social reality and enquiry, so as to challenge 
the microscopic nature of all events [Duster 1981: 109]. In his analytical framework, macro-phenomena 
consist of the effects of the unintended consequences of micro- or middle- range action. For Harrd 
[ 1981: 13 9] it is the macro-order composed of such effects which acts as a selection environment for social 
action, for example by determining which of the rnicro-mutations of social life will take off and persist as 
a component of social change [Harrd 1981: 1391. Harrd proposes a theory of social change in which the 
notion of diffuse social influence from unknown structural properties of a macro-order plays a part [Harrd 
1981: 158]. 
In Giddens's [1981] duality of structure, based on the tension between action theory and 
institutional analysis, rules and resources instantiated in social systems "structure" actors' actions; 
structural qualities generate social action and are reproduced through these actions. Knowledgeability and 
capability of social actors are bounded by unintended consequences of (previous) social action which 
condition social reproduction. Unintended consequences have a key role in explanations of social change 
since they divert social action from a structured course (Giddens 1981: 161 ]. 
Callon and Latour [ 198 1 ], on the other hand, do not believe in a micro-macro distinction. They 
do not think that we draw closer to social reality by descending to micro-negotiations or by rising towards 
the macro-actors. Macro-actors are not more complex than micro-actors and are just micro-actors "seated 
on black boxes" [Callon and Latour 1981: 299]. 7bey also, symnetrically, oppose the view that rnicro- 
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negotiations are truer and more real than the abstract, distant structures of the macro-actors [Callon and 
Latour 1981: 300]. Furthermore, "by taking for granted differences in level and size between actors, (one] 
ratifies past, present and future winners ( ... ) finding favour with the powerful" (p. 300). 
The macro-micro question is obviously complex and unresolved. Actor-network theory is also 
complex and difficult to use, since describing actors and networks, even when including Clegg's power 
i- 
circuits as illustrated above (Section 2.3A), runs the risk of producing asociaf, apolitical, ahistorical, and 
decontextualised accounts. In this case study, on the other hand, rnacro-actors and structures in the 
transport context are difficult to ignore and include 'big' business and 'big! politics, even though they may 
well be previous, stable, irreversible, actor-networks, which are conditioning the current actor-network. 
2.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The macro-micro problem is particularly relevant to the Socrate case study and, clearly, the 
purpose here is not to resolve these socio-philosophical issues, but merely to avoid some of the pitfalls 
identified by researchers, such as: social or technological determinisrn, focusing only on either the micro 
or macro levels, and adhering to either micro or macro-actors' explanations unquestioningly. 
As a constructivist theory, actor-network theory is, as claimed by Monteiro and Hanseth [1996], 
very effective for describing how minute, technical design solutions are interwoven with organisational 
issues; and as claimed by Walsharn [ 1997], a good contribution to building an empirical base. However, 
as discussed above, it tends to ignore wider societal issues of conflict and it needs to be complemented 
with some critical analysis of power and political relations. Referring to Knights and Murray's [1994] 
classification of theoretical approaches to technological change in Figure 2.2, the theoretical framework 
of this thesis is localised and envisages politics as an inescapable feature of organisational life (the top 
right hand comer of the matrix). However, it is important to conceive of local sites as part and parcel of 
global relations. Organisations both reflect and reproduce the major social inequalities in society, thus 
Knights el al [1997] recommend concentrating on the internal political context as well as the social and 
institutional aspects of the external context. 
Using Clegg's circuits of power, combined with Callon and Latour's sociology of translation, can 
also prove productive in the present case study in order to analyse how translations failed (i. e. obligatory 
passage points giving rise to contradictory interpretations). However, Silva et al' s[ 1997] have found that 
in utilising the circuits of power framework to analyse IS implementation in organisations, the role of 
exogenous contingencies such as economic crisis, internal market ideas and IT-supported managerial 
practices, must not be underestimated. Furthennore, "the activity generated and reproduced through 
managers ( ... ) is rooted in market relations", and "markets and information regarding the state of particular 
markets do not exist independently of the conceptualisations and interpretations that organisational actors 
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have of them" [Knights and Murray 1997: 41]. Organisational uncertainties are reproduced through 
markets, and this leads to tensions between individual and collective goals. In our case study, the changing 
nature and perception of transport markets, in particular the issue of co-operation versus competition 
(detailed in Chapter 4), are good examples of this. 
"The management of IT can first and foremost be understood as a process of organisational and 
extra-organisational politics responding to, and acting upon, perceived imperatives generated 
through the socially constructed phenomena of 'markets', 'technologies' and 'organisations'. These 
phenomena appear to take on a life of their own and the individual confronts them as a 
constraining or facilitating reality. The asymmetrical distribution of power as access to, and 
control over, material and symbolic resources allows certain individuals, groups, and classes to 
dominate a socially constructed development, design, use, and management of specific 
technologies. But tensions between managers locked into particular labour processes and the very 
unpredictability of markets suggests that this domination cannot necessarily guarantee the 
successful use and development of IT. This analysis would suggest that the role of IT in 
organisational change is neither pre-ordained nor predictable" [Knights and Murray 1997: 53]. 
Clearly, it is believed here that macro-structures do not control rnicro-events, and that social 
processes exhibit chains of intended and unintended outcomes, which it is argued, explain failures. Some 
human perspectives win over others in the construction of technologies and truths, some human actors go 
along with the will of other actors, and some humans resist being enrolled, in an unpredictable manner. 
In terms of clarity of analysis and presentation, Drummond's [1996: 180-185] use of macro, 
'meso' and micro levels in her Taurus case study seems appropriate and useful here, and is as fOllOws- 
The macro level refers to the wider context and opens the analysis to the possibility that domination is tied 
to the "deep structure of power" [Drummond 1996: 181]. Macro-level forces in her case study were the 
Establishment (surrounding the London Stock Exchange) and the power struggle within the City. At the 
Imeso' level, actors pursue their multiple, respective and sometimes conflicting interests. An example at 
Taurus was the institutionalisation of regular information gathering exercises through various reporting 
committees; each move is entirely logical, as the product of a previous decision, leading members to say 
"this is what the committee said we ought to do". The micro level includes issues of commitment, 
performance feedback and working practices. The categories already used in the introduction (Section 
1.7 and Figure 1.2) i. e. macro, organisational and micro levels of analysis correspond to these divisions. 
Nevertheless, as Walsham points out [1997: 469): "actor-network theory is both a theory and 
methodology combined", in that the researcher needs to "trace and document network elements, both 
human and non-human, processes of translation and inscription, the creation of black boxes or immutable 
mobiles and the degree of stability and irreversibility of networks and their elements" during his or her 
empirical work. This is no small task for a complex network (p. 470). Walsham (1997: 476] observes that 
actor-network theory studies produce a veritable mass of detail which often lead to book-length outputs - 
for example Latour's monograph on Aramis [1992] examined earlier, but also Vaughan's [1996] and 
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Drummond's (1996] books which are typical of in-depth sociological case studies. Walsham [1997] 
estimates that IS. research is lacking in research-based books such as those, and that studies based on 
actor-network theory could offer a contribution there. However, they are extremely labour-intensive and 
time-consuming, for instance Vaughan spent nine years researching and writing her book on Challenger. 
Some IS researchers have found that "only a rich, integrative view of IS implementation does 
justice to the complex realities of social life in organisation" [Myers 1994: 198], and that implementation 
can only be understood in terms of its wider social and historical context. Furthermore, Harvey and Myers 
( 1995: 23] argue that "generalisable knowledge is often neither relevant nor meaningful, in which case we 
are better off understanding specific contexts", even though story-telling approaches may be 
rnýisinterpreted as non-rigorous. What is required is "a rigorous approach to the analysis of the institutional 
contexts of IS practices, with the notion of context being one of the social construction of meaning 
frameworks" [Harvey and Myers 1995: 2 1 ]. Sauer [ 1993: 3] recommends studying whole cases so as not to 
reject any part of them as irrelevant and to come closer to a realistic understanding of information systems 
failure. The social system dimension must include the larger social and political processes through wwch 
the interests of the different social groups interact with one another and with the technology [Robinson 
1994]. This implies that macro-social and historical factors must be investigated, as well as the multi- 
causal relationships more immediately involved in failure [Lyytinen and Hirscheim 1987). 
Despite the increasing prominence of interpretivism, the development of non-positivist research 
methods has been controversial, and the debate continues on the relative merits of interpretivist versus 
positivist approaches to IS research [Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991]. The positivist perspective, with its 
exclusive reliance on statistical or experimental testing of hypotheses, has been subject to heavy criticism 
and its application to the social sciences, as opposed to the natural sciences, is not so successful 
[Hirschheim 1992]. The positivist tradition tends to remove the effects of context to achieve 'objectivity' 
and reliability, but this is at the expense of a deeper understanding of what is actually occurring. 
Positivism is inclined to explain phenomena through determinate and one-dimensional causal 
relationships, which is inappropriate when studying the interactions among technology, organisations and 
society [Markus and Robey 1988]. The ontological position of interpretivism assumes that access to 
reality is only gained via social constructions such as language, shared meanings and artefacts. Whilst it is 
incorrect to equate qualitative research with interpretivism (and quantitative methods with positivism), it 
tends to be the method most frequently drawn upon. 
Mainstream quantitative positivist research methods are therefore of limited use and longitudinal 
qualitative studies focusing on the context of each case are more appropriate [EJIS 1993]. They enable a 
richer investigation of (a) the n-kro-level, at which social actors and work groups act and interact locally; 
and (b) the macro-level in which actors and organisations are situated and which affects their economic 
and social interests, power, knowledge, culture and aspirations to control. Quantitative positivist research 
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methods have been criticised as too rooted in functionalism, and too concerned with causal analysis at the 
expense of getting close to the phenomenon being studied. 
Many significant contributions in the social sciences have resulted from single-case studies 
published in book form. Darkc, Shanks and Broadbent [1998] believe that case study research enables the 
capture and understanding of context and can be used to achieve a variety of research aims using diverse 
i- - data c6llection and analysis methods. Dyer, Wilkins and Eisenhardt [ 199 1] even argue that publishing in 
research journals prevents in-depth examination and extrapolation because of space restrictions. In the 
interpretive tradition, the most appropriate method for conducting empirical research is the in-depth case 
study, which allows for a comprehensive approach to the historical and longitudinal analysis of complex 
phenomena (Montealegre 1995]. The interpretive researcher attempts to derive his or her constructs from 
the field by an in-depth examination of and exposure to the phenomenon of interest. The categories and 
themes that emerge out of this approach are intended to closely couple those relevant to the study's 
participants [Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991: 14]. Because of the commitment to a processual view of 
phenomena, critical studies also tend to be longitudinal. The research methods of choice in critical studies 
are long-term historical studies and ethnographic studies of organisational processes and structures 
[Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991: 20]. 
Equally, radical micro-sociological orientations reconstitute macro-sociology on the basis of a 
micro-sociological foundation, partly due to their critique of quantitative measurement in sociology 
[Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel 1981: 13]. Experts in social research methods have long argued that survey 
methods can only address exploratory questions of what, how many and how much, whereby case studies 
can investigate explanations to why and how questions [Yin 1989]. Social constructivism relies on 
theoretically informed empiricism and a sensitive methodology, which preserves the characteristic traits of 
the field of study. Some comrnon elements used in micro-sociology are verbal and non-verbal data, 
cognitive structures such as frames, scripts or plans, gathered via tape and video- recordings and 
observations. 
In this case study, the analysis is complex since it involves many groups and many levels. It 
encompasses a cross-cultural (from the US to Europe) and cross-sectorial (from air to rail transport) 
transfer of an information system, as well as an attempt to transfon-n associated management discourses, 
commercial practices, economic models, strategic goals, political perspectives, sectorial markets and 
structures. A series of complex 'translations' takes place in the transfer of the deregulated model from the 
US to Europe, and from the air to the rail sector. The project goes through translations in order to 
proceed. It succeeds, not because it is inherently better than the alternatives, nor because it is the 'right' 
answer to the problem being faced, but rather because it is adopted by other actors to serve their purposes. 
instead of understanding IS projects as proceeding 'normally' unless they are actively stopped (and hence 
Thil'), projects are seen as not proceeding unless actors make them happen. Each actor 'translates' the 
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project and takes it in a specific direction according to his/her context. A detailed understanding of actors' 
contexts and purposes, therefore in the case of the present thesis researching the politics and economics of 
transport, rail and air, American and French, is critical. 
Connnonly, there are difficulties in gathering inforrnation for research into failures and disasters 
[Flowers 1996]; it is inadequate just to rely on the relatively few instances that come to light through 
public inquiries and press reports. Poulymenakou and Holmes [1996] even suggest that the 'famous' 
failures such as the London Ambulance Service or Taurus are merely the tip of the iceberg. There are 
often in public sector organisations where failures with high public profiles are more difficult to 'hidethan 
incidents in the private sector. 
It is also difficult to make sense of events retrospectively. The act of exploring itself has an 
impact on what is being explored [Weick 1988: 305]. Retrospection often creates an erroneous impression 
that errors should have been anticipated and prevented [Starbuck and Milliken 1988: 338], and learning 
from disasters is neither inevitable nor easy since they typically leave incomplete and minimal evidence. 
Weick [1988: 306) also argues that the exploring itself is guided by preconceptions of some kind. 
Moreover, decisions that are perceived as right (or wrong) at time (1) may be viewed in a different light at 
time (2) and in another light at time (3) (Drummond 1996: 166]. And there may be a code of silence, 
which prohibits discussions about failures [Nulden 1996: 69]. 
There is a multitude of different data collection techniques and they vary according to the extent 
of interaction (the 'distance') between the researcher and the phenomena under study. Until quite recently, 
much of the reported interpretive IS research [Walsham 1995a] only involved relatively distant data 
collection methods such as analysis of published data, textual analysis or surveys. Document analysis was 
used in my fieldwork together with less distant methods such as interviews and observation, wWch 
provided face-to-face contact with the social actors in order to explore and probe responses. The case 
study method necessitates the collection of a large amount of rich, 'thick' qualitative information from a 
number of sources in order to address the complexity of the organisational processes and of the context 
studied. These are described in the next section. 
2.4.1 Fieldwork 
The fieldwork for this research project started early in 1994, six months after the failed 
implementation, and lasted eighteen months. The choice of the case study was motivated by the 
uniqueness, richness and complexity of this case, which was seen as a rare opportunity for investigating 
the many contextual influences which affect the implementation of information systems, through detailed, 
in-depth qualitative research. My awareness of this case came as I was queuing to buy tickets in a Paris 
railway station in July 1993, and, apart from having to wait an unusually long time, I noticed a large 
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SNCF poster (see Appendix 1) apologising to travellers for difficulties with the new computer systern. 
Every French person I talked to in the following few months, family, friends and strangers on trains, had a 
story to tell about their bad experience with Socrate and had strong, often divergentý opinions about the 
matter. It became obvious that the combination of Sabre, French Railways and failure had to be the topic 
of my thesis... 
Stories and story-telling are common activities and for the most part we do not take these 
accounts very seriously. However, the significance of stories has come to the attention of researchers as 
they, in particular, document organisational successes and failures [Schwartzman 1993: 44]. However, it is 
clear that even ethnographic descriptions "depend not just on decisions about what we believe to be true 
but also on judgements about relevance" [Hammersley 1990: 609]. As Stanley [1990: 623] in a comment 
on Hammersley (1990] argues, inexhaustible descriptions of empirical phenomena are possible, but 
writing accounts of social reality is not inexhaustible. We need to examine why 'this description' rather 
than any other. Of course, as a researcher and academic, I work within contextually-specific practicalities 
which provide me with particular responses to social problematics. I need to account for my research 
experience but also to produce a text that needs to satisfy the concerns of my academic peers. As Ely el al 
[1997] point out creating research writing is also about crafting stories which are useful, believable and 
interesting and that evoke the complexity of the experience within their studies. Additionally (and 
mercifully! ), unlike most readers who have not been 'there', I have experientially-based knowledge for 
making a judgement about validity. On the other hand, and reflecting upon my own involvement, my very 
first reaction when queuing in the Gare de I'Est in Paris in the summer of 1993 was of bewilderment and 
anger at SNCF having done something to 'my' trains, at having imposed a change to 'my' long- 
established (and youthful! ) way of travelling in my native country... I suspect this was a widespread and 
very French way of reacting. This initial reaction in itself was of interest, and the subsequent realisation 
that Sabre was a major component of this new situation was a sort of retribution as it paid back for my 
years spent in the late 80s in business schools nearly believing in the American-born gospel of IT and 
strategic advantage... An obvious and convenient, if not strategic, advantage of being bilingual and 
French-born was my extensive knowledge of the French and English cultural contexts and perspectives. 
Relatively easy research access to this public sector enterprise was also an important contributing 
factor. Flowers [1996] stresses how difficult it can be to gain access to private companies when 
investigating implementation issues, particularly failures. Sensitivities can lead to access difficulties and 
restrictions to report which may "serve the interests of the powerful" [Lee 1993: 129]. When contacting 
my interviewees I engaged myself in writing to preserve their anonymity and only their initials are given 
in this thesis. At the beginning of each interviewing session I asked for permission to use a tape-recorder 
and no interviewee refused. In fact, they provided me with a tape-recorder when mine broke down. My 
interviewing technique started with outlining my background and my research interests; I clearly stated 
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that I thought failures were complex and far from clear-cut; and that several computer failures had also 
happened in the. UK such as Taurus and the London Ambulance Services; most interviewees had not 
heard of these cases, so briefly telling these stories was a good opening line, which I concluded by joking 
that at least SNCF had not killed anyone, unlike London Ambulance Services... This proved extremely 
successful in relaxing the atmosphere (at the expense of the British mainly! ) and somehow made it easier 
to build trust and show appreciative understanding, openness to exchange and complicity, ingredients that 
Lee [ 1993: 13 6-9] recommend when researching sensitive topics. 
Incredibly, my initial contact happened to be married to an English woman who had studied 
French at my institution, Salford University at the time. He responded immediately and showed great 
enthusiasm and generosity in helping me, providing me with names and contacts, introducing me to people 
in corridors, letting me browse in filing cabinets, directing me to libraries and photocopiers, taking me to 
the local cafd, and walking back with me to the mdtro station in the evening asking for my impressions. 
Eventually, it also became clear that being French but living abroad had been an advantage: not living in 
France anymore, interviewees did not feel threatened by my presence, in fact welcomed it and were 
actively seeking the opinion of someone they saw as more detached from the events. The timing proved 
judicious too. Research access immediately after the events (summer 1993) would certainly have been 
refused. SNCF was greatly exposed to the scrutiny of the media for several months and a climate of blame 
prevailed externally (it was still present internally during my fieldwork, which I will expand on in 
Chapter 6). They had just recovered from a reluctance to face journalists' accusations by the time I 
contacted them. In fact, one of my interviewees [JPD Interview 9, see below] remarked as I was leaving 
his office that if I had sought access as a journalist (even as late as November 1994 when I interviewed 
him), he would not have told me "one twentieth" of what he had said during our conversation. 
Interviewees appeared to welcome an opportunity to re-examine events six months later and many 
interviews lasted 3 hours. Some kind of relief at having had a chance to revisit painful events and 
unburdened themselves was evident at the end of several interviewing sessions. This would not have been 
possible in the heat of the events. 
These were the dominant dynamics during interviews with SNCF executives. Other more 
complex elements influenced a particular interview [CQ Interview 10]: 1 felt this had been the hardest and 
most difficult interview and thought I had failed in eliciting much from CQ, the only woman in the 
Socrate tearn. In fact, after listening to the tape, she had talked very freely and had provided me with very 
valuable material. Possible interpretations of the tension I felt during the interview can be attempted. 
Being the only 'powerful' woman she may have felt threatened in her authority and expertise (although 
she was highly praised to me by her male colleagues). The issue of expertise I perceived on other 
occasions too and may have originated from an impression that I would know more about Anglo- 
American management and technical jargon. Listening to the tapes I realised that I dealt with it by 
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distancing myself from the English-speaking world (usually making some sort of joke about English 
peculiarities) and reasserting my French identity. My academic status I think was more of an asset than a 
threat as academics have generally a good image in France and researchers are usually seen as objective. 
This was very much the case with union and passenger representatives, as well as low level staff. In the 
case of Interview 10,1 also realised listening to the tape, that one of my first questions was formulated in a 
very simplistic 'black and white' way; although I was not very knowledgeable about many areas - which 
is what makes interviewing challenging and is part of the research process - this was not the case about 
this particular question. My retrospective impression is that I did so in order to allow her to regain 
control, as she started arguing and shouting against my statement vigorously making the atmosphere 
uncomfortable for me. My memory of the interview is one of embarrassment, but she was given space as a 
result and her comments proved invaluable (the French also tend to treat shouting and arguing as a natural 
part of working life too). 
Empirical evidence was thus gathered using multiple methods of data collection [Benbasat et al 
1987] as follows. Primary methods resulted in approximately 25 hours of audio-taped in-depth individual 
and group interviews. Interviews lasted from one to three hours, and much informal discussion with many 
staff occurred in corridors, at the photocopier, in the library, in the nearby cafd and mdtro station as well 
as general observations. Simply being around is a form of research sometimes designated "hanging around 
and listening in" [Strauss 1987] which provides insights into the organisational climate, frequent topics of 
conversation, off-hand remarks, group events, etc. In fact, the cafd opposite SNCF headquarters is heavily 
frequented by staff, and one of the waiters had spotted me when he had brought us cups of coffee during 
one of my interviews. It had an impression on him as my interviewee was the ex-head of the Socrate 
project and well-known; the waiter was curious of my presence with the 'big boss' and this led to 
interesting conversations. 
All 'formal' interviews were transcribed and analysed qualitatively (see Section 2.4.2). A list of 
common questions asked during interviews can be found in Appendix 2. Many of the original members of 
the socrate executive team were interviewed, "tous les papas, et la maman, de Socrate" as one interviewee 
put it [GC interview 6], as there was only one woman in the tearn. Interviews took place at SNCF 
headquarters and various other locations in Paris with: 
SNCF top executives and senior managers, 
IS specialists (yield management in particular), 
Marketing and human relations managers, 
Training managers, 
Sales staff, 
Trade union representatives, 
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Passengers' associations, 
Travel agents and tourism experts. 
The London Ambulance Services case study [Silva and Backhouse 1997; Beynon-Davies 1995) 
illustrates the benefit of examining written secondary sources as research material which provide a 
multiti'de of interpretations. Documents such as public domain government reports, press analyses, 
consultancy reports, union documents were therefore included. Silva and Backhouse [1997: 401-402) 
claim that a careful selection of secondary sources can establish some degree of triangulation. I was also 
given liberal access to internal files - some confidential - and documentation covering the initiation, 
development and implementation of the Socrate project, starting from 1989 until the 1993 events. This 
extensive 'secondary' material was analysed in order to: present background information on the social, 
political and econornic context (Chapter 4); reconstitute the history of the project and provide empirical 
data for the technical sections in Chapter 3- in which some quantitative analysis was also carried out on 
demand projections; provide empirical data concerning, marketing, pricing and ticketing details (Chapter 
5) and organisational issues (Chapter 6). Secondary research for this thesis thus included: 
press reports, 
internal SNCF memos and documents e. g. [SNCF 1993a; SNCF 1989], 
government and audit reports e. g. [Cuq and Bussereau 1994], 
technical documentation (e. g. pricing schedules, ticketing information and training 
procedures), 
- union publications e. g. [CGT et al 1994; FO 1994], 
marketing research and consultants' reports e. g. [APST 199 1; Causa Rerum. 1993), 
Rail and air, French, European and US transport literature e. g. [Midtus 1989; 
Petzinger 1995; Bavoux 1994; Hepworth 1992]. 
A detailed list of interviewees, their organisations, departments and positions, and their previous 
roles during the Socrate project if different from the time of interview, can be found in Appendix 3. 
When interviewed together and therefore leading to a group discussion, interviewees appear in the same 
box. When referring to interviewees' comments in the rest of this thesis, their initials are used and the 
interview number, e. g. [JMM Interview 1] or [EC Interview 3]. Quotes from French interviewees and 
writers are my own translation throughout. However, some text is also left in French, for instance job titles 
and names of departments and systems in technical diagrams. In terms of time coverage, the interviews 
and internal documents concentrated mainly on the duration of the Socrale project, from its initiation in 
1989 to the aftermath of its implementation until 1994, to include for instance the revision of pricing and 
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the new simplified ticket in January 1994. Interviews themselves took place from early 1994 to late 1995. 
Secondary sources and some interviews covered a longer period, going back to 1981 when the first TGV 
was launched in France between Paris and Lyon, and to the 70s to have some understanding of CRS and 
air deregulation in the US; and desk research carried on until the SNCF split between operations and 
infrastructures in January 1997, which seemed a natural milestone. 
i- - 
2.4.2 Data analysis 
The essentially social nature of information systems has led many IS researchers to adopt 
research approaches which focus primarily on human interpretations and meaning [Walsharn 1995b]. 
Interpretive studies reject the possibility of an 'objective' account of events, opting instead for a 
relativistic understanding of the phenomena being studied [Orlikowski and Baroudi 1991]. Interpretive 
researchers see the pursuit of meaning and understanding as subjective and knowledge as a social 
construction [Walsharn 1993]. They examine the social reality and subjective meanings held by people by 
eliciting and observing what is significant and important to thern. They are not reporting facts but their 
interpretations of other people's interpretations [Walsharn 1995b]. There is no rigid separation between 
data collection and analysis and the process is an iterative cycle of data collection and analysis, with the 
intention that the results of the analysis will help guide the subsequent collection of data. The cycle is 
repeated and theory is elaborated and checked as the process continues. When conducting interpretive 
research it is believed here that researchers should interact directly and intensively with the subjects of 
their research over a period of time. 
Open-ended interviews, or primary data, complemented by published, or secondary data, were 
the most suitable forms of data capture. Secondary data covered a wide range of sources (see Section 
2.4.1) and provided essential preparation for the interviews. Secondary sources of particular importance 
were the internal SNCF documentation, technical documents, union and passenger associations 
publications. These secondary sources are presented in a different typeface in the references at the end of 
this thesis (see References). They allowed cross-checking of factual information, major events, technical 
details, historical decisions and main organisational players and roles; they also supported the probing and 
exploring of particular responses during interviews. Such field study methods permit 'thick descriptions' 
and iterative collection and analysis for instance within and across interviews. A progressive analysis of 
actors' interpretations was thus possible together with an immersion in the context and a more 
sophisticated involvement and growing awareness of my own interpretations and personal experience. The 
focus was exploratory and attempted to discover patterns in the data and then explain these patterns 
through induction of concepts. 
This research study is by necessity bounded by choices - who to interview, when and where, the 
types of questions to ask - which limit the conclusions that can be drawn. Gaining access to social groups 
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of potential relevance is a mixture of forethought and intention, chance, expediency, acceptability and 
opportunism The interviewees were chosen for their relevance to the conceptual questions rather than 
their representativeness. Asking participants to suggest names of other actors and general networking 
through personal contacts expanded the sample. The total number of respondents to interview was reached 
heuristically, i. e. the decision to stop adding respondents was taken when nothing new was being learned 
from the interviews and a state of theoretical saturation was achieved. The interviewees were selected on 
the basis of their closeness with the Socrate project and their high levels of experience of organisational 
change at SNCF. It was deemed essential not to limit interviewees to IS staff. Other internal functional 
areas such as strategy, marketing, human resources, audit, sales and unions were represented; as well as 
external actors such as passengers and travel agents. 
Verbatim transcription of interview data (in French) was carried out and extensive written notes 
were also taken during interviews. The information gathered from these interviews was subjective 
although an attempt was made to present an account from various perspectives and levels within and 
outside the organisation. Interview transcripts and written notes were analysed systematically through 
iterative and repeated re-reading of notes and transcripts and re-listening of the audio-tapes themselves. 
This enabled a more and more elaborate understanding of each interviewee's viewpoint and perspective, 
of links and contradictions within and across interviews, of complex and intertwined contextual factors, 
and of the many relationships between concepts. 
Conceptualised descriptions emerged throughout the research process as follows. The first level 
of analysis identified various categories and organised them hierarchically. A colour coding system was 
devised and applied to paragraphs and sentences in interview transcripts; this corresponded initially to a 
broad structuring of the subject matter (e. g. transport policy). A second level of comparative analysis was 
carried out through validating relationships between categories and more abstract descriptions were 
derived (e. g. relationship between yield management and deregulation). An example of identification of 
categories from some interview data can be found in Appendix 4. All interview data was 'coded' in this 
way, although not all 'data' was directly used in the text; nevertheless, the coding helped 
conceptualisation, for instance the extract from Interview 16 below shows that union representatives were 
keen to steer the interview towards issues of public transport policies. 
Finally, a more forrml process attempted to integrate categories into an increasing organisation 
of theoretical components and their conceptual relationships (for instance 
how information gathering and 
market segmentation relate to separating infrastructures from operations, see Section 63.2). 
This led to 
structuring the flindings into chapter sections and sub-sections and constructing gradual building 
blocks to 
assemble a more complex theoretical account. The findings are presented in discursive form embedded 
in 
a thick context of descriptive and conceptual writing. Detailed discourse analysis and coding were not 
deemed necessary, as they were perceived to atornise individual perspectives and prevent the development 
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of rich conceptual relationships. An effort was rnade to keep a focus on real actors, their backgrounds, 
roles and stances. 
Conceptual analysis, theory building and methodological processes are difficult to control and 
manage. They are an aggregate description of exceedingly complex phenomena. While empirical data may 
be presented in evidence of a theoretical argument, the very selection of which data to present (and 
exclude) is an act of interpretation. The tension between 'data' and 'subjects' was experienced very 
strongly during data analysis and is reflected in an effort to keep subjects 'whole' throughout the thesis. 
The issue of distinction between fact and interpretation in case analysis still remains in question; however, 
accounting for 'whole' subjects rather than isolated pieces of text seemed to do more justice to the actors 
and their dilemmas in complex situations. 
The findings of this thesis are in the form of general propositions obtained by inference. 
Arguably, the use of rhetoric and generalisation, based on the researcher's interpretation of field data, is a 
medium for presenting research findings in interpretive research [Walsham 1993]. However, the aim of 
case study research is not to say that the account given is what 'really happened'. It is to make an 
informed interpretation and analysis of the events available [Geertz 1973]. 
Description and anecdote can be useful tools for learning but do not constitute a form of 
analysis. When we analyse data we are looking for 'tendencies' that have emerged in the course of the 
research which explain past data [Bhaskar 1979]. These are then put into logical clusters and 
communicated in the form of issues, themes and concepts held within a coherent analytical context. An 
example of logical clustering from the mass of field data is how almost all interviewees kept discussing 
the issues of transport deregulation and the relationship of SNCF to the State. Another example was the 
4neutral' nature of yield management. It therefore became apparent that deregulation and yield 
management might form the basis of major themes in the thesis. 
Logical clusters need to be related to social theories in order to generate a sociological analysis. 
Each theory is necessarily partial and was used in what was felt to be its most useful application, but also 
acknowledging that these theories have their critiques. The aim was neither to argue for the superiority of 
any of these social theories nor to use them in a mechanistic way. Indeed, the possibility of a 'complete' or 
&perfect' theory is rejected. Describing how an analysis of data is constructed from social theories is 
challenging, as the process is not neat and tidy. The following attempts to describe how the logical 
clusters were broadly related to social theories. 
Most IS failure models examine the phenomenon in a vacuum and are idealised and 
decontextualised. One fundamental tenet of the sociology of technology is that there is no one inevitable 
way to develop technological artefacts. Therefore, when interviewing, one is listening for narratives about 
why things emerged in the way they did or not, in the case of failures; hence collecting multiple 
interpretations with all their contradictions, rather than finding the 'correct' interpretation. 
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A non-essentialist, social constructionist approach to technology understands the design and role 
of information systems in relation to their economic, social, political and political context. Actor-network 
theory is useful in understanding how information systems are mobilised as a resource and 'translated' by 
different actors; and Clegg's circuits of power help concentrate on power and political interests. Analyses 
at the local micro level (passengers, vendors, yield management), organisational level (change, culture) 
and macro level (transport deregulation in France and Europe) show the interconnectedness of the 
different levels of analyses. They also consider the implications of information systems beyond their local 
context in transforming the nature of personal experiences, changing organisational practices and affecting 
market and industry structures. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE HISTORY OF SOCRA TE: 
A STRATEGIC TRANSLATION FROM RAIL TO AIR 
I.: 
This chapter first looks at the origins of Socrate. Reasons put forward for upgrading the previous 
cornputerised reservation system, RESA, are examined. It is argued that, despite some technical 
justifications for the changeover, priorities were of a more commercial and strategic nature, such as 
increasing yields per seat and controlling distribution channels. Additionally, SNCF seems to have been 
fascinated with air transport, which played a part in the choice of software. The rhetoric of IT-led 
competitive advantage and the legend of Sabre's strategic success at American Airlines were also very 
influential on the thinking of the company. 
The installation of the new system is then described together with the necessary software 
custornisation and adaptations, and the ensuing technical and operational difficulties, due to the different 
nature of rail and air transport. A comparison is made with Greyhound Lines Inc., which also tried to 
computerise reservations of coach travel in the US and faced very similar problems. Finally, yield 
management techniques and optimisation models are reviewed to outline the technological basis on which 
changes were built. 
3.1 ORIGINS OF THE SOCRA TE PROJECT 
Until the early 1980s rail passenger sales clerks in most countries had to use various sources to 
complete transactions and had to go from enquiry to reservation to ticket purchase, which was a lengthy 
process. Passengers often had to go from ticket office to ticket office to obtain information, a reservation, 
then a ticket. Workstations in rail stations ticket counters, travel centres and telephone services started 
being linked in the late 80s [Thomas 1989] to central reservation systems allowing reservations to be 
made at the same time as tickets being printed by an all-purpose ticket machine. The workstation usually 
has access to a computer-aided timetable enquiry system which suggests the best route and train times. 
British Rail, for instance, integrated the systems into one set between 1991 and 1993 for InterCity 
services. Some of the objectives were to reduce the transaction times and to encourage people to make 
reservations more often. 
Whereas BR built on its own systems, SNCF chose to abandon its in-house system and purchase 
a computerised reservation system developed for use in the airline industry and bought Sabre in 1989 
from American Airlines for an initial FF lbillion (LI00m). Jean-Marie Metzler, Directeur Voyageurs 
Grandes Lignes and a 'polytechnicien' (from Ecole Polytechnique one of the elitist institutions leading to 
senior civil service in France) with a long and successful record of top positions within SNCF, presented 
the proposed purchase to the SNCF Board on 22 nd March 1989. All SNCF administrators, apart from five 
personnel administrators who either voted against it or abstained, supported his proposal [JMM Interview 
1). 
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3.1.1 Technical reasons? 
CgRaci 
A technical reason put forward for modernising ticketing and reservation systems was capacity. 
The existing system could only deal with 20 transactions per second, whereby the new system would 
manage 800 transactions per second. This technical reason originates from one of the early arguments put 
forward by SNCF strategic decision-makers. The previous system, RES, 4 (short for reservation), was 
developed in-house and implemented in the 70s to respond to a growing demand for reservation 
management (and then through the Minitel network in the early to mid-80s). It was claimed that a new 
system was needed to handle up to 135 million reservations a year by 1995 (approximately two third on 
TGVs), particularly after the opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1994 and the TGV Nord-Europe (Paris- 
Lille) in 1993. RES, 4 would be reaching saturation point (50 million reservations a year) by 1989. These 
projections varied (from 125 to 150 million, by 1995 then extended to 2000) and may have also 
represented symbolic and commercial reasons as well as strictly technical demands. In fact, Moissonnier 
[1994: 2] even states in his official report to the government that the existing system RES. 4 would have 
been capable of absorbing future increases in reservations. Another secondary aim he identifies is also the 
ambition to to host other companies' data like airlines CRS. 
In 1987 Raymond Monnet, SNCF Directeur Gdndral Adjoint, stated that: "computer systems 
contribute to strategic objectives as well as operational efficiencies ( ... ) and information technology is a 
fundamental element in the evolution of the culture of the enterprise and has an impact on commercial, 
technical, organisational, managerial and personnel functions" [Monnet 1987]. RESA, the first 
computerised reservation system, was designed in the early 70s and was available to sales clerks in most 
stations in 1973 [JPD Interview 9]. This booking system was stand-alone in the sense that it was not 
connected to timetabling information, ticketing or accounting. In 1977, SNCF joined the French Direction 
Gdndrale des T616communications in its 'tdldmatique' pilot activities which led to the establishment of 
the nation-wide Minitel public data network. In March 1984, a SNCF server was first made available to 
Minitel users in the Ile-de-France and Picardie regions, and expanded to the whole country by November 
1986. This '36-15' (also called 'Kiosque') public access Minitel service provided train timetabling and 
reservation, first separately then integrated (in October 1986), for 160,000 'relations' as well as payment 
at a distance, leading to an increase in the number of reservations. Electronic reservations were also 
supported through Herm&, a European packet switching network enabling exchanges between national 
rail companies, for trans-national freight traffic since 1985, and for international passenger traffic in 1988. 
Hermas was initiated by the Union Internationale des Chemins de fer in order to stimulate rail traffic 
across borders. 
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A modem distribution syste 
Since 1987, SNCF was planning to renovate its distribution mechanisnis and strategic studies 
were carried out by the Direction Commerciale Voyageurs to examine the nature of European passenger 
rail supply, pricing and distribution (SNCF 1989]. These studies stated that SNCF had an advantage with 
its high-speed network but that the environment would become more and more competitive [MJA&BT 
Interyýiew 5]. Their major recommendation was to set up the Socrate project, which would enable SNCF 
to compete on sales and distribution. 
A confidential document dating January 1989 [SNCF 1989] clearly describes the thinking 
behind Socrate and how some SNCF directors understood their environment. Competition was perceived 
as increasing between rail and other transport modes, particularly air; the opening of the European market 
would lead to increased competition between air operators; more than 50% of SNCF passenger rail supply 
on medium and long routes would compete with air. A primary objective was to improve supply, but 
more importantly, "to be able to adjust supply in the short-term using the 'weapon' of pricing" 
[SNCF 1989]. Adjusting fares to demand intensity was strongly advocated. A new distribution policy was 
clearly seen as the key to survival. It entailed a reduction in distribution costs through the use of Minitel 
and vending machines in stations; control of travel centres and agents distribution channels, and product 
penetration through these networks, in France, Europe and elsewhere; and tarification flexibility. A 
clearly defined tactic was to establish links between the SNCF network and global distribution systems 
(GDS). 
More importantly, RESA was seen as obsolete, but not so much in its processing capacity. In 
fact its robustness was not in doubt since it had been capable of absorbing the enormous increase in 
reservations due to the introduction of the TGV Sud-Est (Paris-Lyon) in 198 1, the first train which it was 
impossible to board without a reservation. The strategic thinking is entirely apparent in this confidential 
document: "the functionalities of RESA do not support the marketing and distribution policies envisaged" 
[SNCF 1989]. Extra functionalities required include above all the forecasting and optimisation of levels 
of overbooking and tariff quotas. A quantitative and qualitative evolution was seen as necessary. 
Inflated demand proiections 
One can therefore state that the dernand projections referred to above were in fact secondary if 
not symbolic, and that commercial, rather than technical, objectives dominated SNCF thinking. It can be 
argued that a traffic increase was not paramount compared to commercial optimisation and that indeed a 
traffic decrease would not have been a problem as long as the new tarification and yield management 
system improved revenue and most importantly margins [EC Interview 3). In fact, with the benefit of 
hindsight, it is clear that these projections were inflated. The Rapport de la Cour des CompteS3 
[Grosrichard and Jakubyszyn 1996] criticises SNCF for its inflated traffic estimates on the TGV Nord 
(Paris-Lille opened in 1993): actual figures were less than half the forecasts. 
3 The French National Audit Office 
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Tfie 1993 overall SNCF traffic figures showed a decrease of 5.5% according to SNCF (from 854 
million passengers transported in 1992 to 823 million in 1993 with a total revenue decreasing from FF 
55.4 billion in 1992 to FF 52.9 billion in 1993 [SNCF 1994a]); of 7% according to the government 
enquiry [Cuq and Bussereau 1994]; and of 8.4% according to the Observatoire Econornique et Social des 
Transports [SNCF 1993b]. Compared with other European countries where the average growth in traffic 
was 9%, SNCF lost an important market share [Eglizeau et al 1996], although SNCF claims that this 
decrease did not affect TGV traffic, but only normal intercity trains [SNCF 1993b]. Jacques Fournier, 
SNCF president at the time, claimed that: 5% of the 1993 decrease in traffic was due to an economic 
recession; and 2% came from both an insufficient reaction to the competition with Air Inter (French 
internal flights) which had a good price policy, compounded by SNCF worsened public reputation due to 
the Socrate debicle (Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 35]. Nevertheless, public transport traffic stagnated at best 
or decreased (depending on urban, regional or intercity) during 1994 and 1995 too [Bridier 1995]. Only in 
1997 did traffic figures and total revenue increase again for the first time since 1992 (intercity and TGV 
by 4%, regional by 3%, urban by 1.7%, freight by 8.9%, total revenue from FF 40.9 billion in 1996 to FF 
43.1 billion in 1997 [SNCF 1997]). 
Table 3.1 Reservation forecast for 1995 [SNCF 1989] 
Total 
Fr2nce 
Abroad 
120 rnillion 
106 Stations 74 
Travel agents 32 
14 Amadeus 1.4 
Stations 0.7 
Aizents 0.7 
Galileo 11.6 
Stations 8.7 
Agents 2.9 
Overseas I 
Table 3.1 provides a reservation forecast for 1995 (total 120 rnillion) put forward by SNCF in its 
strategic justification for the Socrate project in 1989. The actual (reserved and unreserved) figures for 
1995 [SNCF 1996a] give 2S4 million passengers for regional and intercity trains, with 45.7 for regional 
trains, 208.3 for intercity of which 95.8 million are for TGV. The total of 95.8 TGV reservations is far 
from the predicted 120 (even if allowing for some reservations on 'classical' intercity trains). 
Choice of software 
In order to build the required system, three options were possible: (a) modifying the existing 
system, (b) starting from scratch and developing a bespoke software, or (c) adapting existing software 
from the airline industry. SNCF chose the third option. The first option was quickly dismissed because it 
did not permit to integrate new commercial concepts such as optinýiisation, although the main official 
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argument put fohmd was about the limited capacity of RESA (again on the 'grounds of projected 
demand). SNCF decided against option (b) because of human and technical resource limitations, and also 
the added risk of failure and lengthy developmenL It was estimated that building its own system would 
have taken SNCF seven years [Anon 1992]. 
It is clear that 'intelligent' distribution and optimisation and short-term adjustment of fare prices 
was paramount in the decision to look for existing software. A fourth option could have to been to simply 
registe ,r with an existing air GDS. Jean-Marie Metzler and Andrde Maitre, the latter at the time worked 
for the joint venture between AMR Information Services and SNCF set up to develop the new software, 
argued against that option on the basis that rail transport has some specificity which an air GDS could not 
cater for [Metzler and Maitre 1990]. Yet this argument was either ignored or not applied to the choice of 
an air CRS and its implications not fully realised (see more on the crucial differences between air and rail 
CRS below in Section 3.3.1). Another interpretation is that there was the ambition with some SNCF 
technocrats to be the first to set up a rail electronic distribution network and become the first owner of a 
rail GDS in the world, rather than depend upon other GDS. 
A fascination with air? 
Additionally, the search for technical partners was heavily influenced by the perception of 
competition with air transport. As witnessed in a confidential document (SNCF 1989], decisions by rail 
and air trarisporters regarding their choice of GDS were carefully exaniined, if not emulated. Operational 
systems such as those of rail transporters AMTRAK, and Deutsche BAhn, but also air transporters 
Swissair, British Airways, air distributors such as System One, Apollo, PARS, Galileo, Amadeus, and also 
one IT supplier, Unisys, were investigated. For all potential GDS, a scoring was undertaken to find out 
which system performed best in the following areas [Adam and Cahen 1997: 12]: which system provided 
the best Personal Nominal Requirement (PNR), which reflects traditional file management capacities for 
airline passengers, i. e. the best coupling of the ticket with different services provided, such as car rental, 
hotel booking, etc.; and which system was the best in terms of yield management, again borrowing from 
airline optimisation techniques. The AMTRAK system was the most advanced rail reservation system but 
didn't correspond to SNCF requirements [JPD Interview 9]. It wasn't enough to buy a CRS which is just 
a seat inventory system (for example Air France's CRS), or a GDS only, but both inventory and 
distribution systems were required. SNCF entered into negotiations with System One, but these failed. 
This provider was considered because Amadeus (Air France GDS) had entered in a partnership with 
System One at the time too, after negotiations with Sabre had failed (JPD Interview 9]. 
Sabre, of AMP, was chosen since it had a strong emphasis on distribution and optimisation and 
staff had extremely strong yield management and operational research expertise. Another reason for 
choosing Sabre was that it runs on IBM equipment and uses the TPF (Transaction Performance Facility), 
which is common to many GDS and therefore allows technical compatibility. Sabre was also the biggest 
and oldest (30 years old) reservation system in existence at the time. Another consideration was the 
eventual possibility that the system could technically host some of if not all services of other rail 
companies. 
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Tfie choice of Sabre, the American Airlines systern, in March 1989 only confu-nis the fact that, 
from the beginning, there was a wish to mimic the air industry. A sophisticated cornputerised reservation 
system could help SNCF fill its trains, in the same way that it allowed American Airlines to fill its planes, 
and make SNCF as effective as air companies [Levy, 1992]. In Metzler and Maitre's words [ 1990: 2 1 ]: 
&&rail must reach the level of its competitors, particularly air companies. The answer to this challenge is 
information systems, in the form of modem reservation systems ( ... ) International sales must be facilitated 
through global distribution systems such as the ones found in air compani&l. This strange fascination of 
a rail company for aerospace was also noticed in displays of trains and plane models and posters on the 
desks, shelves and walls in many offices during my visits at SNCF headquarters... Several members of the 
Socrate team were connected with the air and tourism industries: a project manager [SEB Interview 4] 
had worked for Air Inter; and Georges Vialle, the second in charge, left the Socrate project to work for 
the Club Mediterranie where he became head of information systems [GV Interview 14] and 
implemented yield management principles there. And Metzler, head of the Socrate project, believed that 
rail stations should be like airports [IMM Interview I]. 
3.1.2 Importing Sabre: American Airlines' classical strategic success 
One major attraction for SNCF top management was the fact that Sabre was claimed to have 
generated three quarters of American Airlines profits [Levy, 1992]. This was translated by SNCF in the 
potential to gain market share against road and air transport, through controlling the distribution channels 
in Europe, by being the first and hopefully dominant electronic distribution network, selling tickets to "all 
Europeans", and expanding the high-speed rail network in Europe [Anon 1992]. In Metzler and Maitre's 
terms [ 1990], market demands were seen as the driving force. 
The emergence of computerised reservation systems, in particular Sabre at American Airlines, 
and their role as a 'competitive weapon' have been described and analysed by many authors since the 
mid-1980s. Most business information systems textbooks, business schools, academics and consultants 
have made ample use of Sabre as an example of a strategic information system (see classic papers by 
Porter, Millar, Clemons, McFarlan, Ives, Learmonth, Wiseman, Earl, Ward, Scott Morton and Rockart). It 
can be said it is the archetypal example of how information can provide strategic advantage. This 
however has been interpreted and analysed in many different ways and even disputed. 
Three generations of airline co=uterised reservation systems 
From basic operational support to start with, the use of computers in airlines has expanded over 
the last 30 years to include most functions [Henderson 1994]: passenger service (reservations, ticketing, 
check-in); operations (flight planning/scheduling, departure control, crew tracking/scheduling, cargo 
tracking/accounting); maintenance and engineering (planning, scheduling, purchasing/inventory, rotables 
control, performance monitoring); fmancial (revenue accounting, statistics); fare quotation, frequent 
flyer, yield management; weather, in-flight sales, bag tag, airport information, catering tracking, 
hotel/car/tour reservations, customer requests, human resources, fuel, message switching, cockpit 
80 
Chapter 3 
information, cre* training. The world's airlines continue to spend heavily on automation, and some are 
reported to spend $0.5 billion a year and the most heavily automated functions are reservations and 
maintenance/engineering. Top companies such as United Airlines also sell applications and automation 
services to other carriers, and the most extensive offerings are those of American Airlines' parent, AMR 
Corp. which supplies both services and applications to a lengthy list of fellow carriers [Henderson 1994]. 
The origin of Sabre - and of all real-time computer systems - can be traced back to Sage or 
SemiýAutomatic Ground Environment, funded by the US Air Force in 1951-to develop a real-time radar 
defence network to guard against surprise Soviet air and rriissile attacks (Schulz 1992]. The first 
commercial real-time venture was Saber (Semi-Automatic Business Environment Research) began in 
0 ctober 1959 after five years of analysis and design study by American Airlines and IBM, which had 
been involved in Sage. The development of the initial system took another four and a half years, over 400 
man-years and cost $30 million. A common and almost mythical anecdote places the initial idea for Sabre 
as emerging from a chance meeting between an AA executive and an IBM sales manager sitting next to 
each other on a flight from New York to San Francisco... 
The initial version (1959) was capable of handling information from and about other air carriers 
and AA was able to charge rent for use of its system. By then, the system could handle up to 1,800 
messages per second from 80,000 linked terminals [Adam 1990]. This first mover's advantage lasted 
several years until Eastern Airlines launched in 1965 PARS (Programmed Airlines Reservations System 
1), also known as System One, which performed a number of functions in addition to reservations (e. g. 
check in, fare quote, weight and balance). PARS also provided Eastern with outside revenues from sales 
of the software package. Delta (Deltamatic) and Pan Am (Panamac) also bought Saber from IBM, and 
AA changed the name to Sabre to avoid confusion [Adam 1990]. In 1970 American Airlines introduced 
an upgraded Sabre and an enhanced PARS syst=4 which it had bought from Eastern, and which was 
jointly licensed by American and Eastern. They could merge modules from the two systems using PIJI 
programming methods, and this new technology became an industry standard. TWA (in conjunction with 
Burroughs) and United Airlines (in conjunction with Univac) had bought and tried to customise their own 
systems based on this architecture. However, their efforts failed and, after some legal tangles with their 
suppliers, bought software and expertise from Eastern [Adam 1990). By 1972, TWA had its own version 
of PARS and United had set up a system called Apollo. Schulz [ 1992] refers to these developments as the 
first generation CRS (1958-1974) which concentrated on system-building and competency acquisition, 
with airlines now customers of the CRS vendor airlines. On the other hand, the technical lead held by AA 
and then Eastern was no longer so obvious by the mid-1970s [Adarr4 1990]. All the main carriers had 
stable and reliable internal systerms and communications networks supporting their main operations. 
The second generation CRS (1975-1985) concentrated on marketing and niche innovations 
[Schulz 1992). With the deregulation of US airlines in 1978, American Airlines introduced 'name check- 
in' which linked passenger name records with marketing records, and allowed the introduction of the first 
'frequent flyer' programme. Another innovation was the realisation of the importance of the travel agent 
market, which had provided 30% of bookings in 1967, compared to thrice that number in 1987 [Adam 
1990]. The introduction of terminals to travel agencies had started slowly, but deregulation provided a 
competitive spur in the late 1970s. AA started aggressively pursuing travel agents as 'lease' customers 
81 
1ý Chapter 3 
and installing Sabre terminals. Agents had access to flights of all airlines that paid AA a fee for entry onto 
the system. By the end of 1985 American and United had 45% and 29% of the CRS market respectively 
[Schulz 19921 and by 1987,95 per cent of travel agents were automated [Monteiro and Macdonald 1996]. 
Gains could be achieved only by displacing rival systems. To make them switch from one CRS to 
another, some airlines offered agents cash incentives, extra commissions for sales on their carrier, and 
free use of their CRS up to five years. One particularly successful tactic was to exploit the tendency for 
agent& to book passengers on carriers located in their local area, even if this means taking a connecting 
flight. In the 1983-1986 period, System One (Eastern) jumped from 16 to 45 per cent in Miami, and 
, 4pollo (United) in Orlando went from 10 to 35 per cent [Monteiro and Macdonald 1996]. 
Additionally, AA realised the market potential of Sabre and devised the 'co-host' scheme 
whereby smaller carriers can pay to have preferential displays on agents' terminals, i. e. for their flights to 
appear on the screen before those of competitors (Adam 1990]. This gave rise to numerous carriers and 
travel agents filing petitions with the Civil Aviation Board because of problems associated with CRS 
dominance. These problems feH into several categories [Monteiro and Macdonald 1996]: access to the 
CRS, bias in the CRS displays, monopolistic and discriminatory pricing of booking fees, and exclusive 
arrangements with travel agents. American and United were found to have developed algorithms that 
ordered the display of information that favoured their co-hosts; for example by ranking flights by carrier- 
specific factors rather than neutral factors such as shortest journey time, departure time or fewer 
connections, by adding time delay to some flights, or by failing to show competitors' lowest fares [Mietus 
1989]. Even though "the regulation that emerged ( ... ) generally eliminated the more blatant forms of anti- 
competitive use of CRS, it was not totally satisfactory" [Monteiro and Macdonald 1996: 178]. Vendors 
were not prevented from making charges, which continue to make CRS ownership a "financial gold 
mine". 
Schulz [1992] suggests a third generation of CRS (1986-1990s) characterised by smart 
workstations, which allowed, for instance Delta Airlines to enter the corporate travel market. The US air 
travel agency industry is very competitive and agencies use IT extensively to lower cost and improve 
service. The corporate segment in particular makes use of complex databases to manage corporate clients' 
travel expenses (including co-ordination of hotels, entertainment, food, meetings, baggage, shuttles, taxis, 
car rentals). Doll [1994] argues that corporate travel agencies will continue to grow as they broaden the 
range of services they offer their customers, particularly through the use of integrated reservation 
services, world wide databases of tours and resorts and travel management software. In the mass travel 
market, there will be consolidation of nation-wide 'mega' agencies that will dominate the travel service 
industry. Additionally, PCs and internet-based services allow passengers to book directly from home, and 
this may re-shape the travel agents industry now even further. 
An example of a more sophisticated PC-based tool is SMARTS (Sales Management and 
Reporting/Tracking System), developed in 1990 by American Airlines, which is based on CRS 
reservations data and internal booking data, and which delivers agency specific revenue performance and 
bookings [Christiaanse 1996]. The system organises data by city, zone, territory, location and national 
account, supports custornised revenue reporting and allows consolidated data manipulation using 
information from other CRS. Since 98% of US travel agencies do their bookings on one of the four 
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dominant CRS (Sabre, Apollo, Norldspan and System One), this means that all the -booking behaviour of 
each of the 33,000 travel agencies is available. This enables American Airlines to carry out precisely 
targeted incentive programmes for travel agencies. A more recent example of an internet-bascd service is 
the Web Pets Travel Service which is a KLM online reservation system through which customers can 
organise for the air transport of their cat or dog [Christiaansc and Zimmerman 1998]. 
Another feature of the third generation CRS according to Schulz [1992) is yield management, 
whichýwill be covered in more detail below. -Within the context of a deregulated environment, yield 
management, in combination with PC-based reservation systems, as well as the established large-scale 
systems, provides the airlines with unprecedented capabilities at providing customer service and 
marketplace' pricing" [Schulz 1992: 71]. 
Perhaps most importantly for SNCF, "conservative estimates credit Sabre with a cumulative 
cash contribution to American Airlines between 1976 and 1986 of $900 million, producing an internal 
rate of return during the decade of 68.70/o" [Copeland 1991]. In 1991, with 85,000 terminals in travel 
agencies in 47 countries providing access to fares and schedules for 665 airlines, Sabre accounted for 
about 85% of American Airlines' earnings [Copeland 199 1 ]. In 1997, Sabre was in place in 54 countries 
and with some 20,000 travel agents, with estimates suggesting that some 130,000 terminals were 
connected to the system. Each day some 1.6 billion bookings were taken over it for some 740 airlines and 
it dealt with 20 times this number of enquiries about product details contained within it [Russell and 
Johns 1997: 124]. 
IS and coMj2etitive advantage 
The air industry has been seen as one of the best illustrations of how infomiation technology can 
have an impact on industry structure. Sabre has been cited as an example of the use of information 
systems to gain competitive advantage since the mid-1970s. According to Max Hopper, vice president 
for IS at American Airlines and vice chairman of AMR Information Services, who joined AA as director 
of Sabre in 1972, "we helped define an era" (Hopper 1990: 118]. 
However, he argues that it is difficult to document the claim that Sabre generated substantial 
increases in traffic by creating market-power advantages over the competition. He states that "Sabre's 
real importance to AA was that it prevented an erosion of market share"[Hopper 1990: 122]. Together 
with Copeland [1991], he believes that most explanations for Sabre's success focus on the competitive 
advantages realised by locating terminals in travel agencies and are too shallow. The cumulative, 
complementary and incremental technical and organisational capabilities are a better explanation. 
Factors such as well established functional and technical operating routines, and a long-standing 
pattern of tit-for-tat rivalry between American and United Airlines, even prior to deregulation, accounted 
for many necessary competitive counteractions. AA did not plan to dominate distribution channels but 
learnt by doing. For instance, as an incentive to travel agents to subscribe, it added functions to help them; 
one such function was improved passenger records, since travel agents were interested in data grouped by 
passenger, in contrast to traditional airline priorities where data used to be grouped by flight. Once this 
enhancement was complete, AA saw in this the basis for the first frequent flyer's programme. This 
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attracted f@l-fari business travellers, who subsidised the low fares AA was forced fo offer when low-cost 
airlines such as People Express entered one of its markets [Copeland 1990]. Further, Copeland states that: 
"it is most unlikely that another organisation will replicate the strategic coup that American accomplished 
with Sabre"; and that "today no company would allow a competitor to gain electronic control over a 
distribution channel, in large part because of the example of the airlines' experience" [Copeland 
1991: 60). 
z. One relevant concept underlying the strategic discourse surrounding IS is that of 'information 
intensity', which the air industry is said to possess. For instance, it would be impossible for travel agents 
to cope with the volume of information generated by constant changes in flights and fares (which 
originated in deregulation) without CRS. CRS played a key role in the deregulation and the management 
of fluctuating prices and routes (more on the links between deregulation and IT in Chapter 4). Another 
example is how frequent flyer customers want to know which route would allow them to claim the 
maximum mileage points. These are clear illustrations of how the technical and the social intermingle so 
closely that it is impossible to separate them. The technology addresses and creates information intensive, 
or social, problems simultaneously, for example increasing changes in flights and fares. 
CRS are also seen as a market in themselves and have been profitable through fees from other air 
companies for using the system, renting hardware, etc. Evidently, selling Sabre to SNCF is an example of 
this secondary 'information' market, from which American Airlines benefited, and that SNCF was hoping 
to emulate. The intention was for Socrate to be in a good position for controlling the European marketý 
thereby changing the role of SNCF towards an organiser of travel and become an international rail 
distribution provider "6tre le leader europden du transport terrestre de voyageurs & grande vitesse" 
[SNCF-GL 1992]. Possible arrangements were to host services from other rail companies and provide 
reservation access through the SNCF network (like airlines), software licensing arrangements, and 
consultancy, made easier through the SNCF/Arnerican Airlines partnership. AMRIS (AMR Information 
Services) was to explore with SNCF opportunities to license Socrate to other companies [Metzler and 
Maitre 19901. Another way in which Socrate was meant to emulate the success of Sabre was through 
enlarging the range of services on offer, such as hotel bookings and car rentals [Levy 1992]. 
Socrate as a (national? ) stratepic vision 
It is clear that the strategic rhetoric of the 1980s was taken on board by SNCF's top executives 
and that they saw Socrate as providing SNCF with the fht-mover advantage [JMM Interview 1]. 
According to many accounts [e. g. JPD Interview 9, GC Interview 6], the personalities involved were 
critical. Jean-Marie Metzler, head of the project, and Georges Vialle, second in charge, seem to have 
constituted a very dynamic and brilliant duo (combining a "strategic genius" and a "locomotive" 
according to JPD Interview 9) and shared a strongly articulated strategic vision. When interviewing 
Metzler, he showed me slides he uses in teaching strategy at several top business schools in France where 
he is a regular speaker. Metzler and Vialle envisaged a total "mutation" [JMM Interview 1] for SNCF and 
saw Socrate as an inescapable necessity to face the growth of a deregulated European market. They 
"To be the European leader of high-speed terrestrial passenger transport". 
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perceived ihe Mure core business as rail distribution rather than rail transport [JMM Interview 1] and 
Socrate as the tool of a competitive, commercial and international enterprise [GV Interview 14]. They 
understood the future as a matter of competing with air, and the ownership of a tool such as Socrate as the 
key success factor for survival [GV Interview 14]. Tlieir reasoning is partly based on the fact that 50% of 
SNCF revenues come from ten major routes where there is fierce competition with air [JMM Interview 
1]. They saw it as an "absolute duty" [JMM Interview 1] to equip the enterprise with CRS/GDS 
technology, seen as an "intellectual instrument with predictive power"; although they clearly articulated 
thatý even if nothing could be done without it it is not sufficient and decisions are strategic by nature 
rather than technical. Their verdict after the Socrate implementation debAcle, is that fundamental strategic 
issues at SNCF still need to be addressed [JMM Interview 1]. 
It seemed logical to transfer technology and management expertise and follow the American 
'model' to gain this advantage. More generally, European countries have tended to export the American 
model of corporate capitalism since 1945 and Djelic [1999] identifies a 'mimetic' mode of transfer. In the 
logic of globalising; nvirkets and increasing competition, CRS and GDS are a technological response to a 
commercial problem (capacity management) and a financial problem (profit maximisation) in the service 
sector generally. However, whether American Airlines' experience over many years could be 
transplanted and duplicated in a different context is an interesting question, at the core of the global/local 
debate. What is remarkable is the deep conviction of many SNCF top executives [e. g. interviewees JMM, 
GV, GC, CQ, SEB, JPD, LDM] that this was, and still is, the way forward. Many top SNCF executives 
were quickly convinced that Metzler and Vialle's strategic vision was the right one: "Metzler saw exactly 
what was coming, he was truly strategic, he anticipated that infrastructures would go and that control of 
distribution networks was the way to go" [GC Interview 61; "He saw that in the future we may have to 
cough up two dollars per transaction to some system like Amadeus so he prepared for that" [JPD 
interview 9]. 
Beyond the changing perception of advantage and survival at SNCF, and related to the 
global/local debate, it is clear that there are nationalist stakes too [CQ Interview 101. Apparently, when 
looking for possible associates, SNCF approached British and German rail companies since they were the 
only two in Europe with a CRS, with the view to set up some form of European partnership [CQ 
Interview 10]. This failed for reasons of perceived national differences. The French felt they could not 
trust the British - their CRS were very marketing-oriented but their train services had a poor reputation, 
and their idea of a partnership was too short-term [CQ Interview 10]. The French did not trust the 
Germans either who were seen as "fishing foe' information and expertise when shown around, with little 
in return [CQ Interview 10]. Perhaps from a British or German viewpoiný the French were seen as too 
pushy and wanting to dominate the European scene which may explain these tensions. Similar national 
rivalries were also present between the French and the British during the Channel tunnel project. Ile 
American partnership in comparison seemed much smoother [CQ Interview 10]. 
The next section examines how the software was adapted to the SNCF context and the attendant 
problems. 
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3.2 SOFTWARE CHANGES: FROM AIR TO RAIL 
The Socrate project was decomposed into three phases [see Figure 3.1]. During phase 1, 
'Network' (mid 1989-mid 1990) dumb sales computers were to be replaced by more powerful IBM PCs. 
This was required in any case. In phase 2, 'Dialogue' (mid 1990-mid 1991), the distribution software was 
to be implemented and connected to the existing RESA reservation software; this enabled all sales 
worksiations (PC-based, Minitel access and automatic vending rnachinesý to be linked to the SNCF 
distribution network (SDS, or Syst6me de Distribution SNCF, running on a private packet switching 
transmission network, Rdtipac). Some workstations were installed abroad, in Base], Geneva and London 
(Lomazzi 1991]. Connections to a GDS were made, for instance to Esterel-Amadeus for travel agents. 
Phase 3, 'Trains', started in mid- 1991 with an expected date of delivery in mid- 1992. The new reservation 
centre was set up, working with the Socrate system, and trains to which the new commercial principles 
apply were to be added progressively to the database. The optimisation software was to be designed and 
implemented, and RESA only used for 'non-intelligent' access (e. g Minitel terminals). 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
'Network' 'Dialogue' 'Trains' 
Mid 1989-mid 90 Mid 1990-mid 91 Mid 1991-mid 1992 
RESA 
Optimisation 
RESA 
Reservations 
Distribu- i 
network Distribu- 
don 
tion 
network 
Dumb PC-based 
T_ 
PCs and ven- Minitel and ven- Non intelli 
terminals work- ding machines machines gent access statio 
Figure 3.1 Socrate calendar [after Metzler and Maitre, 1990] 
3.2.1 Adapting software 
Collaboration between SNCF and AMR was intended to adapt Sabre in the following ways: 
modify the inventory, use AMR's expertise in optimisation techniques, maintain and possibly increase the 
system performance. During 1989, a joint AMR/SNCF team was to establish specifications for SNCF 
internal software. The partnership was intended to be long-term in order to design the most powerful 
product on the market. The partnership is called "Groupement d'Intdret Economique" (GIE) RESARAIL 
2000 [Resarail 2000,1992] and SNCF is tied to AMP, the American holding company that owns Sabre 
until 2007 [SNCF 19891. 
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Cost benefit analysis included projected traffic increases resulting from the new system (which 
did not materialise, see above), which would have required modifications to the RESA systern, as follows 
[SNCF 1989]: 
Initial costs FF 570m 
Annual functioning costs FF 200m 
Annual benefits FF 830m 
Costs included hardware and software for reservation and ticketing, timetabling and fare 
information, and increased distribution costs due to increase in demand. Benefits included productivity 
gains in sales and accounting, but primarily increases in revenue per seat sold realised through the new 
pricing systern. The internal rate of return, compared to a simple modification of RESA to suit the new 
commercial policies, was estimated at 30%. 
From a technical perspective, it is clear than air and rail differ. They vary in their operational 
activities, for instance in the number of connections between routes, the range of fares, the seats on offer 
(e. g. various sleepers or couchettes). The volume of transactions is also on a different scale; Amadeus (Air 
France) deals with 80 million transactions in the whole of Europe per year, whereby transactions in 
French rail alone can reach 100 million a year [Metzler and Maitre 1990). The distribution channels are 
mainly in stations, and less so in travel agencies (from 10 to 25% of total revenues depending on the 
country). 
A team of 400 staff (in 1990) of SNCF and AMR computer scientists had to transform an air 
industry system into a railway software system to adapt the software to SNCF norms, and to integrate the 
complexity of the rail network and its operational differences. Design and programming were carried out 
in the Paris area and in Lille where three super mainframes were centralised in May 1990. The new 
reservation centre in Lille, where all data are centralised, is said to have been built like a real 'fortress' 
[Lornazzi 1991], partly for security reasons. Phase I was completed in July 1990. The specifications 
documentation reached the grand total of 8,000 pages by December 1990 [Metzler and Maitre 1990]. The 
system was intended to support the provision of 400 millions tickets a year, corresponding to 840 million 
journeys on inter-city and suburban rail. More than 30,000 workstations and automatic vending machines 
were to be installed in stations and travel agencies, dealing with 1.3 rnillion transactions a day [Levy 
1992]. 
Project management included the following, which helped keep the software development under 
control: external consultancy by Coteba Management Consultants, specialists for complex project 
management; the use of Super Project, a project management software from Computer Associates; 
breakdown of the project into six primary projects to make it more manageable; the use of software 
houses such as Unilog; creation of two independent teams, i. e. not linked to the software developers, for 
quality assurance and test/validation; quality assurance was carried out by 90 staff from the Sema Group 
[Levy 1992]; training was supported by the technology department of Ciefop engineering consultants 
[Capdevielle 19921. 
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By rnid*1992 the project involved 650 people from 24 different nationalities, half from SNCF, 
and 100 from American Airlines. Phase 3 was delivered approximately 10 months late (March 1993 
instead of mid-1992) which is not enormous bearing in mind the size of the project. The budget was 
tonly' 30% more than anticipated, as Socrate had cost FF 1.3 billion by 1993 instead of the planned FF I 
billion, and software development took four and a half years, from 1989 to 1993. 
Serious difficulties arose. First of all Sabre was written for a maximum of 80 'relations' or pairs 
of loýjgin-destination' (O-D) with very few intermediary stops. It had to be rewritten to cope with the 
most important relations at SNCF and its 2,400 stations. Secondly the fare structures are much larger for 
trains than for planes. The most fundamental change was the disappearance of the station as the 
computing 'unit' replaced by the relation between two stations, implemented through the use of relational 
databases. Relational databases support the definition and manipulation of pairs of stations defining a 
route, leading to the notion of market 'segment'. This was not possible with previous database technology 
which only supported the connection of single units. These relations or O-D pairs correspond to those 
requested at least once a day. If the relation has not been pre-recorded (too small stations, not enough 
demand) the transaction has to be done manually in two steps, so takes mice as long. The concept of 
origin-destination allows prices to be defted not according to physical distance between the origin and 
the destination, but according to the nature of that O-D relation; this has many more parameters, for 
instance the type of train, travelling time, type of seat and time of booking. Marketing surveys about 
socio-economic characteristics of each relation, competition on that relation, and the value customers find 
in the TGV service especially, determine the price for each instance of the relation. 
Initially, 160,000 'direct' relations (direct from station A to station B with no connection) and 
4,000 'indirect' relations were input in the databases. This represents 80% of the traff ic which was 
insufficient and contributed to delays as sales staff had to input station names manually instead. Another 
41,000 'indirect' (from station A to station B via station C, D, etc. ) relations were rapidly added by June 
1993 [Moissonnier 1993: 13]. 
Another reason for the initial difficulties was the lack of integration across three pre-existing 
4sub, databases (timetables, O-D station pairs and prices) which feed the Socrate SDS system. These 
databases originate in different parts of the organisation and had been created gradually over a long 
period of time; they use old (and different from each other) programming techniques which are difficult 
to maintain and modify [Moissonnier 1993: 5]. Instead of a total rethink of data management in the light 
of the new system, two of these existing databases (OD pairs and pricing) were redesigned to adjust to the 
new commercial techniques; the third database, timetables, was left as it was (partly in order to carry on 
feeding the existing RESA system which run in parallel with the new system) [Moissonnier 1993: 12]. 
Technical integration across these databases also required institutional co-operation across departments 
and their different cultures, and these issues were underestimated. This led to incoherent, anomalous and 
missing data, which were another important cause of delays and lengthy passenger queues in rail stations 
at the time of the launch of the system. Centralised control of data input across the three departments was 
put in place by the end of 1993 and the complete redesign of these databases was also set in motion as a 
result [Moissonnier 1993: 13]. 
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Not a softxýare ddveloRment failure? 
The extent of software custornisation for reservation management was obviously large, even 
without considering the complexity of designing optimisation software, covered in a later section. From 
the evidence, the project seems to have been managed appropriately, quality assurance mechanisms were 
employed, budgets were not hugely overrun and slippages were minimal. Some even argue that Socrate 
was not the failure that it was said to be and that "IS projects that involve the purchase and custornisation 
of large applications constitute a more rapid alternative to the development of new systems" [Adam and 
Cahen 1997: 3]. It is quite clear that, once project managers decided that in-house development would not 
6ve been possible, it would also have been difficult to outsource due to the size of the project. And 
arguably, Sabre was the most robust GDS available at the time. Using multi-cultural software 
development teams proved successful too, maybe surprisingly. AMRIS trained SNCF staff on TPF, and 
the objective was that, in time, they would become autonomous. Adam and Cahen [1997: 14] claim that 
the different work habits generated fundamental conflicts and that there were difficult cultural battles that 
affected the development. One interviewee mentioned that early in the development, collaboration with 
American partners was not easily accepted, and that apparently graffiti appeared on walls in Gare St 
Lazare near SNCF headquarters with "US go home" [JPD Interview 9]. According to this interviewee 
[Socrate IT director], problems were not only due to cultural differences, but also to a large rnix of 
experiences and perspectives: RESA experts, TPF experts, functional experts (e. g. rail timetabling, 
pricing) and technical staff6, rail public service and air private company attitudes [JPD Interview 9]. On 
the other hand, the French were able to adapt to English as the working language and common work 
procedures developed progressively; on one of my visits at the operational research group at their Paris 
headquarter in November 1994, staff of all nationalities (French and American but also Spanish, 
Vietnamese, Peruvians, etc) were organising a Thanksgivings party for the following weekend... 
Development teams were strongly motivated and "were working flat out for peanuts, but for personal 
satisfaction, in order to say 'I worked on Socratel, there was a 'commando' climate, a feeling that we 
were doing something exceptional" [JPD Interview 9]. 
Technically speaking, the system was delivered on time6 and exceeded the original budget by 
only 30%. One reason for the delay was that the definition of requirements took longer than planned. The 
system is still successful and is being used by international rail companies such as Eurostar (with only a 
few stops for which Socrale is well suited), and Swiss railways (only for their international sales) [GV 
interview 14]. One could therefore agree with Adam and Cahen [ 1997: 18] that the methodological choice 
was judicious, and that selecting AMRIS as a partner brought large amounts of expertise and a 
willingness to undertake such a project. However, real life testing and implementation were disastrous. It 
is clear that SNCF underestimated the implementation problems. The next section describes a very similar 
5 Mixing functional and technical staff in software development teams was also an innovation at SNCF, 
where traditionally computing staff had been dominating and rather antagonistic towards user 
departments [JPD Interview 9). 
6 The initial plan included about one year as leeway, which got used up. At the end of the four and a half 
years, it was decided to go ahead rather than drag on, partly to manage staff motivation and keep the 
pressure on, based on the experience that longer or extended projects tend to fizzle out [JPD Interview 9]. 
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experience- at Greyhound Lines Inc., to illustrate how operational differences in the nature of transport 
markets plays an important part in designing CRS. 
3.2.2 Operational differences: the example of Greyhound Lines Inc. 
Operational differences in the nature of the air and rail markets explain some of the technical 
difficulties faced by SNCF, and a similar case at Greyhound Lines Inc; in the US coach industry 
illustrates this. Greyhound Lines Inc. faced the same problems as SNCF [Tornsho 1994] in that there are 
many more stops during coach trips than on air routes. Greyhound's story is remarkably similar to the 
introduction of Socrate at SNCF. 
Greyhound Lines Inc., with headquarters in Dallas, Texas, has long been the leading trans- 
continental coach company in the US. However, the company's share of interstate travel dropped from 
30% in 1960 to 6% in the late 1980s, because of the rise in ownership of cars and discounted airline 
services. In 1991, a new chief executive and new chief financial officer began to cut costs (from 3700 to 
2400 coaches), upgrade coach facilities, replace terminal workers with part-time workers, leading to 30% 
staff annual turnover, and computerise. One of their motivation was the view that "financial market 
analysts focus on computerisation as the key to remaining competitive" [Laudon and Laudon 1998: 108]. 
Coach customers rarely reserve seats in advance, and traditionally clerks plotted journeys manually from 
thick bus schedule log-books, which was very slow. Computerising all the routes and stops would 
theoretically greatly reduce the time needed to plot journeys and issue tickets. 
Trips, the new system, was intended to cover most operations, from passenger reservations to 
fleet scheduling and driver allocations. Management hoped that adopting a reservation approach would 
allow them to reduce the number of near-empty coaches. The Trips project began in early 1992 with a 
staff of 40 and a $6 million budget. However, creating a coach-oriented system proved to be far more 
complex than designing an airline reservation system. An airline passenger flying from Baltimore to Los 
Angeles might make one stop; the same passenger on a bus might make 10 or more, with a different 
group of people filling the seats on each leg of the journey. "Greyhound technicians estimated that they 
would need a system capable of managing as many as 1,800 vehicle stops a day, more than 10 times those 
of an average airline" (Tomsho 1994]. Additionally, the average coach passenger is much less affluent 
than the average airline passenger and few passengers have credit cards to enable them to purchase tickets 
in advance by telephone (and even how many have telephones available). 
When the software was implemented in 1993 it was a disaster. It began in May using a 
preliminary version because there was not enough time to develop a full version. When Trips reached 50 
locations, the computer terminals began to freeze unpredictably. Learning to use it required 40 hours of 
training. 7be system greeted ticket clerks with a disorganised, multi-screen barrage of options for getting 
passengers between any two points. Because its data bank didn't include all Greyhound destinations, 
clerks sometimes had to haul out old log-books and plot journeys by hand. The time needed to issue a 
ticket doubled - when the system didn't crash; the system crashed so often in some locations that agents 
were writing tickets manually. The passengers who arrived with manual tickets were told to wait so that 
they could be reissued a ticket by the computer. Long queues, delays and confusion resulted. For days 
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passenge 
' 
rs . rnissed connections, were separated from their luggage and left to sleep in terminals overnight. 
When the new free phone number began serving the 220 terminals already connected to Trips in July 
1993, the system could not handle all the calls and customers often had to call as many as a dozen times 
to get through. Centres were told not to take any reservations. 
In September 1993, Pips was closed down West of the Mississippi River because of its 
continuing problems and delays. Passenger traffic plunged 12% in August 1993 and Greyhound stock 
tumbIrd 24% in a day [Tomsho 1994). To entice customers to reserve, in May 1994 the company offered 
a $68 ticket for a trip anywhere in the US with a three-day advance purchase. The crush of potential 
customers brought Trips to a halt. Coaches and drivers were not available in some cities, resulting in large 
numbers of frustrated passengers stranded in terminals. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
investigated the company and former directors, officers and employees for possible securities law 
violations in January 1995, suspecting insider trading and inadequate internal accounting procedures. 
Finally in 1995, a newly appointed chief executive officer decided to dismantle the 'airline' model which 
relied on reservations, in order to bring the company back [Zellner 1996]. 
Nowadays, Greyhound does not take reservations. People show up at the terminal and are likely 
to get a seat at a reasonable price. If a coach fills up, Greyhound will bring out another until everyone has 
a seat. The price structure was also changed. The previous regime had raised the 'walk-in' price as high 
as possible while lowering prices of advanced purchased tickets, to compete with the airlines. Today 
Greyhound's maximum one-way 'walk in' fare averages half of airline discounted prices. Other steps 
toward profitability include adding more people to answer telephones, adding coaches to popular routes 
(e. g. New York to Boston), and restoring long-haul routes to rural areas which had been nearly abandoned 
under the previous regime. The company is also trying to rebuild its package express service from urban 
to rural areas at a low cost. Revenues and sales have grown, although it is not clear how much more the 
company can grow [Laudon and Laudon 1998]. 
Almost the same incidents took place in French railway stations during the summer of 1993. 
Greyhound under-estimated the complexity of the task and didn't allocate sufficient resources. SNCF had 
to adapt an airline system to a rail system, which proved to be extremely difficult technically. In both 
cases, the technical problems were due to the more complex nature of rail and coach transport markets 
when compared to air. Perhaps the expectations were raised by the fact that Sabre was such a successful 
system; however, this was achieved with a small army of technicians spending three decades and several 
hundred million dollar perfecting the system. 
3.2.3 Socrate architecture 
The new site in Lille was finished in May 1990 and accommodates technical components. The 
choice of site was also significant and quite symbolic. It is near the TGV-Nord new station in Lille, at the 
junction of train routes from London, Paris and Brussels. Pierre Mauroy, Lille mayor and former Prime 
Minister, lobbied intensely to locate the new TGV station in his city, at the heart of a network of 
European cities. Euralille, a vast urban and innovative development is situated around and on top of the 
rail hub [Aldersey-Williams 1995]. The site consists of 6,000 square metres and can self-operate for 72 
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hours. It fiouse§ three IBM 9000 (340Mips, 520 gigabytes) and three parallel processing database 
machines NCR-Teradata (410 gigabytes); it is the second Teradata site in Europe and has an overall 
capacity of a terabyte. 
Socrate, like Amadeus, which enables travel agents to book amongst others Air France tickets, is 
a GDS. It is linked to Herm4s, which carries out connections with other European rail reservation and 
distribution chamels, including Eurostar services. In fact, SNCF signed an agreement with AmadeuS at 
the end of 1995 (Anon. 1995], one of the biggest electronic reservation system in the world linking 
153,000 terminals in airline sales offices and travel agencies. From 1996, travel agencies subscribing to 
Amadeus were able to book rail tickets in the SNCF reservation system from their Amadeus terminals. 
Most of the components in Figure 3.2 are located in Lille. 
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Figure 3.2 Socrate functional architecture [after SNCF 1992a] 
Aristote: commercial and accounting software 
Aristote stands for 'Amdlioration de la Restitution d'Information par un Syst6me Transactionnel 
Optimisd sur le Trafic de I'Entreprise', and was approved in April 1990. It cost FF 300 million and its aim 
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was to make commercial and accounting data jointly available. Previously, revenue management and 
accounting was costly and labour intensive (3,000 staff, FF 600 niillion a year). Furthermore, revenue 
analysis was slow, poorly integrated and non-exhaustive. For instance, revenues for different trains and 
for long distances were generally not exact figures but estimated ones. The motivation for Aristote was 
that "inter-city lines are operating in an increasingly competitive market and the growing use of IS in 
enterprises is making a better knowledge of revenues essential" [SNCF 1993c]. The aim of Arislote was 
therefore to provide "a better knowledge of revenues and their distribution,. and a simplification of the 
organisation based on more appropriate staff qualifications". 
passenger traffic revenues 
As soon as a sale transaction is completed in Socrate, a message is created. The messages are 
sent daily to Aristote. Data is processed in different ways for different purposes: quality control, 
distribution of revenues across units (SNCF, foreign networks, catering, etc. ), calculation of net profit, 
tax, etc. The messages are stored for four months in a database, which can process up to I million 
transactions a night. It uses Teradata hardware (parallel processing). 
Commercial analysis 
Aristote communicates to the different management levels of the commercial networks (stations, 
travel agents, telephone and Minitel sales, sales abroad, etc. ); data about their performance can be 
compared to their objectives. For instance, the sales team leaders of the 50 most important stations and 
the commercial executives of the 120 passenger units receive every day a summary of the previous day's 
sales. Monthly results are available on the 5th day of the following month. Commercial data analysis is 
also made available on the database for about 400 users (in regional or central divisions) to provide 
detailed information of product use, revenues, reservation traffic for each train or for each route. Aristote 
also provides information about large clients such as enterprises. 
Simplified accounting 
Aristote deals with accounting reports and audits, invoicing, payment and ledgers. All this used 
to be done manually. Through the IT networks, the accounting work was reorganised into two levels. 
Central accounting services now deal with large accounts (travel agencies, business clients, foreign 
networks), maintenance and auditing. Local accounting services (the sixty 'Bureaux de Contr6le 
Comptable' spread across France) deal with the 'first level' accounting control of sales staff operations. 
This reorganisation implied an upgrade and redefinition of jobs (e. g. account manager, accounting 
controller). A management dimension has also been added. For instance the local accounting services are 
integrated in their units and use the same management methods as those used by the sales forces. Aristote 
feeds the existing management accounting system ('Sachem') by calculating revenues for each passenger 
activity (inter-city, regional, Ile de France) and for establishing purchasers/providers contracts with 
regions. 
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ArUtole* was planned in the three phases below, and as illustrated - in Figure 3.3. The 
implementation of A71stote was delayed until January 1994. This was due to the problems encountered by 
Socrate, and Aristote staff had to abandon their work to help solve Socrate problems [Baýonet 1994). 
Phase 1: Conunercial revenues 
November 1992-March 1993: revenue management pilot 
April 4 993: revenue management to all 
Phase 2: General accounting 
June 1993: revenue accounting 
Sumner 1993: pilot sites 
October 1993: revenue accounting to all; start of accounting control, feeding to general accounts 
Phase 3: Management accounting 
December 1993: allocation of revenues and costs to units 
June 1994: accounting control and general accounts to all 
SOCRATE 
I 
ARISTOTE 
Phase I Phase 2 Phase 3 
Commercial Accounts Management 
Accounting 
SACHEM 
Figure 3.3 hnplementation of Aristote [SNCF 1993c) 
Thalk: optin-ýsation software 
Thaks (Traitement Heuristique Algorithmique des Espaces de Service) was derived from the 
optimisation software developed by American Airlines Decision Technology (AADT)7 an operational 
7 In 1994 AADT was integrated with Sabre Development Services and AMRIS Transportation 
Automation Services to form a new entity, Sabre Decision Technologies (SDT). SDT is a leading 
provider of off-the-shelf packages and custornised yield management systems and services to a variety of 
transport and tourism businesses. SDT's primary market continues to be large enterprises but some 
software may be suitable for independent, medium-sized operations, such as MRPS, Hotel Analysis, 
Reporting and Planning System [Arthur Andersen 1997]. 
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research 
* 
subsidia'ry of the AMR group, and implemented for American Airlines under the name Dinamo 
(Dynamic Inventory and Maintenance Optimizer). The contract signed in March 1989 between SNCF and 
AMR for a partnership until 2007 covers: a contract with AMR Information Systems for the adaptation 
of Sabre to SNCF; and a contract with AADT to use their experience of Dinamo to build yield 
management software for SNCF. The general principle is that "reservation is indispensable, and so is 
yield management" [SNCF 1992b]. 
z. initially, optimisation software was to be applied to TGVs only, and to normal inter-city trains 
later, after the first results were analysed. From 23"d May 1993, Thaks was applied passively for one year 
(phase Itransitoire'), and recorded reservations and price data per TGV and per day, to create a history of 
demand. After the first year, it was to operate fully, using the data accumulated during the first year as a 
baseline. 
For all individual trains, Thalk stores the changes and evolution over time of filling rates, prices 
paid by clients (full fares, commercial or social discounts) and routes. Combining this information with 
forecasting and optimisation software, Thaks can then propose, dynamically, train per train, the best 
distribution of seats to increase profitability. It can, for each train, modify seat allocation according to 
how this particular train is currently filling up. If the figures are less than the initial forecasts, Thalk can 
choose to increase the number of seats offered at discounted prices [SNCF 1992b]. The following is a 
simplified example to show how ThaMs works. 
Example: 
400 seats, three stations A, B and C, two fares (full, half price) 
Segment Fare Ptice Demand forecast 
AB full 300 100 
AB half 150 200 
AC full 400 50 
AC half 200 150 
BC full 200 50 
BC half 100 100 
Estimated demand AB=300 
Estimated demand AC=200 Total AB+AC= 500 when there are only 400 seats 
Estimated demand BC=150 
AB is a problem segment (too much demand for existing capacity) so the software ranks different options according to 
profits and allocates seats in the following order: 
Price Maximum Demands Final sales 
no. seats 
AC full 400 400 50 50 
AB full 300 350 100 100 
AC half 200 250 150 150 
AB half 150 100 200 100 
500 400 
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This limits the number of AB half fare seats and protects AC and AB full fares especially. The'maximum number of 
seats' possible for each category is revised automatically or manually according to demand so far (if it diverges from 
predicted demand based on historical data). For instance, if demand on AC Is lower than predicted, maximum numbers 
for half fares can be increased. On the other hand, if demand for AC Increases, these can be reduced. 
Obviously, this becomes extremely complicated when one introduces first and second class, an 
average of six stops, 4 or 5 different prices, 500 trains a day, and 60 days of sales (booking prior to 
departure). With historical records of reservations Thalk can also estimate 'no shows' statistically train 
by train. For instance, passengers booked on the l7h3O from Lyon are more likely to change their time of 
departure than passengers booked at I Ohl 5 in Marseille. Thalýs can therefore determine exactly the level 
of over-booking to allow by type of seat (first and second class); and for each category it can determine 
the number of seats on offer on certain routes and at different prices [Trdfault el al 1990]. 
The next figure (Figure 3.4) shows how Aristote and ThaMs fit into the Socrate functional 
architecture. The main elements of Figure 3.2 are reproduced and appropriate additions made in bold 
italics. 
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3.3 YIELDMANAGEMENT 
Yield management techniques, forecasting and optirnisation models are examined in further 
detail below, as they constitute the fundamentally new and most complex part of the Socrate system. It 
seems that perhaps more effort was put into designing Thalis, seen as the strategic core of the system. 
This may possibly have contributed towards some of the operational problems faced during the initial 
impleinentation. Yield management is seen in this thesis as the core too in the sense that it is closely 
related to deregulation covered in Chapter 4, pricing examined in Chapter 5, and organisational changes 
considered in Chapter 6. 
3.3.1 Computerised reservation systems and global distribution systems 
Reservation and distribution systems consist of a database management system centrally 
controlled, which manages the complexity of a fluctuating demand related to the variability of prices 
through yield management techniques; it provides real time information on marketing policies and fare 
structures of competitors and data accumulation for capacity and profit analyses. The computer networks 
and management techniques allow large-scale data collection in stations and distributors. They manage 
the complexity of the price/capacity relations and routes/times, in order to optimise the commercial and 
financial yields, in a context of inter-sectorial competition (air, rail, road). Yield management databases 
and models require certain functionalities in the reservation and distribution system. The yield 
management system is linked to: 
Historical databases (past reservations per origin-destination, per fare paid, cancellations, no 
shows); 
Databases of current reservations; 
Databases with characteristics of capacity; 
Database on competition. 
Information for these databases comes from the cornputerised reservation systern, which 
manages the reservations and holds information on timetables, availability, prices, etc., to which is 
connected, through the GDS, the points of sale terminals in the stations, the travel agencies, other 
companies, ticket machines, and the public access network (see Figure 3.5]. The yield management 
system manages quotas and overbooking through minimum and maximum thresholds based on 
predictions. Human analysts' intervention to modify these parameters is required when unusual conditions 
arise (e. g. the Gulf war), which can be aided through computer simulations. Models are refined through 
comparisons between predicted and actual demand, capacity and profit implications. 
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Figure 3.5 Yield management, CRS and GDS 
3.3.2 Yield management techniques 
Yield management used to rely almost exclusively on human expertise and has evolved to what 
may be seen as a science that employs more systematic analysis and decision techniques. The simplest 
form of yield management deals with each flight leg independently, rather than trying to optimise seat 
allocations over the airline's entire network of flights. Seat inventory control for a future departure only 
sets booking limits on discounted fare classes once, at the start of the reservations process for that flight 
(usually 6 weeks prior to departure), and takes no ftirther action as reservations are accepted. 
The more sophisticated forms of yield management take into account the information provided 
by actual reservations, through monitoring of booking trends and adjustment of discounted fare class 
limits, to maximise total flight revenues or flight loads. Adjustments are made on the basis of an analysis 
of past data, current bookings, and forecasts of future bookings for the flight. 
Yield management techniques aim to know, control and predict demand, as well as manage 
capacity and control costs according to this knowledge. It combines differentiated pricing, profit 
maximisation and quota management. It balances under- and over-capacity using customers' sensitivity to 
prices. It determines the number of seats per flight (quotas) which are discounted, so as to maintain 
maximum profits from the normally priced seats. These quotas can be determined dyLian-& : they are 
revised continuously according to real time demand until then. The goal is to control and manage 
travelling behaviour. This is done through working out the ideal point at which a customer who does not 
get a discounted fare either transfers to the higher fare or to another flight at the same price rather than not 
travelling or using another mode of transport. It is based on the analysis of past statistics, comparisons of 
past and current demand so far, forecasts based on current demand, and other statistical techniques. 
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Yield management and optimisation, when compared to previous' price differentiation 
mechanisms where several techniques were simply used in conjunction, represent a fundamental 
qualitative shift: detailed information is gathered about each and evejy flight throughout the day, the 
week and the year; information is gathered continuously on seats sold so far, so that the price mix on each 
flight can be modified in real time; each journey becomes identifiable, accountable and marketable as an 
individual and isolated product. 
3.3.3 Yield management in US airlines 
The motivation for yield management in airlines can be surnmarised as follows: "tell us what 
you can afford and we'll send you a ticket". It can also be argued that it is a pricing strategy developed at 
the time of deregulation so that established airlines could at least 9PPea to be competitive in price with 
the new entrants, and might even be able to fill otherwise empty seats with stimulated demand. It enabled 
pre-deregulation airlines to respond more rationally to price-cutting by individual competitors and/or in 
specific markets. 
Yield management includes both pricing and seat inventory control. Seat inventory control 
enables the airline to influence yields and total revenues on a flight-by-flight basis, within a given price 
structure. For an example of price structures, see Figure 3.6. Controlling the mix of fares sold for a 
particular flight is thus viewed as by far the most important aspect of fare competition, more important 
than the actual prices charged. The payoff from effective seat inventory control can be substantial: Delta 
Airlines has estimated that selling just one seat per flight at a full fare rather than a discounted fare can 
add to its annual revenues [Belobaba 1987]. 
Practice has evolved from an emphasis on human expertise in making seat inventory control 
decisions to computer support. US carriers have changed organisational structures accordingly. Seat 
inventory control and yield management are closely related to a range of other functions in the airline 
corporate structure, including pricing, marketing, sales, reservations, overbooking, and payload control. 
Several of the carriers have combined all the functions critical to yield management into a single unit. 
Pricing and overbooking control are the most common functions to have been incorporated into the yield 
management unit, which in turn is most commonly found in the airline's marketing and market planning 
department. Co-ordination with the remaining related functions can pose a problem. Inventory control 
agents are held responsible for all flight legs that traverse a particular route or set of routes, and are 
accountable for the traffic n-dxes and revenue levels achieved on their own routes. 
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3.3.4 Yield management and reservation systems: from simple to complex fire structures 
Seat inventory control is highly dependent on the capabilities of the airline's reservation system. 
Strictly independent ('non-nested' or independent from each other, e. g. number of business class tickets 
independent from APEX -Advance Purchase EXcursion- tickets) fare class 'buckets' represent the 
simplest reservation systems structure. More sophisticated reservation systems have discounted fare 
classes 'nested' (non-independent) within the highest fare class and share the same seat inventory. These 
subclasses of the cabin inventory can themselves be independent (non-nested) of each other or nested 
serially in descending order of yield. 
The major reservation systems used by travel agents (distribution systems) initially displayed 
seat availability by flight leg and accept bookings in a maximum of five 'buckets' [Belobaba 1987: 66]. 
Airlines are constrained by this limiý since they need a standard to exchange availability and booking 
information with other reservation systems. Carriers have upgraded their reservation systems 
to accept bookings in up to 40 reservation buckets. This allows airlines, for example, to stop sales of 
extremely low-priced seats in selected markets (particular O-D relations) on a connecting flight leg, 
without closing down the entire fare class to additional bookings. Most systems have the capability of 
lirniting sales to local passengers in favour of through and connecting passengers that generate more total 
revenue. 
American Airlines seemed to have been the first to have such systems in place (Belobaba 
1987: 66]. The focus of their seat inventory control process changed to one of managing fare class 
inventories with respect to the revenues generated by the passengers on local, through and connecting 
itineraries, all on the same flight leg. The decision models required to achieve this goal are far more 
complex than those required for simple leg-based seat inventory control. 
3.3.5 Forecasting and decision support 
Reservation systems also play an important role in decision support for seat inventory control. 
Initial fare class booking limits potentially require revision on the basis of actual reservations and forecast 
demand. It is essential to be able to retrieve historical booking patterns and traffic data for the same or 
similar flights. Yield management software extracts data from computerised reservation systems and 
provides decision support for seat inventory control. It also offers an ability to monitor actual bookings 
relative to historical patterns. 
An important decision support tool is the monitoring of actual bookings relative to fare class 
booking limits, so as to maximise flight revenues. On the basis of historical booking trends for a flight or 
group of flights, a decision support package generates 'booking threshold curves' (see Figure 3.7), which 
show the expected range of bookings at any point before departure [Raeside 1997]. When an airline' 
reservation monitoring system flags a flight for which bookings approach any one of the limits of the 
threshold set for that flight, a decision must be made either to: (a) increase the availability of seats in the 
relevant fare class; or (b) allow the system to close it down to additional reservations. This decision used 
to be made by groups of individuals on the basis of experience and judgement. Carriers have improved 
101 
Chapter 3 
this by developing optimisation algorithms for finding the fare class booking limits that will niaximisc 
expected flight revenues. Such algorithms do not entirely eliminate the need for human j. udgenient, since 
there are variables such as rapid changes in the competitive market and unexpected events. These 
optini-isation models for seat inventory control allow yield management agents to focus on these variables 
by making routine tasks more systematic. 
Discounts available 
100 
Days before use 
Discounts available Fitted 
The curve shows how the number of discounts available should be reduced as the date of use draws near, For 
observed demand the yield manager ran estimate the threshold line by fitting the model. This method may not find the 
optimal booking level but nevertheless it is simple to use and gives good results. However, a major problem is the 
update of the curves when patterns of demand change. This stresses the need for good forecasting. 
Figure 3.7 Threshold curve [Raeside 1997: 51-52] 
3.3.6 Optimisation models 
Optinusation models have been developed since the late 1980s due to rapidly changing 
competitive conditions in the airline industry since deregulation. They built upon the introduction in the 
1970s of the APEX fares in international markets. They use expected marginal revenues by fare class in 
finding optimal seat allocations. Solution algorithms make use of the expected marginal revenues 
approach to optimise booking lirr: iits in reservation systems with independent (non-nested) buckets, 
The airline seat inventory management problem has both probabilistic and dynamic aspects. 
. 
Probabilistic elements are the uncertainty about the ultimate number of requests that an airline will 
receive for seats on a future flight, and more importantly, for tlic different fare classes offered on that 
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flight. Dy6amic elements are about how the total number of reservation requests acýepted for a flight will 
change from day to day, potentially affecting estimates of requests still to come, and in turn, the optimal 
allocation of remaining seats among fare classes. 
The (probabilistic) expected number of requests for each class fare must be estimated from 
historical distributions of demand. Also, the number of seats allocated to a particular class fare might not 
always exceed the number of requests for that fare class, resulting in rejected demand. atatic models for 
non-nested fare classes are easier to build than dyLiamic models for nested-fare classes. The aim of the 
optimisation models is to allocate seats between the class fares so that the marginal expected revenue with 
respect to additional seats in each class is equal to zero. At optimality, total expected flight revenues 
cannot be increased by taking a seat from class I and allocating it to class 2 instead. 
Static models 
In the simplest, static, indMende (non-nested) fares models, the demand for each fare class is 
assumed to be independent of that for the other class, and the optimal seat allocation is made only once, at 
the beginning of the booking period for a flight. However, in reality, demand for different types of fares 
might not be independent as high demand for one fare class could be associated with high demand for 
another. Also, a static seat inventory management model does not account for the dynamic nature of the 
reservations process, in which actual bookings accepted for a flight might provide valuable additional 
information about the ultimate number of requests that can be expected. 
Dynan-dc models 
In dynamic models, total flight revenues are maximised by 'closing down' the low-fare class to 
additional bookings when the certain revenue from selling another low-fare seat is exceeded by the 
expected revenue of selling that same seat at a higher fare. Revenue-maximising booking limits are 
calculated for each fare class by incorporating probabilities of selling remaining seats to high-fare 
passengers. Losses in total expected revenue are accounted for when low-fare passengers ultimately deny 
space to higher-fare passengers. Non-indMenden demand for each fare class equates with assuming that 
booking behaviour has a significant impact on the optimal seat allotments (i. e. the rate of low-fare 
requests decreases as the rate of high-fare requests increases as departure day approaches). 
Flight lep-s 
Another dimension is allocating seats of each leg to either a through or local passenger. One 
solution is to determine optimal booking lin-dts for each flight leg first, and then perform an allocation of 
seats among fare classes. In other words, varying the allotment of low-fare seats for different passenger 
itineraries. Models for multiple leg flights with multiple fare classes are more complex. One way for 
optimal load targets for each class fare in each O-D (origin-destination) city-pair served by the flight, 
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could be f6und Uy allocating each marginal seat to the O-D and fare class combination with the highest 
total expected revenue. But this assumes independence of fare classes, and O-D markets. 
For example, on a flight operating A to B to C, a feasible sequence would be to allocate the 
marginal seat to a low-fare class from A to B and to save that same seat for a high-fare passenger from B 
to C. There would be 12 feasible combinations for a one-stop flight with three fare classes. The feasible 
combinations are ranked in terms of expected marginal revenue as each seat is allocated incrementally. 
When-the problem is expanded to multiple class fares and passenger itineraries, it becomes more difficult 
to flind the optimal points analytically (see earlier example in Section 3.2.3). 
Mathematical programming and network flow analysis (finding the rrdx of passenger itineraries 
flowing through the airline's network that would maximise total daily revenues) have been applied to such 
problems to find the optimal seat allotments through more efficient solution methods. Mathematical 
programming techniques take into account Rrobabilistic (rather than deterministic) demand for each fare 
class. Those techniques can also be used in combination. When network formulations are expanded to 
include multiple flight legs and passenger itineraries involving connecting flights, the number of binary 
decision variables required increases rapidly. Work has been done on dynamic applications of these 
optimisation models to the reservation process, to revise booking limits as reservations are accepted and 
flight departure day approaches. 
Non-independence of fares 
So far, these optimisation models have assumed independence of fare class inventories. 
Mathematical programming and network formulations also involve large sizes of formulations. In a 
nested (non-independent) fare class reservation structure, it is more difficult to fizid optimal booking 
limits analytically. The size issue is incompatible with a volatile competitive environment that requires 
efficiency and adaptability. Some other factors which complicate matters further are: the relationship 
between overbooking and seat inventory control; refused requests which are not necessarily lost since 
passengers may be allocated on another flight of the same airline, or might accept a reservation at a higher 
fare class; and the existence of a significant correlation of demand levels among fare classes. Simpler 
decision rules, which can be used dynamically to limit bookings on flight legs or in specific markets, 
might be a more practical approach to improving seat inventory control than large optirnisation models. 
Optimisation models, forecasting techniques and yield management need to be implemented in a 
co-ordinated way by airline carriers to be beneficial. Decision support systems that can make use of the 
enormous amount of historical reservations and traffic data can be implemented relatively quickly, if 
there are adequate numbers of trained analysts. In addition to storing historical data, reservation systems 
are the operational centre of the seat inventory control process, and changing their capabilities to relate 
them more to the needs of yield management is more time-consuming. The most complex and longest- 
term objective is the development of mathematical decision-making models to forecast future bookings 
and to optimise planeload revenues. Optimisation models require input data in the form of forecast 
demand levels for future flights and estimates of expected revenues. Developing forecasting models in the 
context of an inherent variability in air travel demand and the volatility of airline markets, is more 
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difficult. Statistidal and econometric methods can be used to reduce the uncertainty*associated with future 
demand levels. 
Optimisation models often also include simulations that enable 'what if' analysis and 
manipulation of external variables monitoring the environment and competitors' actions. Generally, these 
variables can be classified as shown in Figure 3.8. 
Market data 
Competitors' prices 
Company 
strategy 
Competitors' reactions 
Optimal pri 
decisions 
Figure 3.8 Optimisation, model and variables [Russell and Johns 1997: 123] 
Some claim that each increase in yield can mean large additional revenues to airlines [Belobaba 
1987]. Some argue, however, that measurement of yield management performance still needs additional 
research. Revenue improvements of 3 to 5 per cent are commonly claimed, but the method by which the 
improved revenue is measured is often questionable. Few controlled experiments have been performed, so 
managers do not know if revenue improvement occurred because of yield management or because of 
other factors Pmes 1997: 10). Nevertheless, with restrictions on discounted fares, more restrained 
matching of competitors' low fares and limited sales of seats at low fares, pre-deregulation airlines are 
generally believed to have adapted successfully to the increased competitiveness of a deregulated industry 
and increased profitability for carriers. 
3.4 Yield management at SNCF 
Gathering information about yield management techniques at SNCF was not as forthcoming as 
other aspects of Socrate, since it is considered the strategic core of the system. The building where the 
operational research group works is hidden away in the middle of tracks at the back of a Paris station, is 
built in concrete with no windows, looks like a second world war concrete 'blockhaus' and is very 
difficult to get into. Security was very tight there is a checkpoint where I had to leave my French identity 
card before being allowed in, and I was accompanied in and out of the premises. 
Interviewees were happy to discuss the general principles of yield management and its 
implications for SNCF, but didn't volunteer much detailed information. On the other hand, as yield 
management was a new concept in the late 1980s in France, several SNCF staff became experts in the 
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field. Two of them, Georges Vialle already mentioned above, and Sylvain Daudel, International Sales 
Manager at SNCF at the time (Daudel 1992], published the first textbook in French on the subject in 1989 
[Daudel and Vialle 1989]. Other SNCF staff did express some cynicism about this exercise. Despite 
praising the boo k as a well-timed, accessible if general introduction to the subject matter, the authors are 
criticised for having borrowed, if not plundered, American Airlines expertise and translated it into French 
for their own benefit; they are blamed for not having included other team members in this venture [CQ 
Inter-Wew 10]. As already mentioned, Georges Vialle then moved to a new position at Club Mdditerrande 
where he was responsible for introducing yield management [Mitrofanoff 1994]. Among European 
tourism and transport companies, British Airways, Lufthansa, the SNCF and Club Wditerran6e are now 
the only ones generally acknowledged to have top-level yield management expertise in-house [Arthur 
Andersen 1997: 26]. 
The previous way to calculate fares in RESA was straightforward. It simply multiplied the 
number of kilometres travelled by a unit price per kilometre [JPD Interview 9]. The fundamental principle 
of ThaMs is that of commercial optimisation: not just the filling of trains, but their profitability, by 
lirniting access to certain prices, train per train. Price quotas (the proportion of discounted fares per train) 
can change daily before departure according to bookings, and affects only certain seats, not whole trains. 
This is intended to bypass blanket restrictions (e. g. peak time). ThaMs stores a history of all seats sold to 
determine pricing and number of discounted seats train per train. 
Through the ThaMs system, information about past reservations is extracted from the CRS and 
the demand analysed. This is also complemented by traffic information collected in the trains, and in the 
case of the Channel Tunnel, check-in information (which was easier to implement since there are no stops 
and very few origin-destination pairs, e. g. London-Paris, Paris-Brussels, Brussels-Lille [Open University 
1995]). Thalis yield management techniques imply optimal filling of trains combined with as great a 
profit as possible from each seat filled, through optimising the average price/rate of occupation ratio per 
seat. Beyond bookings and ticketing, Socrate therefore provides an optirnisation software which aims at 
redirecting demand not by altering prices but by changing (all the time) the number of train seats 
available at certain prices. The aim is to control and manage demand. The main information flows into the 
ThaMs yield management system are shown in Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.9 Information flows for yield management at SNCF [Gianfaldoni 1993: 53] 
Unlike the reservation and distribution parts of Socrate which are clones of Sabre, the yield 
management software was entirely written from scratch at SNCF, in collaboration with AMRIS staff [CQ 
Interview 10]. In fact, the yield management software written for Socrate displayed better performance 
and was being rewritten for American Airlines as a result, at the time of interviewing [CQ Interview 10]. 
The interviewee, a SNCF yield management expert, commented that AMRIS consultants also benefit 
from working with SNCF clients, and AA leamt from the experience. On the other hand it was pointed 
out that this was also a result of collaborating together on software development rather than having 
entered into a purely purchaser/provider relationship. Consequently, expertise was transferred to SNCF, 
staff feel they know what is in the systern, the final system fitted their needs more closely and they can 
update and maintain it more easily and cheaply [CQ Interview 10]. The collaboration was not entirely 
trouble free, as the Americans were perceived to be patronising to start with. "They used to tell us that 
treally it is quite simple, it is only because you are French'.... ( ... ) but eventually they acknowledged that 
they had not thought trains were so complicated and that in fact air transport is really quite 
straightforward" [CQ Interview 10]. Another initial difficulty was the lack of data. Airlines have check in 
procedures which are almost non-existent in rail transport (apart from Eurostar, see above). "American 
software engineers kept asking us for more data to extrapolate from and test the prototype with. We could 
only provide very limited amounts and we had to reconstitute statistics through 'best guess', from the 
little information we had through surveys and marketing which was very difficult and time-consuming" 
107 
Chapter 3 
[PQ Interýiew 10]. By the time I interviewed them operational research staff had started accumulating 
historical data and were leaming to use their techniques better. However, problems surrounding pricing 
and decisions to simplify quota management taken after the troubled implementation of Socrate (see 
Chapter 5) biased the traffic data and was hindering yield managers' work. 
According to Daudel and Vialle [1989], yield management must abide by the following rules. 
Adaptive flexibility. Levels of price must be established according to the price sensitivities of 
different client groups and competitors' prices (air and road). 
Flexibility of initiative. One must anticipate and respond rapidly to competitors' actions; altering 
reservation deadlines and tariffs must be done easily. 
Communication. As good a cornmunication as possible must be ensured with the distribution 
channels (standardisation, norms, agents' function, contracts) and final users (understanding and 
acceptance). 
Tight categorisation. Specific constraints must be set up for client groups who are not so sensitive to 
prices so as to prevent them from switching to discounted tariffs (to avoid 'fare dilution'). 
Incremental rules. Prices must be incremental, so that clients who cannot benefit from discounted 
prices anymore (full quota) or who do not accept constraints associated with discounted prices 
(booking ahead) switch to higher tariffs rather than choose another mode of transport. 
Management. The model must take into account risks of waste (over-capacity), refusals (under- 
capacity) and denials (turning away clients who have booked, if reservations are accepted beyond 
availability). 
SNCF applies the principles of 'quota management' which must be balanced, in particular with 
overbooking, so that: 
- if the risk of waste is higher than refusals, quota management with lower tariffs will be favoured 
if the risk of refusals is higher than waste, quota management with higher tariffs will be favoured 
Through a process of trial and error, SNCF yield management seeks the optimal situation in 
which the cost of the risk of waste (loss of earnings) and the cost of the risk of denials (clients will need 
to be compensated and reputation will get damaged) are minimised. Since the more the risk of waste 
decreases the more the risk of refusal increases, the total cost of overbooking is at its lowest when the two 
risk costs are equal [Daudel and Vialle 1989]. In practice, determining this total final cost requires very 
complex probability calculations, and a progressive improvement of forecasting models by incorporating 
new data from staff experiences and historical records. The principles of quota management are illustrated 
in Figure 3.10, in which the proportion of discounted and standard prices can be altered anytime (the 
dashed line can move). 
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Figure 3.10 Quota management [Gianfaldoni 1993: 52] 
Daudel and Vialle (1989: 127] also clearly state how yield management should be integrated with the 
marketing, distribution and operations functions, if the organisation is to become a truly service-oriented 
company, as achieved by US airlines (see Section 3.3.3). They represent this in the two diagrams below 
(Figure 3.11) , the first one showing the traditional way to organise a services enterprise, the second one 
having yield management at the centre of the organisation [Daudel and Vialle 1989: 128-129). 
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[Daudel and Vialle 1989: 128-129] 
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Figure 3.11b Yield management, marketing, operations and distribution 
[Daudel and Vialle 1989: 128-129] 
The heart of the systen-4 and of the organisation, is yield management. It supports not only better pricing 
decisions but also planning of human and other resources. In this way, a system ostensibly designed to 
improve revenues also brings substantial benefits on the cost side [Arthur Andersen 1997: 16] and has 
profound organisational implications, investigated in Chapter 6. Before this, broader implications of 
yield management in terms of pricing, regulation, politics and consumers are discussed. 
3.5 Implications of yield management: the social and the technical 
In recent years, the airlines have been joined at the forefront of yield management technology by 
the largest hotel chains, cruise lines, car rental companies and amusement parks. Increased competition in 
all these service industries has fuelled development of ever more sophisticated computer modelling 
systems [Arthur Andersen 1997: 15). Theoretically, yield management could also be of use to other 
service fmns such as hiring of equipment (e. g. cranes, computers), labour (temp agencies), know-how 
(consultants), space (car parks) or even time (processing and communication time) [Daudel and Vialle 
1989: 137]. The necessary conditions for yield management are [Kimes 1997: 5]: 
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Fixed' capacity. Yield management is designed for capacity-constrained service firms, for example 
hotels. Some industries with fairly fixed capacities use yield management to adjust the size of their 
capacity, for instance airlines can change the size of their planes and so can rail companies. 
High fixed costs. There is a high cost of adding incremental capacity, for example the high cost of 
adding capacity to an airplane, hotel or cruise line. 
. Low variable costs. The cost of putting an additional customer in otherwise unused capacity is 
telatively inexpensive (e. g. the cost of an extra meal). 
Time-varied demand. Capacity-constrained firms cannot easily alter their capacity to match changing 
demand patterns. 
Similarity of inventory units. Seats or rooms are considered to be fairly interchangeable (within a fare 
bucket). 
In the European rail industry, Danish railways already use some yield management, while the 
Norwegian railways are reportedly working on a major yield management project, and the Austrian 
federal railway is developing pricing policies that will more closely reflect yield management principles 
[Arthur Andersen 1997: 55]. Related to yield management, there appears to be a general trend towards 
some discounting and greater price differentiation. However, the use of yield management raises many 
questions. 
Market segmentation and price differentiation are technically difficult to implement in railways. 
The travelling public is large and complex and these techniques can misfire and lead to a mixing of 
segments and a failure to distribute demand more evenly. Some advocate more demand-based 
discounting, more differentiated pricing and more restricted discounts for instance through the choice of 
route, time of travel, type of train [Arthur Andersen 1997: 70), as a solution to this problem. These 
suggestions are closely related to a belief in the elimination of regulations "which restrict the prices of 
otherwise freely competing businesses", as recommended by consultancy firm Arthur Andersen 
[1997: 327]. Similarly, the following quotes use loaded and highly symbolic words such as freedorn, 
artificial, natural, to express a liberal agenda where regulation is a bad thing since it prevents good and 
natural things from happening, and as if AU price could be 'natural'; and where political considerations 
are a nuisance, probably unnatural, and a major obstacle to the clean and neutral use of yield 
management. 
"Artificial price constraints limit businesses' ability to combat the natural seasonality of 
demand and to optimise profits" [Arthur Andersen 1997: 327, my emphasis]. 
"The factors that impede greater yield management use by railways are of two types: operational 
and attitudinal or philosophical. The first of these generally relates to the way in which railways 
view their capacity, and the second to their obligations as state enterprises vis-&-vis the provision 
of service to the public" [Arthur Andersen 1997: 55]. 
"A national railway in Europe asked us for an introduction to possible yield management 
applications ( ... ) The railway executives quickly 
determýined that it would be impossible for them 
to implement yield management, because political considerations would prevent them charging 
different prices for the same service" [Arthur Andersen 1997: 56]. 
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"Public-of political obligations [are one of the problems identified]. Sorne state-owned or non- 
-profit-niaking enterprises may feel differentiated, demand-oriented pricing is inconsistent with 
their mission, or may find it is politically untenable" [Arthur Andersen 1997: 24]. 
Through this discourse and through yield rmnagement, transport is being redefined as a service 
industry amenable to marketing and business 'natural' principles, in contrast to old-fashioned unnatural 
and artificial restrictions and regulations, represented by public rail enterprises with the wrong 'attitude'. 
Moreover, consumer rights and customer protection legislation are perceived as obstacles to yield 
management applications, and the law, for instance in the travel sector, "has set traps for ( ... ) managers 
who try to maximise yield" [Boella 1997: 4 1 ]. Customers are resistant to overbooking (overselling? ); they 
complain about the lack of transparency in pricing; they are unhappy about 'bait and switch' tactics, 
whereby a company aggressively advertises an extreme price, usually very low, but in fact has very little 
inventory available at that price; and they object to 'gouging' where the prices are so high that they are 
regarded as unfair [Arthur Andersen 1997: 24]. 
This reflects a fundamental conflict between sellers who want the flexibility of pricing according 
to yield management principles, and buyers who want stability and predictability of prices and delivery. 
There is a movement of countervailing forces as the buyers and sellers each seek to obtain market power 
in their relationships. Bell and Kaven even argue that: 
"Yield management is not based upon market power equilibrium, but on an inequality between 
large sellers and small or independent buyers who can be induced to buy when business is son or 
forced to buy a higher price when business is good. Yield management application is only really 
useful against the price powerless" [Bell and Kaven 1997: 93] 
"The yield management tactic is not conducive to long-term mutual trust between buyers and 
sellers inasmuch as yield management is dependent upon sellers seeking market power 
advantage over buyers" [Bell and Kaven 1997: 95]. 
Taking a non-essentialist stance, it can be said that the technical (yield management) is totally 
intertwined with the social (pricing), and from a critical perspective we can also see here obvious power 
relations. Some essentialist writers, for instance Adam and Cahen (1997: 20), would analyse the issues 
raised above by arguing that Socrate "is not questioned as a technological device, but on the strategic 
field ( ... ) and that 
it is the conunercial policy that Socrale was carrying out that was the heart of the 
problem [not Socrate itselfl". This convenient split between the technical and the social (strategic and 
commercial here) isolates and exonerates the technology. By contrast, a representative of passengers' 
associations remarked that "once they had invested in this marvellous new thing, it had to be used. They 
say it simplifies matters, but as soon as you do things with such a tool, everything becomes more 
complicated ( ... ) Some things could not be done with RESA, it is not neutral" [SIB Interview 18]. 
The choice of Socrate as a strategy for SNCF was the expression, the translation, of a particular reading 
of the social, economic, technical and political environment, and corresponded to the development of a 
new actor network as a technico-commercial solution to the problems faced by SNCF. (Chapter 4 
examines that environment in more depth and highlights its complexity and contradictions). Top 
executives were convinced by the logic of this translation, and yield management came to represent the 
means of achieving that strategic vision. However, yield management is not just a technical tool and is 
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associated "With social practices such as pricing covered in Chapter 5. This subsequent translation and the 
extension of the actor network became problematic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
SOCRA TE AND SNCF STRATEGY IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSPORT 
DEREGULATION: A POLITICAL TRANSLATION (FROM MACRO ... ) 
Placing SNCF's decision and the Socrate project in the context of market structures and 
organisational cultures enables us to understand the strategic aims, their associated management 
techniques and information systems. The European transport market and the evolution of national State 
policies, the development of fast trains, together with the propagation of the American air transport 
deregulation model, need to be understood in mode depth before an analysis of the pricing strategy at 
SNCF (Chapter 5) and the problems encountered by Socrate and its yield management techniques can be 
carried out. The economic climate was also put forward as a justification for the Socrate project by the 
Direction Gdndrale at SNCF [LDM Interview 8]; budget constraints were imposed by the government, 
there were changes in the transport market and competition was growing with air and road. The new 
apparatus put in place for the management of passenger travel, through the import of yield management 
techniques previously associated with the US air industry and represented by the choice of the American 
Airlines Sabre software, was intended to make a public sector enterprise respond to a new market 
situation. The French rail industry structure is evolving from a public monopoly situation and becoming 
one of increased inter-sectorial competition. The complexity of these changes underlies SNCF's strategic 
choices and its decision to buy Sabre, which was seen as a mechanism through which American Airlines 
responded to similar market changes [Hopper 1990; Doll 1989] in the US deregulated air industry. 
in this chapter, the deregulatory moves within the French Railways monopoly situation are 
examined in the context of European and US transport deregulation. The dilemma between competition 
and co-operation is an example of the controversial effects of deregulation. This is explored in the context 
of intermodal (between different modes of transport such as air, rail and road) competition and intramodal 
(within one transport sector) competition. The transferability of the deregulation model from the US to 
Europe, and from air to rail is questioned. This will set the scene for analysing pricing differentiation in 
the next chapter. It is shown that deregulation leads to new controversial notions of access to transport 
and pricing, towards which the new information systems are geared. The impact of CRS and GDS on the 
airline market structures is also examined in order to envisage what market changes they may effect in 
rail transport. These new information systems may have an impact on infrastructures, transport planning 
and intermodal competition. Deregulation and computerised reservation systems therefore relate to 
organisational changes at SNCF, its members and customers and their practices, explored in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
4.1 RAIL TRANSPORT DEREGULATION 
The traditional co-operation between European national railway companies for cross-border rail 
transport is being replaced progressively by European deregulation and competition. The ultra-liberal 
European directive 91/440 was adopted on 21st June 1991 and published by the EC Official Journal on 
29th July 1991. It aims to separate exploitation activities and accounts from infrastructure costs and 
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managemeýt in the name of harmonisation of the conditions of competition between rail, road and air; 
and to free access to national infrastructures (freedom of transit) to international operators, traditional 
national operators and private operators. 
4.1.1 Transport deregulation in general 
Regulation and deregulation must be seen as addressing intermodal competition as well as 
national, international and global competition. Traditionally, the State intervened in the transport 
industry, on the grounds of a natural monopoly, large investments and high fixed costs. In return, the 
State determined prices so as to regulate intermodal competition, particularly road and rail, and to control 
external costs such as pollution, safety, mobility, space management, regional economic development, 
etc. The Anglo-American tradition of industrial policy generally consists of governments intervening in 
markets only when it appears that transport supply per se could be improved by such action. By contrast, 
countries such as France and Germany have tended to "treat transport as an input into a wider social 
production function involving broader industrial matters, regional policy, social equity, etc. and transport 
efficiency in its narrower sense may be sacrificed in the process" [Button and Pitfield 1991: 7; see also 
Section 5.3.2 with reference to pricing and Section 7.5.2]. This is sometimes called the Continental 
approach although this ignores the traditional attitudes of countries such as the Netherlands. And even in 
the UK there have been marked differences [Button and Pitfield 1991: 19] across transport modes 
(buses/coaches, rail, roads, road freightý cars, scheduled and charter airlines, airports, ports, ferries) and 
changes in policy across time (public ownership, restricted competition, privatisation, quasi-corripetition, 
subsidies). 
Regulation can be seen as a way of protecting users from the undesirable effects of free 
competition. Deregulation, on the other hand, compensates for the effects of State intervention 
(particularly in order to decrease public fiinding and control inflation). Undesirable effects of State 
regulation are often seen as inhibition of progress and technical development, over-capacity, sub-optimal 
distribution of traffic between different modes and maintenance of unprofitable lines. But it is not clear 
that transport deregulation totally eliminates the cost of regulation, without lending itself to unintended or 
undesirable effects [Sanchez 1993]. 
4.1.2 US air deregulation: pioneers? 
Air deregulation in the US went ahead in the late 70s despite these difficulties. Through a more 
rational management, the expectation was that companies would reduce overcapacity and decrease prices. 
The results were contradictory. One important effect was that short routes with small profits were 
abandoned resulting in a higher concentration of operators. It became clear that without government 
intervention the industry would eventually evolve to exhibit a high degree of market concentration 
[Williams 1994: 49]. Other effects were: air routes were restructured in star-shaped networks with'hubs' 
and 'spokes', leading to economies of scopeR; fare structures became extremely complex, leading to 
8 By redesigning their route systems into hub and spoke configurations, US airlines were able, through the 
115 
Chapter 4 
gigantic reservation information systems; a decrease in prices was not found to be'uniforrn, indeed there 
was even an increase of prices once the concentration of operators had stabilised. This movement is 
having implications for non US air companies, particularly European ones, and also modifies the 
competition situation within European terrestrial transport which is not the case in the US. 
Deregulation has occurred in the US air transport industry for 20 years, and similar changes are 
taking place in Europe. Deregulation in the US transport sector has given rise to oligopolistic markets 
comppsed of private carriers. US air deregulation led carriers to innovate- technologically by creating 
distribution software which synthesises cost and price information in new ways, i. e. yield management. 
4.1.3 Tensions in European deregulation: harmonisation or liberalisation? 
Transport deregulation in Europe is different from the US in that it has to consider intermodal 
competition (between rail, road and air) as well as intramodal competition (within a particular sector, e. g. 
air). One aim of European liberalisation is to harmonise standards (technical, economic, social, financial 
and fiscal) so that rail and air transport companies can operate freely in any European member State. 
Since the late 80s the European Union (EU) has introduced measures to abolish market restrictions in the 
air and rail sectors [Hope 1993]. The first measures taken by the EU have been the clarification of the 
relationships between national States and transport companies, the emphasis on fast-speed networks 
[Freeman Allen 1991] and the abolition of public service obligations and compensations. Separating the 
accountability of infrastructures and exploitation is the logical next step, followed by the co-operation of 
national companies to exploit international transport and the opening of national routes to competition. 
European transport deregulation is also contradictory, as there are tensions between 
harmonisation and liberalisation. Harmonisation (e. g. signalling, size of tracks) would need to take place 
pjLor to any liberalisation. On the other hand, there is the opposite belief that such a harmonisation can 
result from liberalisation and free markets. Since the late 80s, the latter view has prevailed at the 
European Community [Hope 1993] and the EC has introduced measures to abolish market restrictions in 
the air and rail sectors, without having initiated harmonisation first. 
This is a controversial issue; for example, the Social and Economic Council [Comitd 
Econornique et Social des Communautds Europdennes 1987] has argued, without much apparent effect, 
that before any liberalisation, a harmonisation of the rules of intermodal competition should be carried 
out. Of particular importance is the harmonisation of the financing of infrastructures, of the pricing of 
these infrastructures, as well as social, fiscal and technical harmonisation [Bdnard 1993]. 
The Directive 91-440 on the liberalisation of rail transport (adopted in France in 1995) aims to 
revitalise rail transport through market forces; but it also believes in supporting trains since they pollute 
less, and envisages that increased intra-European exchanges through high-speed train networks will 
reduce road traffic congestion. One can discern here some tension, usually, and perhaps simplistically, 
taken to be a clash of views between Karel Van Miert, the EU competition commissioner who supports 
free market economics, and Neil Kinnock, the EU transport commissioner for several years, who wanted 
better utilisation of their aircraft and flight crews, to derive economies of density. Economies of scope were 
obtained through the carriage of passengers with different origins or destinations on the same aircraft, 
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to promoti rail *transport. Applying the free market model to rail transport ii presumed to enable 
economies of scope in the design, production and operation of infrastructures, as in the US air industry. 
However, consequences such as the disappearance of short routes are very controversial in smaller and 
more densely populated countries. Other long-term consequences are the splitting of national companies 
into separate business units dealing with international, intercity, regional, urban and suburban transport, 
and the merging and/or disappearance of national companies. In fact European transport liberalisation 
measures have led to "uneven multimodal initiatives which continue to encourage inefficiency and waste" 
and a multitude of policy prescriptions which "many regard as inherently inconsistent or even 
contradictory" [Ross 1998: xii]. Various authors [Ross 1998; Leavre 1990] refer to a 'transport crisis'. 
D ifferences between the US and Europe are examined in the next section, in particular: the co-existence 
in Europe of intramodal and intermodal competition, European transport liberalisation measures, and the 
emphasis on high-speed trans-European networks. 
4.2 US AIR DEREGULATION AND EUROPEAN RAIL DEREGULATION 
As explored in Chapter 3, in choosing the computerised reservation system Sabre, SNCF was 
hoping to benefit from the same strategic advantage this technology brought to American Airlines during 
the deregulation of US air transport in the 80s. However, the adoption of a new transport distribution 
model based on the deregulated US air industry proved to be controversial, leading to implementation 
problems. Socrate represents a new form of management control, particularly in its use of yield 
management techniques, and has to be situated within the broader context of US and European 
deregulation. The new distribution system at SNCF must be seen as intervening in the competition 
between European rail, air and road travel, unlike the US where Sabre operated in the air sector only and 
brought considerable competitive advantage to American Airlines [Hopper 1990]. The changes effected 
through Socrate in the organisation of passenger travel at SNCF must be examined in the lights of the 
deregulatory changes within the European traiisport industry [Mietus Jr 1989; Bavoux and Charrier 1994] 
compared to those in the US air industry [Petzinger 1995]. 
4.2.1 Competition, co-operation and complementarity: comparing the US and Europe 
Intermodal coMetitio 
Unlike the US, competition in European transport has taken place on an intermodal basis for 
many years (air/road/rail), as well as on an intramodal basis in the air sector: between European airlines 
primarily for cross-European flights and expanding into domestic flights, and with European and non- 
European air companies for international flights. With deregulation, competition will eventually take 
place on an intramodal basis in the European rail sector too across and within European countries. As in 
the air industry, the intention is to obtain economies of scope in the design, production and operation of 
infrastructures. At the same time, technical co-operation is essential in rail (as opposed to air) and 
requires complex collaborations between states, networks, operators and industrial partners. Tunnel 
resulting in 5- 10% higher load factors on routes radiating from a hub [Williams 1994: 18]. 
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heights, trick stindards, electrification, signalling and passenger safety need to b6 harmonised. In fact, 
signalling and telecommunication systems have always been designed on a national basis, as much as the 
choice of rolling stock, electrification systems, operational methods, traffic command and control, rail 
equipment, etc. for a variety of reasons including protectionism. A particularly extreme example is that of 
Spain which chose a distance between tracks different from all other European standards deliberately 
[Descoutures 1992: 136]. 
: -, In terms of intermodal competition, European deregulation of air and coach/truck transport has 
over the last ten years exacerbated the competition for rail transport companies. Intermodal competition 
has many adepts as it relates to the proposition that the main form of market failure in utilities is 
monopoly [Bishop et al 1995]. However other authors argue that intermodal competition is to the 
detriment of rail [Troin 1995: 11 ]. SNCF has responded to this competitive pressure by investing heavily 
in TGVs for passenger transport, particularly on certain routes such as 500-700 kms segments which 
require 3 hours by high-speed train and by plane. This strategy, partly explained by the robust 
engineering culture and expertise at SNCF, has been regarded as a success and the French nation sees the 
TGVs as a major technological and economic achievement. 
Intramodal conetitio 
Intramodal competition is a different issue. There is a long history of co-operation between 
national rail companies for trans-border traffic based on national geographic boundaries, with codes of 
conduct in a kind of 'cartel' culture between operators preoccupied with infrastructures primarily [LDM 
Interview 8]. Some trans-Euro-express trains function throughout Europe (private trains such as the 
Venice-London Orient-Express) where national companies provide a locomotive and a driver, and charge 
the operator. However, if this type of traffic is to increase dramatically, the problems multiply: again 
harmonisation, training, safety and economic co-operation, as well as the saturation of networks (too 
many operators on too few lines). Bearing in mind the EC objective of a high-speed train network, issues 
of infrastructure investments and pricing have to be considered. The EC is considering funding only a 
few high-speed priority projects [Blum et al 1992] the rest being funded by the member States or the 
regions, which may not be able to. 
The Rolitical -conflicts of 
Eurgpean. national and regional develgpment 
Regions are also caught in a vicious circle. Their financial involvement is based on the hope of 
having a fast-train such as the TGV in their area; however, a TGV line is more profitable the fewer stops 
there are, very much like a plane route. Related to this issue, there is very lively debat? on what the 
French refer to as 'territory management' or the concerted planning of national and regional economic 
development (to which a government department, the DdIdgation A I'Arridnagement du Territoire et A 
I'Action Rdgionale, is dedicated). The growth of the TGV network, contrary to expectations, is seen as 
9 It was one of the arguments brought to the fore by the SNCF employees during the massive French 
strikes in December 1995 to protect public services [Duval-Smith 1995]. 
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creating a 'discontinuous' space and reinforcing rural "disertification" [Offher 1993]. Having already built 
the most profitable lines (particularly Paris-Lyon opened in 1981 which has been the most profitable TGV 
line for years), SNCF faced enormous further debts if it invested in new TGV lines without State or 
European aid. Consequently, there has been a series of decisions and counter-decisions concerning the 
construction of the TGV Est route over the last few years [Troin 1995]. The project was dropped [Le 
Monde Editorial, 1996; Andrdani, 1996] in 1996, then relaunched in 1998 [Bdlleret 1998], starting with 
Mulhouse-Besanqon, after complex negotiations involving local, regional, national and European political 
actors. There are some unusual arrangements, such as the Eurotunnel financing group or the TGV 
Atlantique (Paris-Bordeaux) where the trains are run by a consortium of banks which rents them from 
SýNCF. The choice of the TGV Mdditerrande route has also been marred with controversy. However, 
private interests may worsen the "ddsertification" effects mentioned above. This can be seen as a direct 
result of increased interinodal competition. 
National intermodal competition between air and rail can be seen to also create 'internal' 
intramodal competition within SNCF across its different products. This prejudices the planning of an 
integrated transport policy within and across modes, which are now seen as competing rather than 
complementary. TGVs and 'classical' intercity lines now compete within the same transport company. 
Further intramodal competition between rail companies seems to be favoured by the EU, to the detriment 
of co-operation between rail companies. The separation of infrastructure and operations is another step 
towards intramodal competition. However, co-operation and coordination are still necessary. The new 
industrial model implies competition rather than co-operation and complementarity and IT is expected to 
play a crucial role to support this new competitive environment [Heddebaut and Joignaux 1995: 39]. 
4.2.2 A controversial translation: cultural, econon-dc and social differences between the US and 
Europe, and between air and rail 
Table 4.1 Comparison of US and European air and rail transport 
us Europe 
Transport 
Market - Long distances - 
Short/medium distances 
- Unique liberalisation regime - Densely populated 
- National liberalisation regimes 
Air 
- Intramodal competition - Intramodal pan-European competition 
- Concentration of operators - Many national operators 
- Hubs and spokes - Intermodal national competition between 
air, rail and road 
Rail 
- Little rail passenger transport, - High-speed and traditional trains 
mostly freight - Many stops, dense networks 
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Very little intermodal air/rail - Costly infrastructures 
competition 
- National intra and intermodal competition 
- Little pan-European competition 
Intermodal and intramodal competition in European transport originates in the deregulation 
movement in the US air market. However, the European aviation market differs in several major respects 
from the US domestic market, indicating that liberalisation in Europe may not produce the same results to 
that experienced in the US. The transferability of the US air transport deregulation experience to 
European air transport has been questioned. According to Hanlon [1996: 37] "proponents of market 
contestability consider the airline industry as almost a textbook example of a contestable market". A 
contestable market is one in which there is plenty of potential competition, with a lot of potential new 
entrants. The US air deregulation experience, however, has cast a lot of doubt on this proposition 
[Hanlon 1996: 37]. This should challenge the case for rail deregulation in Europe even further. Button 
and Swann [1991: 104-105] have delineated some of the differences which present obstacles to the 
translation of the deregulation model from US air to European air. Under each following heading, the 
argument is extended below to the transferability and translation of deregulation from air to rail [Mitev 
1997]. They are briefly summarised in Table 4.1. 
Different na6onal markets 
The deregulated US aviation market is domestic, and so are the competing US air companies. 
European air transport is mainly cross-border, and rail transport is mainly national. Air and even more so 
rail companies have strong national identities. There is a large variety of economic, social and political 
objectives which underline different nations' aviation and rail policies. 
Geography, demographics and historical infrastructures have to be taken into account. The 
physical size of the European air market is significantly smaller than the domestic US air market. The 
average route length in Europe is some 750 kilometres, whereas in the US it is 1300 kilometres [Hanlon 
1996: 19]. Airline operating costs increase enormously as flight lengths shorten (many of the costs are 
incurred in take off, landing, climb and descent). Shorter distances also mean that road and rail can be 
much closer substitutes. If routes are short there is much less scope for hubbing because any time spent 
changing plane (or train) during a trip takes up a relatively long time. Hubbing may be an option for rail 
in some countries but not others. Different countries also have different geographic network 
configurations e. g. a star shaped network in France vs. a federal structure in Germany. The existing star- 
shaped centralised rail network in France with Paris at its centre, and the resulting emphasis on a few 
TGV fast routes, seems to have predisposed SNCF towards an air-related model of transport. 
A major difference between air and rail that affects transport policies is the enormous cost of rail 
infrastructures, particularly for high-speed trains such as the TGV. There is growing emphasis in Europe 
on high-speed Trans-European Networks (TENs). High-speed trains cannot be boarded without a 
reservation, like planes and unlike the 'classical' intercity trains, and planes compete with fast trains on 
certain routes, in particular 500-700kms segments. Europe is much more densely populated, routes are 
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shorter, aýd theie are many more stops on a train line than on an air route, which makes railways more 
complex operationally. 
EurMean trans]Rort Rolicies: different liberalisation regimes 
The rate of adoption of liberalisation measures varies from country to country and over time; for 
instance, a president of Deutsche BAhn, Heinz Durr [in Jakubyszyn 1996a] decided not to separate 
infrastructures from operations, unlike SNCF and British Rail. On the other hand, he was planning to 
open DB's rail infrastructure and domestic market to competition from other operatorslo. His successor, 
Johannes Ludewig [in Jakubyszyn 1997a], by contrast, has now stated that the real competitors to rail are 
road and air, and has initiated co-operation between SNCF and DB on the Paris-Metz-Frankfurt route 
TEN. 
Sweden was the first European country to vertically separate infrastructure from operations in 
accounting terms in 1988 [Alexandersson and Hultdn 1999]. The first European rail company to fully 
adopt the European directive 91/440 was British Rail which split into Railtrack and a number of train 
operators in 1994. That year also saw the merger of Deutsche Bundesbahn (DB) and Deutsche 
Reichsbahn (DR) into Deutsche Eisen BAhn AG (DB AG), a private consortium owned by the German 
State, due to split into three companies running freight, passenger traffic and infrastructures separately, 
with regional transport left to the Landers. In Italy, Ferrovie dello Stato (FS) was dismantled into a private 
company (FS spa) that holds specialised subsidiaries (with various private interests) and has a majority 
(60%) concern in Treno Alta Velocita (TAV) which concentrates on building and running a new high- 
speed train (HST) network. 
There is substantial inter-modal competition in Europe over medium distances between 
road/air/rail, especially between high-speed trains and plane services. The US rail system is essentially a 
freight system, with the exception of some passenger services such as the North-East Washington DC- 
Boston corridor, where some intermodal competition with air takes place. The US passenger transport 
market is well segmented into cheap long-distance coach services, more expensive long-distance planes, 
and roads for medium-distance travelling. In Europe, rail services can compete with air on the basis of 
door-to-door journey time for trips up to 500 kilometres. High quality roads in Europe, also mean that 
road transport competes rather more effectively on some corridors with rail than would be the case in the 
US. 
European policy-makers already have the US experience to guide them and they are, therefore, 
likely to react against some of the perceived difficulties, for example conglomerates and company 
mergers or alternatives such as flight code sharing and domination of CRS systems. There are many 
industrial, institutional and social reasons which are likely to preclude the full adoption of US-style 
deregulation. Table 4.2 summarises the contextual factors which make the transfer of the US air 
deregulation model to European rail transport problematic. 
10 He'provoked some anxiety in France when he declared that he wanted the German high-speed train, 
the ICE, to reach Paris. 
121 
Chapter 4 
Table 4.2 Summary of deregulation contextual factors 
Market 
- Rail operations more complex than air 
Economic 
- Intra and intermodal competition in Europe 
- Cost of high speed trains infrastructure 
Political 
- Different national liberalisation regimes 
- National and regional development issues 
- Pollution, social costs, complementarity/multimodality 
Cultural 
- National identity and cohesion 
- Public access to transport 
- Organisational changes and public service mission 
Technology 
- Yield management 
- Impact of CRS and GDS on market structure 
4.3 SNCF, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT AND EUROPEAN TRANSPORT 
SNCF has the monopoly of rail transport in France, and is in competition with road and air 
transport at mainly national level. Until the early 80s, SNCF was a public monopoly and had to fulfill 
performance criteria and procedures set by the French government. The Ministry of Transport set 
limitations in terms of pricing and in return protected its monopoly. This was also expressed as the 
notion of equality of access to transport and the collective national good (whereby the pricing is directly 
proportional to the distance travelled, or the principle of "pdrdquation gdographique" or geographic cross 
subsidising). At the same time, financial deficit was common and, more often than not, settled by the 
goven=ent. 
SNCF and the French government have been, and still are, hostile to the liberalisation of 
European rail transport [Jakubyszyn 1996b] on the grounds that the national rail network would be 
weakened if split; and that deregulation ignores the practical realities and the cultural and public service 
differences between countries. Various French governments (under Juppd and Jospin) have appeared 
publicly to protect France from the ultraliberal, EU agenda. Louis Gallois, current president of SNCF, has 
expressed his desire to delay the EU plans to deregulate passenger and freight rail traffic. He opposes any 
"unreasonable liberalisation which would destabilise SNCF11 [Tillier 1996]. The dominant view expressed 
by the SNCF top managers interviewed is that a neo-liberal EU runs the risk of 'putting its foot into an 
anthill' [LDM Interview 8] and thus disturb the situation with unpredictable effects; and that even though 
co-operation (as opposed to competition) can be criticised, it has its advantages. Another interviewee [GV 
Interview 14] for instance claimed that the English have been too extreme and have gone too far with 
negative effects for rail transport. 
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I'his specifically French attitude towards European liberalisation can algo be conunented upon 
culturally and historically. Most SNCF top managers interviewed (e. g. JMM, GC, LDM, JPD, CQ, GV] 
brought the subject up with little probing and explained it in similar terms. SNCF, but also other French 
public and private long-established institutions, have had a very strong 'French State' culture for several 
centuries. It is strongly associated with the influence of the "grandes dcoles", the French elitist colleges 
where the very best civil servants, engineers and executives are educated (e. g. Ecole Nationale 
d'Administration, Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussdes, Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Hautes Etudes 
Commerciales, Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Sciences Politiques). They often obtain positions in important 
State institutions such as the Minist6re des Finances or the Cour des Comptes, as well as companies such 
as Electricitd de France, Elf Aquitaine or Rh6ne Poulenc and many SNCF top managers come from these 
elite colleges, including several of my interviewees. Their ethos has been for a very long time (going back 
to Napoleon and Saint Simon [Guigou 1997]11) a belief in the "grandeur" and pride of their country, 
which has resulted in many major achievements in terms of national infrastructures, social, cultural and 
technical progress [Suleimann and Courty 1997]. This French 'model' has flaws (it is not very 
democratic) but it has strengths too; it pervades the perspectives of the elite, and it is very unlike other 
European models. Interviewees were of the opinion that this model should not be disposed of too quickly 
and in a sense this State culture ("culture dtatique") feels aggressed by European liberalisation principles 
[LDM Interview 8]. This interviewee commented that such considerations might initially seem quite 
remote from the Socrate project but that they were in fact related to it. 
Nevertheless, since the early 80s, SNCF has had to respond to competition and increase its 
profitability. It has become more accountable and, in its 1990-94 contract with the French State, had to 
reorganise its activities into purchaser/supplier relationships. More recently, the government has decided 
to divide infrastructures and trains operations into two companies on Ist January 1997 [Jakubyszyn 
1996c, 1996d]. This division fits into the logic of liberalisation. Separating operations from infrastructure 
aims to overcome the issue of transport fu-ms as multiple products and joint costs enterprises - though 
this forces a stance on the nature of joint costs, and the basis for this is contestable and contested (for 
instance in the UK post-privatisation between Railtrack and the freight company EWS). Nevertheless, 
using yield management techniques contributes to this new logic of accounting for the profitability of 
each route, and thereby transforming them into individual, potentially competitive, products. Yet in the 
face of current opposition in many countries, it remains unclear whether the EC will achieve its aim of 
opening all European freight, international and domestic passenger rail transport to competition. SNCF, 
for instance, has expressed strong opposition to the opening of domestic routes to competing operators 
(Gallois, SNCF president, in Jakubyszyn and le Boucher [ 1996)). 
43.1 French rail and SNCF 
The French rail situation has been highly uncertain and fluctuating over the last decades and can 
be characterised by: large decreases in passenger traffic in the 90s, with slow re-growth in the late 90s, 
many planning changes to the building of new infrastructures, financing difficulties and series of 
contradictory policies. This has led to a constant flow of government and research reports [e. g. Bourdillon 
" Jean-Louis Guigou is a delegate at the "Ddldgation A I'Amdnagement et A IAction Rdgionale". 
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1991; Descoutuies 1992; Commissariat Gdndral au Plan 1992; Haenel 1994 see also Gayda 1993; Merlin 
1994; Cuq and Bussereau 1994; Perrod 1998] reflecting the fact that the challenges and controversies are 
considerable. On the other hand, a strong 'faith' in rail has led to impressive achievements: several 
highly performant TGV lines, including the Channel tunnel rail link, comprehensive connections between 
South East North and South West TGV trunks, many new TGV stations (Lille, Marne-la-Vallde, Paris- 
Roissy, Lyon-Satolas) and new developments (TGV East, South, towards Italy, growth of multimodal 
and, *recently, freight transport). This expansion must be seen in the contextof a decline in European rail: 
a 4% decrease of the network capacity of OECD countries over the period 1970-1985 [Ross 1998: 8]; 
passenger transport use of rail decreased from 10% in 1970 to 6% in 1990, compared to an increase in 
auto traffic of at least 75% between 1970 and 1987 [Ross 1998: 8). Moreover, total capital invested in 
transport infrastructure declined some 22% in real terms from the mid-70s to the mid-80s, with the overall 
percentage from national budgets declining from 1.5% to around 1% [Ross 1998: 22]. 
SNCF was nationalised in 1937 and its status has progressively evolved from being a 'mixed 
economy' company in 1938, a private limited company with shareholders (5 1% public shares and 49% of 
shares belonging to the original private companies), to an industrial and commercial public enterprise 
(EPIC), a serni-commercial status under State financial control in 1983. Covering 33,000 kms, the French 
rail network is the second largest in Europe after Germany. 14,000 kms; are electrified, the rest uses diesel 
traction. Despite heavy cuts, it still has large assets amongst which 5,500 freight and passenger stations 
and 114,000 hectares of land. In 1994 it employed 182,700 staff, reduced from 500,000 in 1939 and 
252,000 in 1980. Productivity has increased from 201.8 units (kms per hour worked) in 1972 to 348.4 in 
1990. SNCF had cleared its financial deficit in 1989,1990 and 1991 but it worsened in 1992 (3 billion 
francs) and reached 8 billion in 1994 when traffic decreased and investments were high - 16.7 billion 
francs in 1994 for new TGV infrastructures, new rolling stock, and a new urban underground rail link in 
Paris (EOLE). Rail is claimed to be environmentally efficient in terms of space and energy, and SNCF 
energy consumption represents 1% of French energy needs compared to 78% for road transport [Troin 
1995: 15]. 
The passenger network decreased from 42,000 kms in 1950 to 34,000 kms in 1982, creating 
empty areas in between the main axes: Brittany, Poitou-Vendde between Nantes and Poitiers, the 
Garonne area between Bordeaux and Toulouse, the Massif Central between Clermont-Ferrand and 
Toulouse, the Champagne region North of Dijon, the Southern Alps between Grenoble and Nice [see 
Figure 4.1]. Reduced regional traffic affected national traffic adversely. Many transversal inter-regional 
connections disappeared reinforcing the main axes and the star shape of the network concentrated around 
Paris priniarily. 
The 1983 "Loi d'Orientation des Transports Int6rieurs" (LOTI) determines the constraints under 
which SNCF must operate, i. e. management rules for its public and private activities, service 
requirements for regional and urban transport and its contractual and financial relationships with the State 
[Descoutures 1992: 176]. The latter include: pension contributions to compensate for large SNCF staff 
reductions and the subsequent imbalance in active and retired staff numbers; State contribution to 
infrastructure costs; contribution to social fare discounts (e. g. old age pensioners, soldiers, children, 
holiday discount entitlements); contribution to suburban and regional transport costs. This is instituted 
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through ffe-year contracts between the State and SNCF called "Contrats de Plan" which specify SNCF 
business objectives, public service obligations and the State financial contributions. 
Ugnes principales 
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Figure4.1 French rail passenger network October 1980 [Troin 1995: 21] 
The 1990-1994 "Contrat de Plan", which covers the period of the Socrate project, can be seen as 
the result of the long decline of freight traffic (54% of revenue in 1971 compared to 35% in 1990) and the 
shift to passenger traffic (56% of revenue in 1990 compared to 35% in 1971). In 1990 13% of passenger 
traffic was on the TGV, 27% on intercity trains, 10% on Paris suburban trains and 5% regional transport 
[Descoutures 1992: 177]. An important influence on the 90-94 "Contrat de Plan" was the geographic 
evolution mentioned above, i. e. the concentration of activities on the main axes and major urban centres. 
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Týe 1990-94 "Contrat de Plan" was primarily concerned with developing fast intercity services (the TGV 
Nord, improved infrastructures for Lyon North-South rail stations, connections between TGV and other 
transport modes in the Paris region) and consultation with regional partners regarding public service 
obligations for local and regional transport. 
Another important contextual factor in establishing priorities for 1990-94 must have been the 
success of the TGV in competing with air on the Paris-Lyon segment: after the TGV line was opened in 
1981ý the air traffic between Paris and Lyon nearly halved during the 1981-1989 period (Bourdillon 
1991: 99). In fact it slowed down air traffic growth further South (Paris-Nice, Paris-Marseille) 
significantly too. In his report to the French government Bourdillon [1991: 99-100] however moderated 
tliese TGV effects by arguing that: 
(a) it only applies to a maximum of 700-800 kms travelled (or 2-3 hrs by TGV), distance beyond which 
the plane is generally preferred 12; 
(b) air/rail competition is influenced by ease of access to stations and airports and by the initial and final 
locations of the traveller in relation to these; 
(c) it was very difficult (in 199 1) to estimate the effect of future TGV infrastructures on the overall 
French air traffic which was likely to grow regardless. 
Bourdillon [p. 101] also advocates that air and rail policies should not be carried out 
independently, even though he believes that intermodal competition is a "healthy" practice. In addition to 
national factors, there was also a growing realisation of a changing European context. 
43.2 SNCF and European transport infrastructures 
Following the Single European Act (1987) the Single Market took effect on V January 1993 and 
strongly relates to transport and ensuing expectations of increased traffic: free movement of goods and 
people within the EU and development of the open market; opening up of Eastern Europe; growth of long 
distance professional mobility; growth of leisure time and tourism; more sophisticated tourism requiring 
better clientloperator relationships; demand for speed, comfort and quality [Descoutures 1992: 185-86]. 
Additionally, the EU also had (and still has) a "schdma directeur europden" to plan the co-ordination of 
high speed transport links in Europe which concentrates on 'missing links'; these are selected weak 
connections necessitating investments to facilitate cross-border movements. Due to its central geographic 
position in Europe, French links are important and competitively significant [Martinand 1997] 13; 
European priorities have included French multimodal platforms for national and European passenger 
traffic - e. g. TGV, air, RER (Paris urban/suburban express train) and motorway connections in Roissy 
(Paris Charles de Gaulle airport) in order to support French airports, multimodality and air 
competitiveness [Descoutures 1992: 192,195]. 
The EC instigated a far-reaching Action Programme in 1988 in the sphere of transport, including 
intercity links and efforts to integrate the European periphery. As a result, the EU has contributed towards 
12 Depending on fare structures too, as well as overall economic stability. 
13 Claude Martinand is the president of Rdseau Ferrd de France. 
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costs of infrastructures of 'European interest'; however these amounts, for instance 130 million ECUs in 
1988/89, are usually quite modest as they represent a maximum of 25% of total costs [Descoutures 
1995: 95]. In 1991 out of 148 rnillion ECUs, 30 were towards the cost of Gerrnan reunification, and the 
rest was dedicated to seven (scaled down from the initial ambitious Action Programme) 'grand' projects 
[Ross 1998: 53] below, also illustrated in Figure 4.2: 
The high-speed rail link PBKAL; 
The HST Lisbon-Sevflle-Madrid-Barcelona-Lyon; 
Modernisation of the Alpine transit axis; 
improvement of the European air traffic control system; 
Modernisation of the British road axis towards Ireland; 
Completion of the Scanlink; 
Reinforcement of land links in Greece. 
There are obvious clashes of interest between Northern and 'peripheral' countries such as Greece 
in the allocation of infrastructures funding, as well as conflicting priorities between rail and road. The 
European Investment Bank also lends funds for financing infrastructures; for instance over 1986-1990 
SNCF borrowed 739 million francs for the Eurotunnel, 1.2 billion francs for the TGV Nord, and 547 
million francs for the TGV Atlantique, a total of 2.48 billion francs; the French government on the other 
hand borrowed 1600 billion francs for its motorway construction programme [Descoutures 1992: 96]. To 
put rail infrastructure costs into context, the following figures compare the percentages of rail, road and 
air infrastructures investments (out of total transport infrastructures investments e. g. ports, canals etc. ) 
between 1970 and 1990 in France [Descoutures 1992: 89] and show that road infrastructures costs are the 
largest by a long way. 
1970 1980 1990 
Road 38.8% 49 48.4 
Rail 16.7 15.8 14.9 
Air 6.2 3.3 3.1 
"Whereas rail suppliers have carried the bulk of their own costs (a major reason for the heavy 
debt load of Europe's national rail systems), road use carries significant non-internalised social 
and economic costs (pollution, time lost, energy consumption) borne by society at large" [Ross 
1998: 31] 
Financing and environmental concerns have been voiced for instance by Green parties at the 
European Parliament for some time, highlighting the political nature of European transport. Politics have 
an impact on transport priorities and policy-making and vice versa [Ross 1998: 26]. National transport 
planning has a strong social distributional function and European transport policy-making adds several 
layers of complexity to the politics of transport as illustrated in Table 4.3 below. For instance, transport 
subsidies may relate to member States national debts or to belonging to the Euro-zone and are affected by 
EU voting and vetoes [Ross 1998: 24]. Non-econon* issues have played a secondary role to the internal 
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market project's rational isation, cost-saving and competitiveness objectives, even under a supposedly left- 
leaning European Commission under the Socialist Jacques Delors, and despite the advocacy of the Social 
Charter in the late 80s. "Some States, notably Britain, managed entirely to remove transport elements 
from social policy in their European calculations" [Ross 1998: 27]. According to Ross [ 1998: 2 1) there are 
two ways of addressing the 'transport crisis' which mirror different priorities and perceived urgency of 
the ptoblems: 
those who emphasise efficiency, growth management, and the need for each mode to reflect its true 
costs; 
- those who advocate more rapid reform aimed at addressing social and environmental concerns in 
accordance with notions of redistribution and sustainability. 
SNCF and the French government were, and still are, caught in these dynamics and the next 
section examines more recent developments in French transport policy decisions, some of them turning 
away from the Socrate experiment and its implications. Section 4.3.6 in particular situates passengers' 
reactions to Socrate in the political context of French rail, itself part of European tensions. Having 
examined the French and European context of the late 80s-early 90s, time period during which the 
Socrate project was conceived and initiated, it is clear that SNCF strategy and its 1990-1994 "Contrat de 
Plan" responded logically to an environment in which: 
- passenger transport was the main source of income at SNCF (as opposed to freight); 
- high speed transport networks were the main priority in Europe and France is geographically central 
in Europe; its existing star-shaped network also favoured a HST solution; 
- the TGV Est Paris-Lyon was an incredible success, had ensured rail competitiveness against air and 
its technology was being adopted as the basis for the Northern European cross-border network 
(TGV Nord, Eurotunnel); 
with the opening of the European market in 1993 it was believed that mobility and demand would 
increase. 
Table 4.3 European transport politics: eleven dimensions [Ross 1998: 28] 
International dimension 
- Inter-regional conflict (US-Europe-Japan/East Asia) 
- European intergovernmental conflict, including: 
Large vs small States; producer vs non-producer States; 
central vs peripheral States; EU States vs non-member States 
European Union dimension - Intergovernmental vs supranational interests (European Council 
vs European Commission, Parliament, Court) 
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- Parliamentary vs collective/consensual interests (European 
Parliament vs European Commission) 
- Intra-Comn-ýission rivalries, including: 
- Between the Directorates-General (Transport, Energy, etc. ); 
- Within DG VII (Transport) over modal priorities 
Intra-state dimension 
- Government vs opposition priorities 
- Intra-coalition pressures (both across and within parties) 
- Inter-departmental rivalries (e. g. Transport and Treasury) 
- Local and regional vs national priorities 
Modal dimension 
- Intermodal rivalries (rail vs road) 
- Intramodal rivalries (large vs small carriers; State vs private 
operators) 
433 SNCF: recent developments post Socrate 
Continuing public deficits at SNCF over the last ten years or more [Leavre 1990] and 
organisational difficulties [Ribeill 1994] have led to several government reports commissioned to 
examine the 'catastrophic situation. The latestý the Martinand report [Malingre 1996) identifies three 
causes for this situation: decreasing revenues, low productivity and poor returns on investments. The 
Rapport de la Cour des Comptes [Grosrichard and Jakubyszyn, 1996] criticises SNCF for its inflated 
traffic estimates on the TGV Nord (Paris-Lille opened in 1993 at the same time of the Socrate launch): 
actual figures were less than half the forecasts. It argues that this serious overestimating was not 
accidental and was carried out to obtain a return which could justify the investments. Interestingly, the 
costly TGV building programme (1981-1994) itself is not blamed, but its fimancing. Several governments 
are seen as having neglected to bring proper finance structures (at advantageous rates) for this investment. 
This has led to enormous financial costs calculated to reach a level of 400 billion francs of debt by 2005, 
corresponding to a third of SNCF revenues. On the other hand, there is recognition that SNCF pushed 
TGV technology to the detriment of its 'classical' intercity network [Domenach and Teurnier 1999]. 
Moreover, it is alleged [Jakubyszyn, 1996e] that: GEC-Alsthom (the TGV manufacturer) benefited from 
these investment decisions; possibly overcharged a captive SNCF buyer; and ignored requests by SNCF 
(as early as 1971) to look into alternative and cheaper technologies such as tilting fast trains which can 
run on existing tracks (TGVs need new tracks to reach high speeds). 
It is clear that decisions, roles and responsibilities about rail infrastructures and their costs are 
crucial and there has been an ongoing and very heated debate between the company, the government, the 
unions and public opinion. Unions reacted to the first Chirac government's (headed by Juppd) plans to 
decrease public sector budgets with massive strikes and large demonstrations in November-December 
1995. The social security cutbacks instituted by the Juppd government were contentious and in turn had 
transport implications via proposed reforms of SNCF. And SNCF unions rejected the proposed 1995- 
2000 "Contrat de Plan", arguing that it should include a clear involvement from the government to clear 
the debt and take responsibility for infrastructure costs, rather than impose job cuts and continuing budget 
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deficits. Tfie goVernment proposed a SNCF reform in early 1996, which drew to* a halt late 1996 after 
strong opposition [Jakubyszyn, 1996f and 1996g; Anon. 1996). This reform intended to split 
infrastructures from operations, which also corresponds to the EU liberalisation logic. This was 
eventually relaunched in January 1997 after arduous negotiation and bargaining [Jakubyszyn, 1996h and 
1997b]. The newly created public infrastructure company, the Rdseau Ferrd de France (RFF) took on the 
SNCF debt (125 billion francs) and inherited assets worth 135 billion francs, therefore freeing SNCF 
from I future of uncertainty and continuously increasing levels of deficit. RFF is in charge of investments 
and maintenance for the whole rail network, and charges operators (only SNCF so far). A deal was struck 
to freeze SNCF's fees for two years at 6 billion francs a year until 1999. And RFF received 26 billion 
francs from the French government in 1997, and received progressively less in 1998 and subsequent 
years, as it is intended RFF will bring in more revenues from operators. In exchange of resolving the 
financial debt crisis, the government negotiated cost reductions at SNCF through: reorganisation and 
productivity improvements, and future increased calculations of payment for using RFF tracks, as well as 
banking on privatisation benefits [Jakubyszyn, 1997c]. Some problem areas still remain on the future 
payments SNCF will have to make to use the tracks, and also about who will maintain the tracks, run 
triage and telecom activities (maintenance is delegated to SNCF by RFF) and for how much. Overall, 
however, the network remains intact, the national monopoly is preserved and the public service is still in 
place and through lobbying, SNCF was granted two years' grace. On the other hand, it is now up to RFF 
to negotiate with the government on matters of infrastructures and regulation of rail and other transport 
modes, but with little bargaining power (much less than when SNCF was as single company). 
43A A redefinition of public rail transport? 
During these recent events, the role and public rnission of SNCF have been reconsidered. This 
also reflects the current climate of questioning the role and performance of the public sector in general 14 . 
One possible redefinition of SNCF is as a multimodal, intermodal, combined public transport company 
(Caniaux 1995; Savy 1997; Troin 1995; Malingre, 1996; Ross 1998]. 
The TGV and regional development 
An important aspect of the ongoing restructuring of French rail transport is the controversy 
surrounding the cost of infrastructures and the choice of the TGV technology. As in the air industry, the 
intention is to obtain economies of scope in the design, production and operation of infrastructures. 
However, consequences such as the disappearance of short routes, as in the US air market, are very 
controversial in a smaller and more densely populated country. This is particularly manifest in the 
decisions surrounding the TGV routes. The TGVs are regarded as a great technological success in France, 
but financing TGV infrastructures is extremely costly, and opinions are split on its benefits. Regions are 
also caught in a vicious circle. Their financial involvement is based on the hope of having a fast-train 
14 For instance, the Rapport de la Cour des Comptes (the French national audit office) mentioned 
above, examined Electricitd de France as well as SNCF. 
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such as thd TGV in their area; however, a TGV line is more profitable the fewer stops there are, very 
much like a plane route. It is related to the issues of regional development outlined earlier. 
"Plan Rail" 
Perhaps more significantly, there is evidence of a rethinking of a global transport strategy, with a 
"Plan Rail" which is moving away from the strong emphasis on TGV technology or "Tout TGV" as well 
as from the "Tout Autoroute". This is some achievement since the French are still extremely proud and 
fascinated with the TGV, a classical example of techno-nationalism. A more balanced view is present 
towards road infrastructures [Carroud 1997] and high speed rail; for instance in the consideration of new 
tilting TGVs which can use existing regional and intercity tracks for extensions West and South-west 
beyond le Mans, towards Brest and Bordeaux, and in decisions to increase substantially budgets for the 
classical and regional networks. Other ways of using the TGV, such as less coaches on less busy routes, 
have also been suggested [Le Monde Editorial 1996]. The associations between rail transport, regional 
development and national identity are strongly expressed through these transformations, but in new ways: 
the irrational and technocratic reverence towards the TGV is condemned, and its destructuring effects 
(pauperisation of the State and regions, desertification) acknowledged. Interestingly, the unions had 
already argued some of these points for some time: that SNCF should not use the TGV to compete with 
planes over wealthy business customers on a few profitable segments, but should make trains accessible 
to all in order to cover for fixed costs (network and rolling stock) and offer a true mass public transport 
service [Jakubyszcyn 1996g] which can compete with road. Similarly, SNCF has demanded for some 
time an equalisation of rules between rail and road transport [Bdnard 1993]. 
43.5 Liberalisation via the back door? 
These changing priorities in French rail transport have been realised to acconunodate (or it could 
be said, to counteract) some of the EU liberalisation objectives, which have now been reached: 
accounting for infrastructures and operations separately, getting rid of public debt, and recognition by the 
State of its responsibility in financing infrastructures. Further changes are taking place in a new direction: 
the opening up of rail 'freeway corridors' to competition from operators, initially in freight transport. 
French, Luxembourg, Belgian and Italian railways have opened a 'rail freight corridoe across their 
countries which they are operating together since January 1998 and which is not open to competitors, and 
which they are planning to extend to Valencia in Spain. Interestingly, this corridor uses a single, 
centralised reservation bureau. On the other hand, Austrian, German, Dutch, Swiss and Italian railways 
have also opened in January 1998 a North-South rail freight corridor, which is open to operators and 
which could be extended to Sweden and Denmark [Jakubyszyn, 1998a). Further developments may occur 
on East-West freight bunks. In terms of passenger transport, national monopolies have so far preferred to 
co-operate on certain segments: the Paris-London Eurostar and the Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam Thalys 
with Socidtd Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges; SNCF and Deutsche Bahn on the TGVIThalys Paris- 
Brussels-Koln-Amsterdam-London (PBKAL) and ICE Paris-Metz-Francfort routes, extending eventually 
to Paris-Strasbourg-Stuttgart [Jakubyszyn, 1998a). These collaborations tend to contradict Brussels' 
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liberalism whilit the EU is hoping that it will be able to impose a real competition if monopolies cannot 
stop a decline in traffic (Jakubyszyn, 1997c]. 
However, SNCF deficit was less than I billion francs in 1997 and passenger traffic is increasing 
[Jakubyszyn, 1998b]. One major reason is a pricing revolution, which has accumulated revenues through 
decreasing prices. This low-price strategy had been abandoned for several years when the primary aim 
was a search for the highest yield per unit. Socrate and the TGV were the means to do this, and this 
resulted in a decrease of 15% of passenger traffic in three years, from 1994 to 1996 [Jakubyszyn, 1998b]. 
Now revenues are increasing because of traffic increases (all categories, intercity, TGV and regional) 
rather than price increases. The pricing tactics have also been simplified (from 4 to 2 levels, therefore 
making parts of Socrate software redundant) and discounts have been introduced for the 25-59 age group, 
who are usually excluded. These pricing changes follow from the revised conception of rail transport 
mentioned above, rethought of as a mass public transport system. Whether this is the alternative to rail 
liberalisation that SNCF is seeking to challenge EU deregulatory moves remains to be seen. 
43.6 Socrate, politics and liberalisation 
Socrate was perceived by many, for instance some members of the SNCF "Comitd Central 
d'Entreprise" [Bouchd et al 1993; JMP Interview 12], union representatives [Interviews 16 and 17] and 
passenger associations [Interview 18) as an opportunity taken by SNCF management and the government 
to realise their own political objectives. On the other hand, in his official government report on the 
Socrate 'difficulties', Moissonnier [1993] states that the system, if ambitious, was economically 
necessary and that the initial difficulties were due to the combination of a series of unfortunate 
circumstances: an early launch to coincide with the opening of the TGV Nord line; the unfavourable 
timing of a price increase (2.8% average annual increase which took effect on I' February 1993); new 
differentiated pricing methods; the unusually high number of cancellations of skiing holidays (due to lack 
of snow in March 1993) leading to technical difficulties. The main conclusion of this official report is that 
the remaining task is to rebuild trust with users and passengers. SNCF is blamed for underestimating the 
importance and extent of the change imposed upon staff users, passengers and the media, and that 
measures to prevent or soften these effects were not taken. 
This diagnosis of a "conjunction of unfortunate events and circumstances" [Moissonnier 1993: 8] 
enabled the government not to question the system itself or its commercial principles; in fact the official 
report recommends that SNCF pursues its chosen commercial policy and keeps the Socrate system 
[Moissonnier 1993: 19]. The government therefore endorsed SNCF's new commercial policy and 
emphasis on TGV profitable long distance lines at one end of the spectrum, complemented politically by 
partnerships with regional authorities for local transport at the other end of the spectrum's. However, 
these are two extremes and in between the two, there is 'transversal' transport on 'secondary' lines which 
feed into the rest of the network C'maillage" or meshing is a term used in French transport planning); it is 
15 The latter corresponds to the political vision and efforts (initiated by the Mitterand administration 
progressively put in place during the mid-80s and 90s) to decentralise political power to the French 
regions. 
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an important synýbol of public transport, but it falls between two stools. One interv e, iewee [LDM Interview 
8] added that although Socrate concentrated on 'grandes lignes' (long distance) traffic for financial 
reasons, it was problematic statistically as regional traffic (in passenger numbers but not revenues) is as 
large as long distance traffic (for instance Ile de France traffic represents 400 million passenger journeys). 
Union representatives argued further [Interviews 16,17; CFDT 1994: 4] that regional and transversal 
traffic only survives as a feeder to the TGV network and that the formula "On ne s'arrdte pas partouf'16 
emulates air transport. 
SNCF executives [e. g. LDM Interview 8; GV Interview 14; JMM Interview 1) not only saw 
Socrate as justified and appropriate economically, but also as a 'carrier of change' symbolising a 
profound and structural mutation. They believed that the strategic vision embodied was the right one; had 
not been jeopardised by events; and that in fact, and thanks to sophisticated analysis by SNCF business 
intelligence experts [MJA, BT Interview 5], it was ahead of its time which is what led to 'turbulence' 
[LDM Interview 8]. 
In a book entitled "Le train, I'Europe et le service public" published before the events [Fournier 
1993], Jacques Fournier, president of SNCF during the Socrate project 17 , adopts a slightly different 
perspective. He asserts that the notion of public service and the strength of SNCF can be maintained even 
in a climate of competition and deregulation, and that this is achieved through modernisation and 
technical progress. Socrate represents one of these initiatives [Fournier 1993: 52]. This is translated by 
Socrate key yield management expert [CQ Interview 10] into: 
"Adoption of yield management by the railway industry is a natural rogression, essential as 
competition grows between high-speed railways such as SNCF's TGV network and key air 
corridors" (Queille and Silva 1994: 669, my emphasis added]. 
Yield management as a technical object is endowed with the capacity to address a particular 
economic and political objective ('natural' competition with air) but ignores another less vocal activity, 
intramodal competition across trains. It could be said that the former 'hides' the latter, resulting in an 
6unintended effect'. Passenger associations representatives [Interview 18; FNAUT 1994a] argue that: 
instead of unbridled competition with air, the competitive conditions between transport modes must be re- 
examined by the State; that 'free' competition does not exist and is affected by fiscal and regulatory 
measures; and that 'fairer' competition will only occur when all economic and social costs will be 
harmonised . More specifically, they establish links between price deregulation and the fact that SNCF 
has absorbed 90% of infrastructure costs (100% of TGV Sud-Est and Nord, 70% of TGV Atlantique) 
whereas the State and regional authorities heavily subsidise roads, motorways and airports [FNAUT 
1994]. Fournier (1993: 67] similarly asks that: competitive conditions are harmonised to allow a battle 
with equal 'weapons' between competitors; that the rules of the game are known and agreed upon by all; 
and that decisions about 'general interest' are made in the right place, that is at political level (p. 43). 
16 ', We do not stop everywhere", attributed to Jean-Marie Metzler, Directeur Commercial Voyageurs and 
head of the Socrate project. 
17 As well as negotiating the 'Contrats de Plan' with SNCF, the government nominates the president and 
the director general, and Fournier was appointed by the Mitterand socialist administration. His previous 
appointment was as president of Gaz de France. 
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There is an obvious conflict between words and deeds on the part of the French Ministry of 
Transport and the constraints imposed upon SNCF by the government (financial gains and competitive 
conditions) contradicted its political discourse (public service). Socrate was seen by many [Interviews 16, 
17,18] as a way to replenish the coffers of the State. SNCF almost balanced its budget from 1990 to 
1992; with economic recession, it had a3 billion francs deficit in 1992 and 7,8 in 1993. From an 
economic and financial perspective, not only does the use of yield management techniques and 
sophjýticated information systems fulfill a need to balance the books, it can, also become a management 
tool for maximising profitability in a context of conflictual regional, national and European priorities. 
These issues strongly coloured the public reaction to the introduction of Socrate. The price 
differentiation policies enabled by the new system were interpreted as forcing passengers onto the more 
expensive TGVs to recoup the infrastructure costs and compete with air, and to the detriment of the 
'classical' national intercity lines, which the French public and SNCF employees (the "cheminof 'culture 
see Ribeill [1993]), who are very attached to 'their' national rail network, are very keen to protect. This is 
vividly illustrated in the following cartoon published in Le Monde in the context of the failed 
implementation of Socrate in May 1993 and the launching of TGV Nord [Figure 4.3]. It mirrors what 
Troin [1995: 1131 calls a 'two speed' railway or dichotomy between: (a) on the one hand an efficient 
modem and fast TGV network between major and dynamic urban centres and (b) the older network 
(intercity 'classiques' and regional TER trains) which serve isolated and backwards regions such as 
Brittany and the Massif Central. See also a CGT union poster published at the same time in Appendix 5. 
3g; 
Figure 4.3 The TGV and classical trains [Philippe Gauckler in Faujas 1993c] 
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4ý4 DEREGULATION AND CRS 
4A. 1 Computerised reservation systems for air and rail 
US concentration 
- The CRS in the US are owned by the largest airlines (e. g. United Airlines with 4pollo, Delta 
Airlines with Worldspan) while in Europe they are owned by a number of airlines; for instance Galileo is 
owned by British Airways, KIM, Alitalia and several other airlines, and-, 4madeus is owned by Air 
France, Lufthansa, Iberia and SAS (see Table 4.4 for an overview). European air CRS are therefore 
weaker fums than the largest American fums, which display a more predatory behaviour [e. g. Ott 1994; 
Anon 1994; Feazel 1986]. In fact, links between US and European air CRS have been under development 
for several years and in March 1992 the 4pollo and Galileo systems were merged. It is very likely that, 
taking into account of alliances with Australasian, Canadian and Far Eastern air CRS, the world air CRS 
industry will eventually consolidate into perhaps three or four global systems [Williams 1994: 36; KArcher 
1996; Schulz 1996]. In fact, four airline GDS were shaping up to be the most dominant players by 2000, 
namely 4madeus, Galileo, Sabre and Worldspan (Veil et al 2000a: 25]. It is not clear how this global 
consolidation of airline GDS will affect rail CRS when considering the differences between the 
US/European and air/rail operating characteristics explored in this thesis. 
The situation in terms of CRS for the rail industry, in which SNCF wanted to play a pioneer role 
by designing Socrate, is far less developed than in the air industry. CRS are usually developed by national 
railways, and SNCF failed to sell its system to German Railways, which concentrated instead on 
designing its own, simpler, system. The consortium between SNCF, British Rail and SNCB which runs 
the Eurostar channel service, does use Socrate;, however, this particular route, unlike most other rail 
routes, has very few intermediate stops (i. e. London-Ashford-Calais Frethun-Paris with only some trains 
stopping in Ashford and Calais Frethun) and is therefore more akin to an air route; electronic check-ins 
also make it much easier to gather data, control passenger flows, apply yield management techniques and 
constantly modify pricing tactics, borrowing these techniques from the deregulated air industry. 
National rail CRS may be less open to the same degree of potential exploitation (e. g. by 
accessing rivals' data) than large global air travel CRS. However, SNCF signed an agreement with 
. 4madeus 
(Air France GDS) in November 1995 [Anon 1995]. The purpose was to make French and 
Eurostar trains reservations possible via the 4madeus distribution network in travel agencies and air 
companies' booking offices. Socrate is thus accessible through 4madeus point-of-sale computers. The 
purchase of Sabre by SNCF could also be seen as facilitating an inroad into the European market for 
American Airlines. On the other hand, SNCF recently set up a partnership with United Airlines to provide 
intermodal air/rail reservations through the Paris-Roissy Charles de Gaulle airport/TGV hub [Veil et al 
2000b: 117]. It is probably too early to assess relations between air and rail GDS and the situation is still 
fluid and unsettled. The recent growth of Intemet-based services such as Travelocity, developed by the 
Sabre GDS, also add another layer of complexity and uncertainty. 
Overall, judging from the growing global concentration of the world air CRS as indicated above, 
it is possible that similar moves may take place in the rail CRS market, and that the large US airline CRS 
may act again as the major predators. It remains to be seen whether the concentration of CRS in the 
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European iail tuinsport industry will be mirrored, as in the US industry, by a conbentration of transport 
companies themselves. An interesting if unan ra le question is whether the concentration of 
companies leads to a concentration of CRS or vice versa. Instead of seeking cause and effect relationships 
one can state that the technology is a condition and a consequence of market changes at the same time, or 
in other words it both allows and arises from market changes. 
:. Table 4.4 Major computerised reservation systems in airline companies 
CRS Owned by/Used by 
APOLLO UNITED AIRLINES 
GALILEO -. 4pollolGalileo joint venture in Europe: British Airways, KLM, Swissair, 
Alitalia. 
- Other European users include: Austrian Airlines, Aer Lingus, TAP, 
Olympic, Sabena, British Caledonian. 
- Joint venture in Australia: Ansett, Australian Airlines. 
SABRE AMERICAN AIRLINES 
Joint venture in Australia with Qantas. 
WORLDSPAN DELTA, Northwest, TWA and ABACUS 
(Northwest and TWA had PARS, Delta had DATAS2). 
Joint venture with Lufthansa and Cathay Pacific. 
SYSTEM ONE CONTINENTAL AIRLINES 
(inherited System One from acquisition of Eastern Airlines). 
AMADEUS System OneMmadeus joint venture with: 
Air France, Iberia, SAS and Air India. 
Users include: Lin eflyg, Adria Airways, JAT, Finnair, Air Inter, d 
Braathens, Icelandair, Emirates. 
As a comparison, the changes in the European air industry listed below have followed the US 
model over the last two decades [Ross 1998: 23]; it is unclear whether similar changes will occur in the 
European rail sector. 
- partial or wholesale privatisations Of State-run operators; 
- stringent cost-cutting (pay freezes, early retirements, etc. ); 
- bankruptcies and receiverships; 
- corporate restructurings 
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introduction of ýrofit incentives and attention to shareholder value; 
global a Iliance fonnations 
- the ending of 'full-service' companies with significant outsourcing and franchising. 
In fact, when these events took place in the US air industry in the late 70s-early 80s it was often 
brutal and ruthless. As US business journalist Petzinger Jr. [ 1995: xx] describes it in his extraordinary, if 
journalistic and highly personalised epic: "In short order in 1978, for reasons that few fully understood at 
the time ( ... ) the airlines were loosed into a capitalistic free-for-all. The name given to this change was 
deregulation". He relates [p. xxi] how Frank Borman, Chief Executive of Eastern Airlines "strapped to his 
ankle a 9mm handgun as labor strife mounted"; how Richard Ferris of United Airlines "told his workers 
to do things his way or not at all"; and how Donald Burr of People Express "sought to manipulate his 
workers with promises of love and trust in the workplace", for instance by involving pilots in the affairs 
of the company to make them less prone to unionisation [p. 1 16]. The process of elimination was ruthless 
and many carriers, e. g. Braniff, Pan Am, National Airlines, Western Airlines, Air Florida, AirCal 
disappeared in hostile takeovers [p. 99]. Bob Crandall, CEO of American Airlines, is quoted as calling the 
game "closest to the game of Christians and lions" [p. 124]. In 1981,13,000 air traffic controllers went on 
strike. President Reagan fired every last one of them. Reagan's action would utterly transform relations 
between organised labour and management in the US, and "in no industry would that become more 
apparent than in aviation" [Petzinger 1995: 117]. 
Interestingly, Petzinger Jr. [1995: 50] also recounts how Bob Crandall not only brought a passion 
for computers when he joined AA, but also a business and marketing experience in the fast moving 
consumer goods sector, especially pricing expertise, as he had worked at Eastman Kodak and Hallmark 
Cards before. In the new cut-throat context, airline seats began to be seen as fresh 'perishable' goods 
valueless upon departure; matching passengers with seats before the latter 'perished' became paramount; 
and the sale of one last seat could easily decide whether the plane flew the entire distance in the red or the 
black (p. 52]. Nevertheless, minimising costs and maximising revenues in the context of airline marketing 
is much simpler than in the context of land transport in general and rail in particular. Amalgamating air 
and rail transport cannot be problem-free, as shown in this chapter. SNCF top managers argue for 
instance that constant series of mergers, concentrations, demergers, new entrants, alliances, remergers etc. 
may be fline in the air industry but would bring instability and chaos in the rail sector [LDM Interview 8]. 
4A. 2 CRS and electronic markets: a model? 
Cornputerised reservation systems cannot be dissociated from the transport deregulation context. 
The CRS/GDS strategy adopted by SNCF fits in with, and contributes to, deregulation. It optimises the 
commercial and financial yields, in a context of inter-sectorial competition (air, rail, road), provoked by, 
and contributing to, European and national deregulation. As an SNCF top manager stated it, GDS force to 
think beyond the 'hexagon"s and across various borders, alliances, travel agents networks, other partners 
such as American Express etc. on a global scale [LDM Interview 8]. European rail transport already 
18 The map of France is usually sketched as a hexagon and the French refer to an 'hexagonal' mentality 
to mean small-minded. 
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competes with air (and road) on a national basis (i. e. national intermodal competition). Increased national 
and European rail deregulation will create Pan-European rail intrarnodal competition, as well as 'internal' 
competition within SNCF across its different products. This prejudices the planning of an integrated 
transport policy within and across modes, which are now seen as competing rather than complementary. 
TGVs and 'classical' intercity lines compete within the same transport company. The separation of 
infrastructure and operations is another step towards increased intrarnodal and internal competition. 
However, co-operation and coordination are still necessary: for instance, the allocation of timetables is 
very critical to network integration [Railway Reform Group 2000]; the priority given to one's trains 
running on one's own network, vs trains belonging to another company; what happens in the case of 
limited capacity on a line, maintenance and safety, etc. 
High expectations are held for the capacity of information technology and telecommunications 
to help solve some of these problems (traffic control, signalling, etc) and for the CRS and GDS. The latter 
techniques are at the heart of the competition/co-operation dilemma. GDS and networks are carriers of 
economies of scope. After the US experience, European companies are well aware that domination of the 
GDS is part of winning the battle, in that they can provide a global control of travel, tourism, and 
distribution (as well as being a source of income themselves). But they also require technical 
compatibility which may be achieved through co-operation and alliances or, much more likely, mergers 
and acquisitions, as was the case in the US air sector. 
The techniques of yield management and commercial optimisation correspond to a deregulated 
transport model in which operators compete on yield per uniL Imposing that model to rail has proved 
problematic. The "Cour des Comptee' report [Grosrichard and Jakubyszyn 1996] found that, although an 
interesting modernisation exercise, the optimisation part of Socrale was introduced without a reliable way 
of analysing passenger data and of measuring the impact of these commercial changes. It criticised SNCF 
for 'playing' with its new computer system, for paying too much for it and becoming too dependent on its 
provider, American Airlines, whilst running the risk of destabilising its clients, and banking on 
differentiated pricing strategies based on speed (TGV) with disastrous effects. 
It would seem that SNCF, having tried to link a complex pricing strategy to high yields on TGV 
routes particularly, has learned the lessons from the implementation of Socrate and has gone back to 
earlier principles, for the time being. However, the issue of deregulation has not disappeared and is being 
replaced by the notion that differentiated charging of operators, i. e. higher fees for using busy and 
modemised tracks, will act as a market regulator. It is not clear how this will affect passenger pricing. 
Using yield management techniques also supports the new logic of separating infrastructures and 
operations, which leads to accounting for the profitability of each route, thereby transforming routes into 
individual and potentially competitive products. Karel van Miert, the European competition 
commissioner, articulated the same logic when saying that SNCF, with its 'high tech' TGVs and 
sophisticated computerised reservation systems, would be able to attack other European markets 
[Jakubyszyn 1997c]. CRS and GDS were seen in government reports [e. g. Descoutures 1992: 182] as a 
way of controlling the 'travel chain' for consumers in a new national space 'open' to Europe. 
Technology does make certain social relations stable. Infonnation technologies and electronic 
markets are intervening in the management of commercial and non-commercial multimodal transport 
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activities. Information is being used as a surrogate for free and contestable markets', as exemplified in the 
rhetoric that online systems can enable free competition on the same tracks in the UK rail sector. 
Technology is, if not a causal explanation, at least a condition of possibility for global market 
restructuring [Mitev 2000a). What remain unknown are the future effect of global electronic travel 
markets on European transport industries [Mitev 1999] and the role of national policy-makers. In a 
political context of conflicting market and non-market principles, will national policy-making be replaced 
with technology-supported free global markets? 
Ile next section explores in more detail the effects of competition on transport pricing 
mechanisms in the rail industry. It shows how it became logical for SNCF to borrow pricing techniques 
from the air industry and how Socrate became associated with the TGV. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONTROVERSIAL PRICING: 
TRANSLATION TO A CUSTOMER ETHOS AND 
ASSOCIATING SOCRA TE TO THE TGV SUCCESS 
(MACRO TO MICRO) 
The new conunercial techniques used by Socrate to manage passenger travel can be traced back 
to differentiated pricing techniques initiated by SNCF when it launched its fast TGV trains in the early 
80s. More sophisticated differentiated pricing was made possible with Socrate and its yield management 
techniques and is intrinsically related to the TGV high-speed trains network. 
New principles of differentiated pricing presuppose and imply a cultural change for users since 
they assume that passengers will behave rationally and modify their buying habits so as to bring higher 
profits, particularly from the TGV network; and they still maintain cheap fares (at certain times) so as to 
fulfill SNCF public service mission. This seemed the ideal solution, a perfect political compromise for 
SNCF. As Belobaba [1987: 64, my emphasis added] remarks about air yield management: "[it is] a 
pricing strategy developed since deregulation so that established airlines can at least appe-a to be 
competitive in price with the new entrants and might even be able to fill otherwise empty seats with 
stimulated demand" [see Section 3.3.3]. By maintaining some cheap fares, it would seem that SNCF also 
saw the importance of appenring to be competitive, but in a situation of internal competition between all 
of its own trains, particularly the TGVs and the classical trains, as detailed in Section 4.3.6; whereby the 
original intention of yield management was for big US air companies to protect themselves from 
intramodal competition. 
This chapter first provides a brief history of SNCF pricing tactics, details the application and 
effects of yield management to more sophisticated price differentiation and to the identification of market 
segments [Mitev 1997], and outlines the new ticketing put in place when Socrate was implemented. It then 
describes the effect this is having on passengers' buying behaviour, on a different customer ethos and 
culture of access to transport. A clear link is established between advanced pricing techniques and the 
high-speed trains; the success of TGV technology is revisited in order to compare it with, and provide 
fixther explanation for, the problematic Socrate technical innovation. The success of the former may have 
led to high expectations for the latter but at the same time it effected a transformation of rail transport 
which set the scene for the troubles Socrate encountered. 
5.1 PRICING DIFFERENTIATION, MARKET SEGMENTATION AND TICKETING 
5.1.1 History of SNCF pricing tactics 
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As a public monopoly, in order to keep and possibly increase the number of its customers, SNCF 
has historically been caught between the notion of public service and budget constraints. Traditionally, the 
aims of managing urban and rural development maintaining a national identity and ensuring a good 
quality of life, formed the basis of cross-subsidising in French rail transport. Accordingly, a kilometre had 
the same price all over the countryý which was seen as fair and equal to all-French citizens, and a ticket 
price was calculated on the basis of the distance travelled, whichever train or line was used and whatever 
the costs. Therefore, profits realised on some lines could be used to subsidise losses on other lines or 
segments. This principle was a result of a double constraint imposed on SNCF, that of operating 
unprofitable lines and that of balancing its budget on an overall national basis, rather than per market. 
Before the introduction of Socrate, and for many years, train fares were calculated according to 
the distance travelled, following the principle of geographic cross-subsidisation ("pdr6quation 
gdographique"). In this pricing system passengers travelling on profitable lines - and additional 
government funding if necessary - contributed to the cost of running unprofitable lines. Public utilities, 
including major air companies [Villiers 1994], apply this principle in order to provide services in the 
interest of national and regional development. 
SNCF started introducing price differentiation in the late 70s by modifying fares according to the 
time of travel [Gianfaldoni 1993]. Its aim was to optimise average revenues, by examining two variables: 
the filling of trains and the price offered at a certain time on a certain route. If demand is greater than 
capacity, fares can be increased and price-sensitive passengers can transfer their travel to under-utilised 
trains at a different time. Some price differentiation existed prior to Socrate, and had been in place since 
1979, but was quite limited. It was based on a tricolour calendar (three time zones, red for very busy, blue 
for busy, white for quiet periods) published once a year and widely available; it corresponded to three 
simple differentiation bands or zones depending on the year calendar (similar to Channel crossing ferries 
or rented holiday cottages price calendars). It was set a year at a time according to previous results, 
accumulated mainly through sales figures and counting passengers and types of tickets in trains. This 
calendar tried to modulate demand to deal primarily with trains in heavy demand (holidays, weekends). 
For instance on Friday evenings and Monday mornings no reductions were available (red). At some other 
times such as bank holiday weekends or school holidays, only some reduced fares were allowed, e. g. 
youth passes, family cards (blue); and in the third band all reduced fares were accepted (white). Special 
discounts, only available in 'white' periods were also devised. This pricing system was clear and easy to 
publicise. Pricing according to the number of kilometres travelled has the advantage of being totally 
understandable to passengers who can work out the cost of a specific journey. They can also establish very 
quickly which trains their reduction entitlements apply to or not. The calendar had a colourful and simple 
design and was printed as a small standalone folded leaflet available everywhere, which you could carry in 
your wallet (I remember it! ). Its aim was to offer reduced prices on less busy days so as to fill emptier 
trains. 
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This price differentiation, if simple, was also heavy. The calendar had to be set a long time ahead 
and it had some absurd effects. Some of the disadvantages are: 
Rules apply to whole trains so no reduced seats are available at all at busy times; 
Rules also apply to all periods everywhere in the same way; 
It deals primarily with weekly and seasonal variations starting fram Paris (heaviest traffic); 
so in a red period there were no reductions in trains going to Paris (rather than leaving it) 
therefore many trains were made to be even more unprofitable through the use of the 
calendar; 
No control information is available per seat and per train; 
It is difficult to establish detailed patterns of use and customer behaviour; 
Daily variations (the time of the day) as opposed to weekly or monthly variations are not 
catered for. This is particularly important since daily variations occurring on profitable lines 
have the potential of bringing in higher profits through further price differentiation. 
Differentiation was therefore limited and fares were relatively uniform. However, the cost of 
increasing price differentiation, which involves the use of sophisticated computer systems, was initially 
seen by SNCF as too high to warrant any change [Quinet 1990]. The aim of increasing price 
differentiation would be a major consideration in the choice of the Socrate software. 
SNCF started experimenting with fin-ther price differentiation, which eventually set the scene for 
Socrate. It did so on the first TGV line Paris-Lyon that opened in 198 1, and then Paris-Ouest in the early 
90s. A major change was the use of compulsory and chargeable reservations, and the introduction of 
different types of 'supplements' for very busy trains (TGVs as well as normal intercity trains). The 
objective was not only to fill empty trains but also to increase profits on busy routes and compete with air, 
which proved successful on the Paris-Lyon route. It can be seen that in SNCF experience, TGV 
technology and differentiated pricing became strongly associated and successfully so. 
Prices varied from a factor to I (for the slower normal 'classical' train to these destinations) and 
1.35 on the TGV. When the TGV to Le Mans was launched in the early 90s, the increase in the second 
class price was between 25.4% to 53.5% (according to the period in the calendar) over 'normal' prices, 
i. e. calculated on the basis of kilometres [Sanchez 1993]. One implication of this system (which was 
superimposed on the tricolour calendar system) was that it was cheaper to travel first class in certain trains 
than second class in others. The principles of "pdrdquation" were beginning to become eroded 
("ddpdrdquation") in the sense that price became related to the type of train and the time and day of travel 
rather than the distance travelled. 
5.1.2 Sophisticated price differentiation through yield management 
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The biggest price differentiation changes that exploited yield management were applied to the 
new TGV Nord in April 1993. For the rest of the network, pricing differentiation was less extreme [SNCF 
1992c]. However, the well-publicised simultaneous announcement of the TGV Nord and Socrate, together 
with the modifications of many commercial principles through optimisatiorr-on the whole network, soon 
affected relations with passengers. 
Socrate, with its computerised reservation systems and yield management techniques, brought 
the possibility of much more sophisticated price differentiation, and therefore threatened the principles of 
geographic and social "pdrdquation" and equal access to transport to a much greater extent. Three 
parameters could now be used to modulate pricing [Gianfaldoni 1993]: not only the type of train and a 
more refined division of the time of travel (the day of the week but also the exact time of the day), but also 
the type of purchase, and the flexibility (or lack oO of the bought product. 
This new pricing implies the use of yield management techniques to know, predict and control 
demand, and manage available capacity according to this knowledge, so as to maximise revenues. Like 
marketing, yield management seeks to redefine and segment demand and concentrates on the price/quality 
relationship. Yield management includes both pricing and seat inventory control. In the air industry seat 
inventory control enables the air company to influence yields and total revenues on a flight-by-flight basis, 
within a given price structure. 
As well as different prices according to the type and time of train, the time of reservation now 
affects the price. The idea is to block a certain number of seats (a quota) for specific trains, for which the 
price will vary according to the date of purchase (e. g. from 2 months to 45 days - or from 44 to 15 days - 
before the time of departure). Some constraints may be associated such as staying a Saturday night, to 
prevent business people from benefiting from discounts. The price of reservation varies (the earlier one 
books the cheaper it is) in order to experiment with the size of quotas. This implies lirniting capacity for 
certain groups (according to a fare) on each train in order to smooth demand peaks and fill the lows. The 
means to do this are quota management ("contingentement") and overbooking. If the risk of waste 
(unoccupied seats therefore loss of earnings) is higher than the risk of rejects (too much demand and 
dissatisfied customers), the priority will be the low fares group. If the risk of rejects is higher than the risk 
of waste, priority will be given to the high fares group. Compulsory booking enables the gathering of 
information to adjust the offer by modifying train planning. 
The following table (Table 5.1) gives an example of differentiated pricing for the TGV Paris- 
Lille; the proportion of seats on offer in each category is derived from quota management principles. 
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Table 5.1 TGV-Nord Paris-Lille prices [SNCF 1993d] 
Niveau Prix 
normal 
Prix 
r6cluit I 
Prix 
r6cluit 2 
Prix 
r6dult 3 
Prix 
r6duit4 
Joker 
J-8 
Joker 
J-30 
NI 207F 145F 125F 104F 53F 18OF loop 
N2 
N3 
255F 194F 174F 152F loir leop 10OF 
N4 301F 240F 220F 198F 138F 18or IOOF 
There are four levels ("Niveaux") of pricing, from NI to N4, NI being the low period when 
trains are emptier, to N4 when trains are in high demand. Prices are the same in N2 and N3 for second 
class tickets only. Reduced C'116duit") prices correspond to four categories of available discounts such as 
family cards "Families Nombreuses", child passes "Kiwi", young persons passes "Carissimo", couples, 
frequent travellers "Modulopass", old age pensioners "Vermeil", army personnel "Militaires and 
"Pensionnis de guerre", groups, conferences "Billets Congrýs", holidays "Billets de Congd Annuel"). 
'Joker' fares are available when customers buy their tickets 30 days before travelling (J-30) or 8 eight 
days (J-8) [SNCF 1994b]. These "Jokee' tickets are non-cumulative, i. e. they cannot be combined with 
other discounts (reductions 1,2,3 or 4). The 'normal' full fare ticket using the classical train "Corail" 
rather than the TGV is 164FF. 
Other pricing and purchasing changes that took place between January and June 1993 were as 
follows: 
Abolition of stopovers (interrupting a trip); 
Reselling of seats booked via phone/Minitel if not picked up 30mins before departure; 
Obligation to take train specified on ticket; if someone misses a train and catches the next one without 
going back to the ticket office, the ticket will be considered invalid and the passenger fined; 
Impossible to have several discounts on the same trip (e. g. "Modulopass" for Paris-Le Mans and 
family discount for Le Mans-Rennes) 
Abolition of 'supplement' vouchers; 
Unreasonable price increases. 
Passenger associations (FNAUT 1994b] claimed that: when pricing was modified on the first 
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TGVs in 1981, prices were 20% higher than the kilometric unit applied to the intercity 'classical' trains 
(reservation costs and supplements were additional to this); in 1993 this over-pricing ("sur-tarification") 
was 51% higher for full fares and 102% for reduced fares on Paris-Le Creusot, 57% and 130% on Paris- 
Le Mans, 84% and 141% on Paris-Lille. In fact, price increases above the franc/kilometre unit on Paris- 
Lille-,. -were also 
26% for 'classical' intercity trains, and between 80 and 160% for regular passes 
(depending on weekly, monthly or yearly travel passes) [FNAUT 1994a]. 
Difficulties conunonly encountered and complaints made by passengers were accumulated by the 
SNCF Comrnunication Department [EC & AH Interview 3] and Marketing Department [MP Interview 7] 
and some of them were: 
Difficulties in exchanging tickets; 
- More complicated organisation of travel because of impossibility of breaking a journey (stopovers); 
Worries of price stability and predictability, which affect work travel planning and long term 
attitudes; 
Air and road alternatives (including car fleets for businesses) more seriously considered; 
Difficulties in getting information for connecting trains, e. g. from regional trains to TGV; 
Lack of flexibility, too many constraints. 
These difficulties and the problems associated with the new ticket described in Section 5.1.4, led to 
dissatisfaction and anger in a clientele which had been historically faithfull to rail transport because of 
convenience and simplicity [Moissonnier 1993: 13] as well as prices. Passengers compared the new system 
to the previous one in which prices were clear, with only a few supplements on 'luxury' trains, and in 
which travellers could organise their trips easily and improvise if necessary [Sivardi6re 1993]. 
5.1.3 Towards the identification of 'marketable products': a problematic segmentation 
Faced. with what is perceived as a non-uniform demand and increased competition, yield 
management aims to know, control and predict demand, as well as manage capacity according to this 
knowledge. It combines differentiated pricing, profit maximisation and quota management. It balances 
under- and over-capacity using customers' sensitivity to prices. In an under-capacity situation it can be 
used to increase market share and fight off new entrants; in an over-capacity situation, lucrative segments 
can be protected and spare capacity can be offered with discounts. It combines price differentiation and 
capacity management. Overbooking enables operations to deal with 'no shows'. The need for overbooking 
is balanced against the temptation for customers to 'go show'. It determines the number of seats per train 
(quotas) which are discounted so as to imintain maximum profits from the normally priced seats. These 
quotas can be determined dynamically: they are revised continuously according to real time demand until 
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then. Analysing past statistics, comparing past and current demand so far, forecasting from current 
demand, try to establish the ideal point at which a customer who does not get a discounted fare either 
transfers to the higher fare or to another train at the same price. Statistical information and optimisation is 
carried out on all origin-destination pairs, which must therefore include analysing all possible legs of a 
journey. Higher fares may not be the best option when compared to lower fares, if the distance travelled in 
the latter case is longer. 
Yield management and optimisation, when compared to the previously used price differentiation 
where several techniques were simply used in conjunction, represents a fundamental qualitative shift: 
detailed information is gathered about rach train throughout the day, the week and the year; this goes far 
beyond dividing prices into crude time periods; information is gathered continuously on seats sold so far, 
enabling to modify the price mix on each train in real time; each train journey therefore becomes 
identifiable and marketable as an individual and isolated product. 
With Socrate (and Thalis) it is possible to identify, segment and target groups. However, this 
means an end to geographic and national cross-subsidisation, which ensured a coherent regional and 
national development based on economic and demographic factors. New pricing tactics represent an end 
to equality of access and socially orientated price structures, and are seen as contributing to a 
"d6sertification" of less populated areas through an emphasis on profitable segments. The logic of the 
optimisation software is to maximise the number of high fares and limit the number of seats at reduced 
fares. Such a priority coincides with the development of the most profitable parts of the network, i. e. the 
TGV network, which is contrary to the principle of national solidarity and cross-subsidising. The TGV 
lines are more profitable when there are fewer stops ("On ne s'arr6te pas partout" see note 16 Section 
4.3.6). Beyond maxiinising revenues, yield management also leads to maintaining an offer at a slightly 
lower level than demand, so as to maximise revenue per seat. With the new pricing structure the distance 
is not the basis for prices anymore, but a combination of the choice of day, time of day, choice of route, 
type of train, origin and destination and duration. 
Some problems due to segmentation can be illustrated below (see also example in Section 3.2.3). 
With the two following trains departing from Paris: 
Train 1 12h TGV Paris-Valence-Avignon-Marseille 
Train 2 13h3O TGV Paris-Valence 
Prioritisation of segments applies on train 1: a Paris-Valence passenger is accepted only if a 
Valence-Marseille has been sold. The assumption is that a Paris-Valence is refused in case a Paris- 
Marseille is required, and that the passenger wanting to travel from Paris to Valence can catch the 
following train (Train 2). From the passenger's perspective, Train I is not on offer, whereas it is on offer 
all the way to Marseille, and it does stop in Valence... 
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Passenger associations argued that the new conunercial policy did not fulfill public service 
requirements of transport law [Broussolle 1993] as expressed in LOTI ("Loi d'Orientation des Transports 
Intirieurs") and in Article 14 of the "Cahier des Charges de la SNCF"19 [Journal Officiel 1994]. 
Following the controversies surrounding the overpricing ("surtarification") above the standard 
franc4dlometre unit introduced by Socrate, a compromise was reached in an amendment to Article 14 in 
July 1994 which limits maximum prices and the number and proportion of overpriced trains. 'Baseline' 
overpricing was limited to 40%, 'modulation' was allowed up to 50% for high demand trains (full fares) 
and 100% (reduced fares). This amendment in effect legitimated the end of "pdrdquation gdographique" 
and abolished the link between price and distance. SNCF executives [e. g. CQ Interview 10] thought that it 
was too small a step in the right direction; and most SNCF interviewees (e. g. GV Interview 14] stated that 
passenger associations were not representative and always found counterexamples to prove their points, 
when "no system can be perfect" [CQ Interview 10]. 
By contrast, FNAUT [1994a] points out that these limits do not prevent prices from increasing 
on non-competitive segments, for example Paris-Valence or Paris-Arras (Arras is in between Paris and 
Lille); it argues that passengers travelling between Paris and Arras are suffering as a result of arbitrary 
prices on that uncompetitive segment (when compared to Paris-Lille). Additionally, regularity and 
frequency of 'classical' trains on Paris-Arras are suffering and have become too poor to constitute an 
attractive transport mode [FNAUT 1994c]. Conunuters from Abbeville and Arniens (towns in Northern 
France like Arras) similarly suffered as a result and transferred to the A16 motorway [FR3 1997]. And 
daily commuters between Lille and Paris, on the other hand, complained that they had to book their TGV 
seat everyday making travelling to work very awkward [FR3 1997]. 
FNAUT also opposed the generalisation of quota management to the whole SNCF network 
[FNAUT 1994a]; and a member of the Socrate team responsible for sales (LDM Interview 8] reflected 
that in fact there are different priorities and tensions between different functional needs across the 
network, and that yield management only really applies to the first category: 
"Grandes Lignes": reservations primarily and seat availability 
Regions: ticketing: unique journeys and regular journeys - weekly, monthly, 
annual passes 
19 Article 14 is a piece of legislation that specifies pricing principles for SNCF. It is part of LOTI, a law 
first formulated on 30dDecember 1982 (82-1153,83-109,83-817) which determined SNCF status, 
responsibilities and constraints. Article IS states that SNCF as a public enterprise "aims to exploit, 
manage and develop the national rail network according to public service principles"; it has been 
criticised for not clarifying these principles [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 18]. These authors in their report to 
the government for the National Assembly equally criticised The "Contrat de Plan" 1990-1994 for being 
vague and for not mentioning territory management. 
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- "Ile de France"20: ticketing with intermodal transport (metro, buses, tramways [Scotto 2000]) 
It would appear sensible not to have applied yield and quota management to regional transport (it 
never was on urban/suburban transport). However, the boundaries between long-distance, high-speed 
long-distance, national, regional, regular and occasional travelling are fuzzy-, as illustrated in the case of 
Lille-Paris commuters [FR3 1997) above: the advent of the TGV Nord itself changed the situation 
(objects strike back! ) and its use as a commuter train presented unanticipated difficulties and contributed 
to blurring the boundaries even ftirther. 
5.1.4 Complex new ticketing 
A new computcrised 'unique' ticket was introduced which merged reservation information and 
ticket information, and it was only valid for that trip. In the past, there were basically two tickets: one that 
indicated the exact, kilometric, fare for travelling and was valid for two months; and a reservation ticket 
which gave the reservation cost. There may also have been a supplement that, like the reservation slip, 
could be discarded if the passenger decided to use another train, as the first part was valid for two months; 
it could also be re-used on a different train, with or without another supplement. The new ticket made it 
very difficult for passengers to understand how the fares were calculated. Many stories circulated among 
the general public and were echoed in the press for several months [SNCF 1993e; Scripta 1993) 
contributing to the uncertainty, bewilderment and general fi-ustration: for example old ladies coming to 
the sales office with an amount already written out on their cheques and turning away flustered, people 
giving up travelling on their usual train because the fare had doubled, passengers being fined for taking a 
later train, or suffering heavy penalties for exchanging their ticket. The unique ticket may have seemed 
simpler to handle for SNCF but its design did not differentiate between distance and reservation costs; it 
was challenged through a legal consumer protection requirement for clarity of price information (the 
Neiertz law) and it had to be modified and simplified by SNCF a year later [Bensahel 1994]. 
The 'unique' ticket in Figure 5.1 below was revised from the more complex first version (March 
1993) and simplified in September 1993 after customer complaints; it was made available in January 
1994. It indicates, from left to right top to bottom: 
- Origin and destination stations (Paris Montparnasse, Angers) and A/R for a return ticket; 
- Validity information (24 hours only after stamping - all tickets have to be stamped in 
automatic 'composteurs' or stamping machines, situated near the platforms in stations, 
before boarding any train); 
- Number and type of passengers (I adult, 2 children); 
20 Ile de France consists of Paris city and a growing suburban area around it (Hauts de Seine, Seine St 
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- Departure and arrival dates, times, stations, train numbers; 
- Discount applied (farnily fare in this case); 
- Reservation information (2 "d class, coach numbers, seat numbers, window/aisle, 
non/smoking); 
- Price details: per passenger (adult 324FF, child 198FF), total price (1024 + 2xl98 
720FF); 
- In very small print: discount rate (30%), extra costs (reservations and supplements Ingethe 
38FF), fare 'base' from which the discount is calculated (179FF); this makes it very 
difficult to understand how the price was worked out-, 
- Price 'level' of first (onwards) and second (return) trains used ('Niveau I'); this becomes 
very clumsy when using connecting trains; 
- Place, date and time of purchase. 
Another important change brought by Socrate is the lack of flexibility of the bought product. 
Tickets are now only valid for one train, like plane tickets. Previously, all tickets were valid on any train 
for 2 months; if a reservation was made, an additional piece of paper was provided; if this reservation was 
not used, the ticketwas still valid. Now, unused tickets can be exchanged, but with a penalty of 30%. This 
$unique' ticket,, -which merges reservation and ticket information, is aimed at preventing 'no shows' 
(people who reserve several seats but only turn up in one train), and 'go shows' (people who turn up 
without a reservation). 
One effect at the ticket sales counters was a large increase in people requiring exchanges of 
tickets. Many incidents occurred, particularly in the trains where ticket inspectors had to deal with tense 
situations. Under public pressure, ticket collectors had to make ridiculous distinctions between 'good 
faith' and 'bad faith' customers in possession of invalid tickets. 
Denis, Val d'Oise, Essonne, Val de Marne, Yvelines). 
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5.2 RATIONAL BUYING BEHAVIOUR: A NEW CULTURE OF ACCESS TO 
TRANSPORT 
5.2.1'.. Consumer confusion 
Yield management enables complex pricing which becomes incomprehensible to staff and 
customers alike and it is intended that passengers will become "conditioned to the consumer rationality" 
(Daudel and Vialle 19891. The new pricing tactics are so complex that only a computer can work them 
out, and it is impossible for sales staff to understand and explain to the clients the price structure and 
concepts of pricing rnix and quota management. The user-computer interface was changed so that the 
passenger has to first say which day and time he or she wants to travel, like in air reservation systems. 
With the previous SNCF system, RESA, sales staff could display the list of fares on a particular 
destination, and indicate to the passengers which days were the cheapest, which they now find very 
difficult to do. For instance: to travel from Lyon to Bordeaux on a certain day Socrate suggests to use the 
TGV via Paris, which is marginally faster but costs 465 FF (not including the TGV supplement and the 
cost of reservation) as compared to 299 FF on traditional lines another day or at a different time the same 
day. 
The implementation of a pricing mix per train is intended to make passengers change their 
travelling behaviour, assuming they are rational customers and that they can, having worked out all their 
options, make an informed choice. We have just seen that in practice it is very complicated and time- 
consuming to understand all possible options. Passenger associations [SIB and GDA Interview 18) have 
argued that this creates inequalities of access. 
When introduced in 1993, these new pricing mechanisms represented a cultural shock for SNCF 
passengers; anger, confusion over the new ticketing, frustration with the new incomprehensible prices, 
combined with the turmoil caused by the very serious technical problems exposed above, resulted in 
chaotic scenes and long queues of Mous customers in all major SNCF stations (Figure 5.21. Many 
incidents occurred [Maleysson 1993], in trains where ticket inspectors had to deal with tense situations 
and at ticket offices. People became angry when their usual ticket had trebled in price. Neither staff nor 
passengers could understand the new pricing logic. Trains run empty and tickets were issued for non- 
existent trains. Sales staff went on strike by issuing old-style tickets to delighted passengers. Compulsory 
reservation was also badly received. As in the Greyhound case (Section 3.2.2], coach and train passengers 
are used to turning up in a station without reserving in advance. These passengers became very fi-ustrated 
when they had to queue for hours and miss several of their usual trains. Some passengers' associations 
sued SNCF and won (DAufresnes 1993]. 
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Figure 5.2 Gare de Lyon ticket hall, Paris, April 1993 [Adine 1993] 
The technical difficulties (e. g. data missing, complex user interface, poor staff training) were also 
partly due to a top management decision to launch Socrate at the same time at the TGV North (Paris- 
Lille) on 0 April 1993 [Scasso 1993]. System design had to be rushed. This decision reflects SNCF's 
historical success-and confidence in the introduction of Rather price differentiation at the same time as 
opening a new TGV line. This backfired, and as argued by passenger representatives [SIB and GDA 
Interview 18), passengers were not taken in by SNCF's claims that very cheap fares were now available 
on high-speed trains; the general perception was that "other unwelcome measures were taken to 
compensate for this claim". Accordingly, "quota management is used instead of increasing capacity" and 
it represents the "unofficial de facto end of social cross-subsidising" [SIB Interview 181. As early as 
November 1992, consumer organisations stated that with the new system passengers would pay more 
without knowing why and complained about the new unique ticket and the lack of consultation 
[Associations Nationales de Consommateurs 1992]. 
Socrate increases discrirnination through targeting precise and better off categories. This is seen 
as unfair [Ribeill 1994) as follows: people with the least constraints (in terms of availability and income) 
such as the professional or middle management categories, are those who can get maximum benefits from 
the pricing policies (since they can choose their travel times) when they could easily afford the highest 
prices anyway. Workers, clerks, etc. are more time constrained and have less money; they are caught in 
the system; or they can choose another transport. This represents a shift away from social price structures. 
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Unions [Interviews 16 and 17] also analysed Socrate as an alibi, which hides a new commercial policy as 
well as a new work organisation. The new policy is based on the premise that the ideal client is an 
executive who knows his/her departure times and who is not bothered about the expense. 
Unions, consumer and passenger associations perceived these changes in similar ways, for 
example by pointing out the implications for clients who now have to "take responsibility" for their 
buying and travelling behaviour and "behave like adults" [CGT 1993a). Passengers associations felt they 
had been ignored (when previous relations had been good) by the initiators of the Socrate project and 
C riticised the focus on business travellers and competing with planes. They organised demonstrations in 
co-ordination with unions [FO 1993) and various events, leaflets [CGT 1993b], exhibitions in stations 
[CGT 1993c] and petitions [Fdddration des Cheminots 1993] to express discontent. There was a week 
long strike after the implementation in 12 stations in January 1993; three other strikes in February, 
another one in March; and another one after the implementation of a 'super' version of the software 
which was supposed to be bug-free. Another union action which was well-received by passengers was to 
issue open tickets, without reservation, with only the distance accounted for. During three weeks this 
action was strong in Paris Gare de Lyon. Another action was to go on strike for an hour every Friday. 
Both unions [e. g. UFCM-CGT 1994; Interviews 16 and 17] and passenger associations [e. g. FNAUT 
1994c; SIB Interview 18] emphasised the importance of public service and related events to issues of 
territory management and maintenance of the network C'maillage") put at risk through the new pricing 
structures. 
In ternis of buying behaviour, passengers found ways round the systern, soon to be addressed by 
SNCF: it increased overbooking to counteract multiple reservations made over the Minitel or the phone 
(which need to be paid and picked up at a station later on) and which aren! t picked up by customers. Many 
passengers used this tactic to delay as much as possible the choice of the cheapest time and seat. On an 
average Friday afternoon at Paris Montparnasse approximately 1200 travellers change their mind as to 
their departure time and change their reservations. As a sales staff said it: "the computer was designed for 
selling not for after sales! " [SLG Interview 13]. 
Rational consumer behaviour? 
Examining the underlying assumption of a rational, "adult", consumer behaviour implied in the 
new pricing and ticketing techniques, a deeper analysis could be attempted. Critical writers on 
consumerism [e. g. Featherstone 19911 clearly argue that real people, unlike economic 'rational' men, 
cannot express preferences among all possible commodities; do not always prefer cheap to expensive, or 
good to poor (or fast to slow! ); do not act with complete information; and do not, indeed, cannot, act to 
rnaxiýnise preference, and do not have stable preferences. According to the sociologist and philosopher 
Bauman, consumer behaviour has been playing a growing cognitive and moral role, is expected to be an 
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"integrative bond of society" and is also the "focus of systematic management" [Bauman 1988: 807]. 
Providing consumer choice, as evidenced in some of SNCF marketing vocabular/ I could perhaps 
cynically be seen as a way to try to get the people that are either likely to be profitable or likely to accept 
the product on offer. More fundamentally, and following critical accounting acadernics- 
"There is a change at the level of practices, a change in power-knowledge relations, which quite 
specifically produces a new emphasis on calculability while engendering a new power of (and 
for) [accounting]" [Ezzarnel and Hoskin 1991: 6]. 
In the case of marketing train services, transport needs are now construed as an individual need 
for a service or commodity, individually satisfiable. The onus is on the consumer to seek the right level of 
satisfaction, exhibit rational decision-making amongst all products on offer, mediated via complex 
information technology (and large information overload). "Clients will learn to reason train by train and 
will take responsibility in anticipating their travels, by consulting the new SNCF information systems" 
[SNCF-GL 1992]. However, an understanding of price constraints (type of train, purchasing conditions, 
flexibility of product, belonging to a market segment entitled to discounts) does not guarantee a successful 
transaction; moreover, a price at a certain time for a specific train may not be available at another time 
[APST 1991]. Individualisation of consumption and commodification of needs separate consumers as 
social individuals, with the responsibility (through complex information searching) to make their own 
'free' choice. Whether the concept of consumer identity and individual consumption is appropriate for 
collective goods such as train services remains questionable. Furthermore, reformulating power- 
knowledge relations in these terms occludes the politics of distributing the goods, as well as the 
knowledge accumulated about customers in the CRS and statistical databases. 
5.2.2 Public relations 
SNCF public relations and communication efforts did not smooth the introduction of Socrate and 
its associated pricing and ticketing techniques. Public relations staff [EC and AH Interview 3] talked of 
communication blunders and adrnit readily there were many marketing rnistakes; for instance, and as 
already mentioned in Section 4.3.6, combining Socrate with new price structures and general price 
increases in February 1993 (usually introduced later in the summer) sent the wrong message to the public. 
The unfortunate use of the existing slogans "Avec la SNCF tout est possible" and "Le progr6s ne vaut que 
slil est partagd par toUS,, 22 was more than unfortunate and derided by the media and public alike. Figure 
5.3 is an example of a cartoon found in the general press. 
21 For example: 11 existe une formule adaptde A chacun de vos besoins" or "We have a well-adapted 
formula to fit every single one of your needs", in otherwise very clearly designed brochures (SNCF 
1994b]. 
22 "Everything is possible with SNCF" and "Progress is only worth when shared by all", slogans appearing 
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Figure 5.3 Cartoon of ticket staff strike at SNCF [Anon. 1993] 23 
These slogans seemed ironical as events were perceived to undermine the human face of the 
public enterprise. Other events were amalgamated with the initial Socrate problems such as: ticket offices 
opened only at peak times in smaller stations; some stations not equipped to sell all tickets anymore; the 
importance given to automatic vending machines (Foot 1993] and dissatisfaction with a supposedly easy 
interaction with these APVs ("Automate Point de Vente") - "Avoir un dialogue interactif afin de se 
procurer un titre de transport"24 was the SNCF instruction, which Mariano [1993] describes as 
'lechnocratic" and insensitive to older people, for example; the sense of being lost in big stations and the 
difficulty of finding a staff member for help; security problems, etc. It is clear that dehumanising stations 
is a disincentive for the public. At the same time RATP (Paris city mdtro system) was re-hurnanising its 
stations by increasing staff presence (rather than security guards) and security was improving. 
The most serious communication mistake centred on the message transmitted prior to the launch 
of Socrale. Publicity, press conferences and communication with the media largely emphasised the 
on all SNCF brochures, leaflets and posters at the time. 
" The ticket clerk says: "Does someone know how to use this thing? " 
24 "An interactive dialogue to purchase your ticket". 
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sophistication and complexity of the new computer system and associated techniques. In fact, the Socrate 
yield management expert [CQ Interview 10 confirmed by GC Interview 6] recounted participating in a trip 
organised by SNCF for selected journalists: they were taken to the AADT headquarters in the US where 
yield management techniques were explained to them in great detail, including mathematical equations. 
Socr, ite experts seem to have been carried away by their enthusiasm for thig new technology, which they 
presented as "sound economics" supporting "good management" [CQ Interview 10] and providing a mean 
to reduce the SNCF public deficit. This obviously had counter-effects as journalists became cynical about 
these claims when implementation difficulties piled up after the launch. Presenting Socrate as the solution 
to the company's problems rather than passengers' needs, also provoked the following reaction in the 
general public: "this system is supposed to manage things better, so they will make more money, but 
where is this money coming from? Us of course"... [CQ Interview 10]; or even that "the new pricing 
structure is there to pay for the cost of Socrate" according to [DC Interview 2]. In terms of communication 
message, it would have been better to compare the new methods to well-established differentiated 
telephone pricing, for instance. 
The name chosen Socrate does not project images of simplicity or clarity. A change of name was 
considered and rejected. On the other hand, many people believed (and still do) that Socrate was 
disposed of after the events. Understandably, the system is never mentioned externally anymore. Finally, 
constantly referring to air was also counterproductive, as air transport at the time had a mixed image 
(bankruptcies, ruthless behaviour of companies). These communication blunders, together with the 
implementation difficulties, led to a serious degradation of public image. Opinion polls in June 1993 
[Moissonnier 1993: 81 found that: 
-4 in 10 were dissatisfied with transactions at the ticket office; 
-4 in 10 had difficulties with transactions in the previous 2 months; 
I in 2 felt that transactions were more difficult dw before. 
The overall level of satisfaction with SNCF went from 61% in 1992 to 57% in 1993; this 
compared to 92% satisfaction with Electricitd de France, 91% with France Telecom and 81% with the 
French Post Office. Some argued that traffic loss due to Socrate estimated at FF 15 million by SNCF 
could be contested as being an underestimate [e. g. Moissonnier 1993: 116]. 
Jacques Berducou, the new 'Grandes Lignes' director and Jean-Marie Metzler's successor (who 
was also the Socrate director and was moved to the Department of International Relations after the 
implementation debicle), organised a huge passenger survey in October 1993 entitled "Nous avons tant de 
choses A nous dire"25. It involved 165 stations and more than 100,000 passengers. It concentrated on 
passengers' experiences with pricing, information, access flexibility, service quality, ticket control and 
25 "We have so many things to say to each othee'. 
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after sales [Berducou 1994a; Mariano 1993). An effort was also made to rebuild good relations with 
consumer and passenger associations [SNCF 1993f, SNCF 1993g; SNCF 1993h]. The SNCF slogan was 
eventually changed to "A nous, de vous faire prdferer le train"26 which started appearing on all leaflets and 
brochures in 1996 [SNCF 1996b] and represents a significant change of focus. 
.: _ In an effort to rebuild its image, SNCF carried out an audit and set up consultative cominittees 
with passengers [SNCF 1993i]. It reversed its differentiation principles and reviewed pricing and ticketing 
in early 1994 [Berducou 1994b] (as well as simplified its unique ticketý see above Section 5.1A). The 
Moissonnier audit [1993] in fact had recommended that commercial optiniisation should only be used on 
the TGV and that it should be suspended from the rest of the network (in the short-term only). 
SNCF improved TGV boarding conditions without reservation; reinstated better ticket 
reimbursement, for instance "billets de congds annuelS,, 27 and cancellations of group tickets; introduced 
an 'access ticket' in case of very long queues at ticket offices; decreased prices on reduced fares (Kiwi, 
Carissimo, Vermeil); reintroduced free exchanges of tickets and reservation changes without penalty; 
provided better information on prices breakdown (reservation, supplement); allowed some 'open' tickets; 
reintroduced supplement vouchers; modified quotas for reduced fares on some TGVs [CGT 1993d). 
SNCF believes that these measures regained lost traffic by 1994 [Berducou 1994c). This policy has been 
continued in the following years, as outlined in Section 4.3.5: by allowing passengers to change their 
choice of TGV until the last minute [SNCF 1998a); by removing the tricolour calendar from TGVs 
thereby allowing reduced fares on all TGVs (with some limits on 'niveaux' 3 and 4) (SNCF 1994b]; by 
simplifying the calendar on other trains to two periods ('blue' and 'white') instead of three [SNCF 
1996b]; by eventually removing the four TGV levels Cniveaux") and replacing them with two levels in 
2'd class and one level in I" class [SNCF 1998b; SNCF 1998c); by reducing the number of reduced fares 
categories from four to two (see Table 5.1; SNCF 1998b); by introducing new advantageous types of 
tickets, e. g. "Tarif Ddcouverte Sdjour" for various age groups (senior, children, 12-25s) which gives a 
25% discount has to include a Saturday night and has to be for a minimum of 200kms [SNCF 1998d]. 
Pricing simplification and decreases are still currently credited for a 3.5% increase of long distance traffic 
in 1999, superior to the 1998 predictions, and a 4.3% increase in revenues [Anon 1999]. 
5.23 Access to transport, technology and progress 
Socrate represents, and contributes to, a conflict about transport access between: (a) well- 
established public rail cultures and practices; and (b) what was perceived by SNCF and the government 
as "necessary changes" [Moissonnier 1993: 21]. The necessity of these changes was founded on various 
argumentations. Two examples of different formulations are those of Jean-Marie Metzler and Jacques 
`,, it is up to us to make you prefer the train". 
27 Employees with low salaries are entitled to reduced tickets for their annual vacation. 
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Fournier which both draw on notions of progress. The former (IMM Interview 1, Socrale director] bases 
his argumentation on the notion of modem transport: consumer needs are changing; future clients will 
require high speeds, comfort, car rental and hotel bookings, and sophisticated travel distributors; and 
passenger associations do not understand this and have an "old-fashioned" view of transport. Jacques 
Fouriiier [SNCF president]'s argument is related to the concept of social -progress through the use of 
technology: Socrate allows a more sophisticated and flexible approach to pricing; indeed its very 
flexibility has the potential of making the TGV more accessible financially to lower social classes, 
through charging higher fares to wealthy customers 29 [Fournier 1993a: 52; Fournier 1993b)29. 
Marketing research on the concept and presentation of Socrate formulates a different justification 
by avoiding social connotations and proposing a focus on individualised customers. They suggest to avoid 
the following 'negative' images [SNCF 1992d; MP Interview 7; Bruno de Courr6ges Consultants 1992]: 
"trains for the rich, trains for the poor"; pricing complexity; advance booking; cheap sales techniques 
CISNCF is not in the business of selling soap" [Interview 7]); yield and profit. And they recommend to 
concentrate on: a new simpler ticket; the existence of discounts for all and on all trains; a shift from a 
collective anonymous public to a diversity of individual situations, expressed as: "Pour tous et A chacun", 
"A chaque client, un besoin; A chaque besoin, une question; A chaque question, une rdponse, 30; travel 
opportunities with positive connotations of personalised occasions ("you are going away for the 
weekend... ") rather than access conditions and constraints; a new open interaction between SNCF and 
clients where customers are at the centre of the transaction with a "new active way of managing one's 
travel" C'I am a active subject and I negotiate my travel with SNCF") (SNCF 1992d]. These ideas relate to 
the concept of customer rational behaviour analysed above in Section 5.2.1. 
Technical experts, on the other hand, draw on the neutrality of technology to distance themselves 
from social implications. When accused of increasing prices, yield management experts (e. g. CQ 
Interview 10; SNCF 1993j; 1993k] declare that: Socrate does not change prices; they are established and 
published once a year in consultation with the Ministry of Transport; they are well known to the public; 
Socrate merely changes the number of reduced fares available; that it is reasonable as clients who want to 
travel at busy times should organise themselves in advance, like people booking holidays or hotels; and 
31 that the technology is not to be blamed 
Yet another justification of Socrate and of more extensive pricing differentiation [Descoutures 
1992: 23] is market economics: pricing 'freedom' is necessary to cover real costs in order to establish a 
4sane' basis for competition; Socrate allows truth' and 'transparency' of prices [p. 74]; ensures equality 
" This was vehemently denied by passenger associations, see Section 5.2.1. 
29 Jacques Fournier was SNCF president during the events, he left and was replaced by Jean Bergougnoux 
in May 1994. 
30 "For all and for every single one", "For each client, a need - for each need, a question - for each 
3ý 
uestion, an answer". 
This is in contrast to the view expressed by a passenger representative that once the technology is there, 
it has to be used and is not neutral (SIB Interview 18, see Section 3.51. 
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of treatment and enables the mechanism of free markets which secures an efficient allocation of resources. 
Far from the technical being blameless and disconnected from the social, technology and 
modernisation are discourses and instruments of social action. Top SNCF executives share a belief in 
modernisation and progress, position technology as logical and neutral, but make it carry various lines of 
argumentation, as illustrated above. Their style and ethos can be referred to as technocratic [AP Interview 
2] and is also symbolised by the company slogan chosen in 1990 [Fournier 1993: 3 1 ]: "Le progr6s ne vaut 
que s'il est partagd par tous". For instance, and like many other SNCF technocrats, the Socrate key expert 
in yield management [CQ Interview 10, see also Section 4.3.6) also adheres to the view of yield 
management as a modem, technical and 'natural' progression (or technological, natural, 'trajectory' see 
Section 2.2.1). By contrast, transport experts (Quinet 1995: 57] argue that it is necessary to replace 
"technocratic diktat" by a broad and open political debate. 
This vision of modernisation and progress also relates to the earlier success of an important 
French technical innovation, the TGV. It is no coincidence that the Socrate project director, Jean-Marie 
Metzler (Interview 1] had previously successfully managed the introduction of the TGV at SNCF. He 
came from "Ecole Polytechnique", one of the best "grandes dcoles", and he started working on the TGV 
project in 1977, which was successfully launched in 1981. It was a very strong episode in his career, he 
gained an enormous reputation within the company and was therefore highly trusted [LDM Interview 8]. 
The fact that Socrate had to be completed in time for the opening of the TGV Nord (which would then 
lead to the Channel Tunnel) and its advanced pricing differentiation was not a coincidence either. The 
centre of the whole Socrate apparatus is also the TGV, and the next section explores this link ffirther. 
"Overbooking became extremely important for SNCF when it implemented mandatory, instead 
of optional, reservations for TGV services. Like aircrafý TGV trains have a fixed capacity. Short 
of running a complete extra train, it is not possible to use the [old pricing differentiation 
methods) - adding or subtracting coaches to match the capacity and suit demand, and by 
allowing passengers to stand in corridors and vestibuleS32. With the TGVs fixed capacity, SNCF 
had to be able to determine the demand for each route and anticipate the number of reservation 
requests" [Queille and Silva 1994: 669]. 
5.3 THE TGV AS AN ANTECEDENT TO SOCRA TE 
Socrate appears to be a strategy to develop the TGV network and controlling the European long 
distance rail market. Seat reservations for the Channel tunnel rail link are already administered through 
Socrate, which Belgian Railways and British Rail bought from SNCF through the European Passenger 
Services consortium. It is based on the premise that the TGV network can compete with airlines and that it 
satisfies a growth in demand for fast transport (Walrave 1989]. SNCF gained competitive advantage and 
32 Passengers are not allowed to stand in corridors in TGVs (like the Eurostar) for safety reasons, as 
speeds are too high. 
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recouped its investment in the TGV technological innovation through the sale of TGVs to other countries 
- e. g. to Korea [Scemama, 1993] - and the expansion of a fast train network in Western Europe (Marchais, 
1992). Return on investment on the first TGV Paris-Lyon line has been good, although profitability of 
new lines - Bordeaux, Marseille, Rennes, Strasbourg, Lille - is less clearcut. Maximum contribution from 
thes&-newer lines, through the use of yield management techniques, could be seen as the real objective of 
Socrate. However, economic factors (or technical criteria) cannot explain innovation success or failure on 
their own. Innovation is seen as a complex and uncertain process involving many actors and their different 
interests, elaborating and shaping new objects [Mitev 2000b). 
53.1 Socrate and the TGV 
The new computer system is closely related to the high-speed trains (e. g. through pricing) which 
have been declared a major success in the past. Revisiting this past success enriches the understanding of 
the CRS failure: by recognising the French notion of public service, which led SNCF to conceive of TGV 
technology as'a way to prevent rail transport decline; the fact that the existence of the TGV shifted the 
focus on air/rail competition (as opposed to road/rail); and that the subsequent link between the 
successful TGV and the new computer system was in fact a handicap and had unintended effects. It shows 
that any technological innovation is a situated construct subject to negotiation and differential access with 
unpredictable elements and is constantly created and recreated through perceptions, conflicts and failures 
attendant to such efforts. 
SNCF started introducing price differentiation in the early 80s by modifying fares according to 
the time of travel [Gianfaldoni, 1993] but was initially quite limited (e. g. holiday periods, weekends in and 
out of Paris, when passengers tended to book their tickets in advance). Further experimentation was 
carried out with the TGV Paris-Lyon (South East) in 1981 through compulsory and chargeable reservafion 
and different supplements according to time and day of travel. When the TGV Atlantique [Bazin 1988] 
was launched in 1989 the increase in the second class price was between 25.4% to 53.5% over 'nomal' 
prices (Sanchez 1993]. This set the scene for Socrate as in SNCF's experience TGV technology and 
differentiated pricing became strongly associated and successfully so. However, in 1993, the 
sophisticated pricing mechanisms enabled by Socrate were implemented on the whole rail network 
leading to passengers' frustrations. 
More fundamentally, Socrate was perceived as the ideal solution for SNCF: it would bring higher 
profits, particularly from the TGV network and it still maintained cheap fares (at certain times) so as to 
fulfill its public service mission. It is useful to return to how SNCF dealt with conflicting pressures which 
led to the innovation of the TGV, how the TGV itself modified the context and led to the association 
between a successful TGV and another technological innovation such as CRS. 
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5.3.2 SNCF and the TGV innovation 
Innovation is seen here as stabilising, or exposing, a multitude of transformations in this public 
sector enterprise and not just pertaining to the domain of technological objects or economic forces. The 
TGWinnovation, as much as the CRS innovation, was a complex and uncertain process, with a variety of 
planned and unplanned episodes, negotiations and experimentation. Innovation emerges when various 
entities are put together, are associated to a problem with many aspects which interests them all, even if, 
and particularly if, these interests are different. 
Ile general climate for French public enterprises has been shifting for some years from state 
intervention to withdrawal from the state. In this context, and if we look at the enterprise as a rational 
economic agentý the TGV innovation was a way for SNCF to deal with new economic challenges which 
the state could not deal with [Suleimann and Courty 1997]. At the same time, decision-making processes 
are also coloured by inertia and routines, interpersonal conflicts, alliances and compromises which create 
and diffuse, or not, objects. Objects need to be put back in social and cognitive structures from which they 
never escaped. The TGV technological success legitimated the existence of railway engineers and 
constructors and provided SNCF, the service provider, with a social success. 
The TGV was a result of SNCF looking to innovate in order to stop what was perceived as the 
terminal decline of rail transport [Suleimann and Courty 1997]. This decline was a political problem as 
SNCF had continuous budget deficits, and an economic one for constructors as market demand in rail 
equipment was diminishing. The perception of this decline came partly from the US, where road transport 
was winning over rail transport, and rail, as a result, was seen as an out-of-date transport mode. At the 
same time (late 60s early 70s) the Airbus was being designed in the aerospace industry, and its potential 
effect was thought to change air/rail/road competition. However, and unlike the air industry, the history of 
innovation in Frenh rail originates primarily from the rail enterprises rather than the manufacturers, e. g. 
Adrospatiale [Suleirnann and Courty 1997]. 
SNCF was and is still subjected to political, financial and administrative control from the State to 
ensure the 'public good' and this influences its activities and objects. The notion of public service in rail 
transport can be summarised as "no barrier to access to each and everyone, speed and safety". But at the 
core of the public enterprise lays a tension. Its financial structure is designed to ensure solidarity (and this 
affects fare structures), whilst it clashes with profit objectives. In the post-war period, including the 70s 
when the TGV project was beginning to take shape, the notion of public service was strong and shared 
across actors even with different interests (workers, engineers, executives, civil servants). There was pride 
in belonging to the enterprise with a belief in the spirit of innovation for the public good, even if it served 
various groups unequally (e. g. professional value for engineers). "French State engineers had a strong 
loyalty to the natinnal railway as a whole" [Powell 1997: 54). 
The search for speed came to represent this (with connotations of faith in progress and modem, 
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young images of transport). Aeronautic engineering influenced this search, and there were various projects 
in the late 60s such as turbotrains and 'aerotrains' that drew on jet engines. There was also international 
competition with fast trains projects in the US (Boston-Washington) and Japan (Osaka-Tokyo). In the late 
60s, France, Italy, Germany and UK all started high speed train research programmes [Descoutures 1992]. 
Thes*e programmes found their justification in the technical and commercial success of the Japanese 
Shinkansen. The choices made however varied from country to country. Powell (1997] compares the 
economic, social and cultural differences between the TGV success and the failure of the Advanced 
Passenger Train (APT) in the UK. Germany chose to build new mixed lines for freight and passenger high 
speed trains (HST) with many connections with the existing rail network, and HST themselves (240 km/h) 
came second. The UK and Italy both sought HST solutions to run on existing lines. France, having tested 
a HST of 200 km/h in 1956, chose an integrated high-speed solution for passengers, with new rolling 
stock and track at the same time, with large capacities, and the lower cost of building dedicated new lines 
[Descoutures 1992: 1411. 
Organisationally and culturally, engineers easily imposed their faith in the success of speed, and 
stopped being perceived as an unjustified expense to the enterprise. This happened to coincide with 
executives' aims of 'catching up' with the US and Japan and being seen as a dominant and profitable 
company. The representation of the project thus evolved and arguments which convinced and enrolled 
politicians were issues of regional development, a 'new' rail system (notjust faster trains), new lines, a 
new rail policy, decentralisation and equality symbolised in the chosen slogan "la vitesse pour toUS,, 33. 
TGV technology became a mean to achieve business objectives and bring competitiveness as well as 
address political aims. The French TGV represented a fairly simple adaptation of the rail transport mode 
&which 'saved' rail from decline, "like motorways for road transport" [Troin 1995: 11 ]. The first TGV 
investments were funded through a mix of SNCF self-financing, State contribution, borrowing guaranteed 
by the State; these were a sign of faith in the technology to achieve commercial success and be capable of 
ensuring continuing growth of passenger traffic [Descoutures 1992: 86). Plassard even analyses the 
fascination with high rail speed in the French collective imagination as associated with the conquest of a 
new space, Europe: "in the same way as Christopher Columbus and his ships redrew the world map, the 
TGV produces Europe" [Plassard 1994: 47, my translation]. 
5.3.3 The TGV success 
The TGV technical innovation became a social success through unpredicted elements, planned 
and unplanned implications of actions and forces driving actors, which coincided. With strong R&D and 
engineers researching technical solutions to policy problems, speed became the major technological issue 
and a politically seductive promise to resolve 'all' rail problems. An important element identified by 
33 "Speed for everyone". One can see a strong link with the later slogan "Progress is only worth if shared 
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Powell [1997: 46] is the "remarkably integrated technico-administrative elite" and "professional interface 
between the French State and the railways consisting of civil servants and senior railway officers who 
have a shared educational background". This elite education is both technical and economic and provided 
the TGV project with both a strong engineering base and commercial justification. 
1- The TGV project also effected a major shift (which was the -real and more fundamental 
innovation): instead of running faster trains on existing lines (like the British tilting train), the idea came 
to build new lines, separate from normal intercity trains, but kept compatible when using the urban 
network to reach central city stations. The problem was put on its head, and by changing the nature of the 
network, it became possible to address the speed issue technically speaking (high-speed trains could now 
go fast more easily on dedicated lines). Perceiving speed as the most rational and modem way to deliver a 
transport mode (as well as the 60s fascination with rockets and jet engines) was coupled to a democratic 
purpose: Ia d6mocracie par la vitesse"34 (Lanuning 1987]. 
Other fortuitous elements which happened to have a welcome influence on the project were: the 
choice of line for the first TGV (Paris-Lyon-Marseille which has deep symbolic and cultural connotations 
in France and is called the "ligne impdriale" or "voie royale t, 35); and the fact that, after the 1973 oil crisis, 
electricity became the dominant energy, the main rail network was largely electrified, and the aero- 
dynamic TGV was thus represented as saving energy and as more cost-effective fl= road and air. 
Considerable improvements of speed, the straightening of lines, the modernisation. of signalling 
and the suppression of intermediate stops contributed to a significant reduction of travelling times [Figure 
SA which indicates the 1988/89 travelling time and the planned travelling time, e. g. Paris-Bordeaux A08 
in 88/89 and a planned 2hO5]. The proportion of TGV investment grew to 45% of total infrastructure 
investments in the 1990-94 "Contrat de Plan" whereby investments in domestic rail transport in Europe 
has decreased dramatically since 1975 (Troin 1995]. 
5.3A From the TGV success to Socrate failure 
Once in place, the TGV spurred a transformation in usage (different categories of travellers were 
attracted to rail), increases in traffic (Paris-Lyon, then Paris-Bordeaux) and profitability, and more 
competition with planes. It became an important new transport mode which expanded into Europe 
(Channel ftinnel, but also towards Germany and eventually Eastern Europe [FR3 1997]) and TGV 
technology was sold to Korea, the US and Spain. But it was not sufficient to stop the crisis at SNCF. 
There was still loss of traffic, more recently there has been strong opposition to new TGV routes (whereby 
previously local politicians were desperate to have a TGV station in their region), and 
b 
3ý,, 
all". 
3 Democracy through speed". 
35 , imperial line" or "Royal way". 
164 
Chapter 5 
Projet de Sch6ma directeur national des liaisons ferroviaires 
A grande vitesse ' 
Iftvolution. des temps de parcours au d6part de Paris 
Amtordso 
MER 
9 
DU NORD 
Londres 09 
Colo, h 110 
....................... aa was h00 .......... h Bruxelles Cologne 10 Fronctort 
MANCHE 
along 40 
Mannheim no 
wuan 40 Palms ýs tz stutteart 
Coon Munich 
0 
"It 
.... % PARIS 
X ........... * --. 1 Nancy Fannes ýýR 
StreebOUrg 26 
Wisps; 22 53 ale 3 
57,25 
% Dijon 37 Zurich 
Novara 1h20 h3B Bea n 10/5zi, 
ýN 
00 
1his 
a h22 Lausanne Poitiers 
La Aocha2lo I n1v * 0 Limoges 
32 Lyon h50 
ATLANTIGUE 4 
40 01 
Cho dry 
Turin Milan Venise 
% )Oý 06 Clermont 
01 
1600 
13t-Etlsnne 
to Bordsolix 06 
0 Grenoble 
40 Avignon 
"Montpe2lis 4n 'M ice 
00 Toulouse 48 
........ ..... 00 
Handaye 
F", hi 290 
mama ................................. Perpignan Toulon 2ýh 
MEDITERRANEE 
............ 12-03-1290 
situation future OGY/PARI2001. DFF 
service d'hiver as/aG 
Figure 5.4 High speed rail national plan: future evolution of travelling 
times by rail ftom Paris [Bourdillon 1991: 103] 
165 
Chapter 5 
passengers conVlain about reservations and pricing. Objects are used in unanticipated ways by users too, 
and their experiences with TGV reservations and pricing in the past influenced their reactions to Socrate. 
The tensions between public service and profit making were still present in the mid-80s, and 
some of the aims and rhetoric surrounding the Socrate project were very similar to the ones surrounding 
the TGV project. For instance: addressing business objectives and public -mission at the same time, as 
illustrated above through the use of yield management to sirrmltaneously bring higher profits and (appear 
to? ) maintain a public service mission; using technology to solve political and economic problems; trust 
in technical progress represented in the 80s by computers (as opposed to planes in the 60s and early 70s); 
in fact, a link between high-speed trains and computers (and Europe) was already made in 1989 by the 
"Confdrence Europdenne des Ministres des Transports" [CEMT 1989; see also Hepworth and Ducatel 
1992]; and a faith in modemisation36 and progress. Both innovation processes were situated in similar 
contexts, leading to similar negotiations, perceptions and conflicts. The first innovation was seen as 
successful so an effort was made to repeat it, with unanticipated consequences. The TGV innovation 
formed minds to seeking solutions in similar waYS37 . but at the same time it became a handicap as it had 
itself changed the scene. 
One consequence of TGV technology was to increase competition with air, and in some ways, 
TGVs are a hybrid between planes and trains or "semi-avions" [FNAUT 1994c]. A clear example of this 
blurring of boundaries is the opening in 1994 of the Paris-Charles de Gaulle air-rail hub [Sparaco, 1994]38; 
This set the course for SNCF to seeing itself as a hybrid transporter, and to seek plane-related solutions. 
Sabre must have appeared as the ideal solution as it represented the ultimate combination of planes and 
computers and responded perfectly to business objectives. However, the model represented by Sabre 
contributed to transport deregulation and to intramodal (TGVs competing with classical intercity trains) as 
=11 as intermodal competition and opposition to this was unforeseen or underestimated. The deregulated 
model has implications for transport planning through the separate accountability of identifiable and 
marketable transport segments enabled by CRS and yield managementý in the context of a fierce public 
debate on European transport liberalisation and deregulation [see Cartelier et al, 1996; Fournier, 1993; 
Julienne, 1996; Ross, 1998]. It is particularly related to the opposition between the traditional notion of 
public service in European countries, and that of universal service in Anglo-American societies [Barr6re, 
19981. 
Another way in which the TGV technology has had an important effect on transport planning and 
pricing is the technical object ('non-human' actor) itself, and is another example of how objects 'strike 
36 in a press release announcing the nomination of Jacques Fournier as Honorary President of SNCF, Jean 
Bergougnoux, the new president, congratulates him for having pursued the modernisation of the 
company in a particularly difficult context [Bergougnoux 1994). 
37 A report on SNCF to the National Assembly accuses SNCF of still being "obsessed with the TGV" in 
1994 (Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 127]. 
" The SNCF Charles de Gaulle hub leaflet [SNCF 1994c) offers train tickets and reservations for France 
and abroad, Eurostar, restaurant, train + hotel, car on train, and car rental services. 
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back' or how 'antecedents' have effects (see Section 5-1.3). TGVs are 'half planes half trains' since they 
have fixed capacity. With the second generation TGV, a set of carriages (a "rame de train") which makes 
up a train has 485 seats (116 first class, 369 second class); there are also 37 folding seats for passengers 
who have boarded the train without a reservation despite the fact that this not allowed 39; consists of ten 
articitlated coaches and two engines; it can only doubled to nearly 1000 seats [Bazin 1988: 98-99]. It is 
very difficult to add just one or two coaches to deal with extra demand, and adding a whole train is very 
expensive. Dedicated lines allow speed, which requires fixed capacity, which leads to capacity 
management issues, which brings to yield management. Indeed, the price of speed is a loss of flexibility. 
The French transport situation is changing and the Socrate technology has had an effect too. The 
current climate is to stop the construction of new TGV lines now considered too expensive and the TGV 
is seen as having counter-effects of 'ddsertification' for remote areas, as opposed to providing equal 
access to all French citizens. There is a shift towards investing in the classical intercity lines, 
concentrating on the complementarity of intercity and fast trains (using TGVs more like normal trains, 
therefore regaining flexibility), stopping the building of new motorways, and emphasising the notion of 
mass public transport. Pricing differentiation has been simplified as a result, limiting the use of yield 
management. So despite a discourse of crisis, debt, deregulation and privatisation and some influence of 
American models [Djelic, 1999] - in this case the adoption of new tools such as CRS and yield 
management, new vocabulary such as 'customers', and new management practices - this is not a direct 
adoption but an adaptation and translation of liberal models to fit in with the SNCF aim of working 
towards the common and public good. 
Public utilities are Particularly interesting as they are crossroads of the econornic, the social and 
the political in which innovations are caught. The innovation processes followed at SNCF in the cases of 
the TGV and of the CRS were caught in similar contexts, and their outcomes were equally unpredictable. 
39 The ticket controllers usually deal with these passengers by making them pay a reservation supplement 
on the spot; these folding seats are in practice used too in the case of cancellations, delays or unusual 
circumstances. I was in this situation once: I could not catch the TGV I had booked on (Charnbdry-Paris) 
as my previous connecting TER train (Bourg St Maurice-Chambdry) was delayed so I boarded the 
following TGV and on that occasion ticket controllers were very understanding. Nevertheless, passengers 
are not allowed to stand up for safety reasons and the number of folding seats is small. 
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CHAPTER6 
SNCF AND SOCRATE. - ORGANISATIONAL TRANSLATION 
FROM PUBLIC SERVICE TO SELLING ( ... MICRO ... ) 
Through Socrate the organisation was trying to achieve three objectives-, 
Quantitative objective: to process the forecast volume of reservations generated by TGVs (50% with 
TGV Nord Europe see Section 3.1.1); 
Qualitative objective: to acquire airlines functionality (availability, price differentiation, customer 
profiling, optimisation of price/capacity, other services, car rental, hotels) and distribution capacity 
(see Sections 3.2,3.3.1,4.4); 
Organisational objective: to transform the organisation through automation and integration to 
increase the reliability and productivity of sales and distribution. 
The last two objectives could not have been reached with the previous system RESA (Moissonnier 
1993: 4]. To explore this organisational transformation, this chapter first looks at how the organisational 
structure and culture have evolved in order to understand the organisational climate in which change 
management and consultation exercises took place, prior to and surrounding the Socrate project. The 
internal frictions provoked by Socrate are then detailed. The second section examines the implications for 
sales staff in terms of testing and pilot sites, user-computer interface, dialogue with clients, training and 
sales team organisation. Finally, the shift towards organisational restructuring and its relationship to 
information technologies is analysed. 
6.1 ORGANISATIONAL TRANSFORMATION 
6.1.1 Organisational structure and management control: tabula rasa? 
The traditional sectors at SNCF used to be freight, parcel services, passengers and infrastructures 
and were supported by many specialised occupations. A large geographic spread led to a dual 
organisational hierarchical structure, geographic and functional. Labour costs were high and in 1992 
salaries accounted for 58% of expenses, despite staff reductions of approximately 2% a year to less than 
200,000 in 1992 from 252,000 in 1980 and 500,00 in 1939. By 1992 non- sedentaryjobs represented 14% 
of the total, many of the manual and physically intensive jobs had disappeared and 90% of staff was in 
technical or commercial functions [Descoutures 1992: 178]. 
An organisational reform was initiated in 1991 and its aims were: to increase transparence and 
internal accountability; give a bigger managerial autonomy to different product lines; make the 
organisation more commercially proactive; and introduce internal charging and purchaser/providers 
relationships between technical services and operations. The objective was to separate management of 
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infrastru 
. 
cture afid operations, and regroup products and services into families of products and 
corresponding organisational divisions [Descoutures 1992: 177; Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 79]. 
Professional occupations also had to be reviewed. The traditional professional basis of the organisational 
structure was seen, for instance by Jean-Frangois Bdnard, Directeur Gdndral in 1994, as horrific: "each 
cheminot identifies himself with his profession. It engenders irresponsible behaviour towards customers, 
as the latter are located at the junction of several activities which are totally compartmentalised and 
isolated from each other" [quoted in Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 88]. This compartmental isation also 
necessitates strong centralised control in order to co-ordinate activities, and this was seen as an 
organisational "impasse" [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 88]. 
Other public sector administrations and enterprises adopted similar measures at that time Nbeill 
1993] as a way of responding to and stimulating different market segments, through transparent internal 
accounting, decentralised responsibility and cost/profit centres. Each unit is supposed to manage its own 
production, personnel, accounting, materials, etc. Centralised common services can be cut down, and 
coherence is ensured through the company strategic vision and direction [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 91]. 
Nevertheless, its implementation in a rail company is complex. Indeed, its diverse commercial activities 
largely draw on common resources, e. g. rail tracks for freight and passenger travel, the use of 
locomotives and traction engines and of drivers, maintenance teams. They are linked and integrated, and 
the accounting of these activities is intricate. The Direction Gdndrale worked on these measures for 
several years, was planning to implement them on I" January 1994, but this did not happen and it was 
postponed until 1995. Difficulties in setting this reform in motion were due to serious implementation 
difficulties (Descoutures 1992]: 
The move from a budget based, low risk, neatly compartmentalised style of management to a 
transparent responsibilised, contractualised, cross-functional management mode upset power 
divisions and responsibilities; 
Performance indicators and production criteria for each service used to be measured in technical units 
specific to each service, e. g. trains/kilometres for transport, points/jobs scores for equipment or 
labour hours for materials output. The new measures had to create a common language across 
functions, e. g. contracts, service levels, etc. which were to be negotiated and evaluated in financial 
units only. 
Executives in the regions and the main functional establishments received this new thinking 
about organisational structure with enormous critical apprehension (Ribeill 1994: 44]. This was 
compounded by a context of confused and fuzzy public service missions and objectives for the whole 
company. Executives could adhere to a decentralisation that reinforces their roles, but could see that 
contractual relations (purchasers/providers) would expose them to further economic evaluation. 
Incomprehension and reticence, if not defiance or resistance, led executives to stop adopting or only 
partially adopt their expected managerial roles and lines of cornmand to implement the new top policies. 
This radical 'tabula rasa' change meant a total break with the past and the new management mode implied 
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a restructuiing af all managerial level, for central and regional directions and local tinits of production (the 
"dtablissements"). 
Concentrating certain units (equipment, traction depots, maintenance), their experimental 
merging, sometimes into multifunctional units, were initiated and became sources of classical local 
conflicts. In 1992, the transfer of some central Paris headquarter functions were being examined, as a 
contribution to the governmental policy of decentralisation (see Section 4.3.6 Note 15) and involved 
relocation of Parisian jobs to the provinces. In the spring of 1993, SNCF announced a wide-ranging 
structural reform. After merging two regions (Paris-Sud Ouest and Paris-Montpamasse) in October 1989 
into a single region (Paris- Rive Gauche), and that of Metz and Nancy in 1990, SNCF wanted to 
concentrate the 23 remaining regions into 12 "inter-rdgions" (renamed 'operational zones'); some would 
have control over 'old' thinned out regions (e. g. Caen, Poitiers, Besangon) which would become simply 
SNCF 'ambassadors' with the regional councils - their political dialogue partners regarding the funding of 
regional trains (TERS). Evidently, this project of restructuring and thinning out of regions was strongly 
opposed since it implied staff cuts and moves in regional headquarters. SNCF exposed itself to resistance 
from agents threatened by relocation, as well as from regional elected representatives, worried that 
employment opportunities would decrease in their region. Following the vociferous Air-France conflict in 
1993, and fearing that such a reform would provoke massive social and political protests, the government 
slowed the reform down in November 1993, and stopped it altogether in January 1994 [Ribeill 1994: 43]. 
only three pilot experiments were carried out (merging of Paris-Nord and Amiens where new 
headquarters were set up; decentralised reorganisation of the Lille region; restructuring of the Bordeaux 
region with an SNCF representative in Poitiers for the Poitou-Charentes region). 
In terms of workforce, changes of qualifications, promotion and job grades have followed 
changes in SNCF recruitment as average educational qualifications have been increasing. The 
importance allocated to promotion based on years of service has been reduced. Besides professional and 
cultural resistance to the new contractual mode of management, there was opposition to increasing 
geographic mobility due to a recent "s6dentarisation" of "cheminot"40 families. Earlier this century, 
"cheminots" used to move as they got promoted, and only at the end of their career could they buy some 
property, usually in their initial birthplace. The man was the only earner in 75% of railworkers' families 
in 1962, compared to 38% in 1992. In three decades, the old pattern of mobile non-sedentary "cbeminot" 
families became eroded, with families earning two salaries, having higher educational expectations and 
becoming house-owners [Ribeill 1993]. This evolution parallels the growing importance of more 
technical and commercial jobs. 
These internal changes have to be viewed in the light of external polifical and econornic 
pressures in particular increased competition (in freight initially). They put in question SNCF's 
accountability and imposed staff reductions through budgetary control, in a situation of growing deficits. 
European transport liberalisation measures undermined monopolistic behaviour and LOTI also changed 
the status of SNCF into a semi-commercial enterprise in 1982, as indicated in Chapter 4. 
" The term 'cheminot' which initially meant someone working on railway tracks ('chemins de fer) came 
to mean any railway employee; even an executive can be referred to as a 'cheminot' in SNCF culture. 
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A new "Direction Commerciale" 
Significant structural changes took place in the organisation of conunercial functions [Interviews 
7& 8]. The old "Direction Commerciale Voyageurs" (DCV) became the "Direction Grandes Lignes" 
(DGQ with new separate regional directions ("Services Rdgionaux Voyageurs" or SRV). In the previous 
structure, the commercial division (DCV) was divided into functions such as distribution, sales force, etc. 
In January 1992 it was restructured into three main activities (according to product types): a "Grandes 
Lignes" unit, 22 Regions, and a "Ile de France" unit. They share a unique distribution system, controlled 
by the Grandes Lignes unit, which in effect controls distribution for all types of transport. This has 
disadvantages when negotiating systems specifications: GL predoniinates to the detriment of the 22 
regional managers and the ldF manager, which creates tensions. Support of functional needs expressed by 
regions and Iff such as simple and rapid transactions (6 seconds average for urban transport) was not 
provided in Socrate GL tends to focus more heavily on product design, marketing, communication, 
quality and distribution; whereas other more routine functions are taken out of GL and put into a new 
department called "Services Communs", making it awkward for regions and IdF [LDM Interview 8]. All 
units have been turned into cost centres with the view of making them in the future profit ccntres or 
4strategic business units' - an expression many of the interviewees (Interviews 6,7,8] used in English. 
The reasoning behind these changes is that control of the distribution function is strategic and 
needs to be centralised and closely controlled [MP Interview 7]. New professional activities had to be 
delineated as relating to profit margins; distribution costs were organised per business unit; 
purchaser/provider contractual relationships with distributors were set up; distribution costs had to be 
related to revenues. But these changes are culturally problematic and "this kind of chopping has 
associated costs" [LDM Interview 81. They were badly received by staff with associated fears of loss of 
status etc. [LDM Interview 81. Structural changes were accompanied by attempts to change the 
organisational culture and this is explored in the next section. 
6.1.2 Cultural change: a new managerial ethos 
According to Georges Ribeill (1994], a social historian of French rail transport, SNCF experienced a 
social malaise' during the 80s and early 90s due to a fracture between (a) its traditional 'corporatism' 
and social conservatism and (b) modernising tendencies (technical and commercial). Historically, and 
until the late 80s, SNCF was organised on a strong centralised (from Paris headquarters) and hierarchical 
basis, with clear lines of command and control, with little participation in decision-making, and with 
promotion linked to years of service. In 1986-87, SNCF employees went on one of the longest strikes in 
the history of the enterprise; one major issue was the criticismýl of top management practices and its 
command and control structure based on hierarchy and length of service (Ribeill 1987]. It challenged the 
corporatist military-hierarchical culture, as well as asked for new salary, job and promotion structures. A 
set of reforms was initiated by the SNCF personnel department as a result [HO Interview 11], with the 
support of some of the managerial elite, which sensed a cultural change was needed. A form of "social 
" Including by some top executives themselves. 
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managerrient" [Ribeill, 1994] was advocated. The traditional regime of embedded sovereignties, spread 
within all functional directions, from the top feudal chiefs to the bottom vassals, was to be directly 
confronted and questioned. After an external audit of the management of the enterprise, the Direction 
Gdndrale chose a global reform of the functioning of the company to respond to political and economic 
pressures and adapt strategically. Jacques Fournier (1993] initiated a prograrrune of social transformation 
in 1990, which aimed to maintain managerial control as well as seek approval of unions and corporatist 
commitment [IMP Interview 12]. Some of the social and managerial reforms of the early 90s are 
outlined below. 
- The first and most important reform in 1991 was the modification of salary scales, more flexible 
remuneration and promotions which balanced: on the one hand, the old notion of career 
advancement on the basis of years of service; and on the other hand, the introduction of promotion 
on merit and new hierarchical levels which recognise staff responsibilities and perforniance. it 
satisfied both 'careerist' and 'traditionalist' groups; 
- Decentralisation of personnel and middle management functions to the regions; in 1988 recruitment 
of operatives and executives (middle managers) was delegated to regions, and in 1992, management 
control of executives was also partially delegated to regional headquarters; 
- Of a more symbolic importance, in 1990 agreements were signed on: training (only CGT refused to 
sign these and protested against the closure of many SNCF training centres); equal opportunities for 
the disabled; and the development of specialised training programmes for uneducated low-level 
staff (SNCF traditionally recruited young people with very low educational background). 
These reforms were perceived by the large majority of staff and unions as socially progressive, 
positive and corresponding to the traditional role of SNCF as an enterprise of social promotion, and were 
readily accepted. On the other hand, other reforms affected the routine, organic and customary ways of 
doing things and play of power and responsibilities at all levels of the enterprise. They destabilised the 
traditional managerial modes, forced a cultural conversion of executive control: from a 
compartmentalised, low risk budgetary control to a culture of transparent, cross-functional, contractual 
relations. They were received with scepticism if not outright rejection by a large proportion of staff at all 
levels [Ribeill 1994: 47]. 
The following reforms were met with scepticism and resistance: participatory management, which 
was intended to bring a new 'empowering' (my retrospective translation here) relational mode of power 
for hierarchical roles and command structures, more open to initiatives from workers' groups. They were 
initiated by a small minority of executives with management profiles and were resisted by a large 
majority of technical and administrative executives, trained to the old methods of relaying authority from 
above, and who associated their legitimate authority and status to their technical expertise or budgetary 
responsibility. 
If this new type of discourse could be heard in the enterprise, breaking off with the old militaristic- 
hierarchical SNCF universe, it is because it was supported by a minority of executives, "who saw 
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themselves as m. anagers" [ Ribeill, 1994: 411. This reform, indeed, could only b6 blocked by the large 
majority of middle rank technical (engineering) and administrative executives. The old model/mould in 
which they were shaped made them simple relays of an authority traditionally legitimated by their mere 
technical competence or their budgetary autonomy. Opposition between these two groups was therefore 
strong within SNCF [JMP Interview 12]; in fact, it grew in 1992-93 according to a study commissioned 
by the SNCF "Comitd Central d'Entreprise" and carried out by the "Laboratoire dEconomie et de 
Sociologie du Travail, Universitd d'Aix-en-Provence" [see Falla 1993a- and Ribeill 1994: 41]. The 
company is still split between two groups with different professional ethos: a first older and still large 
group believing in SNCF traditional values of high technical quality (e. g. the TGV technical excellence) 
and centralised control, and a smaller younger group of entrepreneurs anxious to promote a different 
organisation and new management methods [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 93]. This is illustrated by lunching 
habits: according to one interviewee [EC Interview 3] working at the Paris headquarters, these groups 
have their lunch breaks in different places. Top executives eat in the company restauran% older traditional 
middle managers meet in the staff canteen and younger entrepreneurial managers go to the local cafis... 
- The 1990-1994 "Contrat de Plan" pursued this cultural revolution and intended to promote staff I 
development through further decentralisation, social dialogue, participation and better decision-making 
through planning and forecasting based on information systems. Jacques Fournier (1993: 173-174] 
expresses this fundamental cultural shift as follows: 
"The challenge of this reform is considerable. It is about no less than moving SNCF from an 
administrative, bureaucratic, centralised and normalised mode of functioning in which each unit 
must conform to pre-established rules and procedures, to an entrepreneurial, decentralised4 
contractual mode of functioning, in which clearly identified [and financially] independent centres 
exchange purchasers/providers contracts. The cultural leap required from the enterprise is very 
significant". 
Most interestingly, he adds that: "Its realisation is only possible if methods have been specified, 
minds have been prepared, and tools have been made available to sustain this new managerial mode and 
manage this cultural shift, especially information systems" [Fournier 1993: 174). Yield management is 
such a system and its intended impact on the organisation was represented in Figure 3.11 b (Section 3.4). 
The new managerial discourse, together with commercial and marketing skilIS42 , and information 
technology expertise are in conflict with the traditional engineering and administrative orientation of the 
organisational culture. The former represents the new, modem, 'managerialist' rhetoric and practices 
analysed by many critical management academics [Willmott and Grugulis 1999; Alvesson and Willmott 
1992; Fournier and Grey 2000] and tend to provoke professional as well as social resistance. 
6.1.3 Degradation of consultation with staff and unions 
42 Several interviewees [EC Interview 3; LDM Interview 8] referred to a book which obviously had 
impressed them and insisted on giving me an interview of the author published in one of the internal 
company newsletters; in it the author, a professor at HEC (Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales, a top 
business school) explains the importance of the brand names SNCF, TGV, Socrate and compares them to 
EuroDisney and deodorants [Kapferer 1993]. 
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Tintil f983, when the enterprise changed its public enterprise statiis and became semi- 
commercial, consultation was organised through a series of specific committees dealing with economic 
and social affairs, delegations representing staff requirements, and staff delegates participating in 
personnel decisions on salaries, job specifications, training and promotions. This system ensured 
consultation throughout all hierarchical levels [HG Interview 11]. In 1983 was added a "Comitd Central 
d'Entreprise" with various personnel representatives on health and safety and working conditions 
committees amongst others [IMP Interview 12]. There were soon problems with the new consultation 
apparatus. Some claim that it did not allow equal representation of all "cheminots"; and that it only served 
as a justification for the new managerial principles rather than ensure a true expression of workers' needs 
[Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 98]. The partial co-existence of the old and new systems and a proliferation of 
conunittees diluted staff relations. 
The three main unions represented at board level (CGT, CFDT, FMC) voted against annual 
budgets from 1987. Personnel negotiations were hectic and salaries were in effect steadily decreased for 
ten years. CGT and CFDT, the two biggest unions, refused to sip salary agreements from 1987. The 
other staff associations (FO, CFTC, FMC, FGAAC and CGC) have signed since 1989, but FO refused to 
do so in 1990 and 1992. In 1993, there were no salary negotiations as there was no plan for any salary 
increases. Since 1984, the average gross annual salary and spending power have been eroded 
systematically, apart from two "luxury" years, 1989 (+1.79%) and 1992 (+1.79%). The endless job cuts 
made the vast majority of staff feel abandoned by a Direction Gdndrale which overall did not appear to 
notice them [HG Interview 11] The 1988 and 1990 internal staff surveys carried out by SNCF, showed 
that 66% of personnel thought they were well-informed, by 1992 it had become 36% (Cuq and Bussereau 
1994: 98). It can be said that all the above led to a progressive breakdown in communications. Bernard 
Bosson, Ministre, de I'Equipement, des Transports et du Tourisme, estimated that by the end of 1993 it 
was impossible to contemplate any meeting between the different social partners. Striking had become the 
only way for staff to compensate for the poor funcfioning of consultative mechanisms [Cuq and 
Bussereau 1994: 1001 which partly explains why staff and unions promptly resorted to action during the 
Socrate ddbAcle. 
The various managerial reforms delineated above also affected executives ("cadres"). Their 
numbers had grown from 4.2% of the workforce in 1938, to 22.9% in 1978, and 39.2% in 1992, whilst 
there was fewer and -fewer staff 
to supervise. For the first time, they were also affected by a poor 
organisational climate and felt that their future was uncertain. Jacques Mallet, prdsident of the 
"Wdration des syndicats d'ingdnieurs, cadres et agents de maltrise des chemins de fee, complained that: 
a new direction ["Direction des Cadres" established in January 19941 "only concerns top executives and 
divisional directors, and was set up, as too often, without any consultation, and only to emulate what is 
being done in other enterprises" [quoted in Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 93]. 
GARP and social dialogue: a sham? 
To improve the situation, top management decided to associate staff to the development of the 
"Contrat de Plan" for 1995-99. GARP (Groupe d'Animation et de Rdflexion Prdalable) was a consultation 
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initiative designed to involve staff, as consultation for the 1990-1994 "Contrat de Plan" had been 
criticised for being merely symbolic. GARP involved 20,000 staff, started at the beginning of 1992 and 
lasted till June 1993, and was run by the "Direction des Relations Humaines et Sociales" [JMP Interview 
12]. A Steering Group consisted of 30 internal and external personalities known for their "social 
competence". Central and regional voluntary groups run by managers worked on a series of suggested 
themes such as: 
- the goals and objectives of the enterprise; 
- the analysis of social conflict; 
- quality of production; 
- staff commitment; 
- the notion of the flexible enterprise; 
- organisational culture, values and identities; 
- how to improve cross and multi-functionality. 
A proportion of 8.6% of total staff participated in a group and 10.4% responded to surveys and 
questionnaires. One top executive in two was consulted, one middle manager ("cadre") in three, and one 
supervisor in eight. Unions did not seek to participate at national and central level and criticised its 
representativeness. As a result of these workshops, a new phase called "Construisons nos choiX"43 Was 
started in September 1993 during which ten groups worked in more depth on a series of strategic themes. 
This covered a deeper reflection involving 1,500 local and national representatives, and the results were 
disseminated to the whole staff. 
GARP led to twelve reconuriendations, half of them about human resource management and the 
functioning of the company. Management argued that GARP showed dialogue was still possible and 
welcome by staff. However, FO (Fdddration Syndicale Force Ouvri6re des Cheminots) representatives 
called this initiative "des grands-messes" (or religious rituals) which did not correspond to claims and 
were not constructive [HG Interview I fl. CGT boycotted them as some of the problems they identified 
were not addressed, and it was "anything but consultation" [Bernard Thibault, secrdtaire de la Fdddration 
Nationale des Travailleurs, Cadres et Techniciens des Chen-dns de Fer CGT, quoted in Cuq and Bussereau 
1994: 99]. This consultation exercise did not lift the general scepticism. Experiences were that there was a 
large gap between the medium-term objectives of each "Contrat de Plan" and the short-term negative 
measures taken to balance annual budgets as a response to yearly financial imperatives imposed by SNCF 
contracts with the government. Contradictory short-term measures fed disillusions about participation and 
its good intentions. Staff felt GARP did not consider organisational realities. The chosen themes (see 
above) were criticised and can be seen to relate to new managerialist thinking; more practical subjects, for 
example the evolution of railway stations and the role of staff, might have been more useful. This 
participative consultation, it could be'argued, even endangered the day-to-day adaptation to worsening 
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conditions*. And, in its approach to "talk to everybody" GARP has been analysed as a way to bypass 
unions [Cuq and Bussereau 1994:. 99]. 
Unions: ripe for Socrate 
Seven union organisations represent SNCF employees. There are five federated unions (CGT, 
CFDT, FO, CFTC, CGQ which are affiliated to national unions, some with political leanings e. g. CGT 
and CFDT to the lefý and two unaffiliated or autonomous organisations, FMC (Fdddration des agents de 
Maltrise et Cadres) and FGAAC (Fdddration Gdndrale Autonome des Agents de Conduite). Some are 
o. rientated towards specific professional groups i. e. train drivers (FGAAC) or rriiddle managers (CGC and 
FMC). Unionisation amongst cheminots is high and was estimated at 33% in 1990, which is far superior 
to the public sector at large (26%) and the private sector (8%). Union strength used to be affected by 
divisions and in-fighting; on 76 national (as opposed to regional, local or for a particular profession) 
registered calls for strildng from 1990 to 1992,67% were initiated by only one organisation, and only 9% 
by at least four of the seven organisations Pbeill 1994: 50]. 
In 1993 there was a marked increase in unity of action [HG Interview I I]. Of 18 national strike 
calls, only 10 came from only one union and four from at least four unions. 71iis reflects an increasing 
consensus in criticising the policies of the enterprise (from short-term austerity measures to threats to the 
political regime of rail transport). Localised strikes (regional, local or professional) decreased in 
comparison to national strikes, particularly in 1993, which had more national and unified action. This can 
be interpreted as a sort of "collectivisation" of conflicts, which have become more political and 
corporatist than local or profession-related [Ribeill 1994: 5 1 ]. 
Ribeill [1994: 3940] analyses the social dynamics at SNCF as a historical tripartite balance 
between three groups of social partners, political actors (government), management and the unions, which 
usually creates the following two alternative alliances: a corporatist alliance between management and 
unions; or a political alliance between the government and management. It depends on: whether unions 
and staff are in tune with each other; whether their representativeness in the organisation is secured; 
whether unions are able to present a united front; and how management positions itself, running the risk 
of isolation and exposure to both political order and union action. Union actions have been based on the 
following motives (Ribeill 1994: 51-52]. 
- Intemal/social opposition to short-term austerity measures (salaries, staff numbers) or to their 
announcement (vote of the SNCF budget at board level, or budget modifications during the year); 
- Internal/political hostility to the global direction of the enterprise and its medium term future, as 
stated in the "Contrats de Plan"; 
- Corporatist/social resistance to threats (real or potential) to the social corporate regime (status, 
salary scales and promotion. - pensions, the right to strike), or to the company practices (repression 
and antistrike sanctions, legal sanctions against prosecuted staff in the case of accidents); 
"' "Let's build our choices". 
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Political/corporatist rejections of anything which affects the foundations, including cultural ones, of 
corporate values (public rail transport, integrity of the public enterprise); 
External/social and/or political actions reacting to governmental measures or projects which can 
affect all sectors socially (e. g. non income-related taxation) or politically (employment policies, 
public services etc. ) or the public sector at large (salary freeze, staff cuts, social security etc. ). Ile 
1995 massive national strikes against the Juppd government and its ultra-liberal measures [Cassen 
1996] are an example of this and had a long term effect (Prdsident Chirac called another election and 
socialist Lionel Jospin became Prime Minister instead of republican Alain Juppd). These strikes 
involved many central union federations at national level. 
Socially orientated and internal strikes (e. g. against the 1993 budget on 25, h November 1992) 
usually reach around 20% staff participation [Ribeill 1994: 52]. Political union actions, for instance the 
31" January 1990 strike against the "Contrat de Plan" which was organised by all union organisations 
except CGC, can reach 41% staff participation (Ribeill 1994: 53]. Between 1992 and 1994, the period 
surrounding the Socrate project, actions became more political and unified; for instance the 27d, October 
1992 European strike against the 91/440 European directive and for defending public rail enterprises 
involved 28 European rail unions [Ribeill 1994: 54; see also more recent European petition against 
privatisation in rail, CGT-CFDT-CFTC-CGC-FMC 1994]. The year 1993 saw more focussed and radical 
activities against strategic directions (employment, public service rrgssion and integrity of the company) 
which Ribeill [1994: 59] interprets as a reaction to: new internal corporate and rnanagerial priorities 
which diverge from cultural and organisational reference points; a destabilising external political context 
that renders the political future of rail uncertain. Ross ( 1998] also argues that: 
"Organisational conflicts over policy priorities play a crucial role in transport issues and by 
linking newer, post-industrial (e. g. envirorunental) policy concerns with traditional, class-based 
issues" ( ... ) "the idea of a common cause [emerges] due to combined economic and socially re- distributive functions of transport systems" [Ross 1998: 29]. 
Interestingly, management and unions often articulate the same concerns and political arguments 
regarding the survival of rail [Ribeill 1994: 61]: harmonisation of competition conditions across transport 
modes, political co-ordination of infrastructures financing, equal negotiation of contributions towards 
public service missions [e. g. FO 1994; LDM Interview 8; MG, MN, Interview 17]. This is best expressed 
by Bernard Thibault's (CGT Secrdtaire Gdndral) comment that "today a cheminot in four works to pay 
the debt back" [quoted in Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 97; see also FR3 1997]. Yet Jacques Fournier, who 
was an almost rnilitant SNCF president in his defence of the notion of public service [Fournier 1993; 
Cartelier et al 1996], failed to complete this alliance: his controversial corporate managerial initiatives 
brought him down [Ribeill 1994: 61] - mainly because of a clash between the rhetoric of 'bottom up' 
empowerement and decentralised responsibility, and the reality of constant 'top down' cost cutting 
measures, fear and uncertainty. This was best expressed by an interviewee [GC Interview 6]: "at the coal 
face this is perceived as the right hand not knowing what the left hand is doing". On the other hand, some 
think that these managerial initiatives at least enabled Fournier to break down what they perceived as "the 
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old baroni" [SNCF 1994e] or "the old feudal system" [AP Interview 2]. Cuq and Bussereau [1994: 97] 
reflect that if these initiatives had been better carried out, it would have mobilised energies and human 
capital as cheminots, despite their shortcomings, share a sense of belonging and pride in the enterprise 
and a strong tradition of competence and professional identity (Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 100). 
The Socrate events made unions turn towards the public, passenger associations and rail users as 
their allies; abandon the inconvenient and ill-received 'all out' strikes; and devise innovative actions such 
as issuing open tickets (see Section 5.2.1], organising debates and exhibitions in stations [CGT 1993b; 
also available in Appendix 6], circulating petitions and leaflets [Fdddration des Cheminots 1993; CGT 
1993c]. 
6.1.4 Internal tensions over the introduction of Socrate 
Clearly the climate was generally tense in the whole organisation. There seems to have been a 
constant pressure and extreme statements about the state of the crisis of the enterprise, for example "la 
situation de Pentreprise est grave, tr6s grave"44 by Jean Bergougnoux [FO 1994), which must have 
contributed to a climate of fear and uncertainty. This can hinder support for organisational changes, for 
instance in the "Direction Commerciale Voyageurs" (DCV), the part most directly affected by Socrate. 
The unions had opposed the structural changes at the DCV already mentioned above (Section 6.1.1). 
They were against splitting the DCV into three 'product' units (GL, IdF, regions) as they felt this would 
lead to disunity, dilute responsibility for public transport and was in fact a preparation for privatisation 
[Fdddration des Cheminots 1992]. Activities "with potential margins" would be isolated to the detriment 
of others [Interview 17]. The new divided commercial structure would lead to the imposition of cross- 
functional and geographic mobility, intensification, less specialisation and standardisation of jobs within 
each of the subdivisions [CGT 1993e]. 
When the Socrate project was first announced in 1990, the DCV produced a report on the 
introduction of new technologies and planned changes in sales and distribution. The Fiddration 
Nationale des Cheminots responded [1990] by raising concerns about the organisational implications of 
the introduction of new technologies, their effects on professional qualifications and on the nature of the 
tools. Stations were to be divided into three categories: (1) those with less than 3MF annual revenues, 
(2) those with more than 3MF and (3) those with more than 30MF. The cost/revenue ratio per "point de 
vente" (selling point or PV) was to be no more than the average per type of station. Unions [Fdddration 
Nationale des Cheminots 1990] claimed that the implications would be to reduce costs through staff cuts, 
leading to the closing of PV in small stations leaving them unmanned. 407 unmanned (or stopping only) 
stations had been closed down in 1989. In other stations part-time staff on short-term contracts would be 
employed at peak times only. Similarly, services such as cleaning, car park management, assistance for 
the handicapped, stations maintenance, providing trolleys or pillows and blankets for night trains, were 
being outsourced. The DCV planned for sales to shift from 73% to 53% in stations, 3% to 15% through 
automatic vending machines, and 21% to 27% in travel agencies between 1989 to 1995. Other plans 
were to provide sales facilities in post offices or newsagents shops. Additionally, the number of 
44 "The situation of the enterprise is serious, very serious". 
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telephone"reser-ýation centres ("Centres de Renseignements TdIdphoniques Voyagýurs" or CRTV) was to 
decrease from 103 in 1989 to 26 in 1995, employing more staff on short-term contracts. 
Increasing distribution profitability was seen as enforcing competition between the various sales 
points and distribution methods (particularly from the cheaper call centres), and as constituting threats to 
permanent staff, job security and prospects. Computing staff similarly opposed IT outsourcing, felt under 
pressure when comparing practices with AMR staff (working long hours, weekend availability, 
recrgitment of cheaper staff, degradation of salaries) [UFCM-CGT 1993a and 1993b]. 
Another area of conflict worsened by the new emphasis on different product lines was the one 
between regional and intercity services ("Grandes Lignes") and their divergent interests. GL was 
perceived as arrogant but prestigious organisationally, with more substantial budgets and revenues, more 
educated and technical staff and strategic clout. In the new structure GL was in charge of the overall 
distribution network and of the Socrate project, which was badly received by other divisions (see Section 
6.1.1). To fears of dismantling of activities, loss of territory and changing alliances was added the fact that 
the "GL issue was a problem going back a long way" [LDM Interview 8]. Consequently, when the 
Socrate problems happened, "there was little support left internally ( ... )a 'balcony '45 blame culture, 
which was not the usual SNCF culture (traditionally solidarity, passion and pride in the company) 
prevailed. This has left a scar, a trace in the company" [LDM Interview 8]. 
A research study by the Universitd WAN en Provence (APST 1991]46 into the possible impact 
of Socrate on the workforce observed that: "technical choices are presented as inevitable" (p. 5); the 
discourse of transforming activities and 'liberating' sales staff does not correspond to working realities; 
there is the danger of destabilising existing and collective know-how, e. g. the information desk ("Bureau 
Information Rdservation" or BIR) has "accumulated collective knowledge which has not been taken into 
accounf' (p. 6); Socrate could interfere with existing practices as it takes away the often invisible but 
complex collective nature of work; training is said to make staff more responsible in the whole enterprise 
(and is related to the new organisational culture changes see Section 6.1.2), but at the same time changes 
in jobs are presented as a consequence of new technologies (p. 15) leading to contradictions. 
Commercial staff had also experienced increasing difficulties and work pressures in their day-to- 
day activities [Interview 13]: lack of controllers on trains, staff cuts at ticket offices, closing down of 
services (information desk, after sales office, luggage services), reduction of opening hours and of tickets 
on offer. An instance of only one mechanic left on duty at St Lazare, a major Paris station, was cited as a 
revealing example [Interview 17]. The union for middle managers [CFTC 1993] also drew attention to 
problems before the Socrate launch such as lack of training, poor data quality, ill-conceived internal and 
external communication; and also to what they considered as strategic mistakes: closure of stations and 
ticket offices, staff cuts (including on trains, leading to more fraud and profit losses), poor quality of 
services, expensive audits from consultancy fu= which were perceived as not politically neutral (CFTC 
1993]. This context made many employees wary rather than resistant to the new system, seen as "imposed 
from the top" and disconnected from working realities (Interview 17]. CFTC (1993] for instance agreed 
11 This alludes to the headquarters buildings in Paris, a set of I ate 19'h century houses with many windows 
and balconies and interconnecting courtyards. GL staff felt physically exposed at the balcony stared at by 
the other divisions with glee. 
46 it was commissioned by the "Comitd Central d'Entreprise" [JMP Interview 121. 
179 
Chapter 6 
that SNCP hadto respond to EU and economic pressures in order to "develop' services on offer and 
protect our sales"; but that although necessary, Socrate should have been accompanied by suitable 
organisational reforms. 
Personalities involved played a role too and contributed to tensions at top level. Jean-Marie 
Metzler, Director of the Socrate project (and Director of the DCV), and Jacques Fournier, the president, 
had very different styles, personalities and preferences, including politically (the former to the right, the 
latter-to the left, whilst the government was socialist). 
Nevertheless, despite occasional confrontations and differences, they both assumed their 
responsibility when the Socrate events occurred. The president faced the press and the public and gave 
many radio interviews and press conferences [SNCF 1993e]. He did however leave many unsolved 
problems to his successor Jean Bourgougnoux in May 1994. Jean-Marie Metzler was even more closely 
associated with the events in the public eye and obtained the nickname "Monsieur Socrate". He gained 
respect from many of his colleagues in taking the blame internally and externally [Interviews 3,4,7,9]; 
although a FNAUT representative [GDA Interview 18) joked that he had been put in a 'golden cupboard' 
when he was sidelined to International Relations and put in charge of international distribution systems on 
I" September 1993. This was also symbolised by moving his office from a top floor to a lower floor at the 
Paris headquarters, but still located at the front (a sort of tower) of the building where all 'lop notch 
people are" according to a waiter in the cafd opposite. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, Metzler can be seen as representing a technocratic, top down, 
strategic vision of the Socrate project; whereas Fournier was more focussed on the organisational 
changes required to transform SNCF into a commercial enterprise, but also caught in the power relations 
and contradictions between the government's political indecision, financial pressures and social needs. 
The choice of Socrate as a 'quick fix' organisational solution was not well accepted as it clashed with 
existing conditions, cultures and skills and it did not build upon them. This gap between the strategic and 
organisational vision and the climate of crisis led to a tendency to present the changes as purely technical. 
6.2 SOCRATE AND SALES STAFF 
Sales staff was confronted not only with a new computer tool but also a new commercial 
philosophy [Moissonnier 1993: 6]. Yield management and new commercial objectives disrupted the staff 
culture. There were many existing tensions within the organisation so when problems started occurring, it 
was much harder to contain them A rushed pilot phase, complex new interface and inadequate training 
did not help. 
6.2.1 Controversial pilots 
A Steering Group was set up between the "Direction Commerciale Voyageurs" and staff 
representatives in 1991. It was intended that unions would be kept informed about the evolution of the 
project and that they would visit pilot sites. This started happening, but communication became flawed. 
Bernard Bondu (CFDT Secrdtaire Gdndral) claimed that user feedback on the pilot sites was hardly taken 
180 
Chapter 6 
into consfderati6n when the software was modified and eventually finalised at the end of 1992 [PLR 
Interview 16]. 
In an effort to get user feedback, SNCF commissioned the "Agence Nationale pour 
I'Amdlioration des Conditions de Travail" (ANACT) to monitor the pilot sites through interviews and 
observations [SNCF 1992fl. The choice of pilot sites was voluntary and the first phase involved installing 
the software in a representative selection of stations (small, medium, large); in the second phase this was 
expakided to one site per region; and in the final phase, due to take place in January 1993, the system was 
to be used by 15,000 sales staff ("agents commerciaux" or AQ and 11,000 "agents commerciaux trains" 
(ACT or ticket controllers in trains). 
The "Direction Grandes Lignes" claimed that Phase 2 (November 1992) went well. The CGT 
union [1992b] denied this and complained about lack of training, a simplistic computer simulation, 
serious technical malfunctions (breakdowns, longer queues), too many temporary rather than permanent 
staff, and warned that problems would reoccur in the final phase.. In December 1992 (Phase 2/3) 92% of 
sales staff encountered technical difficulties, an increase from 80% in November 1992. They are broken 
down into [SNCF 1992e]: 
- 25% incidents at central level 
17% unhelpful messages 
41% wrong system response 
49% complex sale transaction 
16% data anomalies 
- 17% system too slow 
- 24% complex procedures 
- 25% local incidents 
- 8% payment problems 
There were many breakdowns of the conununication interface with the X25 network, which could 
only be remedied through reloading the software; this seriously interrupted work processes as it took at 
least 15 minutes which is far too long and increases waiting times considerably especially at peak time 
(when the average time for staff to process a transaction is Imin30). This was remedied through the 
implementation of Ethernet local area networks but only in important stations. 
Pilot staff was still unhappy in January 1993 and asked to delay the launch and for two more 
training days. Unions [UFCM-CGT 1993c] stated that the system was not reliable, the training was 
inadequate, increases of transaction times were unacceptable (two or three times longer), and that the new 
ticket was unreadable. And that this was likely to lead to poor service and worsening working conditions. 
ANACT also argued that the planned phases were too tight and measures were taken to space out Phase 3 
[SNCF 19931) and to improve data quality, provide more support and documentation on procedures for 
exchanging tickets. Phase 3 had been planned on 3 weeks, starting on 18th January with the "Terminaux 
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Points de Vente" (TPV), the 25" for travel agencies and the 28h for the "Automates Points de Vente" 
(APV). This was changed to 3 months with the TPV on 12 th January and finishing with the APV on IIh 
April. There were still serious problems in early April e. g. central loading of tapes and manipulation 
errors, which blocked workstations for two hours on 6th April [SNCF 1993n]. 
The system went live despite the fact that the majority of sales staff still wanted the software to 
be simplified [Baverel 1993]. Union representatives expressed regret that training on the pilot sites, which 
proved unsatisfactory, was not improved. New concepts related to the air industry, such as the difference 
between ticketing and booking, were only added to training material later on. 
In his goverment report, Moissonnier [1993: 14) states that there was a significant difference 
between the important funds provided for the computer centre in Lille (see Section 3.1.1) - in terms of 
reliability, security, backup, autonomous power, etc. - when compared to more limited amounts for sales 
staff TPV in stations. He reflects that this contrast led to serious malfunctions "like having a fantastic 
computer centre but very poor data" [Moissonnier 1993: 14]. Unions [CGT 1992a] had also questioned the 
amount invested in each Socrate workstation (8,0001717) as early as June 1992. It would seem that 
investments on workstations was important to SNCF employees but less so for SNCF management who 
were more concerned with the technical and commercial changes introduced, although the latter did have 
a direct effect on working conditions. 
Deliberate lack of user involvement? 
Unions and staff representatives asked for consultation on Socrate itself and the pilot sites, and 
also on sales team organisation, call centres (CRTV), the new pricing policies, and changes in large 
stations due to the new system. As soon as the end of 1992 unions asked for extra time to think about 
modifications to solve problems which occurred in the pilots. Pilot tests were run in such stations as Paris 
Austerlitz, St Brieuc and Lyon, and showed that the system was running correctly technically, but 
comments made by staff were not integrated in the design. And new mistakes appeared in the next 
implementation phases when more sites were connected. Technical improvements were eventually carried 
out (to the communication interface and fixing bugs); but rather than accepting there may be more serious 
user interface issues, the underlying belief appeared to be that sales staff were not mastering the new 
"selling logic". 
Eventually, some form of user involvement was put in place and user panels were constituted in 
May 1993 for consultation on technical progress [SNCF 1993m]. Adams and Cahen [ 1997: 19) go further 
in arguing that: non involvement of users was a "deliberate, fundamental, and arguably necessary choice 
to ensure the success of Socrale to enforce the company's business strategy"; and that SNCF by not 
including the users in the development "may have avoided a quasi certain failure" (Adam and Cahen 
1997: 20). On the other hand, they also comment that "it is surprising that Socrate survived at all" [Adam 
and Cahen 1997: 17]. Lack of user involvement was certainly a cause of staff hostility but only in so far as 
it was just another area of friction following from a long history of broader organisational problems and 
tensions. 
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6.2.2 'Interface design and dialogue between sales staff and passengers 
Socrate was installed on all workstations on I st April 1993 despite the fact that sales staff still 
wanted the software to be simplified. There were bugs and mistakes because of rushed testing and 
implementation: wrong prices, seats reserved for several people simultaneously, seats reserved without 
any týg displayed on the seats themselves in the train, and seats reserved for non-existent trains. Waiting 
times were unacceptable. Issuing tickets was too complex even for relatively simple trips. If the system 
went down manual procedures were difficult to carry out. Passengers were given 'temporary' yearly 
passes on paper that would get torn in a few months etc. Beyond the initial teething problems, this section 
examines the new user interface more specifically and its effects on the nature of the task and on the 
dialogue between sales staff and passengers. 
The sales and distribution system was installed on sales terminals (TPV for "Terminal Point de 
Vente") and on the computerised ticketing machines (APV for "Automate Point de Vente") at SNCF 
premises. It was also connected to the Minitel network and to travel agents and other comparnes with 
computerised reservation systems. Modifications were necessary since the Sabre user interface was 
inappropriate and a new interface named MULTIVISION was added. Four different versions were 
designed corresponding to the four following contexts: TPVs in stations, APVs ticketing machines, 
Minitel and travel agencies. 
Temiinal Point de Ventc 
MULTIVISION is in use on TPVs in stations and is a screen management system adapted from air 
to rail [JPD Interview 9]. It divides the screen into four zones as shown in Figure 6.1: 
- bottom right hand comer: a menu-driven zone consisting of 16 areas, related to the current 
transaction and accessible via a pad of 16 keys for further menu options (no mouse access). For 
instance, pressing the area "Dossier client" will bring up customer details as shown in Figure 6.2; or 
pressing "Fichier RP P will bring up "Relations Privildgides" or stored preferential O-D relations, as 
shown in Figure 6.3. 
top areas: seat avai ai ity "disponibilitds") on one or two zones if necessary. In the example the 
top left area displays one way (Paris-Rouen), the right left area shows availability coming back 
(Rouen-Paris). The following details are displayed: types of trains (TGV, Express Rdgional), 
departure and arrival times, correspondence (via EVR, the code for Evreux), types of fares 
C'classes"), services (buffet, restaurant), and pricing level (N 1, N2, N3). 
- bottom left hand comer: in this zone, the various options chosen are displayed showing a history of 
the transaction, which builds the client profile and then produces a ticket. In the example, seat 
availability from Paris Gare de Lyon (PLY) to Rouen has also been examined for various dates. 
There is a keypad with 16 keys corresponding to the 16 options in the bottom right hand comer of 
the screen. Mirroring the 16 screen areas with the use of this keypad was generally praised as very 
convenient. There is also a normal keyboard for typing station names for instance. On the screen there is a 
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system status aria ("syst6me central") for error messages and a free input line foithe sales clerk to note 
extra information ("bloc note"). Various pop up menus appear on top of this 4 square screen, as shown in 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 or for data input. All the information is available on this unique screen; this is an 
advantage over the previous system where sales clerks had to remember information from one screen to 
the next. Having a history of the transactions carried out for this customer so far (bottom left hand comer) 
also helps remembering the various options already examined. This screen design seems comprehensive 
and dear, although sales staff claimed that there was too much information on the screen, making it 
unreadable, and they also asked for the capacity to zoom in and out [SLG Interview 13]. 
The issue of interaction control is not so clear cut. The logic of the sales transaction is imposed by 
the system in that it is driven by seat availability. This presumes a particular type of transaction and logic 
of communication between the buyer and seller. Seat availability is provided according to "classes" of 
fares, which are complex and were new to staff. For a specific train at a given time, the computer system 
will nearly always have offers and the premise is that a transaction will always lead to a successful sale in 
whichever class is left. Emphasis is also put on the "Dossier clienf' or customer profile, which keeps a 
history of all transactions for regular customers. This is perceived by sales staff as 'objectifying' 
customers and as trying to sell them more, possibly in classes of fares equal or superior to what they have 
purchased in the past [SLG and NR Interview 13]. 
Disponibilit6s ALLER 27/11/93 Disponibilit6s RETOUR 27/11/93 
PST PARIS ST LAZARE A ROU ROUEN ROU ROUEN 4 PST PARIS ST LAZARE 
train heure via classes 
.......................... 
services sup 
.......... 
train heure via 
.... . . . 
classes services sup 
..... 
I TGV R 11: 16 JA3 1AJ1 IAC7 BR N3 
... ... . ..... 1 TGV R 16: 23 
............ 
IA3 1A. J1 IAC7 
.......... 
BR N3 
08721 15: 18 2A7 2A. 17 2AC2 
.............. . . 
08972 20: 25 2A7 2AJ7 2AC2 
................. 
2 TGV R 12: 56 1A71AK3 
.. ...... 
BRIF N2 
................... 
2 TGV R 17: 23 
............ 
1A41AJ71C2 
.......... 
BF N2 
08625 15: 06 EVR 2A3 2A. 12 08973 21: 25 2A7 2AJ32 
EXP RP 15: 19 EVR 1A7 ................... ............ .......... 
03689 17: 45 2A5 3 TGV R 17: 57 1A7 1AK3 BRIF N1 
............................... .......... 08972 19: 54 EVR 2A32AJ2 3 TGV R 14: 16 1A4 1A. 17 1C2 BF NI EXP RP 20: 03 EVR 1A7 
08737 18: 18 2A7 2A. 13 03689 21: 54 2A5 
(Bloc note: 1 ligne) 
Affichage du dossier voyage No 1414 
Affichage du dossier client No 456 Date 
Dispo de PLY A ROU le 23/11/93 RP Odgine Destination 27/11/93 
Dispo de ROU A PLY le 23/11/93 
Dispo de ROU A PLY le 25/11/93 
Dispo de PST A ROU le 27/11/93 Fichier RPI Via Classe Serv Heure 
Dispo de ROU A PST le 27/11/93 
Retour Dossier Dossier Dir cl/ 
Syst6me central: OK Voyage Client 
e 
3 segments 
ýmessage d'erreur ou de confirmation) 
Suite 
disponibilit6 R6servation Prix Tarif 
I 
Figure6.1 Screen example of availability for return tickets [FaYta 1993b: 155] 
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Dossier client No 456 
Nom: Martin Pr6nom: Pierre 
Adr: 116 rue de Saussure 
75017 PARIS 
T61: 99 99 99 99 
Parcours: PLY DIJ Pads Lyon/Dijon 
Classe: AS2 Assise 26me 
Placement: NFI Non Furneur Imp6ratif 
Figure6.2 Customer profiling [Falta 1993b: 156] 
RELATIONS PRIVILEGIEES - Fichier 1 
1 PST ROU: PARIS ST LAZARE - ROUEN 
2 PST CAE: PARIS ST LAZARE - CAEN 
3 PST LEH: PARIS ST LAZARE - LE HAVRE 
4 PLY MSC: PARIS LYON - MARSEILLE ST CHARLES 
5 PLY LPD: PARIS LYON - LYON PART DIEU 
6 PLY DIJ: PARIS LYON - DIJON 
7 PLY AVI: PARIS LYON - AVIGNON 
8 PLY VAL: PARIS LYON -VALENCE 
9 PLY MTP: PARIS LYON - MONTPELLIER 
10 PLY TOU : PARIS LYON - TOULOUSE 
11 PLY NAR: PARIS LYON -NARBONNE 
12 PLY JOI: PARIS LYON - JOIGNY 
13 PLY AUX: PARIS LYON - AUXERRE 
14 PNO LIL: PARIS NORD - LILLE 
15 PNO AMI : PARIS NORD - AMI ENS 
16 PES MET: PARIS EST - METZ 
17 PES THI: PARIS EST - THIONVILLE 
VOTRE CHOW 
Figure 6.3 Privileged relations [FaYta 1993b: 162] 
Sales clerks also found that because of the amount and complexity of information on the screen, 
it was more difficult to build routines and automatic gestures [Interview 13]. This leads to visual fatigue 
and further mistakes. To minimise reading and transaction times sales staff go directly to availability and 
ignore timetables. The emphasis on preferential and most frequently asked O-D relations [Figure 6.3] can 
be seen in the same light. This is similar to travel agents booking 90% of airline tickets from the first 
screen display [Taib 1990]. Only offering times that sell can lead to sales agents not offering some trains 
which appear last on the screen and jeopardising their future existence. Another implication of the user 
interface design mentioned by consultants [FaTta 1993b: 157] is that: when several passengers want to 
travel together but benefit from different types of discounts, three transactions have to be carried out and 
three tickets produced, increasing the workload. 
Travel aizencies 
185 
1. Chapter 6 
In travel agencies, the previous system seemed very easy to use compared to the new interface 
[KM and HB Interview 153, which is less polished than the one for TPVs. Town codes are not normalised 
between SNCF and air reservation systems (unlike between air reservation systems). Before requesting a 
ticket, the agent must consult a list of stations in a leaflet or on the screen and write down the town code 
(there is no cut/paste facilities forcing users to write down codes from screen to screen) then enter the 
query with separators such as !, $, etc. If another request is necessary the agent must start all over again 
in order to compare with a different route or another type of fare. Socrate-cannot: give a price unless a 
reservation is initiated; output a ticket for a whole group using discounts; or incorporate on a single ticket 
part of a route which is not a pre-recorded O-D relation. The interface rationale was that travel agents 
would already be familiar with CRS types of dialogues. However, since codes are different, agents must 
now cope with different systems for Socrate, Amadeus, Club Mdditerrande, etc. This may be partly 
alleviated by the agreement between SNCF and, 4madeus [Anon 1995] that enabled. 4madeus subscribers 
to book SNCF and Eurostar rail tickets from their existing terrninals from 1996. The large chain of travel 
agents investigated only had one employee specialised in the use of Socrate to whom requests from all 
branches were directed. According to their training manager it is not worth training all staff on this 
system [KM Interview 15]. In factý the largest tourism chains which offer their own package tours as well 
as tickets from many airlines, tend to build (or partly buy or lease) their own information systems [Faujas 
20001 which are often integrated with one major GDS (or parts of, depending on cost). This is to avoid 
having to manipulate too many CRS and GDS [KM Interview 15). 
Auto iate Point de Vente 
There are two sorts of cornputerised ticketing machines or APV. Some are a complement to 
traditional means (ticket sales counters) and are placed in large stations to ensure a higher number of 
transactions. Others are placed in small and medium-size stations and are used instead of sales counters 
leading to staff cuts. This has other effects: often the station employee was multi-skilled and performed a 
commercial role as well as operational and safety tasks. This policy has had de-motivating effects on 
employeq. Commercial posts are often part-time short-term contracts. In terms of transactions with 
passengers, the Socrate APV suffers from problems similar to many other automatic ticketing machines; 
but the complexity of pricing, of the variety and validity of discounts and the large number of destinations 
all add to the difficulties in 'reducing' human interactions to machine transactions [Foot 1993). APVs 
require as many transactions as there are types of discounts; group tickets are not catered for; paying 
mechanisms go wrong leading to queues and delays at peak times; human agents are needed to explain 
how to use the machines or to carry out the manipulation themselves [NR Interview 13]. Foot shows how 
difficult it is to anticipate such practical problems and take account of human agency; he also argues that 
the design of automatic ticketing machines ignores the symbolic nature of commercial transactions [Foot 
1993: 171. 
Minitel 
The Minitel Socrate interface is not very sophisticated and users cannot benefit from 
simultaneous access to a range of timetables, fares, and availability for a specific destination. It supports a 
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reservatioi dial6gue for a certain day and time rather than consultation; it then*provides users with a 
reservation reference number, which they use at a real ticket office to pay and get their tickets. More 
recently, Internet access has proved popular and it is claimed it is leading to increased sales [Anon 1999] 
although pricing structures are simpler than originally planned with the first version of Socrate. A Web- 
based interface can also be more sophisticated and powerful than using Minitel technology. 
changed task and dialogue with clients 
- Changes in transaction times have been an area of complaint. Adam and Cahen (1997: 16] state 
that Socrate transaction times were underestimated at the requirement specification stage as the time for a 
u. ser transaction had to be shorter than what airlines can afford. The new screen interface gains 7 to 14% 
per transaction but unions argue that it increases visual and mental fatigue [CFDT 1994]. Now that the 
job is more computer-related staff is asking for pauses; however there is no SNCF policy on this and 
some regional directions have stated that when staff interacts with customers they don't look at the screen 
therefore this does not constitute a fully cornputerised task. This assumes the nature of the task has not 
changed and that the new computer system supports the same job as before. 
Paradoxically, the computer system does not contribute to a simplification of the job; as 
availability and prices are constantly changing, transparency has now disappeared. The new commercial 
logic is determined by the system [GC Interview 6]: the sequence of the commercial transaction is built 
in the interface, as the first element which appears is the availability for a specific date. The price is only 
available after six screens. This is reflected in the training slogan "Un train, unjour, une heure" (A train, a 
day, a time) [GC Interview 6]. The interface displays available trains for a specific time rather than all 
trains for different time periods. The latter information is available for phone information staff in CRTVs 
but not station sales staff 
The nature of the work is disrupted. Sales staff used to be selected and promoted on their 
knowledge of price structures, products and discounts available, and of the rail network. They built their 
dialogue using this knowledge. Interactions between sales staff and clients generally consist of obvious 
and less obvious activities [Niero 1993]: listening to explicit and implicit questions; eliciting and 
clarifying poorly formulated needs; explaining answers; anticipating further questions; managing the 
interaction with the client and with the tools at hand, for instance by not asking the client to wait too 
many times whilst searching computer files; verifying, correcting and validating transaction details; 
managing this particular transaction in its context: queuing pressures, equipment breakdowns, refilling 
paper etc., dealing with colleagues' demands and being aware of other individual and collective events in 
the ticket office, time breaks and changes of work shifts, etc. [see Figure 6A]. 
To support these working practices, computers could be used for repetitive tasks so that staff can 
spend more time to interact with clients. It is not clear the new system assists in this manner. Dialogue 
with the client is now more difficult since staff must keep looking at the screen; the dialogue is now 
curtailed to: "for such a time it is that much, full stop" [interview 13]. This dialogue does not support the 
complexity of making a buying decision and it is up to the customer to find a compromise between prices, 
times and his/her own priorities. The dialogue framed in the machine appears to support faster and more 
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sales transactiong at higher fares. Some interviewecs referred to this situation as "oiganised racketeering" 
[interview 17] and "publicitd mensong6re , 17 [Interview 16]. 
Through the new system staff felt forced to implement a new commercial policy which rewards 
quick sales at the least possible cost for SNCF. They felt caught between commercial imperatives and 
client needs. They were also aware that ticket revenues are necessary to pay their wages and believed that 
as a result of corporate decisions they were at the 'coal face' of potentially conflictual relationships with 
clients. SNCF had been warned of serious consumer behaviour problems in -adjusting to new pricing and 
ticketing [APST 1991]. Working conditions for sales staff and train ticket collectors involve relations 
with the public adding a mental and emotional workload. Ticket controllers on the Paris-Lyon TGV had 
experienced this for many years. They report a difference between the TGVs and the classical trains [DP 
Interview 13]: in the former the atmosphere is more individualised, mechanical and conflictual, compared 
to the latter where communication flows more easily between passengers (through "tdldphone arabe") 
usually with an appeasing effect. 
Figure 6.4 Gare de Lyon ticket office, Paris, March 1993 
[Benhasel and Villeneuve 1993) 
The new managerial discourse claimed to put customers at the centre of the enterprise [GC Interview 6]. 
This calls for providing information and client support during the sales transaction, not just performing 
quicker sales. It also leads to better job satisfaction but takes longer. Understanding the new pricing 
47 Or "unethical advertising" with respect to the advertised but unfounded availability of cheap tickets on 
trains in high demand (as manipulated by quota management). 
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structures in order to support clients in their transactions is only really possible ývith high quality staff, 
better qualifications and training [CGT 1992a]. 
6.23 Staff training and skills 
Five training days were organised, principally about new pricing structures and the new conuncrcial 
policies [GC Interview 6]. Those were highly criticised by staff and unions for not providing enough 
information about the interface and technical aspects [Interviews 13,16,17]. Unlike its predecessor, this 
new system requires a good understanding of what happens behind the screen. A computer-based 
simulation was used, but its examples were too simplistic and unrealistic. It was abandoned. Some of 
&se problems were blamed on delays in software design and a rushed implementation. Technical staff 
could not produce material in time to train the trainers who had no real examples to show during the 5 
days training sessions (GC Interview 6]. Another four months should have been available to bridge the 
gap between commercial and operational requirements and to prepare staff to these changes [GC 
Interview 6]. Seeking involvement from regional staff for instance was not organised by headquarters in 
time (GC Interview 6]. 
Training consultants on the Socrate project contended that staff had to "own change by 
implicating themselves with issues such as 'who are your competitors in your rail station?... [Capdevielle 
1992]. This met with resistance. For instance, CGT [I 992b] argued that such contents were ideologically 
unacceptable. Training material was interpreted as asking staff to sell tickets as expensively as possible - 
just a bit cheaper than plane ticketS49 - and not to mention discounts as "it is up to clients to do it first" 
[interview 17]. This also fitted in with corporate catch phrases [CFDT 1994]: "On ne vend pas tout 
partoutl"9 and "Trains A moitid vides plutot que pleins et A bas prix"50 [Interview 17]. Training sessions 
were criticised for centering on an aggressive commercial discourse. It is in contradiction with the need 
to have non-conflictual interactions with users. Words such as passengers, rail users, public service have 
strong emotional connotations. Replacing them by clients, customers, price differentiation, commercial 
transactions, alters the working relationship. A gap or "double language" (PLR Interview 16] between the 
commercial discourse about quality and the reality became obvious. "When ticket controllers working in 
trains with broken windows for lack of repair staff sit in these training sessions, it contributes to their 
mental images" [DP interview 13]. Ticket collectors felt that they were asked to become "income tax 
collectors" [DP Interview 13]. 
Skills and gualificat ons 
SNCF had a tradition of training and preparing staff for new jobs and new technical 
requirements. Internal promotion, in-house and external education and training were important, and a 
large majority of middle managers have come through internal promotion. The Socrate training sessions 
48 PLR [Interview 16] pointed out that a sales clerk cannot tell clients to buy a plane ticket instead if they 
are not happy; that placing air/rail competition as predominant is counterproductive as other transport 
modes (car, coach, bus) are alternatives for most passengers. 
49 "We don't sell everything everywhere" accredited to Jean-Marie Metzler on the grounds that 50% of 
stations bring in 98.5% of revenues. It is reminiscent of the phrase "We do not stop everywhere" (see 
Note 16 in Section 43.6). 
50 "Half empty trains rather than full trains with low fares". 
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seemed disigned to change sellers' approaches to their work. Promotion exams had been based on 
knowledge of fare structures, discounts, routes, etc. Sales staff was now to deal with sales only and not 
general information; job status was related to volume of sales rather than experience; work variety was 
diminished; the sales process was standardised implying deskilling; sales teams with performance 
objectives were set up; permanent staff was to work with more temporary staff trained in a few days. The 
message seemed to be that if the machine does everything, unqualified staff is sufficient. Another 
contradiction was that sales staff was to be "more commercial" (after 3-5 Jays training) but it was not 
matched with better salaries such as those in the air industry [Interviews 16 and 17]. SNCF agreed to pay 
bonuses (from 120 to 50OFF a month) and union action ensured another day of training and some changes 
in job qualifications. Training was entirely rethought and redesigned after the Socrate events, with new 
user manuals, pricing documentation, specialised guidelines (international, urban and regional sales 
manuals), videos, paper-boards and interactive training aids (SNCF 1994Q. Sales teams' managers, who 
had been judged ill prepared for the changes, were more strongly associated with training and 
performance monitoring [GC Interview 6]. 
New rk organisation: sales teams 
Under the previous more traditional work organisation, sales clerks (AC or "Agent Commercial" 
now) had a supervisor ("chef de bureau"). Most supervisors had previously been sales clerks themselves 
and had been selected internally on their knowledge of pricing rules and regulations. They could easily 
perform selling and ticketing tasks, provide help if necessary and even replace staff in case of problems. 
Their technical competence was recognised by clerks and gave them legitimacy. Supervisors were in 
charge of a sales area regardless of individual staff. Sales areas are split into rapid sales, advance or 
scomfortable' sales and reservations ("Bureau Information Rdservations" or BIR). A "chef de bureau 
principal" was responsible for sales in a whole station and had deputy assistants. With the old system, 
there were more sales staff, supervisors and deputy assistants, up to three times more than current 
numbers in a station like Paris-Montparnasse [PLR Interview 16]. 
This was replaced, initially in 1990 with the opening of the TGV Atlantique, by a system of sales 
teams and managers. Team managers ("Technicien Commercial" or TQ are selected externally and their 
competence is managerial only. They are responsible for sales teams (individual staff) rather than sales 
&zones'. This can present co-ordination problems: a particular team manager may have managed her team 
well and has adapted the team organisation to changes in demand, but if another team manager has not 
organised her team properly, this can create chaos [PLR Interview 16). TCs are accountable to a 
commercial deputy or delegate ("ddldgud commercial"). A station director ("chef d'dtablissement") has 
several deputies or delegates; the first and second deputies are usually technically or engineering oriented; 
the third deputy is the commercial one and the fourth deputy is administrative. The commercial deputy is 
responsible for evaluating conunercial results and participates in the formulation of future commercial 
objectives. Station directors are accountable to a regional director who usually comes straight from one of 
the "grandes dcoles" before pursuing her career at headquarters. 
These new managerial/conunercial roles are not well understood by sales clerks [SLG and NR 
Interview 13]. Team managers have rather ill defined competencies and they do not know how to perform 
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sales traniactions or use sales terminals, undermining their legitimacy. They come'in at 9am to check that 
everything is running smoothly then disappear again at 9.30ain to various meetings with the station 
director or elsewhere and their role is to understand the corporate strategy and communicate it to their 
team. Team managers are assisted by an "agent commercial moniteur" (ACM) whose role is to liaise 
between the team manager and sales clerks. She is much closer to sales clerks. She has the same working 
hours and starts at 6.00arn, checks that all staff is present, holds the keys to offices and equipment, 
allocates sales clerks to particular ticket offices, organises breaks, deals with technical incidents, reloads 
software, changes printers and intervenes with clients in case of difficulties. 
Team managers work in a separate office where they evaluate cost/revenue ratios, reallocate 
clerks, monitor sales per clerk and control resources. Team managers for train ticket inspectors ("Agent 
Commercial Train" or ACT) have the same role and have even less legitimacy than team managers for 
sales teams, as they hardly ever set foot in trains". Sales managers set sales targets and objectives. This is 
seen as dissociated from real work: "it is easy to sit there and say 'we will sell more 0 class tickets, 
margins will increase by such a percentage... [PLR Interview 16]. Targets are hardly ever met, which 
does not necessarily mean sales are decreasing or sales teams have performed badly. An increase of 9% is 
set and the results may be -5%, but this all seems quite arbiwary: sales clerks have done no worse no 
better than before, they have coped reasonably well without being able to achieve additional margins. 
pLR [Interview 16) quoted an example where the target was 0% (Paris-Austerlitz which is seen as 
declining because of TGVs at Paris-Montparnasse) and sales staff achieved an increase of 13%. The sales 
management and control system could not really cope with this. Reward, appraisal and promotion 
mechanisms do not seem to work very well in this context leading to dernotivation, and appraisal was 
boycotted [Interview 171. 
Sales staff was generally criticised for not understanding the new conunercial principles, not 
knowing how to sell with the new system and not delivering the expected results [EC Interview 3]. The 
new Socrate selling techniques were to be supported through team managementý team managers and 
individualised planning and control in order for staff to conunit themselves to the new objectives 
[Capdevielle 1992]. Competitions and games organised between sales teams to encourage this 
commitment were received with scepticism and produced few results. The introduction of teamwork to 
replace line work has been shown by critical management theorists [Ezzamel and Willmott 1998] to 
extend -rather 
than supplant traditional hierarchical systems of management control. "Self-managing 
demands of teamwork contravened workers' established sense of identity ( ... ) and had the unintended 
effect of fementing hostility toward the managerial goal of making the teams fully self-managing" 
[Ezzamel and Willmott 1998: 358]. Realising that this 'conceptual' approach had been too brusque and 
that change needs to be "accompanied socially", SNCF executives have since been developing more 
progressive training and management methods [GC Interview 6). 
6.2.4 Not against Socrate: another way of using it 
1 Train inspectors do not like being followed around by their supervisor whilst doing their jobs and 
would resist their presence quite strongly. They may even use it in incidents with passengers and say "Oh 
well, my boss is just here as it happens... " to put them on the spot [DP Interview 13]. 
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Lýnions'and staff representatives have been very keen not to blame the technology or computer 
staff or even Jean-Marie Metzler "who in fact was doing his job very welil " [PLR Interview 16]. They 
clearly blame policies rather than the technology [Interview 17). As early as December 1991 union 
organisations condemned the new comniercial objectives on the grounds of collective social costs and 
environmental consequences (energy consumption, pollution, safety, accidents, road traffic saturation). 
'Pure' competition leads to poor utilisation of rail infrastructures, some are under-utilised when roads are 
choking with traffic. Instead of competition across sectors, they argue that there is room for 
complementarity and combined transport in the interest of the public; and that Socrate could be used for 
integrating different modes of transport and consider social aspects [Prades 1993]. 
They suggest other ways of using the technology. CGT (I 992a: 15] advocates to use the computer to 
support a dynamic, responsive commercial attitude towards passengers; to have more sales points with 
well qualified staff-, to maintain all services, reservations, information, timetables, etc. and types of 
tickets; better promotion and training prospects; more breaks in call centres particularly (a minimum of 30 
seconds least between calls, and 20 minutes pauses every 2 hours); and to use technology to enrich work 
in the stations as well as services offered to clients [CGT 1993e: 5]. 
Examples of improving services have been transit suites for business travellers with fax 
machines, telephones and Minitel connections in Dijon station. Unions criticise SNCF management for 
lirniting such developments to small highly lucrative niches to maximise revenues. Other customer groups 
could also benefit from these, such as young people. The potential of Socrate is put forward and it is 
envisaged as a mean to rebuild public trust and reaffirm the public service mission, thereby reclaiming 
modernisation and regaining control of the technology. 
6.3 FLEXIBLE INFRASTRUCTURES AND RESOURCES: THE LOGIC OF IT-INDUCED 
MARKET STRUCTURES 
6.3.1 SNCF restructuring: strategic/organisational fit 
The use of yield management techniques is a management tool for maximising profitability 
through controlling organisational costs. Yield management can potentially transform transport planning 
through a more flexible allocation of trains to match commercial needs. Distribution of resources, 
decisions about new equipment, infrastructures and investments, cost reductions and passengers' financial 
contribution can be directly related to the results of yield management and resources can be moved across 
the rail network. Relationships between commercial, maintenance and operational services are affected. 
Decisions and power relations are transformed in an organisation where traditionally engineers and 
technicians dominated. The nature of the SNCF public network and the existing organisational culture 
and power base are altered. 
Other affected areas are the relations between purchasers and suppliers and the centralisation of 
decision-making. The electronic network enforces a concentration of financial, technical and commercial 
means on 'core' activities, and the outsourcing of peripheral tasks such as property management, 
maintenance, etc. There is a process of rationalisation and specialisation of the distribution network, 
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with poinis of sale in stations curtailed to match demand and the growth of hubs. In terms of human 
resource allocation, there is loss of sales jobs and the setting up of automatic ticketing machines. 
Inspection staff may be replaced by more intelligent check-in systems. Job flexibility is enforced through 
standardisation (all sales staff to do the same job everywhere and anywhere), intensification (through 
automatic monitoring of sales transactions) and casualisation of labour (e. g. part-time workers for peak 
periods) [Lemaltre 1995]. 
Socrate enables SNCF to go beyond the objective of just maximising revenues. Through yield 
management, the offer can be kept at a slightly lower level than matching demand so as to maximise 
revenue per seat. Material utilisation is optiniised and maintenance organisation is modified. This has 
effects on working conditions: repair and equipment workshops are reorganised from normal working 
hours to rosters of three times 8 hours [PLR Interview 16]. This is not to say that there is a direct causal 
relationship between yield management and new maintenance regimes, but they are both aspects of the 
same managerial principles and they reinforce each other. As already argued in Section 4.4.1, the 
technology is simultaneously a condition and a consequence of - or it both allows and arises from - 
organisational changes. 
The management of rail companies is made to follow principles usually applying to commercial 
enterprises, which imply a separation, in accounting terms to begin with, of exploitation activities from 
infrastructure management. In their 'post Socrate' government report, Cuq and Bussereau (19941 
advocated accounting for the direct costs of increased use of infrastructures, externalities (congestion, 
pollution, safety) and passenger contributions towards infrastructure costs. Accordingly, "if all this 
information is taken into account properly, yield management can lead to better customer choices for the 
system and optimal allocation of resourcee' [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 62). They stated that SNCF did not 
go far enough with Socrate and that there is a need to know infrastructure costs line per line, through O-D 
relations accounting [Cuq and Bussereau 1994: 66]. They recommended that financial modalities for 
infrastructures should be readjusted through stronger involvement from public authorities; and that public 
investments and market modalities for infrastructure charging should be decided through political 
intervention (p. 68) and individualisation of infrastructures (p. 84). An institutional split logically follows. 
6.3.2 Split between Infrastructures and operations: Information gathering and 
market segmentation 
As outlined in Section 4.3.3, SNCF did eventually split in January 1997 into two companies, 
"Rdseau Ferrd de France" which looks after infrastructures, and SNCF now dedicated to operations. 
Several interviewees in 1994 had predicted that this would happen and indeed called for it [GC Interview 
6; GV Interview 14; PLR Interview 16]. In a sense, the problems surrounding the implementation of 
Socrate raised a public debate about economic issues and infrastructures funding particularly. Socrate 
was seen as a way to recoup TGV infrastructure investments assumed by SNCF, when they should have 
been paid for by the State. Many felt that the organisation was put in an unfair position, having to 
constantly increase productivity and cut costs to repay for these investments. Some argued [GC Interview 
6) that ftu-ther divisions into strategic units were also necessary and would ultimately occur: "Grandes 
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Lignes" 6r long distance trains, "Ile de France" for urban/suburban transport and "Services Rigionaux 
Voyageurs" for regional transport [GC Interview 6]. Customers would pay for GL; IdF and SRV would 
be partially funded by local and regional authorities in the public interest. There would be competition in 
sales and distribution, not only with travel agencies but also between ticket offices in stations, from these 
new commercial entities and others, like airline companies in airports (see Figure 6.5]. The importance of 
distribution systems is clear and Socrate was envisaged as multi-hosting air, rail, car and hotel products 
fronjýany company. This implies open access to national rail infrastructures to international operators, 
groups of traditional national public rail operators or even new private transport operators, such as Virgin 
[GC Interview 61. 
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Figure 6.5 Ticket consultant, Dr B. Ching, Private Eye, No 993,14 th January 2000 
The restructuring of the US air industrY into hubs and spokes resulted in a split of the market 
between firms, with fewer and bigger 'trunk' companies occupying the 'inter-hub' market, and local 
companies left with the smaller and less profitable routes between the hub and the spokes. A similar 
restructuring of the network, in the French geographical and transport network context, follows from this 
logic. Combined transport and complementarity, for instance with the coach companies competing for 
profitable hub to spokes segments to the detriment of less busy routes, and rail for hub-to-hub, is already 
happening in many parts of the network. However, intermodal competition between road, air and rail on 
hub-to-hub would require an arbitrage in terms of profitability, accountability and fair competition. It is 
symptomatic of the emergence of a new market: an information market, which can readily identify 
profitable market segments, to be shared with firnis potentially competing in other markets, possibly 
resulting in alliances and cartels. 
If rail transport is to be seen as a contestable market, deregulation must entail the suppression of 
, artificial' entry and exit barriers. Infrastructure costs (sunk costs) have to be detached from operational 
costs, so that individual market segments can be accounted for separately and therefore made 
exchangeable. The integrated computer systems Socrate, Thalas and Aristote (see Section 3.2.3) facilitate 
this and provide information for competitive leverage. Whereas deregulation in the US affected air 
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transport, ivhich'Ied to frantic price competition, in Europe, deregulation is affecting different areas of 
transport simultaneously. Cross-sectorial co-operation and competition may take the following forms 
(Bjorn-Andersen and Nygaard-Andersen 1995]: vertical integration of the distribution channels; and 
horizontal integration through alliances with competitors. Inter-organisational links aim to establish entry 
barriers as well as economies of scope. Technological networks play an important role in creating 
interdependencies in these new electronic markets [Eistert and Krcmar 1995). 
6.3.3 Global electronic tourism systems 
The tourism sector is currently being transformed into an intensely competitive, global arena, 
highly dependent on international distribution channels, and subject to electronic dis-intermediation and 
re-intermediation [McCubbrey 1999). In recent years, other areas of the tourism industry have joined 
airlines in the use of yield management technology, for instance hotel chains, cruise lines and car rental 
companies (see Section 3.5). Some argue that artificial price constraints limit tourism businesses' ability 
to deal with the seasonality of demand and to optimise profits [Arthur Andersen 1997]. However, national 
public transport enterprises may feel differentiated demand-oriented pricing supported by yield 
managementý is inconsistent with their public transport mission and politically untenable. Additionally, 
international travel depends on national infrastructures. 
Yield management in distribution channels can be seen as an essential mechanism which can 
make businesses compete 'freely' through electronic markets. However, it raises many questions and can 
misfire when used in rail transport. Among European tourism and transport companies, British Airways, 
Lufthansa, SNCF and the Club IvIdditerrande are the only ones generally acknowledged to have top-level 
expertise in CRS and yield management (Arthur Andersen 1997). SNCF is the only rail company but its 
currently unsuccessful transformation into an international rail distribution provider and organiser of 
travel and tourism (as opposed to tranSport)S2 can be attributed to the tensions between demand-oriented 
pricing and equal access to transport. 
Redefining rail transport as a service industry amenable to marketing and segmentation 
principles presents problems. Market segmentation and price differentiation are technically difficult to 
implement in railways. The travelling public is large and complex and these techniques can lead to a 
mixing of segments and a failure to distribute demand more evenly. Some claim that a transport 
revolution is in process [Messerlin 1997]. The responsibilities for local, national and global transport 
infrastructures, and the boundaries between commuting, leisure, business travel and tourism will probably 
be incrementally (Graham et al 1996) redefined and renegotiated before global electronic markets in 
trmport can operate. 
6.3.4 Information systems, managerialism and the segmentation of transport 
52 Note the presence of the words "Affaires" (business travel) and "Tourisme" in the Socrate acronym 
(,, Syst6me Offrant A la Clientale des Rdservations d'Affaires et de Tourisme en Europe") as well as the 
word "Europe". 
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The nature of SNCF and rail transport is being fundamentally affected by IT-supported large- 
scale information gathering. The re-conceptualisation of transport as a business has involved a change in 
organisational culture and a clash of discourses. The legitimation of managerial as opposed to engineering 
decision-making has been achieved through the introduction of a new language of economic rationality 
and performance or a 6market speak', typified by the replacement of public sector specialists with 
'generic' generalist managers. "This redefirtition is being accomplished with-the introduction of new 
inforLpation technologies which are designed to make visible the new accountability" [Doolin 1997]. The 
solution is being presented in terms of 'better management' and 'more information'. And "the 
introduction of a managed market represents a translation of the problem into one of competition in which 
tlýie market is delegated the task of ensuring economic value" [Bloomfield 1995]. However, information 
is not the product of some neutral recording activity. Such a recording of 'reality' makes it susceptible to 
evaluation, calculation and intervention. Appeals to 'common' market interests and attempts to make the 
information systems an obligatory passage point are equivalent to the solutions transforming the nature of 
the problern. 
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CHAPTER 7 
TOWARDS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVIST ACCOUNT 
OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS FAILURE 
This thesis has attempted to build a social constructivist account of an IS failure case study 
in order to find more complex and richer ways of describing and understanding the controversial use 
of IS in organisations. This has entailed the inclusion of broader social, economic, political, cultural 
and historical perspectives, as announced in thefirst research objecfive (Section 1.3.1). As such it is 
not directed towards finding solutions to the problems associated with IS failures, but instead 
attempts to provide a better understanding of what IS innovation represents and how it is constructed. 
This phenomenon is both a product of, and an influence upon, our society. We have shown that 
understanding the reasons for the implementation problems faced by a complex system such as 
Socrate is only possible through an interpretive, emergent and process perspective and a mixing of 
levels of analysis (Section 1.4.1). The analysis explores the interplay between technology, 
individuals, organisations and social structures and the following contextual factors were investigated 
(see Table 4-2): market, economics, politics and culture. As indicated below in bold italics, 
relationships can be established between technology, the micro level (individuals and groups), the 
organisational or meso level and the macro level (markets, economics, politics, culture). These three 
levels were outlined in Section 1.5.2 as Mecific research questions to investigate about technology 
and change at SNCF. 
The technical problems were found to relate to the more complex nature of rail market 
operations when compared to air transport markets - relationship between technology and 
markets; 
The economics of US and European air and rail transport differ in terms of intermodal and 
intramodal, as well as national and pan-European competition, and liberalisation measures 
vary amongst European states - relationship between organisation and economics; 
Politics was an important element in the opposition to pricing policies interpreted as forcing 
passengers onto the more expensive TGVs to the detriment of the 'classical' national 
regional lines, and leading to the desertification of peripheral zones. Other related political 
issues are pollution, fair competition, infrastructure and social costs and equality of access to 
Mnsport - relationship between organisation, politics and individuals; 
Cultural aspects were apparent in the view that the national rail network would be weakened 
if split, and that deregulation ignores the cultural and public service diff rences b e etween 
countries. Cultural issues also became evident when comparing the Socrate project with its 
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intecedent, the TGV. They relate to notions of national identity, modernism and progress - 
relationship between culture and technology; 
Organisational changes such as a shift in power relations and in the relative importance of 
certain professional groups (from engineers to marketing and computer staft), deskilling and 
work intensification, were seen to be related to the introduction of Socrate - reladonshiý 
: -, between technology and organisation; 
All these points illustrate the fact that implementing systems goes beyond simply dealing 
with technical issues. Contextual factors are interrelated, evolve rapidly and unpredictably, and it is 
difficult to state whether one is more influential than the others and to assess their relative 
importance. One major finding is that in transferring a technical solution from one context to another, 
SNCF was drastically underestimating the difficulties. Expecting technology to reproduce strategic 
solutions is simplistic. Technical solutions are not neutral, they carry with them assumptions about 
the context and they interact with contexts. One important contextual difference in this case was that 
deregulation affects more complex and multiple transport sectors simultaneously in Europe, unlike 
the US air deregulation which had an impact on national intramodal competition only. 
The second research objective (Section 1.3.2) was to explore how the social and the 
technical are combined and constructed using the controversial aspects of the case study. An effort 
was made to avoid deterministic accounts and perform a non-essentialist sociological analysis to 
describe the translations and negotiations leading to the Socrate new socio-technical actor network 
Section 1.5.1). Analytical insights are surnmarised below using actor- 
network theory and the concept of translation (Figure 1.2). 
7.1 A SERIES OF TRANSLATIONS: PARTIAL SUCCESSES AND FAILURES 
7.1.1 Strategic translation 
In borrowing US airline computerised reservation system techniques, SNCF had commercial 
and strategic objectives that were to increase yields per seat and control distribution channels. The 
rhetoric of IT-led competitive advantage, due in particular to the role of computerised reservation 
systems during US air deregulation in the 80s and the almost mythical legend of Sabre's strategic 
success at American Airlines, were very influential on the thinking of the company (Section 3.1.2). 
Acquiring a global distribution system in the early 90s was intended to provide SNCF with the first- 
mover advantage in the European rail electronic market. However. it is debatable whether the 
strategic coup that American Airlines accomplished with its computerised reservation system could 
be replicated. Whether American Airlines' experience over many years can be transplanted and 
duplicated in a different context is a question at the core of the local/global debate. 
The rhetoric of Sabre as a competitive weapon was translated by SNCF as a potential to gain 
market share against road and air transport through controlling European distribution channels. 
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Market demands were presented as the driving force by the Socrate founding father, Jean-Marie 
Metzler. Various technical and economic justifications were put forward too, e. g. the technical 
limitations of the previous system in dealing with reservation forecasts, which turned out to have 
been very optimistic (Section 3.1.1). As Knights and Murray [1997] point out, tensions surrounding 
IT management are related to complex sets of power, managerial and market relations; and involve 
the mobilisation of particular views of the market and technology in order to legitimate choices 
(Section 2.3-2). The emphasis on using information technology as a strategic weapon also illustrates 
how the technical and the social blend: IT simultaneously addresses and contributes to 'information 
intensive' market issues, for instance by constantly changing fare structures. 
Transferring a technical solution across two cultures (from the US to France) and across two 
different market sectors (from air to rail) assumes that technology is neutral and universal and that its 
identity and use can be managed and controlled. However, unexpected translations inevitably occur, 
due to different cultural and industrial contexts; as a result, and because the social and the technical 
interact the solution is perceived differently, alters and has unintended effects. In this case SNCF's 
belief that the Sabre technology could be transported to such a different cultural and industrial 
context seems simplistic with hindsight; as was their expectation that using this technology could 
reproduce the strategic advantage gained at American Airlines. It exposes the assumption that 
technology can solve social issues. 
7.1.2 The socio-technical role of yield management 
A significant SNCF qualitative objective was to acquire airlines commercial functionality. 
Computerised yield management and statistical techniques used in global distribution systems are 
critical in supporting commercial optimisation and complex differentiated pricing strategies (Section 
3.3). They also correspond to a deregulated transport model and lead to accounting for the 
profitability of each route thereby transforming routes into individual and competitive products 
(rather than a national network), and to the maxiniisation of capacity/revenue for profitable lines. For 
instance, yield management techniques were associated with the promotion of profitable high-speed 
trains that compete with planes over wealthy business customers. 
Demand-based discounting, differentiated pricing and restricted discounts through the 
choice of route, time of travel, type of train and purchasing method are related to a belief in the 
elimination of regulations hindering freely competing businesses. Through this discourse and through 
yield management, transport is being redefined as a service industry amenable to marketing and 
business principles, in contrast to 'old-fashioned' unnatural and artificial restrictions and regulations. 
However, this obscures a conflict between sellers who want flexibility of pricing and buyers who 
want stability and predictability of prices. The technical (yield management) is therefore intertwined 
with the social (pricing) and the power relations are obvious. As a passenger representative pointed 
out, the technology is not neutral: "once it is there you have to use it, it does things that could not be 
done before" (Section 3.5). 
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The chbice of Socrate as a strategy for SNCF is a translation of a particiilar reading of the 
social and political environment and corresponds to the development of a new technico-commercial 
actor network. Yet the subsequent translation of social practices through new pricing principles 
became problematic (see below and Chapter 5). 
It is also clear that adopting an American airline optimisation and pricing techniques was not 
just a matter of duplicating strategic success, but implied transferring the US air deregulation model 
to thc French rail situation, which is not problem-free. It has important implications for transport 
planning and cannot be isolated from current debates on European transport at large. 
7.1.3 Transport deregulation, economic relations and political translation 
Chapter 4 shows that the cross-cultural transfer of the deregulation model from the US air 
industry to the European transport industry is complex and politically controversial. Perhaps the most 
important characteristic of the European scene is that deregulation affects different transport sectors 
at the same time, as well as European countries differently, whereby US air deregulation had an 
impact on national intramodal competition only. The European context involves issues of 
infrastructures, concerning particularly trans-European high-speed trains, complementarity rather 
than competition, national and regional development and identities, traffic congestion, equal access to 
transport, and the conflicting and political notions of public transport and liberalised transport. 
"After deregulation US airfares became purely market-driven and as sensitive to supply and 
demand as a Middle Eastern bazaar. Airline prices no longer bore the slightest relation to the 
cost of providing the service, which was why a 300-rrffle trip beginning and ending at a hub 
airport might cost three times that of a 1000 mile trip through a hub airport. Instead airline 
pricing depended almost entirely on what the market in any place and at any moment could 
bear" [Petzinger 1995: 420]. 
Yet market prices cannot cover rail production factors and investments (equipment, stock, 
infrastructures); it is difficult to evaluate external costs; how these costs are perceived and accounted 
for is a major area of conflict [Descoutures 1992: 74]. External social costs are often borne by those 
who do not benefit from the activity [Perrow 1984: 341]. Harmonisation of the conditions of 
competition across road, rail and air modes is intricate and politically sensitive. 
Consequently, gaining strategic advantage in a context of increased intermodal, intramodal 
and cross-European competition is not as straightforward as it seems, is difficult to manage and 
control and is politically controversial since it has unintended social, cultural and economic effects 
and associated costs. These complex political translations explain some of the difficulties experienced 
when SNCF first implemented Socrate. Yield management as a technical object was endowed with 
the capacity to address economic and political objectives ('natural' competition with air) but ignored 
another less vocal activity, intramodal competition across trains. The former 'hides' the latter, 
resulting in an 'unintended effect'. 
A current unexpected outcome of the Socrate events (an unintended translation) is the 
redefinition and reorientation of SNCF as a low price mass public rail transport company, with recent 
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positive results'(Section 4.3.4). Divall [2000: 137] also found that when the British rail industry 
applied America's experience of diesel locomotives, "institutional, political, financial and economic 
factors of a domestic nature were far more significant", raising questions about technology transfer 
and global vs local solutions. He also found that the polemical reference to American experience by 
British rail managers and engineers contributed to the social construction of the debate. 
Pricing, customer ethos and consumer rationality 
Sophisticated pricing differentiation through yield management was interpreted by 
passengers as: increasing prices on trains in high demand; giving priority to high-speed trains; 
making connections with traditional intercity and regional trains difficult; producing confusing and 
obscure tickets and difficult ticket exchange conditions; making purchasing decisions complex and 
time-consuming; reducing the possibility of getting discounted tickets on some trains; enforcing 
compulsory reservations; and abandoning purchasing convenience, price stability and predictability. 
Marketing slogans such as "Progress is only worth when shared by all" and "An interactive dialogue 
to purchase your ticket" (Section 5.2.2) created poor public relations and contributed to a degradation 
of SNCF public image. 
This new marketing of train services construes transport needs as an individual consumer 
need and the onus is on the consumer to seek the right level of satisfaction and exhibit rational 
decision-making mediated via complex information technology. Whether the notion of individual 
consumption and commodification of needs is appropriate for collective goods such as train services 
remains questionable. Train services can be envisaged as a collective means of delivering individual 
services; but they also correspond to the more general notion of transport, in which the overall 
organisation of services, their cost, frequency, quality, safety etc., whatever the mode, is considered 
in the context of collective or societal goals. And reformulating power-knowledge relations in terms 
of individual consumer choice obscures the politics of distributing these goods. In their relationships 
with customers, organisations reflect and reproduce social inequalities [Knights el al 1997, Section 
2.3.2) 
Two examples of discourses about the changes initiated by Socrate are those of Jean-Marie 
Metzler, Socrate director, and of Jacques Fournier, SNCF presidený which both draw on technocratic 
notions of progress. The former argues that customers demand high speed sophisticated transport; the 
latter relates technology to social progress (Section 5.2.3). This vision of modernisation and progress 
as a 'natural trajectory, [after MacKenzie, see Section 2.2.1) also relates to the earlier TGV 
innovation, successfully introduced by Jean-Marie Metzler in 198 1. 
7.1.5 The TGV as an antecedent innovation: similar modern cultural connotations 
Revisiting the TGV technological innovation highlights common characteristics between the 
two projects: they both attempted to address a perceived decline in rail transport; became ideal 
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political Soluti6ns for SNCF survival; drew on cultural notions of modernity and progresS53; 
reconciled public service inissions and profit objectives; and relied on an integrated technico- 
administrative professional interface with the French State. Yet innovation is a complex and 
uncertain process and a situated construct subject to unpredictable results. Both innovation processes 
were situated in similar contexts, leading to similar negotiations, perceptions and conflicts. The TGV 
innovation became a social success through planned and unplanned elements and coinciding forces 
and actors. An effort was made to repeat this success. Yet similar processes led to a different result 
for Socrate. 
The TGV had formed minds to seeking similar solutions but at the same time it became a 
liandicap as it had itself changed the scene. The TGV was an 'antecedent' to Socrate: it is a non- 
human actor which 'struck back' [Latour 2000]. The TGV increased competition with air, and is a 
form of hybrid, a 'half train half plane, leading SNCF to seek plane-related solutions. It has 
unintended effects, for instance passengers use the new TGV Nord line to commute to work from 
Lille to Paris. This augments the blurring of boundaries between long distance, national, regional, 
regular and occasional travel (Section 5.1.3). TGVs have fixed capacity, one cannot add or withdraw 
a coach at the last minute, and the price of speed is a loss of flexibility (Section 5.3.4). SNCF was 
accused of having become obsessed with the TGV, with managing capacity through price 
differentiation and with market segmentation. 
Socrate as a non-human actor is also striking back. It raised important public debates about 
pricing, infrastructure costs and "aminagement du territoire", a French concept concerned with 
planning and development of the national territory and its regions. Socrate and the TGV were 
perceived as contributing to isolation and impoverishment of rural areas (Massif Central, Brittany) 
and environmental opposition to new TGV lines grew. Since the 1993 events, the obsession with 
TGVs is being replaced by investments in normal intercity and regional trains, complementarity 
rather than competition between intercity and high-speed trains, and a new emphasis on mass public 
a-4mport (Section 4.3A). Pricing differentiation has been simplified as a result, making yield 
management partly redundant. Changes were made to simplify and clarify the ticketing and pricing 
tactics [Bobasch 1997], public relations were improved and SNCF now consults consistently with 
passengers' associations and the general public [Jakubyszyn 1996e]. The translation to a new 
customer ethos has not been achieved, for the time being. 
7.1.6 Organisational culture, systems and actors and managerial transformation 
An organisational objective of the Socrate project was to transform the company through the 
automation and integration of all functions to ensure a flexible management of resources, and to 
increase the reliability and productivity of sales and distribution. This entailed an organisational 
translation to a managerial and commercial perspective for organisational actors. Various 
management programmes were initiated to change a traditionally functional, 'corporatist' and 
hierarchical organisation to a decentralised, accountable and entrepreneurial company. Outsourcing, 
53 "Democracy through speed" and "Speed for everyone" for the TGV (see Note 33 Section 5.3.2). 
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performance indicators, cross-functional management, product oriented organisafional restructuring, 
purchaser/provider relationships, changing working conditions, flexible remuneration and promotion 
were some of the managerial techniques employed (Section 6.1.1). In parallel, social and 
organisational culture reforms were instigated: participatory management, empowerment, social 
dialogue and decision-making supported by information systems. 
These organisational changes were received with scepticism for various reasons. Some 
conservatism was still present in the company and clashes appeared between the older traditional 
middle managers and the younger careerist entrepreneurial executives. Authority had been based on 
administrative or technical legitimacy and the new competencies (commercial, marketing and 
computing) representing 'managerialist' rhetoric and practices tend to provoke professional and 
social resistance (Section 6.1.2). Traditionally good staff and union relations and consultative 
mechanisms worsened leading to a progressive breakdown in communications. Union actions became 
more political and united (Section 6.1.3). 
Contradictions between short-term cost cutting measures, unrealistic targets and the 
participatory corporate rhetoric fed disillusions, pessimism and anxiety. All the following contributed 
to internal tensions over the introduction of Socrate: increasing rivalries between segmented intercity 
and regional divisions (Section 6.1.4); poorly ran pilot tests and lack of user involvement (Section 
6.2-1); inappropriate training and user-computer interface; new sales teams management methods 
(Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3); a changed and difficult dialogue between sales staff and clients in 
conditions of job cuts and ticket office closures. The traditional tripartite balance between the 
governmentý management and the unions was challenged and an alliance between unions and 
passengers became logical. Unions were also adamant that technology was not to be blamed and 
suggested more socially responsible and customer orientated ways of using Socrate (Section 6.2.4). 
The essentially contestable nature of organisational relations is clearly shown here: SNCF 
and its president Jacques Fournier were caught in the power relations and contradictions between the 
government's political indecision, financial pressures and social needs. Strategy and change are a 
contested terrain of discourse rather than a description of a rational process or a prescription for 
rational action, as Drummond [1996] found in the Taurus failure case (Section 2.1.4). The choice of 
Socrate as an organisational solution conflicted with existing conditions, cultures and skills and it did 
not build upon them. Similarly, in her exploration of the Challenger disaster, Vaughan [ 1996] found 
that a business ideology had emerged and clashed with the complex and unruly characteristics of 
NASA technical culture (Section 2.1.5). 
Jean-Marie Metzler's vision was more technocratic, top-down and strategic than Fournier's 
emphasis on organisational reforms. Yet both would agree that it was right for SNCF to equip itself 
with powerful and 'modem' management tools represented by Socrate and these were presented as 
neutral and inevitable. The Moissonnier [1993: 7] government report on the Socrate events claimed 
that all "surrounding" tensions and problems were "crystal I ised" on Socrate, thereby exonerating the 
technology by making it an "unfortunate scapegoat"; and that the justification and rejection of the 
new commercial philosophy were "another problem" [Moissonnier 1993: 6], a clear example here of 
separating neutral managerial technologies from the socio-political domain. The attempt to replace 
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the old pýblic sirvice organisatioml culture by a technocratic and commercial one54 via trianagerial 
technologies floundered. As Truex et al [1999: 118] assert, organisations, structure and systems are 
emergent, socially constructed and reproduced; "but nothing is ever reproduced in quite the same 
way" . 
7.1.7 Potential IT-induced market restructuring and electronic markets - 
The rnarket transfonnations instigated by Socrate represent an erosion of the French 
traditional notions of equality of access and public transport. They are derived from - as well as 
reinforce - the deregulation movement currently sweeping from the US across Europe. With Socrate, 
its yield management techniques and its Aristote and Thai& components, SNCF can use optimisation 
software to increase flexibility and marketability of route segments in order to adapt to, as well as 
bring about, increased competition. 
Socrate and yield management software are still in use - even if not fully applied yet - and 
SNCF is developing expertise in yield management software logic and programs and accumulating 
travel and customer data. The problem may be seen by some as one of marketing and public relations 
Clrebuilding trust and public image" as expressed in the Moissonnier report [1993]): oncepassengers 
are enticed into new buying and travelling patterns, Socrate will enable SNCF to significantly 
increase its market share and become the leading rail transport company in Europe, as firstly 
intended. This view identifies only one aspect - customers' cultural habits - as the obstacle. It 
neglects many other contextual factors. It overlooks what other European air and rail companies may 
do; how European, national and regional development policies will evolve; what emphasis various 
governments will put on road programmes; what influence environmental groups may have; how 
national differences may affect travelling; and how distribution in the travel and tourism industry will 
evolve. It is difficult to bypass complex contextual factors, to anticipate reactions to systems, and to 
predict how market structures will change. And it remains to be seen whether Socrate can be used to 
successfully implement an ambitious pan-European business strategy in the transport sector. 
On the other hand, one event following on from Socrate was the SNCF split between 
infrastructures and operations (Section 43A). These new organisational forms and their integrated 
information systems are more flexible and correspond to a more refi relations accounting of med O-D 
use of infrastructures and passenger contributions towards costs (Section 6.3.1). This could facilitate 
open access to national infrastructures to international operators (Section 6.3.2). Despite a 
reformulation of transport as a mass public systern, a simplification of pricing and a partial 
abandonment of yield management after the Socrate events, liberalisation of freight transport has 
started through the creation of rail 'freeway corridors' open to competitors in France and Europe. 
These make use of computerised reservation systems (Section 43.5). With the separation of 
infrastructures and operations, the issue of passenger pricing is being transposed to differentiated 
charging of operators (higher fees for using busy and modernised tracks) and its ensuing complex and 
54 As Laederich [ 1993] put it: "Ies dieux Service Public et Usagers remplacds par les dieux 
Rentabilitd et Technocratie" (the gods Public Service and Users replaced by the gods Profitability and 
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contested"(see Section 4.3.1) relationship to infrastructure costing [Bonnafous ei al 1996). It is not 
clear ye t whether this mechanism will act as a market regulator, how it will affect passenger pricing 
and the existing organisational forms [Bonnafous and Seligmarm 1996]. What is certain is that IT 
networks will play an important role in the reconfiguration. of the transport industry; one of the aims 
is that online systems will support 'free' competition on the same tracks (Section 4.4.2). And large- 
scale data gathering for accounting and marketing purposes can enable individual market segments to 
be aqcounted for separately and therefore made exchangeable (Section 6.3.2). 
It will also depend on the evolution of the travel and tourism industry at large, which is 
being transformed into an intensely competitive, global arena, highly dependent on international 
aistribution channels (Section 63.3). The long-term threat facing travel agents is the possibility of 
direct sales from tour operators, hotels and transport companies to the consumer [Arthur Andersen 
1997: 45]. The advance of on-line information systems makes this threat particularly relevant. 
Together with yield management and the ongoing efforts to control operations and distribution costs, 
boundaries between transport, travel and tourism [Page 1998] will need to be redefined before global 
electronic markets in transport can be fully operational. In a political context of conflicting market 
and non-market principles, the future effect of global electronic travel markets on European transport 
industries and the role of national policy-makers remain unknown. Will national transport policy. 
making be replaced with technology-supported free global markets? (Section 4.4.2). 
Technology does make certain social relations stable; "technology is congealed social 
relations" [Willcocks and Grint 1997; see discussion in Section 1.43). Information technologies and 
electronic markets are intervening in the management of commercial and non-commercial 
multimodal transport activities. Information is being used as a surrogate for free, contestable and 
global electronic markets. Technology is, if not a causal explanation, at least a condition of 
possibility for global market restructuring. Instead of seeking cause and effiect relationships, one can 
state that the technology is a condition and a consequence of market changes, or in other words, it 
both allows and arises from market changes (Section 4.4.1). However, no market is a homogeneous 
entity; the notion of market is a way to manage interests and resolve conflicts. As Bloomfield [1995) 
expresses it: "The introduction of a managed market represents a translation of the problem into one 
of competition in which the market is delegated the task of ensuring economic value". Appeals to 
, common' market interests and attempts to make the information systems an obligatory passage point 
are equivalent to the solutions transforming the nature of the problem (Section 6.3.4). When you 
have a hammer everything looks like a nail 
7.2 FAILURE AND TRANSLATION 
Exploring the problematic introduction of Socrate by examining the various translation 
attempts across actors helped remove beliefs and assumptions of obviousness usually associated with 
technology implementation. The analysis used the notion of translation to follow how the project was 
carried across, re-interpreted, translated and enrolled actors (or not) from one position to another, 
between micro-, organisational and macro- levels: increasing rail reservation capacity; borrowing 
Technocracy). 
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airline pricing; 'attempting to change passengers' buying and travelling behaviour; transforming the 
organis ation and the professional ethos of sales staff, associating Socrate to the high-speed train 
TGV; accumulating customer data; identifying profitable market segments; restructuring the French 
Railways organisation and the rail network; and exploiting electronic reservation markets. It was also 
found that introducing yield management techniques in a complex social, political, econon-: iic and 
organisational situation such as SNCF and French society at large is not problem-free. It is not clear 
which shape this techno-economic network will take and how it will stabilise, since some of the 
actors' re-interpretations led to unexpected results, a significant one being the redefinition and 
reorientation of SNCF as a low price mass public rail transport company. 
Actor-network theory and the sociology of translation helped describe how the attempts at 
translation and alignment of interests around the development of computerised reservation systems at 
SNCF were a relative failure. Failures can be seen to occur when "the necessary translation of the 
system is problematic and a stable network of aligned interests is not yet developing" [Aarts et al 
2000: 5181- Social contexts are "complex imbroglios of human and non-human components 
[which) represent the intricacies of the different stakeholders". [Pouloudi and Whitley 2000]. In ANT 
a given work situation is considered as a network of interrelated people, machines, paperwork and 
architectures which together produce practices. "The assumption is not that a machine is a true actor 
in a humanist sense; rather the assumption is that only by taking the active roles of all these entities 
into account can we hope to understand the functioning of the work practice and the interrelations 
between its constituents" [Berg 2000: 489]. Constituents in this case study were an imbroglio of 
human actors: individuals (managers, engineers, sales staff) and groups (government, staff unions, 
passengers) and their associated identities and meanings; and non-human actors: trains, stations, 
tracks, tickets, computers, software, user interfaces, fare structures. ANT is a strategy for unpacking 
the complexity of our everyday life. Abbreviations, short-circuits and simplifications are always 
produced. They are the result of a successful mobilisation process with black-boxing effects. 
"The ordering these simplifications produce is neither neutral nor 'obvious'. They are made 
obvious or natural in order to achieve an effect - namely to curb opposition or alternatives. 
For example, the utterly 'obvious' requirement for global information infrastructures to tidy 
up the existing mess, fragmentation, and local variety is not obvious at all; it is constructed 
as obvious" [Monteiro 2000: 82]. 
The boundaries between social and technical actors are constructed as a result of this 
simplification process. Translations succeed when simplifications are accepted as obvious. Yield 
management, as well as being a non-human socio-technical actor, is an example of a simplification 
that failed to become obvious or natural. There were disputes about the nature of the problems it 
addressed and on the reality it inscribed: profitability, deregulation, competition, accountability, 
segmentation, organisational flexibility, pricing, selling, buying and travelling. And as a solution, 
yield management (and TGVs before it) also transformed the nature of the problern. 
ANT has been criticised for only providing amoral and apolitical descriptive accounts of 
contingencies (Section 2.2.5) and one objective of this thesis was to complement this approach by 
including power and interest issues. The manner in which problems are defined, negotiated and 
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maybe shýTed as 'common' (Section 2.2.3) is political and "many historians of technology seek to 
explore how this politics shaped the very standards by which historical actors judged the success or 
otherwise of technical change" [Divall 1999: 100). The next section uses Clegg's [1989] theoretical 
framework (Section 2.3.4) to analyse the case study according to the episodic, social and system 
circuits of power. 
7.3 -,,, FAILURE AND POWER 
Elements of Clegg's power framework help identify empowered and disempowered agencies [Silva 
rl 997: 93]. The three 'circuits of power' were introduced in Section 2.3.4. Ile misodic circuit deals 
with causal power and helps answer the following questions: who are the agencies engaged in power 
struggles? What are their standing conditions? What are their projected outcomes? The 120c-ial 
integration circuit deals with dispositional power and concentrates on: What is the general attitude 
towards innovation? What are the institutional mechanisms that legitimate the adoption of 
innovations? And the syste integration circuit (facilitating power) deals with questions such as: 
What are the techniques and technologies adopted to ensure compliance? Who controls the 
innovation? Who are the disempowered and empowered agents as the result of adopting innovations? 
Silva [19971 combined Clegg's circuits of power and the sociology of translation to analyse 
several case studies including the London Ambulance Services Computer Aided Dispatching System; 
he found that IS adoption in organisations responds greatly to enviromnental uncertainties (or 
exogenous contingencies) rather than to a rationality based on calculations [Silva 1997: 96]. 
affect the social and system integration circuits and the ones relevant to the 
Socrate case study are summarised in Table 7.1. The subsequent tables apply each circuit of power to 
the case study. 
Table 7.1 Exogenous contingencies 
ExogenOus contingencies Changes In System Integration Changes In Social Integration 
Transport crisis Cost cutting Staff cuts 
SNCF deficit Increasing sales productivity Poor staff relations 
European deregulation From public service to selling ethos 
High speed rail networks 
Managerial discourses available: Yield management for price New relationships to passengers 
. CpS and strategic advantage 
differentiation Redefinition of sales jobs 
- New management techniques 
Accounting and marketing data Flexible use of resources 
Uncertain climate 
Changing authority and legitimacy 
The episodic power table (Table 7.2) shows that the strong position held by SNCF 
management, given their resources and their authority for decision making, was not sufficient to 
produce a successful information system. They failed because the circuits of system and social 
integration were not fixed in a successful obligatory passage point. 
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Table 7.2 Episodic power 
Social Relations Agencies Means and Resources Targeted agencies 
Government Socrate management team Authority, discretion on Passengers 
SNCF top management policies and plans, financial Sales staff 
resources 
Direction Commerciale IT staff Execution of operations, Socrate management 
Voyageurs Sales staff discretion on operations, (system design and use, 
membership of trade union consultation, training) 
SNCF management 
(salaries, promotions) 
sales staff Passengers Some discretion on buying Resisting new purchasing 
SNCF marketing and Passenger associations and travelling behaviour habits 
communications SNCF public image 
Figure 7.1 shows the power struggle in the episodic circuit [Silva 1997: 98]. Particular 
agencies attempt to interest and enrol other agencies in their programmes. Power factors contribute 
either to stabilise or unsettle the obligatory passage point (OPP), the Socrate systern. 
SNCF te 
B'99 manage 
prorits 
ment strategy 
Agency 
Power over 
Intentional outcome 
Sales Sell Passen- Accept staff ............... gers new 
I 
more prices 
Figure 7.1 Power struggle in episodic circuit55 
The new information system did not support social integration (Table 7.3). The new rules 
stenuning from the new tasks were not translated successfully and the introduction of the system 
created a gap between management on the one hand, and sales staff and passengers on the other hand. 
Socrate influenced the way employees interpreted management style and objectives. Staff interpreted 
the system as a threat to their identity, their understanding of their work and of the organisation; 
nianagers interpreted staff attitudes and actions as a lack of collaboration and resistance. These 
55 Arguably, there is no 'power over' relationship between SNCF management and the Socrate team; 
SNCF management did have power over the project team whilst negotiating its approval. However, 
according to most interviewees, the Socrate team then seems to have become an almost independent 
and powerful unit of its own (partly due to Metzler's charismatic influence and his convincing 
argumentation but also for strategic reasons). Support from SNCF management seems to have been 
almost unconditional for most of the project life, until the implementation difficulties. Indeed, those 
difficulties have been blamed in some quarters on the isolation and technocratism of the Socrate 
team, which became driven and insensitive to operational problems. 
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contradictory interpretations hindered social integration, making it difficult for management to adjust 
their dispositional power. 
Table 7.3 Social integration 
Discourse affecting rules of Interpretation: Interpretation: 
meaning and membership SNCF management 'Sales staff 
Z. 
-SNCF has to become a competitive Socrate for strategic advantage Lack of training 
company"36 Opposition to new commercial policy 
encapsulated in user interface 
No improvement of qualifications and 
work conditions 
-SNCF has to become a flexible 
" 
New sales teams management Object to now sales team management 
entrepreneurial organisation New organisational culture Contradictions between staff cuts and Organisational restructuring empowerment 
Managerial legitimacy questioned 
Socrale to introduce yield management Socrale will increase control over Resist new pricing structures and 
and new prices operations and distribution costs selling practices Old fashioned uncooperative unions Unions oppose changes to public Organisational resistance service mission 
Expected results not achieved "Sales staff do not know how to sell Sales targets unrealistic 
Passengers' resistance using Socrate" Staff cuts and closure of ticket offices 
Rebuild public trust but keep system Worsened dialogue with clients 
Split infrastructures and operations Formed alliance with passengers 
lie system integration circuit (Table 7.4) concentrates on techniques of control, discipline 
and production. The major effect on control and discipline was that the selling transaction was taken 
from sales staff and programmed into the new information system; new tasks and new rules were 
introduced. Organisational measures that accompanied the system increased the disruption brought 
by the system. The system undermined control and expertise, leading to new empowered and 
disenipowered agencies. 
Table 7.4 System integration 
Innovations In techniques of 
production and control 
Empowered agencies Disempowered agencies 
New reservation, pricing and ticketing Yield management experts decide Sales staff lost control over dialogue 
system availability and fares with client Commercial managers establish sales Targets perceived as unrealistic 
targets 
New accounting and marketing Accounting staff check costs Operations managers become 
information gathering IT staff integrate information across accountable 
functions 
56The sentences in quotes were heard repeatedly in inforrml conversations and during interviews and 
seern to surnmarise the organisational discourse drawn upon. 
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Kestructuring and tighter management 'Generic' managers allocate resources Technical special ists and engineers lost 
control legitimacy and expertise 
An obligatory passage point (OPP) involves at least two agencies: one proposes it to 
another. An OPP consists of strategies, discourses and artefacts that the other agencies must accept if 
they vant to solve their particular problems and fulfil their interests. OPPs represent the translated 
interests, identities and roles of agents. Socrate was an OPP linking and translating different actors, 
management, sales staff, passengers, IT and yield management experts, and their interests or goals, 
strategic advantage, profit maximisation, sales staff working conditions and skills, passengers' ease 
of purchase and fair prices, data accumulation (Figure 7.2). If the problematisation of the project is 
successful and accepted by the agencies the OPP becomes indispensable. Intdressement when 
successful, besides consolidating the identities of the agencies as proposed in the problematisation, 
interposes devices to isolate the agencies from potential competitors (different OPPs). Failure occurs 
when problematisation does not yield intdressement [Silva 1997: 212]. The plain lines in Figure 7.2 
denote a successful problematisation and the dotted ones an unsuccessful problematisation. 
AGENCIES GOALS 
SNCF 
---V, 
To provide strategic advantage 
management Socrate as an To Increase profits 
Sales -------------- --------- 00 
Obligatory 
Passage -------- 
* To facilitate sales transactions 
staff To Improve qualifications and Point conditions 
A6 
passengers Ease of purchase and fair prices 
IT and yield -1-11 
1 Accumulate customer data 
management exPerts 
Figure 7.2 Obligatory passage point 
SNCF management translated transport deregulation and governmental pressures into using 
technology to gain strategic advantage. The Socrate team translated this into techniques and 
strategies enacted by a system to increase profitability through yield management. Commercial 
expertise was inscribed in the form of new pricing rules and a new user-computer interface. 
Passengers were also translated into the system as rational customers. Sales staff and passengers did 
not go through the OPP the way they were expected to. If they were to be enrolled, it had to be the 
result of negotiations, unless enforced enrolment and intdressement are exerted (for instance through 
using authority or to keep one's job). To analyse the mobilisation of agencies is to analyse the 
processes by which these agencies end up being represented by spokespersons or actors, including 
non-human. The stability of the network of agencies and passage point will depend on the stability of 
the relationship between spokesperson and agency. If this relationship is not achieved, agencies will 
opt for dissidence rather than mobilisation [Silva 1997: 217-218]. For example, sales staff did not 
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carry out the intentions of the Socrate team of selling more and differently, and formed an alliance 
with the customers. 
The circuits of power combined with the sociology of translation can help identify whether 
and how the information system became an obligatory passage point, and discuss the power factors 
that contributed to stabilise or unsettle the Opp. Silva [1997: 222] found that various scenarios can 
fail or succeed. Low system and social integration may hinder the adoption of an information system 
as an OPP [Silva 1997: 223]. Conversely, even if there is strong integration of facilitative (system) 
and dispositional (social) power, it does not guarantee that the innovation will become an OPP. It will 
also depend on the political ability of the proposing agency to deploy resources (causal power) to 
jither convince or force other agencies to enrol in the proposal. Neither facilitative nor dispositional 
powers were integrated with the causal power held by SNCF management. 
The Socrate team successfully problematised Socrate for SNCF management. Intdressement 
of some agencies (Direction Commerciale, marketing and accounting staff, new entrepreneurial 
executives) was also achieved. However, enrolment and mobilisation (by persuasion or force) of sales 
staff and passengers did not succeed: resources were perceived to be unequal, objectives as unfair, 
persuasion failed, and force was not used in an antagonistic climate. Being in a position of authority 
and having access to resources is not enough. Staff and unions (and customers) had dispositional 
power too. In fact, there was a reversal of power and backtracking in the use of the systern. 
7A COMPARING WITH TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF IS FAILURE: 
POTENTIAL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
Together, the sociology of translation and the power circuits framework provide explanatory 
power about IS failure, or IS institutionalisation as argued by Silva (19971. The social, system and 
episodic power circuits highlight how power factors influence success and failure, as illustrated 
above, and IS adoption in general. These theoretical approaches help focus on understanding the 
nature of work and the context in which IS are implemented. The social and system integration 
circuits in particular clearly establish links between IS and managerial disciplinary production 
techniques, which corresponds to an interest in a more critical approach (Sections 1.4.2 and 2.3.2 
review some of the critical management studies literature). Social integration encompasses formal 
and informal authority - e. g. sales staff not believing SNCF sales targets, or sales managers not 
having technical legitimacy with sales staff (Section 6.2.3) - and helps see why agents were not 
enrolled. Identifying organisational groupings and links between representatives and groups 
represented, or considering resistance as legitimate, help emPhasise power as a complex and hidden 
phenomenon. This emphasis on power and politics compensates for the limitations of ANT outlined 
in Section 2.2.5 (considered as amoral and apolitical) since it examines power relations between 
agencies and how they become dis/empowered. 
7A. 1 The questionable notion of failure 
More generally, the analysis of failure presented in this thesis is very different from the ones 
usually found in the IS literature reviewed in Section 2.1. A more mainstream IS analysis would for 
instance maintain that a socio-technical approach to the development and implementation of the 
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system w6uld have avoided the failure [Beynon-Davies 1995). In fact, Adams and Cahen (1997; see 
Section 6.2.1] argue that user involvement would have led to the failure of Socrate. And we found 
that user involvement was only a minor concern compared to (Section 6.2.1) other numerous 
organisational problems at SNCF. Another possible interpretation could be that project management 
was inadequate; this partially explains the initial data input problems and software bugs (Section 
3.2.1) and rushed pilots (Section 3.2.1). Yet there were much more fundamental reasons for 
disregarding the input of less common O-D relations, for instance, which were of a strategic and 
commercial nature (Section 3.1.2). These traditional interpretations only stress system integration. 
Other managerialist interpretations would f or instance claim that the IS and business 
sirategies were not aligned, that the configurational fit was not achieved, that there was no leadership, 
or that the company did not know how to manage change (Sections 1.3.1.2.1.3 and 2.1.4). These 
explanations may seem commonsensical but remain supe I rficial. What particular change? Why was it 
problematic? Where did this change come f rom? This ignores for instance how commercial and 
market principles influenced and were represented in the information system. These managerialist 
interpretations only stress social integration. 
For the last decade or so, many IS researchers have recognised 'contextual factors' (Section 
2.1.3) as the main reason for failure: "The major risks and reasons for failure tend to be through 
organizational, social and political rather than technical factors" [Willcocks and Griffiths 1994: 208]. 
These authors identify such factors as: lack of strategic framework, lack of organisational adaptation, 
poor management of change, too much faith in the 'technical fix, lack of skills. Some of these apply 
to the Socrate project, which it could be argued, also suffered from problems associated with large- 
scale projects: large number of divisions, large size, high complexity, newness of technologies, 
environmental turbulence [Willcocks and Griffiths 1994: 213]. 
These authors suggest a 'risk' framework to establish learning points on the management of 
major projects which consists of five key areas: a) governance, b) project management, c) market 
need/econornic survival, d) learning and e) risk prediction and management (Willcocks and Griffiths 
1994: 221-2231. 
a) The Socrate project certainly could have benefited from better governance whereby "major 
stakeholders organise themselves to establish objectives, allocate resources and make 
decisions" [Willcocks and Griffiths 1994: 22 1 ]. But this understanding ignores power issues. 
Stakeholders are not all equals as demonstrated in the previous section and illustrated in 
Section 6.1; some are disempowered so they are not in a position to contribute to decisions. 
Drummond [1996] found that constant involvement of all stakeholders led Taurus to 
continue with the project when it should have been abandoned (Section 2.1.4) which 
contradicts this recommendation. 
b) Better "balancing of top-down and bottom-up project management" [Willcocks and Griffiths 
1994: 222] would have been nice in theory, but again this assumes equal participation of 
actors and reconcilable interests at different hierarchical levels and in different 
organisational divisions. 
c) Market need and economic survival was an area of enormous controversy, as presented in 
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Chapter 4. 
d) SNCF had learned lessons from the past TGV success and tried to build upon it and adopted 
incremental innovation; in this respect this case study is more similar to the Challenger 
experience where NASA banked on past technical achievements to its detriment (Section 
2.1.5). So this last recommendation is not particularly relevant to the Socrate project and in 
fact is ill-founded as contexts change, including as a result of the previous innovation. In 
fact Willcocks and Griffiths [1994: 223] refer here to IT learning, skills, etc. rather than 
organisational or innovation learning in general. In this respect SNCF managed the software 
project appropriately and its alliance with AMR was successful in transferring yield 
management expertise for instance (Section 3.2.1). 
e) Finally, Willocks and Griffiths (1994: 223-224) propose a method for predicting and 
managing risk, which they claim moves away from "ahistorical, acontextual and aprocessual 
forms of risk analysis". It consists in assessing the following areas that contribute to the 
'riskiness' of computerisation: 
the history of IS success and failure in the organisation; 
the external context (government support, use of suppliers and consultancies, maturity 
of technology, market demand); 
the internal context (organisational structure, strategy, human resources, management, 
stakeholders analysis, employee relations, IT infrastructures); 
the content of the project (size, complexity, uncertainty); 
the process (governance, project managementý user training, time span, IT skills); 
the risk outcomes (cost time, technical performance, benefits and impact, market 
acceptance). 
These certainly broaden the understanding of failure and include imny aspects of relevance 
to the Socrate project i. e. government support, internal context, complexity, market acceptance. 
Retrospectively, these explain some of the difficulties faced. It is very debatable whether they could 
have been better managed and avoided at the time. The assumption that lessons can be learned from 
failures once all these factors are taken into consideration betrays a belief that "human and cultural 
factors (can be] managed" [Willcocks and Griffiths 1994: 212] and that future failures can therefore 
be prevented by predicting and managing risk. Efforts to combat ahistorical, acontextual and 
aprocessual outlooks are welcome. However, these are lin-dted as they only concern the history of IS 
in the Organisation and the immediate external context surrounding the Organisation. In the Socrate 
project a major finding was the importance of a previous non-IS technological innovation, the TGV; 
history of innovation at large is therefore relevant. External actors of extreme importance were 
European actors and French society, particularly passengers. In terms of process, the process of 
managerial transformation associated with the introduction of the system was also crucial. One could 
conclude that these 'factors' should be added to Willcocks and Griffiths's list to ensure they are 
managed next time round, so the list gets longer and longer... 
The problem here is the basic premýise of the possibility of managing failure and risk, which 
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is treated as ob-6ous. In fact it is apolitical and managerialist: any management'effort consists of 
power actions that can always have unintended and uncontrollable effects. This apolitical premise 
corresponds to Imodemist' and instrumental assumptions in management theories, as argued by 
57 
critical management theorists (Section 23). In fact, the notion of failure itself is questionable 
Having gained a deep understanding of this particular case study and having tried to relate it to IS 
failure research, I believe that there are no generic solutions to failures, and that the search for these 
is problematic and managerialist in itself. What I find more valuable and feel more cominitted to is 
Ide-naturalisation': the idea that these notions (e. g. failure and also risk [Scott 1998]) which take on a 
natural appearance are in fact complex and contingent historical constructions. Their power comes 
ýom their status as 'natural'. Management (and failure, which could be seen as a subset of 
management) is such a construction The point is not that these notions are 'good' or 'bad'58 but that 
they articulate, and are enmeshed in, particular worldviews which foreclose alternative forms of 
social organisation. What is more interesting is unravelling how, why and with what effects. Social 
constractivism helps in doing this, particularly in seeing the differentiation between what is technical 
and what is social as a matter of power [Silva 1997: 225]. Management and IS implementation are 
social constructions filled with history and political motives, as illustrated on many occasions in this 
thesis. 
7.4.2 IS research: richness vs rigour 
These issues relate to current debates on the nature of IS research. Hirschheirn and Klein, 
two of the IS "great wise men" [Hirschheim and Klein 2000.244, their expression which can be taken 
as ironicalj, recently complained that: 
"it now appears as if IS research has come full circle by returning to new forms, of story 
telling (the politically correct term is, of course, 'narratives'). Whereas the new story telling 
movement can point to much better and more explicit philosophical grounding than 'the 
great wise men, had for their stories, this does not necessarily make them more general". 
They thus place the debate in terms of richness versus rigour: rich accounts or stories do 
not provide rigorous general fi indings". Related debates in the IS field have occurred in the last few 
years over qualitative versus quantitative research methods. Assuming that results from a rich case 
study such as the Socrate story should 
be generalisable and transposable to other contexts betrays 
beliefs similar to the ones outlined above; and of course, nothing is every reproduced in quite the 
same way. It also leads to what I think is a false debate. IS researchers, like all other contemporary 
57 This is connected to the idea that in fact there are only partial or relative successes and failures. It 
depends on interpretations. Socrate was seen as a success by some executives and yield rnanagement 
experts: they thought that the system put SNCF in a much stronger position, and they were certain 
that the system would provide competitive advantage and useful data in the future; on the other hand, 
passengers, some staff and unions would say it was a failure as extreme pricing differentiation was 
withdrawn, ticketing was simplified, and yield management not fully exploited. 
58 it is difficult for management to avoid a technologically deterministic way of acting and thinking 
since the demand for profits almost always pushes management towards 'quick fixes' of the kind that 
technology appears to promise [Knights and McCabe 2000: 169]. 
59 It is also strange to establish such a dichotomy, which implies that rigour cannot be rich or richness 
rigorous... 
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social science fesearchers, should consider the constructed nature of people' and reality; the 
negotiated and problematic status of discourse; the power/knowledge connection; and the fluid 
boundaries between knowledge, technology and action in the contemporary world [Alvesson and 
Deetz 2000]. Methods to research IS in organisations are not only to do with rational, neat and 
orderly accumulation of cleaned, streamlined, rationalised and non-contradictory accounts. More than 
particular techniques and procedures, method is a mode or framework for engaging with empirical 
matetial; how one attends to social reality; what vocabularies are used in clarifying and reinterpreting 
what emerges in the voices of the members of the research site; how to cope with ambiguities and 
contradictions. 
"Methods is thus not primarily a matter of 'data management' or the mechanics and logistics 
of data production, but is a reflexive activity where empirical material calls for careful 
interpretation, a process in which the theoretical, political and ethical issues are central" 
[Alvesson and Deetz 2000: 5). 
Contradictions and conflicts cannot be elicited through surveys or questionnaires or 'quick 
and dirty' case studies with a few isolated variables. In-depth case study 'data' is essential to study 
power. An interpretive approach is also necessary to elicit organisational members' interpretations of 
erent structures of power and authority [Silva 1997: 234]. Research access and rapport need to i the diff 
be carefully and constantly cared for in order to grasp the politics of the organisation. I also found 
that adopting a neutral position was counterproductive and some interviewees in fact responded better 
to their views being probed (whilst not in a confrontational manner). Secondary sources proved 
particularly useful to understand the organisation and its broader environment and in putting 
interview material in context. Internal documents (memos, consultants' reports, meetings minutes as 
well as union documentation and technical reports) help grasp the nature of project, its chronology, 
decisions by committees, who were the Prime movers, what were the major phases, how it 
progressed, etc. External sources such as government and press reports, transport and academic 
literature were crucial to appreciate the specif ic nature of the industry. Building an impression of the 
organisational climate was probably the most difficult part and it is almost impossible to describe 
how that takes place. Small ethnographic details like where interviewees go for lunch, how they 
dress, where and how they meet you, what vocabulary they use, what analogies they make, the types 
of offices they work in and what objects they keep, all help build a picture. Interviewing 
organisational members at all levels and from different functions (not just IS but also marketing, 
human relations, public relations, commercial, strategy, sales) as well as external actors (passengers' 
associations, travel and transport experts) is essential to capture as many voices as possible. Asking 
about their previous positions, achievements and personal relationships to the organisation helps 
profile organisational characteristics too (see Appendix 2). These techniques can facilitate 
interviewees sharing their views on power relations and politics. Ideally, I would also have liked to 
use participant observation, for instance sit on technical, commercial and union meetings and spend 
time in ticket offices or training sessions. This was not possible due to time constraints. Variety of 
data and sources can mitigate limitations associated with researcher's bias. Another difficult area is to 
be self-reflective about one's own bias. I share an attachment and interest in SNCF like most French 
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people thit relatýs to my French identity and my conception of the French nationil territory. I felt it 
made me empathise with organisational members and their difficulties but it is harder to pinpoint 
where this was a disadvantage and how it coloured data collection and reinterpretation. 
7.4.3 The problem with exogenous contingencies: macro, meso, micro 
"Implementation of technical and organisational change is an active process of innofusion, 
reinvention and mutual adaptation, an emergent process of bounded rationality, 
unpredictable consequences and normal accidents, and a political'process of mobilisation, 
choice and negotiation. An improved understanding of this implementation process needs to 
capture its complex, paradoxical character, rather than reduce it to simple rules of 
formulae. New conceptual frameworks and explanatory models are required to guide future 
research and action" [Badham et al 2000: 160]. 
Social constructivism did provide a conceptual framework to analyse technical change and 
innovation at SNCF in the form of the sociology of translation and Clegg's power circuits, which 
complemented each other: 
ANT with its non-essentialist emphasis on the fluid boundaries between the social and the 
technical and on the importance of non-human actors; 
and power circuits which combined well with the notions of translation, problematisation, 
intdressement and enrolment; and which highlight how actors are not equal and can be 
dis/empowered in unexpected ways (for instance the rejection of the new optimised pricing 
structures by the French public). 
Nevertheless there were some difficulties in applying both the sociology of translation and the 
power framework. They centre on treatments of the social and the technical and their links with 
social orders and political intentionality (Wilson 2000], and the question of micro, meso and macro 
actants. 
The sociology of translation is useful as a descriptive language and for detailing relations of 
power between actors in networks but may not be so effective in providing explanations [Collins and 
Yearley, 1992] - although Latour [ 199 1] states that it is the only wa to get at explanations (Section 
2.2.5). Callon and Latour's notion of translation helped to describe Socrate as the stabilisation of an 
actor network: how it borrowed 
from airline pricing to gain strategic advantage and respond to 
market pressures, attempted to change passengers' buying and travelling behaviour, trarisform the 
Organisation and identify profitable market segments through the new systern. 
However, it is hard to avoid social explanations, in Us case by pointing to divergent social 
orders as embodied in the notions of deregulation, public service and universal service, the role of the 
State and the nature of national identity. This may, simplistically, lead to consider for instance 
deregulation as a causal (deterministic) explanation, or perhaps less bluntly, as a condition of 
possibility, for organisational transformation and global market restructuring - although Latour 
[ 199 1: 1291 claims that there is no need to look for additional causes. 
Similarly, the power circuits framework is not such as a good instrument to analyse the 
interaction between social orders, the external context and the organisation itself. The only finding is 
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that exogenous 6ontingencies influence the adoption or the refusal of the use of an innovation as an 
OPP. S ilva (1997: 105] for example found that the exogenous contingencies of cost-benefit and 
internal market discourses were power factors and influenced and were represented in the London 
Ambulance Services information system. And in his other major case study, he found that agencies' 
withdrawal from the technical innovation stemmed from the external contingency of the end of the 
cold war [Silva 1997: 226). 
:ý Throughout the thesis, it was necessary to draw on the macro, meso (organisational) and 
micro levels to analyse the case material, and these categories became part of the interpretation, 
description and accounting for the phenomena under study. Examining the macro-environment, the 
macro-micro connection and linking socio-econornic conditions to organisational analysis and 
individual and group action was carried out as follows: 
Micro level: how changes were perceived, experienced and appropriated by individuals and 
groups: the passengers, now clients who were expected to become rational customers; pressure 
groups, consumer associations and public opinion at large; SNCF sales staff, the regional actors, 
government officials and political representatives; employee groups and their changing 
professional identities and the growing importance of marketing, computer and commercial 
skills. 
Meso organisational level: how a traditionally engineering-orientated company attempted to 
transform itself into an entrepreneurial business oriented organisation, gave predominance to 
accountants and marketing experts, and introduced new managerial techniques. 
Macro level: how information systems support the marketability of route segments, and how 
different organisational forms emerge within French Railways and in the European rail transport 
industry. 
It seemed unavoidable to use these categories as initial reference points: they emerge and became 
more refined as the data collection and analysis progressed, and the three levels became very closely 
intertwined in understanding and reporting empirical detail. As one interviewee said: "European 
liberalisation considerations might initially seem quite remote from the Socrate project but they are in 
fact related to if' [LDM Interview 8; see Section 4.3]. It is not clear whether the reporting would 
have been possible without thinking of these three levels beforehand, or whether their pre-existence 
was what made their intertwining possible (see also Section 2.4.2). MacKenzie [1988; see Section 
2.3.5] asserts that, although the rrilcro/macro distinction is a false dichotomy, traditional macro- 
sociology is more relevant politically than micro-sociology. Latour [1991] argues that macro 
(political? ) explanations can be drawn because they rely on other stabilised networks which are 
already in place (Section 2.2.5). 
A major question is where does one stop using ANT and micro-social analysis. Macro political 
-factors' or social orders such as transport liberalisation are irreversible, existing, powerful networks; 
but identifying all of the heterogeneous associations within an actor-network is difficult enough, let 
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alone thosi of overlapping networks [Walsham 1997: 476]. It becomes only possib to zoom in and le 
out' in choosing actors and networks to study, to use shortcuts and to derive interpretations from 
existing social orders. To avoid social determinisrn, doing this critically to 'de-naturalise' assumed 
orders is necessary but much more challenging. In order to do this, I find that there is most mileage in 
the constructivist idea that the negotiation between the social and the technical is political and 
historical. 
"The social and the technical intertwine beyond the design and adoption of technologies to 
become an ongoing feature of their use. Technology can never be fully understood in terms 
of a final product or isolated artefact outside of the historical context from which outcomes 
emerge, are interpreted and understood. It is a historical process with technical clout" [Dawson and McLoughin 2000: 164). 
A related difficulty in applying Clegg's power analysis to the Socrate case study (Section 7.3), 
following Silva's [1997] example, was separating agencies according to time. Silva's analysis 
contains IS projects clearly delineated in a specific timeframe, they have a beginning and an end, and 
all agencies seem to appear all the time. Within the Socrate project, only some agencies were 
involved at the beginning, some others were just represented and only became involved later on, and 
the project became more and more problematic as a result6o. Analysing complex phenomena at one 
point in time, or even for the duration of a project in traditional IS terms (initiation, design, 
implementation), is limited. The research approach chosen in this thesis was more akin to a 
longitudinal, historical analysis - albeit quite imperfect in these terms. There is little historical 
tradition in IS research and Mason et al [1997] only envisage such as tradition in a Schumpeterian 
perspective (i. e. competition and 'creative destruction'). 
In f44 the failure aspects of the case study became less and less important compared to ftirther 
issues specific to the industry examined and its innovation history. This was revealed to me through 
the realisation of the crucial role played by the TGV. If there are general lessons to be learned from 
this particular failure case study, they seem to me impossible to be thought of as dissociated from 
innovation and change in the transport sector, let alone transposable to other situations. Information 
systems seem to me just another technological innovation amongst many others and the fields of 
innovation studies and history of technology, when adopting a social constructivist approach, appear 
extremely relevant to studying my innovation failure The next section suggests areas for further 
research concentrating mainly on historical and political understandings of technical change in the 
transport industry. 
7.5 FURTHER ISSUES AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Setting aside failure issues, this case study is revealing of fundamental and controversial 
changes taking place in transport. The troubled implementation of an air computerised reservation 
system at SNCF is symptomatic of the difficult transfomiations caused by globalisation and the use 
of information and computer technologies. SNCF adopted knowledge, information, technologies and 
Representativeness and consultation of all concerned agencies were fraught with difficulties 
during the Socrate project for many complex reasons; this is often the case (who speaks with 
authority on whose behalf, which agenda is voiced, which is hidden, etc. ) and this is highly political. 
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management concepts developed by American Airlines in the 70s and 80s. Paradoxically, it was 
fascinated with air transport, which is related to the prestige of this technology in the 20'h century, 
when compared to rail transport. Computerised reservation systems are information technologies with 
the potential to undermine the concept of national sovereignty. Global distribution systems for travel 
are becoming increasingly transnational. Combined with transport deregulation, they are beginning to 
erode the role of the State and its responsibilities towards public transport and the transformation of 
ecod6mic: progress into citizens' welfare. There are tensions between transport systems perceived as 
national infrastructure technologies and how global computer technology is threatening national 
states and cultures. 
7.5.1 National sovereignty 
It was found that applying airline reservation systems and yield management techniques to 
French Railways also implied transferring the US air deregulation model to the French rail situation. 
This is not problem-free. Some of the actors' re-interpretations are leading to unexpected results, a 
significant example being the redefinition and reorientation of SNCF as a low price mass public rail 
transport company, with recent positive results. It would seem that SNCF has re-established its 
legitimacy as a national public service enterprise, despite the use of a global computer technology 
with the potential to undermine the concept of national sovereignty and which threatens national 
policy-making. Whether this unforeseen resistance to cultural homogenisation through technology 
will persist is as yet unclear. 
7.5.2 Public service and national policy-making 
The logic of yield management software is to support the maximisation of capacity/revenue 
for profitable lines. This both responds and contributes to transport deregulation and to intramodal 
(TGVs competing with classical intercity trains) and intermodal (trains competing with cars and 
planes) competition, firstly within France and eventually in Europe (national rail companies 
competing with each other, and with cars and planes). It has implications for transport planning 
through the separate accountability of identifiable and marketable transport segments; and it is 
associated with the split between rail operations and infrastructures. Yield management was also 
important to established US airline companies since it enabled them to appea to be competitive with 
potential entrants in a liberalised market. Whatever role yield management will play on the European 
scene, it is clear that the use of computerised reservation systems and optimýisation software cannot be 
isolated from the current debate on European transport liberalisation and deregulation (see Cartelier, 
Fournier and Monnier 1996; Fournier 1993; Julienne 1996]. It wfll be particularly related to the 
opposition between the traditional notion of public service in European countries, and that of 
universal service in Anglo-American societies [Barr6re 1998]. The former regards the nation-state as 
above the market, as facilitating the integration of people as citizens, as a re-distributive mechanism 
and as providing equality of access to all. By contrast, universal service considers the market as 
predominant, is seen as an exception and is limited to the strict minimum for those who cannot afford 
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anything else, afid according to which unprofitable services are charged at their ieal costs, and are 
therefore only available to wealthier customers [Barr&e 1998]. 
Whether national transport institutions will be able to transfonn econon-dc progress into their 
citizens' welfare remains to be seen. This level of decision-making may be removed, as geographical 
boundaries of national rail infrastructures seem more and more irrelevant in global and electronic 
distribution markets. An example of this is what is currently happening in freight transport in Europe 
(as opposed to passenger transport). Trans-border multimodal freight traffic is increasing 
substantially and supranational political entities are particularly active, although their relationships 
with national entities are complicated and difficult [Savy 1997]. 
7.53 Trains, planes and computers 
Another theme is the increased mobility of knowledge in the form of information, 
technologies and management concepts, and the import of American yield management techniques 
and distribution systems into the French context is a good example of this. Additionally, the 
dominance of the managerial strategic discourse in the international business press of the late 80s 
contributed to the appeal of the American Airlines' system. The choice of Sabre also confirm the 
fact that, from the beginning, there was a wish to mimic the air industry. In the words of Metzler 
(Director of the Socrate project) and Lemaitre (member of the Socrate strategic team): 
"Rail must reach the level of its competitors, particularly air companies. The answer to this 
challenge is information systems, in the form of modem reservation systems ( ... ) International sales must be facilitated through global distribution systems such as the ones 
found in air companies" [Metzler and Lemaltre 1990: 2 1, my translation]. 
This reflects the strange fascination of a rail company for aerospace as a celebrated 
technology of the 20'b century, as illustrated through the development of the half-plane half-train 
TGV; and also noticed in displays of train and plane physical models and posters on the desks, 
shelves and walls in many offices during my visits at SNCF headquarters. 
7.5.4 Transnational technology 
Technical systems such as computerised reservation systems are increasingly transnational. 
In the context of the deregulation of US airlines, computerised reservation systems led to 
standardisation, increased competition and globalisation of air transport, first within the US then, 
progressively, in the rest of the world. Air CRS owners set up schemes whereby smaller carriers pay 
to have their flights appear on the computer screen, to use the systern, to rent the hardware, etc. and 
GDS are now concentrated in a few systems, which dominate distribution channels. 98% of US travel 
agencies did their bookings on one of the four dominant CRS (Sabre, 4pollo, Worldspan and System 
One) in 1991 [Copeland 1991]. From this position of strength, American GDS are making alliances 
with European, Asian and Australian air reservation and distribution systems. In parallel, air 
companies are undergoing series of mergers and alliances across the globe. Global distribution 
systems clearly play an important role in the battles being fought over dornination of world air 
markets and in the global restructuring of the air transport industry. This illustrates how the thrust of 
220 
Chapter 7 
technology has changed direction and now erodes the nation state. However, it is difficult to predict 
whether'the French and European rail transport network will be affected in the same manner by 
global computerised distribution systems and what shape it will take. SNCF clearly intended that 
Socrate would provide a similar position of domination in the European and international rail 
distribution market, thereby making SNCF an organiser, distributor and seller of transport. 
CRS are also seen as a market themselves. They are very profitable through fees from other 
comp Lanies. Socrate offers the capability of hosting services from other rail companies, providing and 
charging for reservation access through the SNCF network and selling software licensing 
arrangements and consultancy services (in partnership with American Airlines) to European 
companies. This has only been successful in the case of European Passenger Services, which use 
Socrate for reservations on the Channel tunnel Eurostar train between London, Paris, Lille and 
Brussels. American Airlines obviously capitalised on their cultural, technological and economic 
superiority to sell Sabre to SNCF but also to attempt to penetrate other markets for their own bcnef it. 
This aim may have been either mistaken judging from the events described in this thesis, or simply 
premature. In organising multimodal freight transport in Europe, the most intractable problems are 
the determination of profitability of each transport segment, the co-ordination of bookings, pricing 
and the allocation of costs between a large number of partners in different conditions across many 
countries (Savy 1997]. Perhaps computerised reservation and yield management expertise will 
become more and more appropriate in what may only be a transitional period towards liberalised free 
markets in European freight and passenger transport. The time period is too short to draw any 
definitive conclusions on (a) whether this will happen and (b) the role information technologies will 
play in this globalisation. 
7.5.5 Techno-nationalism 
SNCF wanted to emulate American Airlines in the globalisation of European rail transport, 
but interestingly reinjected elements of techno-nationalism. Firstly, SNCFs intention was to preserve 
its tradition of technological innovation as a source of national strength by: buying into and gaining 
knowledge of new, modem concepts such as yield management, marketing and computerised 
distribution networks; and adapting them to rail, in order to become the first, biggest and only rail 
distribution network in Europe. Among European tourism and transport companies, British Airways, 
Lufthansa, SNCF, the only rail company, and Club Mediterrande are the only ones generally 
acknowledged to have top level expertise in CRS and yield management [Arthur Andersen 1997]. In 
recent years, other areas of the tourism industry have joined airlines in the use of yield management 
technology, for instance hotel chains, cruise lines and car rental companies. The most strongly 
perceived threat to the existing tourism sector is online information systems supporting direct sales 
run by large tour operators, hotels and transport companies. Socrale is now connected to Air France's 
global distribution systern, Amadeus (Anon 1995], therefore in a position of strength in the European 
combined air/rail CRS market. 
A second element of techno-nationalism. is evident in the association of Socrate to the TGV, 
a major French technical achievement, and also perceived as similar to planes. It may have seemed 
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natural to'wantto repeat and prolong the success of the French TGV by fusilig this train-plane 
technology with a computer technology. Symbolically, trains are a 19'h century technology, planes 
and computers 20'h century technologies. One objective was to launch French-made high-speed trains 
in European markets. Designing a high-speed train to compete with planes in the early 80s was 
related to SNCF top executives' and engineers' enthusiasm for advanced rail technology and for 
ensuring the future of rail through modernism and progress. Its success certainly increased their 
fascination with high-speed technology and in drawing parallels between the TGV and planes, which 
provided fertile grounds for adopting an air CRS. The same top engineers seemed also to have been 
captivated with the complex mathematics and statistics of yield management techniques. As 
, ýrchibugi and Michie [1997: 13] remark, both technology-specific and nation-specific factors shape 
the innovative process. 
7.5.6 Information systems as Intervening In transport 
Technology does make certain social relations stable, through, in this case, integrated global 
computer systems. What remains unknown and to be further investigated is the relationship between 
global electronic reservation travel markets and the evolution of European transport industries in the 
political context of conflicting market and non-market principles. Globalisation of information 
technology infrastructures is also believed to increase risk and the importance of unintended 
consequences [Ciborra and Hanseth 2000: 7]. 
IS research areas which could be investigated further are: the link between deregulation and 
electronic markets; whether information technology is an instrument or a surrogate for 'free', 
contestable, electronic markets; how the new concept of customers' (as opposed to passengers') 
buying behaviour relies on a rational decision-making model and is mediated via information 
systems; what is the role of IS in this notion of customer choice and equality of access; how the 
technology intervenes in the management of commercial and non-commercial intermodal transport 
activities, particularly through computer-aided mechanisms of charging operators for use of 
infrastructures; what is the relationship between global reservation travel systerns and the evolution 
of European transport industries; whether and how the tourism, transport and travel markets will be 
affected and redefined by electronic markets. 
Technology transfer across different cultural contexts is another research area of interest. 
Silva [1997: 233] for instance found that cultural elements of social integration were different when 
comparing IS institutionalisation in the UK and Latin America. A comparison between France, the 
UK and other European countries would be worthwhile, especially as UK transport liberalisation is 
more advanced and open to competitors from Europe [Harper 2000]. A possibility could be 
investigating pricing, reservation systems, customer buying behaviour - using web sites such as 
Trainline. com - accounting information systems and charging mechanisms and the evolution of 
transport policy making in different European countries. 
Public utilities are particularly interesting as they are crossroads of the econornic, the social 
and the political in which innovations are caught. Social constructivist theories can help gain a better 
understanding of these processes, as undertaken in this thesis. Further theoretical work on the 
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relationship between these theories and the critical concepts of power and politics is required. IS 
research needs to continue drawing on other disciplines such as history and sociology of technology 
to compare IS with other innovations. IS failure is only a small piece of the action yet it may also 
provide insights for researchers studying other technological innovation processes, as long as its 
analysis goes beyond technicist and managerialist accounts. 
7.6 EVALUATION AND LIMITATIONS 
The theoretical motivation behind this thesis was a frustration with mainstream positivist 
hypothesis testing IS research [e. g. Boudreau et al 2001] and its associated managerialist and 
technicist accounts of complex social phenomena such as IS failures. The recently developed 
interpretive IS research tradition was seen as a more appropriate starting point (Section 1.4.1), as it 
concentrates on actors' multiple interpretations and acknowledges the importance of context. 
Interpretive research is generally associated with qualitative empirical research methods 
which support the investigation of in-depth, rich, intensive, 'thick', longitudinal studies of case 
material, showing multiple levels and conflicting interpretations, and thereby exposing the 
complexity of the use of IS in organisations (Section 2A). This does not preclude the use of 
quantitative research techniques (there is no strict equivalence between quantitative methods and 
positivism or qualitative methods and interpretivism, see Section 2.4.1) which were only used in a 
very limited way in this thesis (to compare demand projections to actual figures, see Section 3.1.1). 
Quantitative methods, in particular economic analysis techniques, would have been very appropriate 
to study for instance the financial impact of yield management and differentiated pricing on changes 
in buying patterns, traffic figures, revenues and profit, marketshare, distribution, labour and 
maintenance costs, etc. This would have required economic expertise which I do not possess and 
could have led to a better exploration of the contested strategic and economic role of CRS, GDS and 
yield management in transport deregulation. 
Raising the level of empirically based qualitative social IS research is a difficult and 
ambitious goal. ANT, as a post-structuralist non-essentialist endeavour, proved to be a pragmatic 
'network-tracing' sensitising device for qualitative research. This is illustrated in a few other IS 
researchers' attempts at using ANT for the empirical description of actor-networks around various 
information technologies, e. g. geographic IS [Walsham and Sahay 1999], hospital IS [Bloomfield et 
al 1997] and IT infrastructures [Monteiro 2000]. It would be usefal to compare such efforts at using 
ANT to improve IS qualitative empirical work, but it is difficult as journal papers are often too short 
to allow such comparisons. 
The theoretical lens of ANT and sociology of translation was useful in: 
moving beyond the notion of 'context' (Section 2.1.3) often used in IS research as a 
separate, external entity, which 'affects' IS adoption and use; 
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ovtrcoming the divide between the 'social' and the 'technical'61 and *exploring how this 
boundary is socially constructed (Sections 1.3.2 and 7.2.2); 
deconstructing the concept of failure using the idea of 'symmetry' between success and 
failure 62 (Sections 2.1.6,2.2.1 and 7.5-1) and contrasting such an analysis to 
conventional accounts of failure (Section 7.4). TWs deconstruction of failure is 
commensurate with the notion of unintended consequences, introduced in Section 23.5. 
One of the most important contributions of this thesis is probably its in-depth and extensive 
exploration of a case study, which are still rare in IS research (Section 2.4). Perhaps more 
interestingly, this was facilitated by a still unusual theoretical stance in the IS field, social 
constructivism, of which ANT is one expression (see Figure 2.2). It forced me to broaden the scope 
of analysis and to avoid either technologically or sociologically deterministic explanations, which I 
may not have done too successfully. A particularly useful ANT instrument was the sociology of 
translation (see Sections 2.2.3 and 7.2) which appeared to apply to this case material quite easily. In 
fact, one of the perhaps less theoretical reasons for adopting ANT was the obvious potential of this 
instrument to analyse the case study. Structuration theory, for instance. did not offer any obviously 
applicable technique to the material at hand. I am again aware that I may have used this instrument in 
a simplistic manner. The question remains open: was this analytical device appropriate to the case 
material or was it employed inadequately9 This is where comparing to similar research work with 
other qualitative case studies could be valuable. 
In my application of the sociology of translation, I found I had to simplify (shortcut? ) and 
re-introduce macro/meso/micro levels (see Figure 1.2). This is in total contradiction to the theoretical 
of 4 outlook 'IqT43. Moreover, it was also extremely difficult not to appeal to some overarching, 
general analytical constructs, outside the empirical events and relationships that ANT described, 
which brought another level of explanation (e. g. the notions of public service or deregulation, see 
Sections 2.4.2 and 7.4.3). The micro/macro dilemma was very difficult to escape fron-4 let alone 
solve, unsurprisingly (Sections 2.3.5 and 7-5). The question of complex and overlapping actor- 
networks seems central to this dilemma, as discussed above (Section 7.4.3). It is impossible in 
practice not to delineate boundaries ('black-boxing' in ANTjargon) to limit the scope of the research. 
The macro/micro dilenuna is also linked to the criticism of ANT as apolitical and oblivious 
to social structures (Section 2.2.5). Several IS researchers have drawn on other social theories to 
address these weaknesses. Structuration theory, advocated by Walsham (1997] was discounted as it 
does not specifically focus on the relationship between technology and society, which seems central 
61 The consideration of both the social and the technical in the 'socio-technical' systems IS research 
tradition (e. g. Mumford, Land, Checkland) was in fact a progress from the previously strictly 
technical approaches to the study of computer usage. 
62 Symmetry in ANT usually refers to the symmetry between non-human and human actors. It is 
judged as controversial by many critics of ANT, in that it bypasses the notion of intentionality and 
can potentially lead to an insufficient account of the consequences of action. This human-nonhuman 
symmetry was marginal to this thesis. Technology as a non-human actor was found to be only 
relevant in the context of the TGV as an antecedent technology to Socrate (Section 5.3). 
63 Although a critique of ANT can be made on the grounds that the notion of actor is difficult to 
stretch to large 'macro' actors such as organisations, political institutions or nations. 
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to the imilemeritation of IS in social organisations, and is the strength of ANT (Section 2.2.6). On 
the other hand, structuration theory may have brought useful analytical insights to the n*ro/macro 
problematic. Other authors are for instance combining Heidegger to ANT [Ciborra and Hanseth 
1998], drawing on Foucault to study computer networks in the financial services industry [Knights et 
al 1997] (Section 2.3.1), or applying institutionalisation theory [Silva 1997] (Section 2.3.3). 
Heidegger and Foucault's focus on the construction of identity might be useful for further research on 
the changing notion of citizenship (versus technology-mediated customers, -see Section 5.2.1). None 
of these theories concentrate specifically on technology, unlike the field of science and technology 
studies (Biagioli 1999], where ANT is situated. Bringing a critical political perspective to IS research 
has been mainly carried out using Habermas over the last decade or so (e. g. by Hirschheim, Lyttinen 
and Klein). 
In a paper to be presented at the Critical Research in Information Systems Workshop in July 
2001, which itself calls for (re)defining critical research in IS, Doolin [2001] emphasises the 
importance of developing a critical IS research agenda other than by using Habermas. He suggests 
exploring the relationship of ANT, qualitative empirical work and a critical approach. He agrees with 
Knights [ 1995], a critical organisational theorist, that the contribution of case research lies in adding 
depth to more conventional approaches, but also in that the in-depth analysis facilitates the disruption 
of existing assumptions and certainties and can therefore be more critically oriented. A political 
dimension could have been added in this thesis using either Foucault or Clegg (who fit in the same 
area of the matrix of theoretical approaches in Figure 2.2, where they both share a localised focus 
and see politics as inescapable). Silva [ 1997] used Clegg's circuits of power to investigate IS failures, 
combining them to some ANT concepts (obligatory passage points, problematisation, enrolment 
intdressement) and also institutionalisation theory. It seemed therefore more appropriate to choose 
Clegg's circuits of power (Sections 23.2 and 23.4), following Silva's example. Institutionalisation 
of IS was also briefly reviewed (Section 2.3.3) but the sociology of translation seemed to suit the 
case study better. Analysis of the case material using the circuits of power provided some interesting 
results (Section 7.3) and were a valuable complement to ANT. 
However, Clegg's 'exogenous contingencies' (Section 7A. 3) did share the same weakness 
as ANT in that they appeared to encompass different contextual 'macro' structures with little 
distinction. These 'exogenous contingencies' seem to be construed as external, unlike ANT where 
they are just 'another' actor-network, but like most qualitative IS research which sees the context as 
important, but as 'affecting' IS from the outside. Silva [1997] made a similar remark (with reference 
to the cold war as an external event), reported above in Section 7.43. The mechanism by which local 
events and networks become 'macro' or global structures is key: ANT declares that they are the 
same thing; but it is not a simple additive or combinatorial process, which ANT seems to push 
towards in the practice of research and analysis, and which I ended up resisting. 
In a critique of Latour's [1993] We Have Never Been Modern, Cohen [1997: 351] argues 
that: "anthropological totality [as represented by ANT] may be said to replace historical totality (... ) 
[and is] a functional universal [which] is an absorptive cultural 'logic' ( ... ) and negates modem time- 
differences"; and that: "conditions of possibility are not made explicable if the network-model is 
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transcend6rital" (p. 357). 1 found this philosophical paper complex and difficult but one clear message 
is that ANT is ahistorical and tends to the universal. Historical analysis might have provided better 
insights into this case study. Perhaps crudely, I tried to include an unusually long period (in IS 
research terms) before and after the events related to provide some historical dimension, I hope not 
too unsuccessfully; for instance by paying some attention, albeit lin-dted, to the historical shift from 
regulation to deregulation in transport: they not only refer to 'macro structures' but also position 
them historically. 
More serious limitations can be found in the unsophisticated research methods employed. 
The conventional (in IS research terms) split between primary and secondary data" does not pay 
a ttention to the time dimension; a more refted chronology and dating of what was stated (in a 
written or oral form), by which player, in response to which event and when, would have allowed a 
more precise and historical tracing of actions, decisions, influences on actors' thinking, constraints, 
evolution of arguments, etc. An example would be the diagram representing the power struggle in the 
episodic circuit (Figure 7.1) which in fact is a crude approximation (as outlined in Note 55): several 
such diagrams at different times would be necessary to give a more precise picture. Knowledge of 
historical research methods would have instigated more sophisticated and extensive data collection 
and supported better cross-validated data analysis. 
Other theoretical traditions within science and technology studies may be more historically 
oriented and could have brought a different light to this case study. Biagioli's Science Studies Reader 
[1999] includes for instance papers on: the social construction of technology, sociology of science 
and technology, anthropology of science, social shaping of technology, ANT, history of technical 
innovation, cultural studies of science, and also 'large technological systems' [Hughes 1999] which 
could be particularly relevant to the study of large IS. Noticeably, there is only one IS-related paper 
in this collection of seminal papers (by Sherry Turkle on 'thinking about computers'). Many of these 
theoretical themes preceded ANT and in fact some were partly responsible for its initial 
conceptualisation and development. The current fascination with ANT in the IS research community 
runs the danger of applying it as a simplifying universal tool; and IS researchers may benefit from 
drawing on some of its predecessors. 
64 Primary data as something said by actors directly to the researcher versus secondary data as 
something said indirectly, e. g. on paper. 
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Tettre aux voyageurs' 
Poster, SNCF, 1993 
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Lettre aux voyageurs. 
Depuis quelques jours, la SNCF met en place un nouveau systeme 
de vente et de reservation. On I'appelle Socrate. Cest vrai, il ya 
quelques difficultes et certains d'entre vous ont pu en subir les 
inconvenients. Nous vous prions de nous en excuser. 
5 millions de reservations dans les trains in 1970,8o millions en 1992 
et presque 150 millions en 1995: vous etes et vous serez de plus en plus 
nombreux a vouloir voyager, en ayant I'assurance d'une place assise. 
Nous; avons chang6 notre systeme de vente et de r6servation pour 
deux raisons. D'abord, parce que le syst6me actuel. (on I'appelle R6sa), est 
sature. Bientot, des le mois de mai prochain, les T. G. V. Nord Europe, et 
I'ann6e prochaine, les; T. G. V. du tunnel sous Ia Manche seront IA. Vous serez 
encore plus nombreux A prendre les; trains Grandes Lignes et vous voulez 
etre su^rs d'avoir une place dans le train que vous choisirez. Ensuite, parce 
que nous souhaitons vous proposer un systeme plus simple et plus complet. 
Tout simplement plus efficace. 
En voici deux exemples: 
Avant, si le train que vous aviez choisi 6tait complet, vous ne saviez pas s'il y 
avait de la place dans les autres trains: une interrogation train par train 6tait 
necessaire. Avee Socrate, instantanement, vous savez tout sur la destination 
desiree: les heures, les disponibilites de places, les prix du voyage. Socrate vous 
informe: si le train souhait6 est complet, vous savez aussitOt dans quels autres 
trains du meme jour et des jours suivants des places sont encore disponibles. 
Avant, vous aviez en main deux billets: l'un e, tait le billet du trajet et I'autre la reservation du train que vous preniez. Parfois meme il y avait trois billets lorsque 
vous preniez un train a supplement. Avec Socrate, vous n'avez qu'un seul billet, 
sur lequel toutes les informations sont rassembl6es, en particulier le prix et le 
num6ro de la place. Un seul geste donc pour le composter. Socrate vous aidc: il facilite votre voyage en vous donnant toutes les informations, il rassure ceux qui 
craignent de perdre un des billets on de ne pas avoir en main celui qui convient. 
La SNCF et son personnel (commerciaux, informaticiens ... ) s'attachent a faire face aux defauts de jeunesse rencontr6s dans la mise en 
oeuvre de Socrate. Bien sU^r, avant de l'installer, nous avons effectu6 de 
nombreux tests. Mais pour un outil de cette ampleur, seule 1'exp6rience 
quotidienne permet d'obtenir la fiabilite du syst6me et sa malitrise par le 
personnel commercial. 
Nous avons donc decide que, durant cette, p6riode de rodage, 
jusqu'au 31 mars 1993, chaque voyageur qui montera, dans un 
train sans avoir pu acheter sa reservation (dans les T. G. V. en 
particulier), pourra, sans aucune penalite, la r6gulariser aupr6s 
du controleur. 
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The following questions were prepared for interviews with the members of 
the Socrate team. They were slightly modified when interviewing other 
SNCF executives and managers who were not directly involved in Socrate. 
Interview questions to other interviewees such as sales staff, union 
representatives or tourism experts were formulated differently to suit their 
circumstances. On many occasions I let interviewees follow their own train of 
thoughts; and I only intervened when, for instance, a point was unclear or 
worth expanding, there was a connection with another Point of interest on 
which I wanted their opinions, or the flow came to a natural halt and needed 
recapitulating before addressing another set of issues. Interviewees were all 
articulate, some extremely, very willing to talk and highly Involved in the 
issues. Some were difficult to stop... Early in the interviewing process I was 
less familiar with the concepts and vocabulary and asked questions in a 
simplistic way (as perceived by the interviewee) which provoked strong 
reactions and even anger on one occasion [CQ Interview 101. This proved 
very useful retrospectively, ff unnerving at the time: I discovered when 
transcribing the tape that this had allowed interviewees to express strong 
opinions very clearly which might not have been the case otherwise. 
Introduce/check respective names and positions, remind interviewee of who 
gave me his/her name, how/when I contacted him/her or his/her secretary, thank 
him/her for meeting me, check amount of time available 
Check s/he received confidentiality statement, restate university status and 
academic 'pure' research rather than commercial or j ournalistic motives 
Say who else I have/am going to interview (not necessarily exact names, 
depending on interviewee's status, position and groupings) 
Ask if audio-taping acceptable, if so explain I may need to turn tape over, start 
tape 
Announce general order of questions and overall structure and format of 
interview, emphasise that it is not a rigid order but open-ended and informal 
* Overall structure 
My research aims 
Interviewee's background and role in Socrate project 
Organisation in general 
Socrate aims, architecture and project 
Reasons for failure 
Organisational changes 
Future 
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My research aims 
Introduce myself, PhD project, UK/France, short biography, MBA (mainly for 
top executives! ) academic, IT and management, Sabre and strategy, failures 
complex and not clear cut, Taurus, London Ambulance Services, want to hear 
about their experiences, thoughts and lessons learned, how to introduce such a 
complex innovation, emphasise that I have only done some secondary research 
so far which gives a limited picture, and that I need their input to get a fuller, 
richer understanding 
Interviewee's background and role in Socrate project 
Ask for interviewee's previous positions inside and outside SNCF, career 
progression, areas of expertise and interest, major past achievements, 
how/when/why s/hejoined the Socrate project, what they personally learned 
from it, how they have evolved, their current position if different, how it relates 
to Socrate now 
* Organisation in general 
Their understanding and experience of the organisation, structure, culture, 
subcultures, divisions, history, major changes, past successes, staff profile and 
movements, restructuring, cultural shifts, relationship with the public, the 
government, the unions, opinions about what the organisation is good/bad at, 
why, whether they are satisfied with its general direction, how they would 
improve it, how they see themselves in it 
* Socrate aims, architecture and project 
Their understanding and views about CRS, yield management, components, 
GDS market, history, previous system, how they saw then the role of Socrate, 
initial aims, how important they thought it was, how they were convinced of its 
usefulness, technical challenge, how the project was set up, how support was 
negotiated, relations with the rest of the organisation, relations with American 
Airlines staff, internal project management, software engineering, how the 
analysis/design/programming was split, team involved, working atmosphere, 
pressures, constraints, tensions, achievements 
* Reasons for failure 
Minor and major mistakes, reasons, internal, organisational, external, training, 
human relations, internal communication, sales staff, qualifications, public, 
technical, external communication, PR, pricing, timing with TGV Nord, what 
could have been done differently, what could have been avoided or not, what 
was successful, why, what has been learned, not learned 
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Organisational changes 
How they dealt as Socrate members with the fallout, personally, as a team, in the 
organisation, how the rest of the organisation reacted to the crisis, what has 
changed as a result, how it affected their career/reputation, what new things have 
been achieved and/or abandoned since, how pricing has evolved, whether data 
accumulation for yield management has brought some new information, 
whether there has been some new reorganisation, new priorities, what are their 
opinions on these 
+ Future 
Market changes, future demand, effects of pricing, traffic forecasts, market 
segmentation, long distance vs regional vs local, travelling habits, buying 
behaviour, public image, selling techniques and staffing, evaluation of yield 
management, cross-subsidising, access to transport, air/road/rail, future of 
transport, management priorities, cultural changes, role of the organisation, role 
of the state, Europe, obstacles, difficulties, unresolved issues, their vision of the 
future of the organisation and their role in it 
+ Closure 
Recap, check that I got it right, elicit finther if necessary, ask if they can suggest 
anybody else they think I should interview, thank them for time and 
contribution, how much I have learned, how much they have enriched my 
understanding and revealed how complex it all is, restate academic output, 
which when finished could be made available Coke about time-consuming PhD 
and how material they provided will need many years to digestl), wish them best 
of luck in such a challenging environment 
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(Paris, 1994-95) 
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ORGANISATION/ POSITION at time of Interview INTER PERSON 
DEPARTMENT and VIEW CODE 
PREVIOUS ROLE In 
Socrate project if different NO. 
SNCF, Services Grandes Lignes, Directeur I JMM 
Relations Internationales, Paris 
(*) Directeur Voyageurs Grandes 
Lignes et Directeur du projet 
Socrate 
SNCF, French Railways Ltd, London Computer Department Manager 2 AP 
Marketing Manager DC 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Ddldgud aux Missions Extdrieures 3 EC 
Ddpartement Communication, Paris 
Ddldgude Adjoint AH 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Gestionnaire de Projet 4 SEB 
Malitrise d'Ouvrage Socrate, Paris 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Documentaliste 5 MJA 
Service de Veille Technologique, Paris 
Chercheur BT 
SNCF, Direction des Services Communs Manager de la Formation 6 GC 
A la ClienWe Voyageurs, P61e Service et 
Distribution, Ddpartement Chaine (*) Responsable des relations 
Client&le Voyageurs, Paris humaines du projet Socrate 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Manager 7 MP 
Ddpartement Marketing, Paris 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Manager Audit de Gestion 8 LDM 
Direction du Contr6le de Gestion, Paris 
(*) Responsable des Ventes 
Grandes Lignes et membre de 
I'dquipe Socrate 
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ORGANISATION/ POSITION at time of interview INTER PERSON 
DEPARTMENT and VIEW CODE 
PREVIOUS ROLE In 
Socrate project if different NO. 
SNCF, Direction de l'informatique, Gestionnaire de Projet 9 JPD 
Mahrise d'Oeuvre Informatique 
Voyageurs, Paris (*) Responsable informatique du 
projet Socrate 
SNCF, Direction de l'Informatique, Responsable Informatique 10 CQ 
P61e Recherche Opdrationnelle, Paris 
(*) Experte en yield management 
du projet Socrate 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Liaisons syndicales II HG 
Direction du Personnel, Paris 
SNCF, Service Grandes Lignes, Coordinateur 12 imp 
Comitd Central d'Entreprise, Paris 
SNCF, Gare Paris Montparnasse, Vendeur Guichet 13 SLG 
Service Ventes Vendeuse Guichet NR 
Inspecteur Trams DP 
Club Mdditerannde, Directeur Informatique 14 GV 
Direction de l'Informatique et des 
T616communications, Paris SNCF, Responsable des ventes 
Grandes Lignes et membre 
de Nquipe Socrate 
Nouvelles Fronti6res, Unitd Chargde de Formation KM 
d'Enseignement du Tourisme, Paris 
II 
Responsable d'Agence 
I 
-I 
HB 
I 
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ORGANISATION/ POSITION at time of Interview INTER PERSON 
DEPARTMENT and VIEW CODE 
PREVIOUS ROLE In 
Socrate project if different NO. 
Confdd6ration Frangaise Ddmocratique Secrdtaire Gdndral Adjoint 16 PLR 
du Travail, Fiddration Gdndrale des 
Transports et de I'Equipement, Branche 
Cherninots, Syndicat des Cherninots et 
Travailleurs des Activitds Ferroviaires de 
Paris Ouest Rive Gauche 
Confdddration Gdndrale du Travail, Secrdtaire Gdndral 17 MG 
Syndicat des Cherninots de Paris 
Montparnasse Secrdtaire Adjoint MN 
Membre RL 
Fdddration Nationale des Usagers du Secrdtaire Gdndrale 18 SIB 
Transport, Paris 
Secrdtaire Adjoint GDA 
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APPENDIX 4 
Identifying categories 
in interview data 
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CATE- EXTRACT OF INTERVIEW 16 (PLR) 
GORIES 
Q. Comment envisagez-vous le role de votre syndicat? 
Role of A. L'organisme syndical, son crdneau c'est avant tout les revendications 
unions professionnelles. Qui ne sont pas forcdment li6es A la politique 
6conomique de Ventreprise ou de la collectivitd. D'ailleurs Pentreprise 
peut jouer IA-dessus. Si je fais payer plus cher les voyageurs, les recettes 
Company seront plus importantes, il y aura moins de d6ficit, donc peut-etre que les 
strategy cheminots seront mieux rdmun6r6s, ou qu'ils travailleront moins 
longtemps, pour le meme prix. 
Q. Que pense donc votre syndicat de la politique 6conomique de 
Pentreprise? 
Transport A. On en pense pas grand chose. C'est des mots, clest ce qu'on icrit sur du 
policy in papier glacd. Pour mener une politique sociale il faut des recettes; soit elles 
general viennent de la collectivit6 soit elles viennent des voyageurs. On tranche le 
dibat avec forces sondages, le contribuable frangais prdare que les 
autoroutes soient gratuites et que le train soit plus cher. L'altemative posde 
dans le sondage, avec toutes les rdserves qu'on peut faire autour la mani6rc Rail vs dont les questions sont posdes - le journal Le Nouvel Economiste par 
motorway exemple en a publies - Fune des alternatives: vaut-il mieux que les 4.3.4 autoroutes soient gratuites ou le train plus cher, 68% pour que le transport 
individuel soit le moins cher, le moins, tax6 possible, et que le transport 
collectif ils estiment qu'il doit etre solvable. 
Q. Et A la SNCF? 
Local, 
regional & A. Dans, Pentreprise, beaucoup de dirigeants (Vancien prdsident Fournier 
national par exemple) estiment aussi que l'offre de transport SNCF est solvable. 
transport Sauf les trajets de la vie quotidienne, du domicile au travail, I'lle de France 
et quelques banlieues de grandes villes, oa IA effectivement on isole 9A en Market disant c'est tout A fait illusoire de penser que, 9A puisse etre, faut bien que 
segmenta- la collectivit6 subventionne. Elle m8me ayant un retour des subventions. 
tion and Tout le reste, tous les pouvoirs publics, y compris les diffdrentes 
cross- sensibilit6s de ces derni6res ann6es, estiment que sur le fond, c'est 
subsiding solvable. Que les voyageurs doivent payer ce que 9A coOte. 
5.1.3 
D'oii la d6clinaison de toute une politique commerciale Socrate, oil Commer- Fobjectif dtait bien d'augmenter les recettes, la contribution commerciale, 
cial aim of dans les trains les plus demandds. En contrepartie, pour faire un peu passer Socrate la pilule, de brader certaines places. Un peu comme font les compagnies 
adriennes, oit il ya des dcarts de prix de 400% entre deux voyageurs, entre 
celui qui a achet6 son billet charter, et celui qui a achetd tarif normal, tarif 
Air pricing du march6. 
3.3.3 
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Est-il viable d'avoir les m8mes dcarts que les avionsdans les trains? 
Differen- A. A la SNCF peut-etre pas. On a dejAjou6 sur des fourchettes de prix plus 
tiated basses. Par exemple avec Joker: les associations de consommateurs 
pricing trouvent 9A tr&s bien. Nous de Fintdrieur, Joker sappelle comme 9A, parce 
5.1 que 9A a une consonance avec les charters. qA a 6t6 fait au d6part 
simplement pour servir de pretexte A une campagne publicitaire, sous le 
Fascina- th&me "Joker c'est pas du vol". Dans, certains trains il y avait une place 
tionýýWith Joker, sur un train de 1000 places. C'dtait A la limi-te de la publicit6 
air 3.1.1 mensong&re. 
Depuis qA a dvolu6 puisque tous les TGV notarnment aux Niveaux I et 2, 
Yield le Joker West pas contingentd. Jusqu'A 8 jours avant on en vend autant 
manage- qu'on nous en demande. Par contre, il est contingentd sur les autres 
ment: niveaux A un nombre 'significatif de places, personne ne sait, il parait que 
6niveaux' c'est 10%. Cest dcrit nulle part. Comme c'est de la politique 
5.1.3 commerciale, ca ne releve pas du cahier des charges du plan public. Quand 
9A rdle de trop les pouvoirs publics veulent intervenir. 
Ils Warr8tent pas d'intervenir d'ailleurs, les pouvoirs publics ont fait 
Social changd il ya quelques ann6es la date de la carte vermeille pour les 
pricing personnes agdes. La SNCF, sa politique commerciale (50% de r6ductions) 
la donnait A 60 ans pour les fernmes et 65 pour les hommes. Les hommes 
ont tendance A travailler plus longtemps, et elle craignait que la carte 
vermeille pour les hommes entre 60 et 65 ans se substitue A un certain 
nombre d'abonnements qui sont autrement tarif6s, et qui rapportent des 
recettes autrement plus importantes. Les pouvoirs publics ont dccidd, 
Equality durant une campagne dlectorale prdsidentielle, que c'dtait vraiment injuste. 
of access CA a choqu6 tout le monde: mais de quoi ils se m8lent, ou cest un tarif 
social, ils ont qu'A dire A 40 ans s'ils veulent, et de compenser A la fin de 
Pann6e le budget de SNCF de la perte telle qu'on aura pu Vestimer. 
State Avec ou sans tarifs sociaux la r6mundration de 1'entreprise elle est toujours 
contribu- forfaitaire. Le Minist&re des Finances fixe une enveloppe au titre des tarifs 
tion sociaux. Jospin a annonc6 le chiffre de 10 milliards de centimes, 1/3 du 
4.3.1 chiff-re d'affaires (3 milliards de chiffre d'affaires). 
Accoun- Militaires, familles nombreuses, cong6s annuels. Liddal 9A serait qu'A 
tability chaque fois qu'on d6livre un titre de transport, qu'on fasse une facture... 
Donc c'est dvalu6 forfaitairement. Dans Pentreprise, finalement que 9A a 
dvolud forfaitairement c'est pas plus mal, parce que si unjour quelqu'un se 
mettait A virifier, A tout compter, on y perdrait. C'est un sujet tabou. Parce 
que les pouvoirs publics, quand ils veulent faire un mauvais coup sur Ics 
tarifs sociaux, ils disent que c'est la SNCF. 
Et les associations de consommateurs? 
Consumer I A. Souvent. quand on lit, les associations de consommateurs, (par cxemple 
associa- pour les billets de cong6 annuel Ics r6ductions qui dtaient A 30% sont 
tions 
I 
pass6es A 25% il ya quelques ann6es). On a eu dans la presse 
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5.2.2 
SNCF 
budget - 
Relations 
with State 
4.3.1 
bonsumdriste, "SNCF c'est scandaleux, c'est plus cher". Alors que la 
SNCF avait donc ces 5% de moins A ce titre-IA dans son budget. 
C'dtait les pouvoirs publics qui avaient pris la d6cision. Quand 9A les 
arrange ils prennent une d6cision qui s'apparente A une d6cision sociale, 
mais A la charge du budget social de Pentreprise. Autrement ils se font 
discrets. 
EXTRACT OF INTERVIEW 9 (JPD) 
Q. Comment expliquez-vous le role des techniques d'optimisation 
Yield commerciale? 
manage- 
ment A. Loptimisation commerciale est un syst6me de r6gulation autornatique 
oii on joue sur les capacitds et les discounts pour essayer de remplir les 
State trains au plus profitable. Au moment des ennuis de Socrate, une 
interven- commission a 60 crdde, une commission gouvernementale. Pour ne pas 
tion post affoler la population on nous a mis des limitations. Ce qui fait que le yield 
Socrate management ne peut pas rapporter tout ce qu. 'il peut rapporter. 
4.3.3 
Vous avez un systýme d'optimisation dont vous fixez des param6tres, 9A 
Other staff sert pas A grand chose. Limitations du style "garder au moins 10% de ceci 
3.4 ou de cela". Donc elle (CQ Interview 10, SNCF expert en yield 
management) est un peu gEn6e car Phistorique qu'elle est en train de 
Future full constituer n'est pas un historique. Elle va baser les prochaines d6cisions 
use of YM sur Phistorique, et il est pipp6, car on bute, par des contraintes. qA va se 
4.3.3 libdrer petit A petit, c'est une pdriode transitoire. 
Q. Vous croyez que le public y sera prdpard, dventuellement? 
Link with A. Il ya eu un amalgame dans les m6dia. Socrate est venu avec le TGV 
TGV Nord Nord, avec les prix de marchd, et les contraintes du YM, meme brid6es un 
5.3 peu au d6part. Donc il ya eu une rdvolution ae vous ai ddjA parld des 
ennuis au niveau des vendeurs) mais il ya eu une r6volution dans Vesprit 
des clients. Donc il ya eu un amalgame, Socrate, c'est plus tellement 
Finformatique Socrate, cest la tarification Socrate. D'un projet 
Public informatique, ou aurait tr6s bien pu faire un renouvellement d'ordinateurs 
relations sans changer la tarification, on aurait pu changer la tarification sans faire 
5.2.2 Socrate A Finverse, mais on a fait les deux en m8me temps. Ce qui fait que 
maintenant il ya un cafouillis, les gens y disent, le train est trop cher, c9est 
la faute A Socrate. 
Buying Il faut que qA passe dans les moeurs, on va peut-etre etre amend A faire une 
behaviour petite marche arrifte par qi par la, mais c'est vrai qu'il ya des gros 
5.2.1 probl6mes. Vous habitez A 15 kms de Paris, vous mettez Ih pour venir 
travailler. Et vous avez une carte orange A 300 FF. Vous travaillez pr6s de 
Market la Gare du Nord, vous habitez Lille, vous mettez Ih aussi pour venir, A 
segmenta- 250 kms, vous venez A 300 kms A Pheure, et les gens disendl ya pas de 
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tion iaison que, je paie pas 
, 
300 FF pour venir travailler un mOis A Paris puisque 
5.1.3 je suis A lh de Paris. A partir du moment oit les associations de 
consommateurs disent les abonnements sur Lille sont trop, chers c'est la 
faute A Socrate... 
Regional 
develop- Est-ce que la SNCF c'est la poubelle de la DATAR??? (Direction de 
ment I'Am6nagement du Territoire, et A I'Action R6gionale). [loudly, said as a 
4.3.4 joke, but angrily] 
Neutrality Tenez, je vais vous raconter.... [smiling, intimately, again as a goodjoke] 
of techno- Quand j'ai essay6 de vendre Socrate A des Tch&ques, je leur disais c'est 
fogy 7.1 vrai le yield management c'est mettre des contraintes et des prioritds, nous 
on a tendance A donner priorit6 A ceux qui paient plein tarif, vous si voulez 
Internatio- donner priorite A un officier sup6rieur de Farm6e rouge... [laughing] 
nal sales 
4.4.2 Q. Que reste-t-il de cette exp6rience pour vous? 
A. Je passe pas beaucoup de temps, je ne me suis pas mis en premi&e 
Technical ligne comme d'autres, il ya encore beaucoup de boulot, de temps en temps 
success c'est marrant de parler comme 9A tout haut, parce que 9A fait revivre. On 
7.1 aurait pu en faire un bouquin en prenant des notes au d6but. 
C'est typiquement le genre de succ6s technique. Il ya eu une pdriode oii 
Living vous ne pouviez plus sortir de la SNCF sans se faire agresser sur Socrate, 
through a dans la famille, les amis... Tellement marre on est alld au chansonnier. Le 
failure chansonnier a commenc6 A faire des blagues sur Socrate... [laughing] 
Dans Fesprit du public et des journalistes, Socrate c'est encore une fbirade 
de la SNCF, quand vous parlez A des gens d'IBM, des constructeurs 
d'ordinateurs, ou de soci6t6s de service, ils savent qu'on a fait le plus beau 
truc du si6cle, pratiquement. Maintenant il ya presque des gens qui 
h6siteraient A mettre Socrate dans leur CV, c'est quand m8me idiot. Sije 
Social cherche du boulot dans Finformatique, j'aurais pas honte de dire que 
failure, j'6tais chef de projet Socrate. Mais dans la vie de tous, les jours, c'est une 
technical tare. 
success Dans mes projets pr6c6dents, par exemple Ntipac, c'6tait une question de 
7.1 technique pointue. C'dtait le d6but des rdseaux, t6l6coms etc. On se battait 
avec des bits et des octets et des modems, mais pas contre le public, contre 
notre propre Direction Gen6rale qu'il fallait convaincre. C'etait pas la 
m8me ampleur, mais Ritipac c'6tait un projet purement technique pour 
ng6nieurs, alors que 14 il ya tout. 
Est-ce que cette image negative peut etre rattrapde? 
A. Oh vous savez... la libert6 de la presse. Des fois ils nous genent A 
1'exportation, 9A nuit. Tout ce qu'ils ont pu dcrire, les ambassades, etc. QA 
aW lu en Allemagne, en Angleterre, en Cor6e. La seule chose qui 
Role of comptait, c'dtait les ennuis que vous avez eu etc. On esp6re que qd va se 
media calmer. En fait, on a dtd compl&tement abandonnd pendant tout le premier 
5.2.2 semestre 1993. 
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Et de fagon inteme ä la SNCF? 
Organisa- A. Il ya eu deux discours. On a dtd lachd meme en interne. La. prdsidence 
tional. et la DG (Direction Gdndrale) nous ont soutenujusqu'A ce qu'elle a pu, 
structure mais elle a 6td obligde par la pression extdrieure, de ldcher un peu Metzler 
(JMM interview 1). Lui il a dtd franchement lAche. Lui chapeau, il nous a 
d6fendu. Dans les couloirs, il ya eu des gens haut plac6s qui ddblat6raient 
Organisa- sur Socrate. Cest devenu le d6fouloir, "Ah ouais, 
- 
c'est encore Socrate"... 
tional 11 ya quelque chose de tr&s culturel chez les frangais: dire du mal de son 
culture pays, le cherninot dit du mal de la SNCF au. bistro du coin... Pas facile A 
6.1.4 vivre. 
Inflated On a dit que Socrate a fait perdre 6% de trafic A la SNCF. Il ya eu la crise 
demand dconomique. Il ya pas mal de rhetorique. Elle a aussi perdu 13% de son 
forecast? trafic marchandise. Ils avaient pas Socrate. Arr8tez de dire des conneries!! 
3.1.1 [getting angry, loud] 
Q. Quelles legons peuvent etre tirdes? 
A. 11 ya une critique faite dans les; journaux sur la SNCF qui est un peu 
vraie... c'est vrai que moi je suis un ing6nieur, j'ai pas la pr6tention de 
Organisa- vouloir faire la communication de la SNCF, les finances, ou lejuridique. 
tional On est peut-etre un peu trop mentalitd ingdnieurs. C'est-A-dire que quand 
culture 9A r6agit mal 
dans le public, le public, on attrape pas les mouches avec du 
6.1.2 vinaigre, les clients il faut aller les chercher, il faut les satisfaire, et on est 
peut-etre trop technicien encore. Mais A Socratej'avais le role technique, 
i lavais pas le r8le de... 
Personal ri restera une expdrience, sur le plan professionnel des gars comme 
implica- Metzler (Interview 1) et moi, maintenant on aura peut-etre des malheurs, 
tions mais on fera pas une 
d6pression nerveuse pour le boulot. On a etd vaccine. 
Cest tout de meme maintenant une perte humaine terrible d'avoir cette 
6quipe 6clatde. 11 ya pas beaucoup de pays ou d'entreprises qui sont 
Other staff suffisamment riches pour un gachis pareil. 
On avait 14 un noyau-coeur. 
and link C'est mal utilis6 actuellement. 
Metzler a certainement des d6fauts comme 
to TGV tout le monde, vu de la DG il est difficile A manager, mais quand on a 
5.3.1 rdussi A faire Socrate et le TGV, hein! 
242 
APPENDIX 5 
'TG V Oui! A utres trains sacrifijs non! ' 
Union poster, CGT, 1993 
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'(; T CHEMINOTS 
AUSTERLITZoMONTPARNASSE 
14 
wmll 
APPENDIX 6 
'Les cheminots CGT de Paris Montparnasse 
s 'adressent a vous: Qu'est-ce que Socrate? I 
Syndicat CGT Cheminots, 3 juin 1993 
(CGT 1993b) 
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.- LES CHEMINOTS CGT DE PARIS MONTPARNASSE FADRESSENT A VOUS 
QU'EST-CE QUE SOCRATE 
Tarifications - Desserte - 
Securite 
Qualite du service 
SOCRATE CEST QUOI ? 
. Rentabillti en supprimant de nombreux 
points de -vente (et en les iquipant de 
distributeurs de billets). 
Remplissage maximum des trains avec ýes 
voyageurs au plein tarlL 
- Les usagers n'auront plus le choix de l'beure ni du jour de d6part A cause des 
restriction sur les tarifs A caractire 
commercial. 
. Des voyageurs dans un mime train avec des prix de billets variant en fonction de 
la date d'achat. 
Suppression des bureaux Info sur 
1'ensembh: de la SNCF dO h la mise en 
place de SOCRATE. - 
- Cofit plus Important pour de nombreux 
parcours. 
Temps de dilivrauce plus long que par ie 
passi, d'oa allongement des files 
d'attente. 
- Voyage avec obligation de r6server sur tous les trains. 
POUR LES USAGERS 
r 
Impossibilit6 de virifier le prix du billet 
(r6sas, su'ppl6ments Inclus clans le prix du 
billet). 
. D611vrance d'un (itre unique de transport presqu'illfsible. 
. D'6norines difficult6s pour l'obtention d'un billet International ou pour des 
6changes de billets. 
Disparition de trains sur des lignes jug6es 
non rentables. 
I 
POUR LES CHENUNOTS 
Wgradation importante des conditions 
de travail. 
.4 visions sur un m6me 6cran, avec des 
petits 'caractires accentuant les troubles 
de la vue, avec une augmentation de la 
charge de travail, de la tension nerveuse. 
Suppressions d'effectifs. 
_ 
* Difficultis Wes aux erreurs dues aux 
anomalies du logiclel. 
. Temps de transactions beaucoup plus long. 
Difflcultis avec les usagers., 
Reconnaissance Insuffisante de la 
qualification. 
- Suppression de nombreux services (Information - Service Clientile ... ). 
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NOS 
. 
P::,: ROPO$. 1, TTO.: KS-: 
Riouverture des bureaux de 
r6servation Internationaux les 
dimanclies et fites. 
- Riouverture du bureaux de R6sa dans 
les gares banlicues dimanthes et Rtes. 
- Augmentation du nombre de guichets 
af-in de servir correctement la clientile. 
- Accucil suffisant dans les gares. 
- Nparf des TGV branche Aquitaine de 
Paris Austerlitz en utilisant Vinter- 
coliaexion de Alassy Palaiseau afin de 
dývelopper Voffre sur Ja Bretagne et Je 
Sud Ouest, la gare de Paris MP &ant ä 
saturation. 
- Am6lioration de la ligne Paris- 
Argentan Granville. 
- Mise en place de mat6riel roulant 
moderne dejour comme de nuit. 
- Mise en place de personnel suffisant.. 
pour r6pondre aux besolus des usagers. 
- Plus de formation pour les cheininots. 
-SOUTENEZ 
CES 
PROPOSITIONS 
NOM signat re 
I 
vous pouvez transmettre vos remarques et suggestions au Syndicat C, GT Che. minots 
de Paris-NIP 17 Rue du Cotentin 75015 PARIS. 
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Please note: 
Different font types are used to indicate the type of references as follows: 
Secondary sources ( Sections 2.4a and 2.4.2) are printed in Lydian font 
type (bold) to differentiate them from academic references. Secondary 
sources include SNCF internal admini trative documentation and technical 
documents (eg. computing systems, CRS and GDS, pricing, marketing, 
yield management, ticketing, training), union and passenger associations 
publications, governmen and audit reports, consultants' documents, press 
materiaL 
(References in Lydian font type (NOT bold) are secondary material 
about other IS failures than Socrate). 
- Academic references are printed in Times New Roman font type like the 
main text of the thesis (apart from this note). They refer to research in the 
fields of information systems, organisation theory, management, sociology 
of technology. 
- Academic transport literature is indicated in Adal font type and cover air 
and rail transport in the US and Europe. 
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